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ABSTIU^CT 
Religion has.always occupied a very inipo}t*i>^place in Indian politics. The word 
religion means a ''human recognition "of SupermsHf'control ling power and especially of 
Personal God or Gods entitled to obedience'a"n5 Practice. Religion demands absolute 
submission of faith and practice, in a secular state where multi-religious communities 
live together as one nation, the political meaning of religion connotes communal 
disharmonv, tension, mob frenzies and ethnic carnages in the name of one's religion. 
India, in this regard can afford an ideal example. 
The present study 'Religion as a factor: A Study of Parliamentary [flections in 
IJ.P. since 1984" aims to highlight how the government and the state have been infected 
by the virus of religious communalism which is a serious threat to the secular character of 
the nation. Besides this the nature of politics in Independent India and the growth of 
political Parties in the name of religion, region and castes have also been discussed. 1'he 
reservation issue and Advani's F a^th Yatra too have been covered, 'fhc study aims to 
determine the Electoral Politics in Uttar Pradesh. The post Congress era in the State and 
political stalemate, the caste, communal factors and their role in the State's electoral 
politics have comprehensively been studied and their analysis made. 
To asses the causes of rise and fall of the Congress party, the reason for the 
downfall and the end of single party domination, the trend of coalition politics since 
I990's, the Congress opposition to the coalition trend and then itself joining the coalition 
have also thoroughly been studied, and found that the demolition of the Babri Masjid 
during Congress rule had eroded the base of the party in the State. 
An attempt has been made to determine the causes of the consolidation of Hindu 
vote bank. Along with this, the caste politics and SP and BSP's electoral politics in the 
State has also been looked into. 
India has a history of fragile intercommunity relationship. Secular and Communal 
political forces have always been in struggle for power against each other for manv 
centuries. The religion based political ideology and mass mobilization have alwavs 
challenged secular forces in Indian society. Though the constitution of India recognizes 
India as a Secular State, and has provided many fundamental rights for the cultural 
development of different religious communities. The constitution of India does not 
differentiate among its citizens on the bases of their religious belief. The state extends 
full protection against discrimination to all its citizens without distinction on the bases of 
race, religion, caste or creed. 
The secular character of the State has been threatened by the practitioners of 
religion based politics. The majority of Indians are believers of religion and in a multi-
religious country the believers of one religion follow the path of distance from the 
believers of other religions. Another face of Indian reality retlects religious hostility and 
opposition by the believer of one religion against believer of other religion. 
Going back to the historical background of religious hatred by one community 
against the other, it has been found that the British rulers were the first who used 
religious division of the Indians for the consolidation of their political power in India. 
The leaders of the Indian national movement also found it more convenient to mobilize 
mass support against the British rule by using religion. They used religious slogans and 
symbols. With the blessing of the British government, the Muslim cultural organizations 
also increased their religious activities. The net result of these British policies was that an 
element of Hindu-Muslim conflict gradually shadowed the national movement. The 
Britishers used religious identities of the Indians to blur the thrust of the national 
liberation movement which succeeded in Partition of India and creation of Pakistan. 
The close interplay between religion and politics continued even after 1947. intact 
the interplay between religion and politics was further strengthened by some new religion 
based political parties which made use of religion for political ends and did not subscribe 
to secular form of politics. Hindu Maha Sabha, Ram Rajya Parishad, BJP, Rashtriya 
Swayam Sevak Sangh have all .sought to mobilize political support by involving the 
religious sentiments of Hindus. Similarly the Indian Union Muslim League. Janimat-e-
Islami, the Majlis-e-lttihad-ul-Muslimeen have like wise exploited the religious 
sentiments of the Muslims. 
From 1964 onwards there was an upward trend m communal riots in India. 
Muslims broke away from the Congress during the Emergency (1975-77) over the issue 
of forced family planning drive. Their votes were decisively splitted than ever before. 
During this period the RSS and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad stepped up the other issues, 
such as the scrapping of special constitutional provision for Jamniu and Kashmir and the 
scrapping of Muslim Personal Law. 
The 1980's experienced growth of social divisions not only on religious basis but 
it also witnessed the emergence of religion based politics as a central factor in elections 
and public affairs. Thus the Indian States had to grapple with tlie new form of religion 
based politics to safeguard democracy and secularism. During this phase the religion 
based parties had evolved new strategies aiid organizational structure to promote their 
political goals. The 1980's witnessed the emergence of a new communalism which was 
militant and aggressive in nature. 
Since 1980's General Elections, PoHtics of India at national as well as at States 
level had also become too communal. Religion was badly exploited for the purpose of 
winning elections. Assassination of Indira Gandhi was the outcome of communal hatred. 
Political Hinduism had almost become synonymous with the Indian nationalism. The 
elections of 1984-85 were implicitly fought from this ideological platform by the 
Congress. 
During mid-eighties the increased reliance on communitarian symbols helped to 
draw religious categories into the political areas. The most dramatic event in this 
competitive process was the central governments decision to allow the Hindu worship 
inside the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya. This accelerated the mass mobilization organized 
by the Bhartiya Janata Party, Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh and Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad as part of the effort to change the political discourse and control the State in the 
name of Hindutva. 
The BJP filled political vacuum that was created by the decUne of the Congress 
by providing a Hindu Nationahst alternative against the Congress. It's climb to national 
power was facilitated by the Ramjanambhoomi campaign. 
The Indian political scenario had turmoiled once again in August 1990 with the 
V.P. Singh's government decision to implement the decade old Mandal Commission 
Report to provide reservation in jobs to the Other Backward Classes (OBC). With the 
acceptance of the Mandal recommendations, submitted to the Government of India in 
1980, the V.P. Singh's led National Front government brought about radical changes in 
India's social fabric. The BJP was hit hardest by the Mandal Report as it destroyed its 
ploy of uniting all Hindus under saffron emblem. The Mandal Commission Report posed 
a formidable challenge to the BJP's politics of Hindutva. The proponents of Mandal 
politics attached primacy of caste identity in politics which had pitted the lower castes 
against the upper and forward castes on the question of social justice. 
India witnessed a big political debate in the 1990s around the policy of caste 
based reservations, its supporters and opponents occupied the centre-stage of Indian 
politics during 1990s. The growth of the Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party 
during Mandal upsurge was very important. Infact their growth in Uttai- Pradesh since 
1990s symbolized the process of exclusivist political formations catering respectively to 
the Dalits and the Yadavs. 
The Ramjanambhoomi Movement and the L.K. Advani's Ram Rath Yatra in 1990 
heightened the religious schism across India and gave BJP a new ideological 
belligerence, which it had sustained since then. The demolition of Babri Masjid on 
December 6, 1992 marked the peak of the BJP's militant activism. After the demolition 
of the Babri masjid the Hindutva forces had become not only acceptable in the political 
process but also had become a strong contender for political power and that ultimately 
gave rise to commimalism. The demolition of the Babri Masjid brought disrepute to the 
Congress party. The Muslim community in disgust had pledged that it would never vote 
for Congress. As a result the Congress base got badly eroded in Uttar Pradesh. 
The erosion of Congress party's power also offered an opportunity to the Hindu 
revivalists particularly the BJP and the Sangh Parivar to expand then- base. 
The collapse of the Congress Party brought an end to the era of one party 
dominance at the centre and in the States. The decline of the highly centralized Congress 
Part)' had resulted in the decentring of politics and had shifted its center of gravity from 
New Delhi to the States. 
Three General Elections in quick succession during the period between 1996 and 
1999 had set a new trend with the installation of coalition government at the centre. The 
drive of the all India parties to solicit the co-operation of regional parties was another 
significant development that reinforced the importance of coalition as the only device to 
consolidate the apparent disparate groups. 
For the first time in post-independent India, Hindu nationalists were in a position 
to rule the country between 1998 and 2004. The BJP had been voted to power to make a 
change that was after decades of Congress rule and two-years rule of the Third Front. The 
real gift BJP gave to India was political stability through setting up of a coalition pattern. 
During this period the BJP's Hindutva was at a slow motion because of the etiquette of 
coalition politics. 
There was communalization of the state and society during the tenure of the NDA 
government; (Godhra riots, Saraswati vandana being made compulsory in government 
run schools and the saffronisation of textbooks by HRD Ministry). The Hindutva wave 
had gone low when in 2004 General Elections the BJP was defeated by the Secular 
forces. The BJP had lost because of its neglecting the Hindutva agenda. None of the 
Hindutva themes - including the building of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya were a key issue 
throughout the (2004) General Elections campaign. 
.After the 2004 General Elections it was realized that the Hindutva ideology was 
thoroughly discredited and no amount of efforts could revive it. The people felt cheated 
b\ the promises made by the Sangh Parivar and the BJP regarding the construction of 
Ram Temple at Ayodhya. After its debacle in the 2004 General Elections the BJP once 
again tried to catapult the electorates with aggressive Hindutva platform. But the people 
had rejected the party's new emphasis on a return to sectarianism. It is a fact that the 
power politics Ln India had diverted its approach towards religion and for the last two 
decades or so, religion has been dominating it in various ways. 
It is suggested that a conscious and vigorous efforts should be made to promote a 
rational, scientific and modem notion of secularism. Accommodation and adjustment of 
the interest of each section and community of society should be given due place. Instead 
of pett>' religious or caste issues, political parties should go to realize common interest of 
masses which in turn will pave way for political stability and political development of the 
nation. 
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PREFACE 
The dictionary meaning of religion is "Human recognition of Superman 
controlling power and especially of Personal God or Gods entitled to obedience 
and worship. Religion demands absolute submission of faith and Practice. In a 
secular state where multi-religious communities live together as one nation, the 
political meaning of religion connotes communal disharmony, tension, mob 
frenzies and ethnic carnages in the name of one's religion. India, in this regard 
can afford an ideal example. 
Keeping in view the politicisation of religion and misuse of religion in 
politics in a secular state like India, the present study deals mainly with the 
religion and politics in India. The caste and communal mobilization in electoral 
politics of Uttar Pradesh has also been observed. The Congress Party; its rise 
and fall, the caste and communal parties, the demolition of Babri Masjid, the 
rise of BJP, the Hindutva wave and its decline and the trend of Coalition 
Politics etc. all have extensively been studied. In the background of the said 
studied aspects and observations, main focus has been on analytical study of 
electoral Politics, trying to investigate Religion as a Factor: A Study of 
Parliamentary Elections in U.P. since 1984. 
Chapter one primarily deals with Religion and Politics in India. It 
highlights how the government and the nation have been infected by the 
religious communalism, a serious threat to the secular character of the nation. 
Study also deals with emergence of Hindu Nationalism paving way for the rise 
of BJP. The Congress part>', its role in highlighting Ayodhya issue and its 
takeover by BJP etc have also been studied. The Genesis of Muslim Politics, 
Muslims Political consciousness, solidarity, conservative outlook. Shah Bano 
case, Babri Masjid issue, post Masjid demolition reaction, Muslims alliance 
with non-congress and non- BJP parties etc, all have been discussed. 
The second Chapter, Quest for Power: Caste and Communal 
Mobilization, deals with the nature of politics in Independent India. Mushroom 
growth of Political Parties in the name of religion, region and castes have also 
been discussed. The diversion of Muslims towards Samajwadi Party, Dalits tilt 
towards Bahujan Samaj Party, V.P. Singh's Mandal Politics and reservation of 
27 percent of Seats for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes have also been dealt 
with. To counter V.P. Singh's move, Advani's Rath Yatra and withdrawal of 
BJP's support to V.P. Singh's United Front government and its collapse leading 
to BJP's advantages have also been highlighted. 
Third chapter, 'the Electoral Politics in Uttar Pradesh' deals with the 
general background of the State and Struggle for power among political parties. 
The post Congress era in the State and political stalemate, the caste, communal 
political parties and their role in the State's electoral politics have 
comprehensively been studied and their analysis made. 
The Fourth Chapter is about the rise and fall of Congress party. The 
reason for the downfall and the end of single party domination, the trend of 
coalition politics since 1990's, the Congress opposition to the coalition trend 
and then joining the coalition have also thoroughly been studied. 
After the demolition of Babri masjid during Congress rule, Muslim's 
had deserted the part> and since then Congress could not emerge to power in 
L'ttar Pradesh, all such aspects have been focused in the chapter. 
The fifth chapter deals with the consolidation of Hindu vote bank in 
Uttar Pradesh, The Hindu organizations e.g. VHP, RSS and the Bajrang Dal, 
their efforts in consolidating the Hindu votes have deeply been investigated. 
The Samajwadi Part}' and Bahujan Samaj Party, their contest to the 
Parliamentar>' Polls of UP has also been looked into. New alteration in the 
Congress part\'"s political unit on behest of Rahul Gandhi, the end of political 
banishment of the Congress from the State have also been studied. 
During the BJP rule in India, people were badly disgruntled of the 
increasing Hindutva wave and this paved way for Congress to make a come 
back to power at the centre in the form of United Progressive Alliance through 
the General Election of 2004, has also been observed. 
The Conclusion is based on what I have read, learned and observed. 
Being a student of Political Science, I might have been vocal and made some 
overstatement, for which I am open to corrections and criticism. This is the 
study of a research student and should be accepted as such. Further in this woric 
attempt has been made to test the role of religion in the electoral politics of 
Uttar Pardesh in the Parliamentary Elections. Readers may find repeatation of 
the electoral politics and election results in different chapters of this thesis, the 
obvious reason for that is most chapters need such mention. 
The Source of this work are diverse. A plethora of secondary material 
has been fully scanned and utilized. I have based my work on Journals, Election 
Reports, but mainly on Newspaper and News magazines. Besides all these I 
have consulted many books on the related topic. 
I am indebted to the Staff of the Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U., 
Aligarh, Philosophical Society of Indian Library, Lucknow, Tagore Library, 
Lucknow University, Acharya Narendra Dev Library, Lucknow and the Sapru 
House Librarv', New Delhi for their help and co-operation. 
It is m\ pleasant duty to acknowledge the help received from the 
following; 
I have no words to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Mohd. Abid, 
Reader, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University under 
whose guidance this work has been completed. 
I acknowledge my profound sense of gratefulness to my teacher 
Professor M. .Murtaza Khan, Dean Faculty of Social Sciences and Prof Ms. 
Naheed Murtaza, Chairperson, Department of Political Science, for their 
continuous help and encouragement in the completion of this work. 
My special thanks and gratitude to Prof Arif Hameed, Prof Mirza 
Asmer Beg, and Dr. Aftab Alam, for keeping my morale persistently high 
throughout my research work. I also yearn to express my sincere thanks to 
Seminar Librarian Mr. Qasim for extending his help. 
I am beholden to my parents, my father Mr. Q.M. Mustafa and my 
mother Mrs. Aziz Fatima for their continuous encouragement. 
I also acknowledge the help of my friends and batchmates Suniti, 
Farheen and Mona the most and a very special thanks and gratitude to my 
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constant source of zeal and enthusiasm and their presence that tranquilized my 
work. 
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CHAPTER - 1 
INTRODUCTION- RELIGION AND POLITICS IN INDIA: 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(a) The Interface between Religion and Politics 
(b) The Role of Religion in Indian Politics 
(c) The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism 
(d) The Genesis of Muslim Politics 
(a) The Interface between Religion and Politics 
Religion is a mystery among human beings. If there were no religions, it 
would have been necessary for man to invent and establish it. Man could not 
remain without a creator of the phenomenal world of many fold things. Since the 
primitive times, human behaviour and attitudes have been conditioned by many 
beliefs in mystical or supernatural powers and that there was no getting away from 
imaginative ideas or peculiar dreams, ultimately from some sort of religions which 
have been the very texture of human being.' 
According to B.R. Ambedkar, "to ignore religion is to ignore a live wire. 
Religion is an institution or an influence and like all social influences and 
institutions, it may help or it may harm a society which is in its grip.^  
Religion is a belief or a faith in something that is purely theoretical (ideal) 
partly practical and that something gives satisfaction, utility or a benefit to the 
believer. 
Religion or what we call "Dharma", is not one alone. Today we have 
dozens of institutionalized religions like Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Jainism, 
Buddhism, Judaism, Taoism, Zorastrianism, Bahaism and a lots of minor and 
•J 
modem religions in the Indian society. 
The religion in its institutionalized form is unwelcomed. Every person has 
right not only to entertain such religious belief and ideas as may be approved by 
his conscience but also exhibits his belief and ideas by such overt acts which are 
sanctioned by his religion. Today the conditions prevailing are such that people are 
stepping into the mass carnage in the name of religion, e.g. latest being the Godhra 
incident (Gujarat riots of 2002). The painful memories of religious riots after the 
demolition of Babri Masjid still lingers upon the minds of people. Religion has 
become such an important issue that other issues like poverty, unemployment, 
illiteracy, population explosion, corruption and environmental pollution have lost 
their due attention. 
' Jatava, D.R., Religions in Modern Society the Puzzling Issue, New Delhi, National Publishing 
House, 2000. p. i. 
^ Ibid. 
^ Ibid 
India has a history of fragile intercommunity relationship. Secular and 
communal political forces have always been in struggle for power against each 
other for many centuries. 
The religion based politics ideology and mass mobilization have always 
challenged secular forces in Indian society. 
The constitution of India recognizes India as a Secular State and has 
provided many fundamental rights for the cultural development of different 
religious and minority communities. The constitution of India does not 
differentiate among its citizens on the bases of their religious belief The state 
extends full protection against discrimination to every religious group. 
The secular character of the State is under threat from the practitioners of 
religion based politics. The majority of Indians are believers of religion and in a 
multi-religious country the believer of one religion follow the path of distance 
from the believers of other religions. Another face of Indian reality is reflected by 
religious hostility and opposition against the believers of one or the other religion. 
Thus Secularism and communalism are the realities of India and these two ways of 
life are involved in confrontation with each other. The rudest shock comes from 
the manner in which the government and the country are allowing themselves to be 
pushed off the edge of secularism into the abyss of communal reaction, falling 
back to the frightening atavism of stagnant, dark and medieval ethos of the Hindi-
speaking areas. 
If we go into the historical background of the problem then we find that 
there was a close interaction between religion and politics from the Indus valley 
civilization to the advent of Islam, the second from the advent of Islam, to the 
Indian Mutiny of 1857, the third from 1857 to India's Independence in 1947 and 
the fourth from 1947 onwards. While there was close interplay between religion 
and politics during all these phases, the nature, the intensity and the dynamics of 
this interaction was different during each of these phases.'* 
During the first phase, the Indian continent consisted of Hindu civilization. 
There was no other religion and there was no inter-religion rivalry. Whatever 
'* Sharma, T.R., "Religion and Politics in Modern India: A Historical Overview" in Moin Shakir 
(ed.), Religion Slate and Politics in India, New Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 1989, p. 41. 
challenges came to Hinduism like the branching off of Buddhism and Jainism 
came from within. However, interaction between religion and politics was very 
intimate. The state power was generally in the hands of Kashtriya.^ 
On the eve of advent of Islam, the country consisted of numerous small and 
big Hindu kingdoms. Their rivalries and occasional battles were seen merely as 
battles between the two political entities, without any religious overtones in them.^  
From the beginning of the eleventh century till the end of fourteenth 
century the Muslim rulers used their religious identity to muster support in order to 
maintain their political power. The very fact that they vanquished Hindu rulers in 
bloody battle that alienated large segment of Hindu population from political 
powers. Some of these battles were projected as Jehads (holy wars) against the 
infidels.^  
The Muslim rulers lost their power and position with the advent of British 
East India Company. The company had engaged in numerous battles big and small 
against the Muslim and Hindu rulers in order to establish its foothold in India. By 
1856 A.D. the English became the masters of the whole India. They deprived the 
Indians of their political, economic, social and religious rights. The Hindus and 
Muslims stood unitedly in their effort to fight against the British rule. Therefore 
the company soon evolved a strategy to exploit the religious identities of the 
Indians to secure its political power. There were many overt and covert ways in 
which religious identities of the Indians were used by the British to serve the 
political interest of the British rule. 
During British rule the Christian missionaries adopted undignified methods 
to spread Christianit}' in India. They made violent attacks on Islam and Hinduism. 
They began to assault Hindu and Muslim religious beliefs, customs and traditions 
and condemned Hindu gods and Muslim prophet. They began to convert the 
Indians to Christianity by offering them jobs, rewards and promotions etc. The 
activities of the missionaries perturbed the people. 
The English government taxed lands belonging to temples and mosques or 
^ Ibid. 
^ Ibid, p. 43. 
' Ibid. p. 45. 
charitable institutions. It hurt the religious sentiments of the people. In 1850, Lord 
Dalhousie passed a law, which enabled a convert to Christianity to inherit his 
ancestral property. These interference in the social and religious life of the Indian 
also led to the revolt of 1857. After the mutiny of 1857 the East India Company's 
rule came to an end and the Government of India passed into the hands of the 
British Queen and her Parliament. During the revolt there were ample instances of 
the Hindu- Muslim unity against the British. Such a thing was considered harmful 
to the imperialistic designs of the English. They sabotaged this unity by a policy of 
Divide and Rule. 
After the revolt of 1857 the Muslims started harbouring hatred and mistrust 
against the Hindus because of the role played by the Sikhs and Gorkha soldiers in 
suppressing the revolt and in perpetrating excess upon them. In later years the 
English made capital of these differences and fanned the Hindu Muslim mistrust so 
that the two communities might never come together and thus the British Empire 
would stay larger in India, without any challenge from any quarter what so ever. 
Another subtle way of driving a wedge between the Indian people and 
promoting the identity' of each as a distinct religious group was to record their 
religion in the decennial census. Towards the end of the nineteenth century when 
national consciousness began to acquire organized form in India, the British 
introduced with remarkable calculation and foresight, newer and newer methods of 
dividing the Indians along religious lines. In 1906 they successfully managed large 
scale communal clashes between the Hindus and the Muslims in many parts of the 
country. The early years of the twentieth century saw the founding of the Muslim 
League on the one hand and the Shri Bharat Dharam Mandal on the other. In 1920s 
a Sikh religious body Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee was set up to 
manage the Sikh shrines. Gradually SGPC began to be used as spring board for 
capturing political power. In 1909 the British introduced communal electorate in a 
big way and in 1919 they further extended it. This policy of the British ultimately 
put the Hindus and Muslims on opposite sides of the political barricade. The 
Muslims were given higher representation in Legislative bodies than their 
numerical strength in the population warranted. Where they were in minority they 
were given 30 percent seat in the Legislative Assembly; where they were in 
majority they were given an absolute majority in the Legislature. 
While the British rulers were trying to use the religious divisions of the 
Indians for consolidating their political power in India, the leaders of Indian 
national movement like Tilak and later Gandhi also found it more convenient to 
mobilize mass support against the British rule by using religion. They used 
religious slogans and symbols. With the blessing of the British government the 
Muslims cultural organization also increased their religious activities.^ The net 
result of these British policies was that an element of Hindu- Muslim conflict 
gradually enveloped the national movement. The British government attempted to 
pitch the Muslim League against the Congress which for all practical purposes 
amounted to pitching the Muslim community against the Hindus. The success of 
this policy of the British was to use the religious identities of Indians to blur the 
thrust of the National Liberation Movement which succeeded a great deal when 
there broke out serious riots beUveen the Hindus and Muslims particularly in 
Bengal and Punjab. During the entire British rule religion and politics continued to 
be closeK linked. Religion was used much more to serve political interests than the 
use of [X)litics to achieve religious objectives. The interplay of religion and politics 
was qualitatively different from what it had been during the period of Muslim rule 
in India or during the earlier period of Hindu rule.'° 
India witnessed a great bloodbath in 1947 when it got divided apparently 
on religious lines. More than a million people were slaughtered when the State of 
Pakistan was created. 
The close affinit>' between religion and politics continued even after 1947. 
Infact the interplay between religion and politics was further been strengthened by 
some new factors; the first is the existence of religion based political parties. The 
number of such parties has increased with the passage of time. Such political 
parties make use of religion for poHtical ends. These do not subscribe to secular 
form of politics. Hindu Maha Sabha, Ram Rajya Parishad, Jana Sangh (later BJP) 
have all sought to mobilize political support by involving the religious sentiments 
of Hindus. Similarly Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh which was founded in 1925 
* Ibid, p. 50. 
"" Ibid..p.5\. 
''Ibid 
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by Dr. K.B. Hedgewar has become a major political factor in the Hindi speaking 
Northern states of India. 
While ostensibly confining its activities to cultural spheres, the RSS 
operates at the political level through its various front organizations such as the 
Bhartiya Janata Party. Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh and Akhil Bhartiya Vidhyarthi 
Parishad. In recent years, it has been making use of a much wider front 
organizations that is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad." 
Similarly the Indian Union Muslim League, Jamaat-e-Islami, the Majlis-e-
Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen have like wise exploited the religious sentiments of the 
Muslims. These parties have taken on themselves the responsibility of protecting 
and defending the Muslim community from the alleged tyranny of the Hindu 
Majority. These parties have often opposed the secular measures by invoking 
imaginary fears in the minds of Indian Muslims, who have some apprehension of 
Hindu dominance. 
The Akali Dal which is an organization of the Sikhs has always taken the 
position that religion and politics are inseparable. It has become a part of Sikh 
ethos and Sikh psyche that religion is not safe unless it is defended by the political 
might of the State power. It has always stood for a Panthic "government i.e. 
government that serves the Sikh faction". Pre-eminence of Khalsa is one of its 
avowed goals.'^ 
The other political parties who at the regional as well as at national level 
maintain apparently secular posture and do not publicly justify the use of religion 
for political purposes are very few. At least in theory, these vehemently oppose the 
use of religion to achieve political goals and consider religion as a private affair of 
the individuals and do not approve of its intervention in public affairs. The Indian 
National Congress and its various splinter groups, the CPI, the CPI (M) and the 
Janata Party all advocate and emphasize the delinking of religion with politics. 
However compulsions of electoral arithmetic often compel these parties to 
compromise their principles and make use of religious symbols and slogan in their 
political battles. 
" Roy, Ajit, "RSS and Its Cultural Ideological Roots" in Moin Shakir(ed.) Op. cit., p. 57. 
'^  Sharma, T.R., Op. cit., p. 52. 
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While nominating candidates for elections to the national Parliament, State 
Legislatures and even local bodies, all these political parties are forced to reckon 
the demographic spread of the electorate in terms of religion. Thus in a pre-
dominantly Muslim constituency these parties look for a candidate belonging to the 
Muslim community. In Sikh or Hindu dominated constituency Parties like wise 
look for a candidate belonging to the dominant religious community in that 
constituency. Similarly in their election campaigns Parties liberally make use of 
religious slogans and symbols and make highly emotive appeals to religion in their 
public speeches on the eve of election in their door to door election campaign.'"* 
Since Independence the interface between religion and politics has acquired 
a still newer form and various political parties found it more convenient to 
mobilize support in their electoral battles with the help of religious factors. 
If we look back we observe that during the first three decades of post-
independent India, social division on communal bases were contained because 
religion based parties had a marginal presence in the politics of India. The post-
partition period except for the immediate aftermath was marked by the absence of 
major communal riots. There was communal peace during 1950-60 because in the 
aftermath of the partition, Hindu communal forces were kept in check by the 
national leadership, even as the partition had left Indian Muslims weak and 
leaderless. Moreover an accommodation was worked out between the Muslim and 
the Congress that certain symbols of Muslim culture would be protected. Besides, 
constitutional guarantees were also given to all minority religious groups. The 
three central symbols of Muslim Identity were Indian Muslim- Muslim Personal 
Law, a proper status for Urdu and the Aligarh Muslim University.''' 
However from 1964 onwards there was an upward trend in communal riots 
in India. The 1960's was the worst decade when large number of riots were 
triggered off during the period 1965-67, outbursts of violence recorded were 515 in 
which Muslims had suffered at the hands of rampaging communal mobs headed by 
RSS volunteers. 
Muslims broke away from the Congress during the Emergency (1975-77) 
'^  Ibid. p. 53. 
'^  Chander, Prakash, Coalition Politics in India, New Delhi, Anmol Publication, 2000, p. 7. 
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over the issue of forced family planning drive. Their votes were decisively splitted 
than ever before. During this period the RSS and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
stepped up the other issues, such as the scrapping of special constitutional 
provision for Jammu and Kashmir; the scrapping of Muslim Personal law; the 
point that Muslims bred faster and would overtake the Hindu population in India 
and Muslims were the source of riots and so on. 
During Emergency large number of RSS activists were arrested and sent to 
Jail. When Janata Party came to power in 1977, the RSS as well as Bhartiya Jana 
Sangh became part of the ruling coalition. It was the first instance when they 
became part of a national ruling coalition. After the 1980 General Elections 
success the Congress made positive attempts to win over this powerful Hindu 
political factor. 
The 1980's experienced not only the growth of social divisions on religious 
basis but it also witnessed the emergence of religion based politics as a central 
factor in elections and public affairs. Thus the Indian States had to grapple with the 
new form of religion based politics to safeguard democracy and secularism.'^  
During this phase the religion based parties had evolved new strategies and 
organizational structure to promote their political goals. The 1980's witnessed the 
emergence of a new communaiism which was militant and aggressive in nature. 
On April 5, 1980 the ex-Jana Sangh inaugurated a new political party, the 
Bhartiya Janata Part>', which saw itself as the Janata Party's heir. For its then 
President Atai Bihari Vajpayee it was imperative above all to avoid any 
comparison with the Jana Sangh, which had been condemned to an existence on 
the very fringes of mainstream politics. In this spirit the BJP welcomed Janata 
Party leaders who had no previous association with Hindu Nationalism like Ram 
Jeth Malani, Shanti Bhushan and Morarji Desai.'^ 
In order to remain the whole sole entity at the national level the BJP's 
interest collided with the Hindu Nationalist culture of the RSS on which it 
continued to be heavily dependent. The party did well in the Assemblies Elections 
" Bhambhri, C.P., Politics in India 1992-93, New Delhi, Shipra Publication, 1993, p. 51. 
'* Jaffrelot, Christophe, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, I925-I990s, New 
Delhi, Viking, 1996, p. 315. 
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of 1980 where the RSS network was fairly strong and where the Jana Sangh had a 
good support, but the party suffered heavily in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The BJP 
suffered its worst ever defeat in the 1984 General Elections where it won just two 
seats. Its debacle in the Election led BJP to drift towards Hindu Nationalism. As a 
result agitational Politics was emphasized, electoral strategies professionalized and 
public relation functions were upgraded, because it was necessary for the 
majoritarian democracy.'^  There was no looking back for the BJP thereafter. The 
main reason for its success was the adoption of ethno-religious mobilization 
strategy. These strategies helped BJP in capturing the power. 
The VHP's first step towards ideological devotionalism was in November 
1983, the Ekatmata Yatra (Pilgrimage of one soulness). The Yatra marked a shift 
in the Hindu nationalist strategy of ethno-religious mobilization. Till then the only 
symbol that had been manipulated for political purposes was the cow. The 
Ekatmata Yatra introduced a new ideological devotionalism: its formal appearance 
as well as its name were intended to present it as a religious pilgrimage or 
procession. Its deities- Ganga and Bharat Mata were expected to arouse religious 
veneration. The two idols were installed on a Rath, which enabled devotees to 
worship them and honour them with offerings. 
The Yatra was marked by three processions journeying from Kathmandu in 
Nepal to Rameshwaram in Tamil Nadu, from Gangasagar in Bengal to Somnath in 
Gujarat and from Haridwar in Uttar Khand to Kanya Kumari in Tamil Nadu. It was 
joined by 69 other columns setting off from starting points in the interior 
distributed water from the Ganges and refilled their tanks with holy water either at 
temples on the way or from other sacred rivers enroute. This mingling was 
intended to symbolize Hindu Unity.'* The Ekatmata Yatra was a big success. The 
receptivity of the people the procession encountered was probably due to religious 
sentiment as well as to the emergence of a Hindu feeling of vulnerability and its 
correlative reactions. TTie Yatra was without the co-operation of any political party 
it was none the less part and parcel of the effort to construct a 'Hindu vote' which 
could pressurise the government of whatever hue, to defend the interest of the 
" Organizer, February 1985, p. 1. 
'* Jaffrelot, Christophe, Op. cit., p. 360. 
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majority community. This aim became clearer by tlie movement initiated in 1984, 
to bring about the return to the Hindus of Ramjanambhoomi, the birthplace of Lord 
Ramat Ayodhya.'^ 
The revival of the Ayodhya issue by the Sangh Parivar changed the very 
course of Indian politics. Since 1950 the issue of Ayodhya was not in the limelight 
of Indian political system, but the arch light was felt when in 1984 the first Dharam 
Sansad unanimously adopted a resolution demanding the liberation of the site of 
Ayodhya. In May-June (1984) the VHP formed a militant wing, the Bajrang Dai 
under the leadership of Vinay katiyar. The Organization spread throughout Uttar 
Pradesh. Its members were taught how to be bold'. As storm troopers the Bajrang 
Dal was at first used by the VHP on the pretext of liberating the Ram Temple. 
Sri Ramjanambhoomi Mukti Yagna Samiti was founded on July 27, 1984 
under the leadership of the Mahant Avaidyanath. On September 25, 1984, it 
launched a procession which set off from Sitamarhi in Bihar with the mission of 
liberating the temple of Ayodhya. The procession was marked by the Hindu 
Nationalist slogans. Saints and Sadhus from all parts of the country came to take 
part in the Liberation Movement. Mahant Avaidyanath preached that the people 
should vote only to those parties which explicitly promised to give the Hindus their 
sacred places back.^ *^  
In 1983, Gulzari Lai Nanda founded the Sri Ram Janmotsav Samiti 
(Societ>- for celebrating Ram"s Birthday) and brought many Hindu organizations 
including the RSS under one roof In 1984 on the occasion of Ram Navami along 
with VHP, he demanded the return of Ram's birthplace to the Hindus at a 
ceremony in which Karan Singh, Dau Dayal Khanna and Ashok Singhal were 
present. 
However this liberation movement got suspended due to the assassination 
of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. In the 1980's the most important factor responsible for the 
communization of Indian Polity was the Punjab Problem. It was with the purpose 
of ousting the Akalis as being the protector of Sikh interests that the erstwhile 
Chief Minister of Punjab Giani Zail Singh with the encouragement of Mrs. Gandhi 
"/A/a:, p. 362. 
™ India Today, October 31,1984, p. 70-71. 
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and her younger son Sanjay Gandhi, promoted a little known Sikh Priest called 
Sant Bhindranwale to challenge the Akali leadership. Through Bhindranwale the 
capture of the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SPGC) was 
attempted. Even though that attempt failed, Bhindranwale emerged as a 
fundamentalist factor in Sikh Politics.^' 
He attacked not only the peace and prosperity of Punjab, the amity of 
Punjab's two communities, Hindu and the Sikhs and to the nations secular fabric 
but also threw a challenge to the traditional Akali leadership headed by Harcharan 
Singh Longawal. The extremist threatened not only Hindu innocent common folk 
who crossed Bhindranwales trait but also Sikhs in the administration who did not 
serve the purpose of Bhindrawale.^^ The Akali agitation had, by this time been 
usurped by Bhindranwale and his followers especially as the centre and Akali 
leadership could not come to any agreement about the Akali demand. 
June 5, 1984, was the black day in the history of Indian Republic, the 
Indian Army had to go in for a military operation to deal with political extremist 
entrenched in a place of religious worship. The operation 'Blue Star' was designed 
to smash communal extremism. This widened the base of Sikh fundamentalism 
and terrorism. For fairly a long period the followers of the Bhindranwale indulged 
in selective killings not only of politically important people such as Sant longawal 
and others, but also of innocent Hindus who were shot in buses on the streets and 
so on. The purpose was to start a communal conflict. Gradually Hindus began to 
organize in towns where they had a substantial majority. The Hindu Shiv Sena was 
formed and it exhibited some retaliatory force in places such as Hoshiarpur in 
Punjab.^^ 
The aftermath of the army action in the Golden Temple (Amritsar) complex 
was that the whole Sikh community was marked by deep emotional overtunes 
which ultimately resulted in the form of assassination of Mrs. Gandhi on October 
31, 1984 by her Sikh body guard. Its reaction in Delhi and other parts of the 
country was-lynching and burning of Sikhs on that day- Gurudwaras in Delhi went 
up in flames, shops belonging to Sikhs were robbed and burnt, their homes looted. 
'^ Chander, Prakash, Op. cit., p. 9. 
^^  Economic and Political Weekly, July 13, 1985, p. 1187. 
^^  Chander, Prakash, Op. cit., p. 10. 
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Some Congress leaders such as Jagdish Tytler, Ajit Panja, Bhagat Singh and Sajjan 
Kumar etc were alleged to have played a role in inciting and arousing communal 
patience of the rioter. '^' 
After the post assassination riots Sikhs from Delhi and other States started 
shifting to Punjab. This forced migration of Hindus from Punjab to Delhi and 
Haryana. The anti-Sikh riots widened the gulf between, the Hindu and the Sikh 
community and this ultimately poisoned the political scenario of the country with 
the religion being used as an instrument instigating the public for political interest. 
Political Hinduism had almost become synonymous with the Indian nationalism. 
The elections of 1984-85 were implicitly fought from this ideological platform by 
the Congress. 
During mid-eighties the increased reliance on communitarian symbols 
helped to draw religious categories into the political areas. The most dramatic 
event in this competitive process was the central government decision to allow the 
Hindu worship inside the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. This accelerated the mass 
mobilization organized by the Bhartiya Janata Party, Rashtriya Swayam Sevak 
Sangh and Vishwa Hindu Parishad as part of the effort to change the political 
discourse and control the state in the name of Hindutva. 
The BJP filled the political vacuum that was created by the decline of the 
Congress by providing a Hindu Nationalist alternative against the Congress. Its 
climb to national power was facilitated by the Ramjanambhoomi campaign. 
The Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid was put to archlight in order to draw 
the attention of the people from Shah Bano case. The Supreme Court Judgment of 
April, 1985 was seemed to criticise Islamic Law and Quranic concepts in granting 
maintenance rights to Shah Bano (a 69 years old Muslim woman was divorced by 
her husband after 43 years of marriage). Muslims everywhere considered this 
judgment as an assault on the Shariat which in their opinion, makes no such 
provision in the event of a divorce. The Muslim community took to the streets to 
register their protest and accused the Supreme Court of sacrilegious trespass. 
''/bid 
'^ Chandra, Kanchan and Parmar, Chandrika, "Party Strategies in Uttar Pradesh Assembly 
Election", Economic and Political Weekly, February 1, 1997, p. 215 
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This forced Rajiv Gandiii government to introduce Muslim Women 
Protection of Rigiit on Divorce Bill in May 1986. This was done in order to stem 
the rising tide of anger over the Shah Bano verdict which was losing the Congress 
party its Muslim votes. The electoral defeats of the Congress after the momentous 
Supreme Court Judgment were sharp reminders of this. The Muslim vote tipped 
the balance in favour of the opposition parties. 
The victory tasted over the Shah Bano issue encouraged Muslim reaction in 
several different ways. In January 1987, Syed Shahabuddin editor of 'Muslim 
India', and a member of Parliament called upon Muslims to stay away from the 
Republic Day celebrations on January 26. This was followed by a call for an all 
India strike on February 1, 1987 the first anniversary of the day when by an order 
of the District Magistrate, the gates of Babri Masjid were thrown open for Hindus 
to offer worship in the Mosques inner sanctum. 
During 1989 General Election campaign Rajiv Gandhi the then Prime 
Minister of India made communal appeal to win Hindu votes. He started his 
electoral campaign of 1989 in Faizabad the constituency in which the town of 
Ayodhya is located with the promise of creating a Ram Rajya, using language in 
several ways resembling to that of BJP. However this strategy of the Congress 
failed and in 1989 Congress was voted out of power. 
Janata Dal government with the support of BJP and the Left parties was 
formed at the centre. The future of the National Front coalition was shadowed with 
the V.P. Singh's announcement in September 1990 that his government intended to 
implement the Mandal Commission's recommendation of 27 percent reservation of 
educational seats and government jobs for the OBC communities. The Sangh 
Parivar and the BJP criticized this report because they feared that a flat rejection of 
the Mandal formula would endanger the party's protracted drive to attract support 
from lower caste groups. Later BJP withdrew its support from the National Front 
Government. 
To counter the Reservation policy of V. P. Singh for the sake of political 
benefits, the BJP under the leadership of L.K. Advani organized a Rath Yatra from 
Somnath to Ayodhya. But L.K. Advani on way to Ayodhya was arrested in Bihar 
on behest of Laloo Prasad Yadav, the then Chief Minister of Janata Dal 
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government. In protest the BJP withdrew its support to Janata Dal government at 
the centre to which it was a partner and thus V.P. Singh's government collapsed. 
The BJP began to touch new heights, especially in the Hindi heartland in 
1990 when L.K. Advani took out Rath Yatra for arousing mass hysteria among the 
Hindus. The promulgation of the implementation of Mandal Commission report 
had created great enthusiasm among the lower caste Hindus and they were going to 
lend massive support to V.P. Singh's Janata Dal but the BJP wanted to win over 
these low caste Hindus. The BJP had no economic or welfare programmes for 
them which V.P. Singh had. So it played the Mandir card in order to consolidate its 
base among Hindus. 
L.K. Advani's Ram Rath Yatra from Somnath to Ayodhya was a huge 
success. He became an instant hero and wherever he went during his Rath Yatra, 
he attracted large number of people. And not only Advani but also other leaders 
like Sadhvi Rithambara and Uma Bharti also became star attraction as they spewed 
poison against Muslims. They projected Muslim as the pampered minority and 
responsible for keeping the Congress in power. 
The BJP fought the 1991 General Election unrestrainedly on the theme of 
Hindutva. The 199! Election campaign was marked by an unprecedently sharp and 
communal tone, and on numerous occasions election rallies sparked off communal 
violence that sometimes escalated into full-scale riots. In between these political 
upheavals the then Congress President Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by LTTE 
militants in Tamil Nadu. Due to his assassination Congress succeeded in extracting 
a considerable •"sympathy effect" (Congress (I) government was formed with P.V. 
Narasimha Rao as the Prime Minister), but could not prevent the BJP from 
emerging as the second largest party in the country with 119 seat in the Lok 
Sabha.^ ^ 
The BJP was also able to win a majority in the simultaneous State 
Legislative Assembly Elections in Uttar Pradesh. After a thoroughly 
communalized election campaign that had divided the electorate deeply along 
community and caste lines. Once in office, the BJP government became entangled 
'^ Hansen, Thomas Blom, The Saffron wave Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 166. 
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in the web of legal and bureaucratic intricacies that the issue had produced, and 
faced the prospect of dismissal if the court had ordered directing a stay on any 
construction activity at the site were violated.^^ 
In June-July 1992, the RSS embarked on an intensive campaign for Kar 
Seva and temple construction. However, the Kar Seva proved disappointing to the 
RSS and the VHP both in size and nerve, and the RSS opted instead for a 
settlement with the central government that was carried out directly between VHP 
sadhus and the Prime Minister. For three months the BJP kept a very low profile 
on the entire Ayodhya issue and passed no resolutions.^* But after three month, six 
thousand Sants and Sadhus were gathered by VHP in Delhi Dharma Sansad, to 
discuss the Ayodhya problem. December 6, 1992 was fixed for Kar Seva. The 
symbolic Kar Seva was allowed by the central government. Thousands of para 
military troops were sent to prevent the Kar Sevaks from physically attacking the 
Babri Masjid. On December 6, 1992 more than 200,000 people had assembled, 
read) to perform Kar Seva. 
In the afternoon of December 6, 1992 the Babri Masjid was demolished by 
Kar Sevaks. Throughout the afternoon the important members of Sangh Parivar 
shouted slogans from the stage and encouraged the massive congregation of Kar 
Sevaks to go on with the demolition. 
TTie BJP cabinet in Uttar Pradesh resigned on the same afternoon, and in 
the evening para military troops started to clear the area. L.K. Advani resigned as 
leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha in response to what was widely seen as 
his public humilitation. Large- scale riots broke out in protest in cities all over 
India. On December 8, L.K. Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi, Ashok Singhal and 
several other VHP leaders were arrested. On December 11, the RSS, VHP and the 
Bajrang Dal were banned. Less than a week later the BJP run State governments in 
Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan were dismissed on the grounds 
that they were unable to maintain law and order and prevent riots from raging. The 
demolition of the Masjid led to the political banishment of the Congress at the 
centre as well as in Uttar Pradesh. 
-'Ibid 
^^ Ibid, p. 182 
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In the 1996 General Elections the Congress party was badly routed out. The 
Ayodhya issue swayped the Muslim votes from the Congress to other political 
parties. In this election the BJP emerged for the first time as the largest political 
party in India. The BJP's systematic use of communal rhetoric had antagonized 
both Congress and the Left political forces to the extent that no coalition was 
possible. The United Front coalition came to power with the support of Left, the 
Congress and other regional parties. Its life was short, in that course only, the 
country had the experience of two Prime Minister (I.K. Gujaral and H, D. Deva 
Gowda). It was a different matter that no party was in position to form the 
government in 1996, 1998 or 1999 on its own. 
The BJP worked harder in 1998 and succeeded in putting together a 24 
party coalition named as the National Democratic Alliance. Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
formed government on March 19, 1998 but his government again fell just being 
short of vote in April 1999 because one of the allies pulled out of coalition 
(Jayalalitha AIADMK). 
In the 1999 General Elections Atal Bihari Vajpayee captured the mantle of 
power at the centre under the coalition of National Democratic Alliance. BJP and 
its allied Parties had won 301 seats. Major coalition partners of BJP were Shiv 
Sena (15), JDU (21), TDP (27), Trinmool Congress (8), BJD (10), Lok Dal (5). 
Whereas Congress had bagged 138 seats. It major allied partners were RJD (7), 
AL\DMK(10). Other Parties bagged 104 seats. On October 13, 1999, 70 member 
Vajpayee government was sworn in. Being in coalition the BJP had to compromise 
on most of the issues that had been at the heart of its campaigns for more than a 
decade; the imposition of uniform civil code, the scrapping of Kashmir's special 
constitutional status, the construction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya and so on. 
Inspite of all these compromises, the VHP mounted pressure on Vajpayee 
government to handover 67 acres of undisputed acquired land to it for construction 
of Ram temple in Ayodhya with March 12, 2002 as deadline. BJP warned that if 
VHP refused to abide by the judicial verdict on Ayodhya it would have to face 
legal consequences. On February 18, 2002 L.K.Advani the then Home Minister 
said that the court verdict on Ayodhya would be final. In retaliation the VHP 
warned of Hindu blacklash against those opposing proposed Ram temple 
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construction at Ayodhya. 
During those upheavals 58 people were killed and 43 injured on February 
28, 2002, when a coach of Faizabad-Ahmadabad Sabarmati Express carrying Ram 
Sevaks was allegedly set on fire by a group of people on the outskirt of Godhra 
railways station in Gujarat. Immediately, several cities and towns of Gujarat State 
were in flames. The most unfortunate part of this riots was that the whole State 
government machinery blindly supported the rioters emotionally, politically and 
administratively.'^^ 
The Godhra riots proved too costly to the BJP when the party was 
dismantled out of power at the centre during 2004 General Elections. The party 
leaders were profusely apologetic over the Gujarat riots but the then Prime 
Minister topped it off with the offer to recruit two lakh Urdu teachers and allotted 
Rs. 74 crore for modernizing Madarsas. This was a long journey for a political 
part>' that coined the word pseudo-Secularism and flayed minority appeasement.^" 
Critics argued that nothing had changed and that it was a tactical shift 
designed to win elections. According to them the VHP and Bajrang Dal were the 
true faces of the party all of whom were run by the shadowy R.S.S. Events like 
demolition of the Babri Masjid, its resultant riots and the Muslim massacres in 
Gujarat were too close and compelling to be ignored.^' 
In the 2004 General Elections the Congress and its allies bagged 216 seats 
whereas the BJP and its allies mustered 187 seats. The support of 61 members of 
the Leftist Parties brought Congress to the desirable majority. The Congress Party 
with the help of its coalition partners formed National Progressive Alliance. 
After the 2004 General Elections it was observed that the Hindutva 
ideology was thoroughly discredited and no amount of efforts could revive it. The 
people felt cheated by the promises made by the Sangh Parivar and the BJP 
regarding the construction of Ram Temple at Ayodhya. According to L.K. Advani 
"the passions have a tendency of subsiding they cannot be sustained for too long a 
period, for not only do they harm the country, they harm the party as well" (L.K. 
" The Hindu, New Delhi, March 7, 2002. 
'"Ibid. 
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Advani's admission that the BJP was diluting its ideology). 
According to L.K. Advani "a country as vast and pluralistic as India, can 
not be ruled only by an ideological party. Advani went on saying that "if aspire to 
become a ruling party in India, we cannot be limited as an ideological party. To 
rule India, we have to be inciusive".^^ 
After it's debacle in the 2004 General Elections the BJP once again tried to 
catapult the electorates with its "aggressive Hindutva" Platform. But the people 
had rejected the party's new emphasis on a return to sectarianism. The people had 
rebuff the BJP's charge of "minority appeasement" be it the Sachar Report or the 
India- Pakistan peace process or the demand for deployment of security forces in 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
(b) The Role of Religion in Indian Politics 
The relation between religion and politics goes far back into the history of 
mankind. Religious symbols, ideas and institutions have been used by the ruling 
classes in order to perpetuate their control over political system. The subordinate 
classes on their part have been inspired by religious teachings and messages to 
revolt against injustice and oppression. Thus, the connection between religion and 
politics runs deep'^ 
No part of Indian hTe is without the presence of religion. This has given rise 
to the feelings of communalism. In politics religion is used to mobilize all sections 
and classes of a religious community for achieving political and economic goals. It 
is a modem phenomenon which took rout half way through the British colonial 
presence in India in the second half of the nineteenth century. '' 
Communalism has been an integral part of Indian politics ever since the 
British introduced the principle of electoral representation in public institutions. 
Since then religion and communal identities have been exploited and encouraged 
for electoral purposes. Communalism was deeply rooted in Indian polity during the 
" The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 11, 2004. 
" Basu Partha Pratim, "Religious Cleavage, Politics and Communalism in India" in Rakhahari 
Chatterjee (ed), Politics India: The Stale-Society Interface, New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 
2001, p. 259. 
^^ Mukherjee, Aditya., "Colonialism and Communalism" in Sarvepalli Gopal (ed.). Anatomy of a 
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later phase of the National Movement. Unfortunately the history of Indian National 
Movement is also a history of communalization of Indian society.^ ^ 
The emergence of anti-imperial consciousness in India was much linked to 
religious revivalism. In order to arouse anti-British feelings among the masses the 
militant leader's of the Congress like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Aurobindo Ghosh and 
Lala Lajpat Rai etc. used religious platforms and festivals like Kali Pooja, Ganesh 
festival and cow protection societies etc. 
When Mahatma Grandhi took over as leader of the Nationalist Movement 
he had realized that to counter the powerful British Rule, mass mobilization and a 
sense of unity was required among people from various communities and sects. He 
therefore attempted to develop amity and harmony among various religious 
communities, particularly between Hindus and the Muslims. However he never 
attempted to develop a secular image of the Congress or the movement on 
scientific basis. Though he had tried to create communal harmony on the basis of 
equal respect to all religions but he had never realized that his own utterances, 
actions and use of vocabulary like "Ram Rajya" and cow protection could be 
misinterpreted by the elites and people from other religions.''^  
The political parties which were reorganized having communal ideologies 
had centered their programmes around communal goals. During the pre-
independence period the Muslim League was having Islamic State as its goal and 
the Hindu Maha Sabha had stood for a Hindu Rashtra. Both parties had explicit 
religious and communal goals. On the basis of these religiously defined goals both 
mobilized their supporters.^ ^ 
V.D. Savarkar a Hindu fundamentalist had worked with the objective to 
unify and revitalise the Hindu community and to establish India as a Hindu 
Rashtra. He had pleaded for a strong Hindu Nation based on the principles of 
Hindutva and a non-discriminatory Nation state based on the principle of one 
person, one vote. Those were obviously intended to further the cause of a Hindu 
*^ Panikkar, K.N. (ed.), Communalism in India History Politics and Culture, New Delhi, Manohar 
Publications 1991, p. 7. 
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state in India. The emphasis on the Hindu Militarization Movement was based on 
the language of hatred and violence directed against an imagined Muslim 
theocratic community. Savarkar's slogan of "Hinduize all politics and militarize 
Hindudom" exposed the myth of Hindu non tolerance of other religious 
communities. 
Infact the history of Hindu communal mobilization could be traced back to 
the pre-independence days. The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), the 
premier Hindu organization founded in 1925, was outwardly a cultural outfit 
engaged in disseminating the Hindu culture. But its concept of Hindu nationhood 
exhibited an explicit anti-Muslim slant. It also called for the establishment of a 
Hindu State as well as the militarization of the Hindus to achieve this goal. 
Similarly the Hindu Maha Sabha represented the forces of Hindu revivalism in the 
political domain. It raised the slogan of 'Akhand Hindustan' against the Muslim 
League's demand of separate electorates for Muslims.''' 
Since the National Movement had to mobilize the support of all classes and 
communities against foreign domination, the leaders of different communities 
could not press for principle of secularism firmly for the fear of losing the support 
of religious minded and obscurantist groups. This was the major cause that led to 
the partition of India. During 1940s Mohammad AH Jinnah (Muslim League) had 
led a powerftil Movement, which was intended to advance the interests of Muslims 
after the withdrawal of the colonial power from the sub-continent. The idea of 
Pakistan which came from the Muslim League platform in 1940 at Lahore session 
had actually been conceived ten years ago by Mohammad Iqbal in 1930. At 
League's annual conference at Allahabad, Mohd. Iqbal had expressed his dreams 
of a consolidated North-west Indian Muslim State. It then came from Rahmat Ali, 
a Cambridge student, in a more precise and forceful way. Neither Mr. Jinnah nor 
Mr. Zafrullah Khan then had considered it practicable. However, on March 23, 
1940, the Muslim League passed a resolution at its Lahore session. The text of the 
resolution ran as under: "Resolved that it is the concerted view of this session of 
*^ Patnaik, Arun and Chalam, K.S.R.V.S., "The Ideology and Politics of Hindutva" in T.V. 
Sathyamurthy (ed.) Region Religion Caste Gender and Culture in Contemporary India, New Delhi, 
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the all India Muslim League that no constitutional scheme would be workable in 
this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic 
principles, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions 
which should be constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be 
necessary, that the area in which the Muslims are numerically in majority should 
be grouped to constitute Independent State". The League resolved that the British 
government before leaving India must effect the partition of the country into Indian 
union and Pakistan. The basis of League's demand was its "Two Nation Theory" 
which first came from Sir Wazir Hasan in his presidential address at Bombay 
session of League in 1937. He said, "the Hindus and Mussalmans inhabiting this 
vast continent are not two communities but should be considered two nations in 
many respects".''" 
The period preceding the formation of Pakistan witnessed some of the most 
gruesome and violent Hindu-Muslim riots, which hastened the division of India. 
The Muslim League leaders and the bulk of the wealthy and influential Muslims 
went across to Pakistan. Those who stayed back were either committed to Indian 
nationalism and secularism and were consequently prepared to adjust to the 
changed circumstances or were too poor and weak to be embroiled in any kind of 
politics at all. After partition, the Congress under Jawaharlal Nehru distanced itself 
from Hindu organizations and the new constitution provided for the freedom of 
religion as well as protection of all minorities.'" 
The priman,' task before the Indian leadership was therefore to contain 
Hindu communal aggression and channelize it into nation building activity. At this 
stage Muslim sectarianism or communalism was not perceived by it as a 
significant challenge. 
Keeping in view the importance of religion, the framers of the Indian 
constitution had opted India to have a Secular and Democratic Structure. 
Jawaharlal Nehru in this regard had objected strongly any efforts to perpetuate "a 
complete structure of society by giving it religious sanction and authority". 
He wanted that Indian constitution should "protect all religions, but does not 
^° Agarwal, R.C., Constitutional Development and National Movement of India, New Delhi, S 
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favour one at the expense of others and does not itself adopt any reh'gion as the 
state religion" He believed that "religion is all right when applied to ethics and 
morals but it is not good if mixed up with politics.''^ 
There was originally no specific provision in the constitution which would 
declare India as a secular state. The forty second amendment Act, 1976 had added 
in the preamble the word 'Secular' and since then it is read: "we the people of 
India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign, Socialist, 
Secular, Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens: Justice, social, 
economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, beh'ef, faith and worship, 
Equality of status and opportunity; and to promote among them all. Fraternity, 
assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation. 
The word Secularism carries a specific meaning in the Indian context which 
differs from the sense in which it is commonly used in the west at the conceptual 
level and also in practice. According to Jawaharlal Nehru "Secularism does not 
obviously mean a State where religion as such is discouraged. It means freedom of 
religion and conscience; including freedom for those who may have no religion. It 
means free play for all religions, subject to their not interfering with each other or 
with the basic conception of State. It means that the minority communities from 
religious point of view should accept this position. It means even more, that the 
majority community from this point of view should fully realize it. By virtue of 
numbers as well as in other ways, it is the dominant community and it is its 
responsibility not to use its position in any way which might prejudice secular 
ideal'^^ 
The state is permitted to make laws regulating or restricting any activity 
that may be associated with religious practice related to social welfare and social 
reform. Article 26 similarly guarantees religious denominations and their section a 
right, subject to public order, morality and health, "to establish and maintain 
religious and charitable institutions, to manage their religious affairs, to own and to 
acquire property and to administer it according to law". Article 27, prohibits the 
state from compelling any person" to pay taxes, the proceeds of which are 
*^ Kapur, A.C., Select Constitution, New Delhi, S. Chand and Company Ltd. 1997, Part-11 
Government of the Indian Republic, p. 65. 
"^  GopaUJawahar Lai Nehru, An Anthology, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 327. 
27 
specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance 
of any particular religious denomination. 
The interests of Minorities are also protected (Article 29 clause 1) in order 
to dismantle the structure of social discrimination. The minorities have right to 
conserve their language, script and culture. No citizens can be denied admission 
into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of 
State funds on grounds of religion, caste language or any of them (clause 2). They 
have their right to establish and administer educational institutions and the State 
cannot discriminate against any of them in granting aid on the ground that it is 
under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language 
(Article 30 clause I and 2). 
India is a secular State and the State does not recognize any religion as 
official. However, in practice the Indian State does not dissociate itself from 
religion. It recognizes all religions and their social practices. The Indian State not 
only regulates the places of worship it also patronises some places of worship. All 
important temples of India from Tirupati to Vaishno Devi have management 
boards with government fijnctionaries working in co-operation with the Temple 
priests. Ministers and Chief Ministers openly identify themselves with places 
worship by becoming Chairman or Presidents of the management board of these 
institutions. State government have frequently exercised their power to take over 
the management of places of worship and to reconstitute or dismiss their 
management board."*^  
The politicians openly identify themselves with places of worship for 
electoral gains. After Independence when the then President of India Rajendra 
Prasad wanted to attend the consecration ceremony of the Somnath temple the 
then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had advised him not to associate himself 
with the activities of the temple. In 1950s Rajendra Prasad had also participated in 
the holy bath at the Kumbh Mela in Allahabad. Since the State administration was 
busy in making arrangements for the President's holy bath, lakhs of devotees who 
had gathered at Allahabad could not be regulated which resulted in stampede at the 
'^ Bhambhri, C.P., Op. cit., p. 24. 
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mela site and death of many people.'*^ 
After Independence, the first major Political Party to develop on the 
Hindutva lines was the Jana Sangh founded in 1951. It grew out of an 
estrangement between the RSS and the Hindu Maha Sabha (1907). The objective 
of the Jana Sangh was the rebuilding of India as modem democratic society, while 
removing foreign cultural influences as much as possible. The Jana Sangh had 
adopted policies that were symbolically important to its Hindu constituency 
advocacy of Hindi language and Ayurvedic medicine, protection of the cow. "Four 
fundamentals" guided the party one country, one nation, one culture and the rule of 
law. The Jana Sangh was regionally concentrated in the Hindu heartland of North 
India. It had participated in coalition governments in five States between 1967-71. 
It was also the part of the Janata Party in 1977 and 1980 General Elections.''^ 
Muslim communal organization, after independence chose to maintain a 
low profile, the Muslim League was disbanded and till 1962, Muslims in general 
had voted for the Congress. The religious political leadership within the 
community continued to attach importance to the question of safeguarding the 
Shariat (Muslim Personal Law), but they were equally concerned to come to terms 
with India's secular and democratic regime. Support for the Congress rested on the 
conviction that it alone could provide a stable democratic government and ensure 
the prosperit\' and progress of all citizens without any distinction of caste and 
creed.''' 
But this understanding faced a setback in the early 1960s in view of the 
part>'s poor performance in containing organized communal violence and its 
failure to expand educational and promotional avenues for the newly emerging 
Muslim middle class. It stimulated the revival of the Jamaat-i- Islami in north 
India, Muslim League in Kerela and the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen in Hydrabad. A 
Muslim Majiis-i-Mushawarat was founded in 1964 as a confederation of several 
Muslim political groups. It took up the issues on behalf of the community and put 
forth demands like revision of textbooks with "Hindu bias" introduction of 
'^  Ibid, p. 25. 
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proportional representation, protection of Muslim Personal Law, recognition of 
Urdu as second language in North Indian States and preservation of the minority 
character of the Aligarh Muslim University.''* 
The distance between the Muslims and the Congress widened further 
during the Emergency of 1975-76 when there was forced sterilization drive which 
was particularly directed towards Muslims. Then Jhuggi clearance, slum removal, 
police firing on Muslims and suspension of civil liberties, which included the 
banning of Muslim organization such as Jamaat-i-lslami were the core issues.''^ 
All these atrocities fuelled the process and the community played a signification 
part in bringing about Congress's debacle and catapulting the Janata Party to 
power in the General Elections of 1977. Muslims did not endured with Janata Party 
for a long period of time and soon they turned to Congress during the 1980's 
General Elections. 
Communalization of Politics during 1980s was the outcome of the policy of 
appeasement followed by different political parties and the division of the sections 
of the people on religious lines which had resulted into communal riots. As a result 
the Congress party shifted its ideological posture i.e. Secularism to court the votes 
of the Hindu chauvinism and the notion that India's unity was in jeopardy.^" The 
ascendancy of the Congress during 1980s was largely attributed to the growing 
importance of religion in Indian politics. During the first six weeks after Indira 
Gandhi had returned to power, she had visited dozens of temples situated all over 
India. In 1983, she had attended the inauguration of Satyamitranand Girl's Bharat 
Mata Mandir and took part in the ceremonies marking the centenary of the Arya 
Samaj.^' 
The resurrection of Hindu communal activities, extended periods of bloody 
Hindu-Muslim rioting. A growing feeling among urban based Muslim 
professionals and service classes was that their economic and educational interests 
had been systematically neglected by successive Congress governments. The 
'^Ibid, p. 263. 
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Hindu tinge in Congress electoral strategies after Indira Gandhi's come back 
inning in 1980 also fomented a sense of alienation among a large sections of 
Muslims. This set the stage for Muslim organization to explore alternate means for 
channelising their discontent. This process culminated in the consolidation of an 
extremist-communal ideology within the community. 
The consolidation of an extremist communal ideology within the Muslim 
community led the Hindu communal strategist to consolidate its base in India. 
As a result the 1980-84 phase saw a diversification in the activities of the 
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh. Not only was the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
strengthened and its activities widened, the VHP was treated as a mass front by the 
RSS so that those Hindu who hesitated to identify themselves with the RSS could 
also join in the spreading of the Hindu political message. The regions where the 
RSS was not looked upon with favour, other organizations were floated, for 
instance the Hindu Front in Tamil Nadu. 
Another important political development of 1980s was the transformation 
of the Jana Sangh into the Bhartiya Janata Party. The dual membership of the 
Janata Party and the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) issue caused split in 
the Janata Party the break away group with RSS link was named as BJP. The 
political mantle of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh which was inherited by the BJP had 
rapidly augmented its parliamentary strength from 02 seats in 1984 to 118 in 1991. 
It captured power at the centre in the 1998-1999 General Elections under the 
banner of National Democratic Alliance. 
The arrival of the BJP at the centre took place mainly due to two reasons: 
The organizational decline of the Congress and the disintegration of the socialist 
bloc. The Congress had begun to flirt with Muslim and Hindu fundamentalists in 
the 1980s on the Muslim Personal Law and the Babri Masjid issues. In the process, 
it lost the credentials as a secular party. Mandal Commission Report destroyed the 
caste coalition which the Congress had inherited from the days of the freedom 
movement. 
Besides the creation of Bhartiya Janata Party another important religious 
upheavals of 1980s was the conversion of scheduled caste Hindus to Islam in 
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Meenaskhipuram (Tamil Nadu) in January 1981, that shocked the Hindu 
communalists mind. Shankaracharyas and other religious leaders protested against 
it. Hindu Sammelans were organized to face this new threat from Islamic 
fundamentalism. Counter conversions were also arranged in Rajasthan and other 
places in North India within short span of time. The Meenakshipuram conversion 
gave political Hinduism a popular tool to attack Muslims and the Christian 
Missionaries and indeed all minorities alike. The VHP and other front 
organizations launched a self-respect movement among Hindus which was 
symbolized in the form of stickers saying '1 am not ashamed to be a Hindu'. This 
campaign took deep roots among Hindus. 
Political Hinduism became synonymous with Indian Nationalism. The 
method's of political Hinduism during 1980s was the Ekatmata Yagna and the 
Ram Janaki Rath Yatra in 1984 sponsored by the VHP and aimed at protecting and 
preserving India's National integration and demanded restoration of Hindu 
Temples converted into Mosques by Muslim rulers in the past and clamoured for 
building a temple at "Ramjanambhoomi in Ayodhya where a Mosque constructed 
by Babar stood in place of temple. 
Moreover in 1980, the Congress government introduced a bill seeking to 
revise the constitution of Aligarh Muslim University. The bill created storm 
amongst the .Muslims who regarded its provision as anti-communal. The sole 
autonomy of the community over the University was threatened by it. The 
reservation expressed by Muslims infact led the central government to propose 
within a ver>' short time a second and then third draft bill, which was finally voted 
into law in 1981, it reaffirmed the university's Muslim identity and accorded it 
considerable autonomy.^^ 
All those events were primarily responsible for deliberately destroying 
India's democratic political fabric and resorted to communal idiom of politics by 
pandering to the Hindu Majority for political gains. The benefits of the activation 
of Hindu vote bank were later cornered by the BJP in a bigger way.^^ 
The communal monster not only engulfed the Hindus and Muslims but the 
"/A/o!, 334. 
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Sikh community as well. Punjab Politics had a communal dimensions even before, 
Independence. The Sikh Gurudwara Reform movement of the 1920s brought into 
being the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, a central managing 
committee for the Punjab Gurudwaras for the control of Sikh shrines and its vast 
resources, and the Akali Dal, the political movement which piloted the Gurudwara 
reform campaign and became the principal political organization of Sikhs in 
Punjab before and after Independence. 
Even before Independence, a section of the Sikh leadership demanded a 
Sikh State within the Indian union in which Sikhs would predominate. After 
Independence, the Akali leaders called for inclusion of the Sikhs in the general 
process of the reorganization of the States. The demand was finally conceded by 
New Delhi in 1966. Yet three issues were left unresolved the status of the capital 
city i.e. Chandigarh as the joint capital of Punjab and Haryana: the status of some 
mixed Hindi and Punjabi speaking territory in which Hindus were predominant and 
division for irrigation purposes of river waters which ran through the territories of 
both States. This provided the background for the adoption by the Akali Dal of the 
Anand Sahib Resolution (1973) in which basically secular regional demands were 
carefiilly punched with some religious demands of the Sikh community.^'' 
When Congress (1) returned to power at the centre in 1980, it sought to 
upstage the Akalis by playing communal card, i.e. resorted to religious appeals for 
quick mobilization of political support. 
With the purpose of outdoing the Akali as being the protector of Sikh 
interests, the then Chief Minister of Punjab Giani Zail Singh with the 
encouragement of central leadership promoted a little known priests Sant 
Bhindranwale to challenge the Akali leadership. A band of armed bigots assembled 
around him and carried on criminal activities indiscriminately, while the 
Congress(I) administration paid no heed to it. In course of time, however 
Bhindranwale raised the secessionist demand of Punjab from the union of India 
and creation of a Sikh Sovereign State as Khalistan and directed his onslaught 
against Hindus in general. 
'"/fi/W., p. 264. 
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Ultimately on June 6, 1984 Indian Army stormed the golden Temple (the 
haven of Bhindranwale brigade). The operation Blue star' did cost the loss of lives 
of both Sikh civilians as well as of Indian soldiers. But more serious was its cost in 
terms of the embitterment of the entire Sikh population which gave Sikh militancy 
a new vigor. This entailed the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi by her Sikh 
bodyguards on October 31, 1984 followed by massive anti-Sikh riots in North 
India. After Indira Gandhi's assassination her son Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as 
the Prime Minister of India who in September 1985 reached an accord with the 
Akali leadership to settle the outstanding issues and bring peace to Punjab, but that 
accord didn't bring any positive result. Indiscriminate killings by Sikh militants 
continued unabated despite State machinery efforts to curtail the violence. It was 
only in the 1990s that the State limped back to normalcy.^ ^ 
By the end of the 1980s the religion had spread its tentacles within the three 
major Indian communities Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs and stormed the centre 
stage of Indian Politics. Within this period the growth of communal organizations 
with militant overtones was also significant. There were about 500 such 
organizations with an active membership that ran into several millions. The Hindu 
Manch was activated after the highly publicized conversions to Islam by Harijans 
in Meenakshipuram at Tamil Nadu in 1981. The Shiv Sena (SS) got activated for 
the cause of Hindu migrants from Punjab. The Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh 
considerably strengthened itself by spreading the Shakhas (branches) in every 
comer of the country. All these bodies combined with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
and the Virat Hindu Sammelan which were at the apex of several right wing 
organizations that had emerged as the greatest champion of Hindu communal 
causes and were the fore frontiers to launch liberation campaign for Babri Masjid 
along with other 450 Mosques in North India.^ ^ 
Tlie Shah Bano verdict of 1986 and the decision to open the locks of Babri 
Masjid at Ayodhya for which Rajiv Gandhi's government was considered 
responsible gave the Bhartiya Janata Party an immense opportunity to reassert that 
Indian culture was synonymous with Hindu culture and that non-Hindus could live 
" Ibid. p. 265. 
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in India only if they accepted this equation. Those two decisions of Rajiv Gandhi 
government not only marked a turning point in the history of Hindu-Muslim 
relations but also accelerated the pace of communal polarization in post-
independent India. 
Out of the two historic issues i.e. unlocking of the gates of Babri Masjid 
and the Shah Bano case, Muslims were badly disgruntled with the Congress. The 
Congress support to Supreme Court decision in the Shah Bano case marked the 
beginning of linking religion with Politics. 
Shah Bano a divorcee from Indore approached the judicial magistrate in 
1973 for a maintenance allowance from her former husband and the Magistrate 
ordered Ahmad Khan, her estranged husband, to pay her the same. Khan 
challenged the order in the Supreme Court on plea that the Shariat does not require 
him to pay maintenance beyond the end of the Iddat (three months following the 
divorce). The Supreme Court did not agree, it upheld the maintenance order under 
Section 125 of the Indian Penal code. The verdict created much furore and the arch 
conservative Muslim took to the streets in protest. It was also a victory to the 
Hindu Nationalists who regarded the Muslim Personal Law as violating national 
unity and human rights. Muslim conservative organizations especially Jamaat-i-
Islami and Jamaat-i-ulema-i- Hind, agitated and fought for their community rights 
and finally the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi government passed the Muslim 
Woman's Protection of Rights (on Divorce) act in 1986, amending the constitution 
to ensure their rights.^ ^ 
The Shah Bano verdict communalized the Political process. The 
controversy generated by the Muslim Women Bill was criticized as it had 
highlighted the role of government in permitting the growth of fundamentalist 
movement, and then making use of it in arousing sentiments among large sections 
of the people against the so called appeasement of minorities. 
It was further criticized that the Congress government had succumbed to 
the fundamentalist pressures because it was losing its Muslim votes. The Muslim 
vote bank had tipped the balance in favour of the opposition parties. Important 
Basu, Partha P., Op. cit., p. 263 
35 
Congress leaders had advised the Prime Minister against the dangers of a 
confrontation with the fundamentalists. The decision to bring the Muslim Women 
Bill was part of the strategy, to reverse the rising tide against the Congress party's 
effort to woo the Muslims.^* 
No heed was paid towards the progressive opinion raised against the bill 
and the government refused to withdraw the bill on the dubious plea that it was 
formed in deference to the wishes of the conservative Muslims only. Within the 
government the then Cabinet Minister, Arif Mohammad Khan resigned in protest 
against the government. According to him the government had given credence to 
the views of only the conservatives and ignored the secular and progressive 
opinion in the community.^^ 
According to the then Law Minister A.K. Sen, "the consistent policy of the 
government that in the matters pertaining to a community priority would be given 
to the leaders of the community. This statement assumed that Muslims constituted 
a self-contained and monolithic community whose interests were represented by 
the .Muslim .MP's and a section of the Ulema. The massive outcry against the bill 
forced the Congress to rework its defence by shifting the blame on the Muslims. ° 
The -Muslim Personal Law Board had also pressed hard for the annulment of the 
judgment. Rajiv Gandhi government passed the Muslim Women Protection of 
Right (on Divorce) Act in 1986. 
The discord over the Babri Masjid gave the Muslim community a further 
rallying point. It was in early 1986 when a District and session Judge in Faizabad 
ordered that the Uttar Pradesh government should unlock the gates of the Babri 
Masjid- Ramjanambhoomi Temple thus enabling devotees to offer darshan and 
Puja in the disputed structure. Both the UP and the central Congress government 
took no action to reverse this decision, thereby strengthening the impression that 
the margin of manoeuvre for Hindu nationalist organization had broadened.*' 
The Hindus were permitted to worship the idol of Ram inside the Mosque. 
'^  Hasan, Zoya., "Changing Orientation of the State and the Emergence of Majoritarianism in the 
1980's" in K.N. Paniickar (ed.), Communalism in India History Politics and Culture, New Delhi, 
Manohar Publications, 1991, p. 146. 
" Ibid. p. 147. 
^ Ibid, p. 148. 
'^ ' Jaffrelot, Christophe, Op. cit.. p. 370. 
36 
But soon after the Hindu Nationalists claimed the right to build a temple on the site 
and the RSS identified the issue as an opportunity to work for a new mobilization 
of the Hindus. This development gave a fresh impetus to its agitation.^ ^ 
On February 3, 1986, a writ was filed by Mohammad Hashim in the 
Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High Court against the unlocking of the Babri 
Masjid. On February 5, 1986, the Babri Masjid Action Committee was set up by a 
number of Muslim leaders, including Syed Shahabuddin and Imam Bukhari. It 
organized Satyagrahas in Uttar Pradesh in April 1986, then in Delhi in August 
seeking a return to the Statusquo ante at Ayodhya. The VHP responded by 
organizing at Ayodhya a Shri Ram Maha Yagna (Great Sacrifice to the Lord Ram) 
lasting for five days from October 11. The growing tension in the State sparked off 
riots at Aligarh, Muzaffarnagar and Faizabad. The Babri Masjid Action 
committee's proposed march was suspended when the State authorities promised 
that Muslim leaders will also be member of the team for discussion to solve the 
dispute." 
The laying down of the foundation stone for the Ram Temple in Ayodhya 
on November 9, 1989 was a dangerous turning point in the history of Independent 
India. The seeds for a disintegration of a secular vision of the country were sown 
on that day. Even though the court at Allahabad had decided in favour of 
maintaining the Status quo at Ayodhya. A meeting was held in Lucknow on 
September 27, convened by the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh Narayan Dutt 
Tiwari. The meeting was attended by Buta Singh, Ashok Singhal, Dau Dayal 
Khanna, Nritya Gopal Das and Avaidyanath. The meeting was concluded by 
authorizing the Shilanyas in exchange for a promise by the VHP to respect 
property right as required by the court judgment. 
The BJP rather than the Congress was the beneficiary of 'Ayodhya 
strategy'. The BJP since 1989 had emphatically proclaimed its commitment to 
*^  On January 25, 1985 a lawyer from Ayodhya U.M. Pandey, who was not even a party to the civil 
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unlocked. 
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Hindu interests and to the formation of a Hindu State to differentiate itself from 
other political parties. '^' 
The late eighties witnessed communal politics at its height in India. The 
worst debacle in 1984 General Elections forced BJP to play communal card with a 
vengeance and was successful in creating a mass hysteria on the issue of 
Ramjanambhoomi- Babri Masjid. 
The results of the 1989 General Elections marked a decisive break through 
for the BJP which emerged as the third largest party in the country. The BJP got 89 
seats in Lok Sabha because of seat adjustment with the Janata Dal and the Left 
Parties. The Hindu Nationalism played a variable role in bringing BJP to power. 
After the formation of the National Front coalition government (1989) for 
which the BJP and the Left Parties had promised conditional support, the VHP 
relaunched the Ramjanambhoomi Movement. It turned into an agitational 
movement after the Prime Minister V.P. Singh decided to implement the Mandal 
Commission Report. He was sure that this implementation would foment caste 
divisions in the Hindu community from which the BJP was attempting to build up 
a vote bank. The RSS reacted strongly to what it considered an attempt to 
exacerbate the internal division of the Hindu nation. 
The BJP could not condemn V.P. Singh's decision for the risk of alienating 
the OBC's who comprised 52% of the Indian population but to endorse it would 
certainly compromise its traditional support among the upper castes. The BJP 
reacted to V.P. Singh's decision by expressing it approval of quotas based on 
economic criteria rather than on caste. The Mandal affair created a favourable 
context for L.K. Advani to undertake his Ram Rath Yatra for the construction of 
Ram Temple at Ayodhya. The Rath Yatra as had been expected was able to 
strengthened the Hindu solidarity. V.P. Singh who was anxious not to lose the 
parliamentary support of the BJP, tried to negotiate with the Hindu Nationalist 
forces till the last possible moment. He called a meeting of all political parties but 
that was boycotted by the BJP-which pronounced in favour of respecting the status 
^ Basu. Amrita., "Mass Movement or Elite Conspiracy? The Puzzle of Hindu Nationalism" in 
David Ludden (ed.), Making India Hindu Religion Community and the Politics of Democracy in 
India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 59. 
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quo at Ayodhya. On October 17, L.K. Advani had announced that the BJP would 
withdraw its support from the V.P. Singh's government if the latter placed a 
prohibition on the building of the Ram temple. The BJP finally withdrew its 
support from the National Front government when L.K. Advani was arrested in 
Bihar by the then Chief Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav. The BJP launched a Bharat 
Bandh, a national protest movement. This sparked off anti-Muslim violences in 
many places. The Hindu nationlist leaders and organs presented the Ayodhya 
movement as the means of uniting all Hindu in such a way as to defuse the OBC's 
demand. 
The V.P. Singh's government was further weakened by a split in his party 
(Janata Dal). The breakaway group was called as Janata Dal (Socialist). On 
November 7, his government lost a vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha. Following 
the resignation of V.P. Singh, Chandra Shekhar the leader of the Janata Dal (S) 
formed another minorirv' government. He held office with the support of Congress 
(I). However on March 6, 1991 Chandra Shekhar had to resign after Congress (1) 
withdrew its support. In the 199! Lok Sabha Elections the BJP launched an 
aggressive campaign and tried to wrest electoral benefits from the Ayodhya affair. 
In the elections, BJP won 119 Lok Sabha seats. It also won control of four State 
governments, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and most importantly 
Uttar Pradesh. The increase in votes of BJP saw the increase in Hindu- Muslim 
riots. Between January and June 1991, just before the Elections there were 13 
major riots claiming 135 lives. 
The demolition of Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 by the members of 
Sangh Parivar transformed the terms of the strategy of ethno-religious mobilization 
that the RSS-VHP-BJP combination had been pursuing for almost a decade. The 
demolition marked the peak of the BJP's militant activism. The Hindu Nationalist 
Movement probably gained in popularity because of the demolition of the mosque. 
The demolition resulted in communal riots in many parts of the country. 
In the aftermath of the Mosque's demolition the Hindu Nationalist 
Movement was immensely benefited from a 'Ram wave' in North India. The BJP 
rode high in the nineties. It tried to capture power by implementing a policy of 
'one nation, one culture'. According to it, the Hindus have a special privileged 
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position and the various multiple minority groups had to accept so called Hindu 
way of life. Since the believers of 'one nation and one culture' practiced the 
politics of targeting and confronting other cultural groups, they launched a 
powerful movement against the Babri Mosque and succeeded in demolishing it. 
The Mandir-Mandal and L.K. Advani's Rath Yatra helped the BJP to 
consolidate and expand its upper caste Hindu base. From two seats in 1984, the 
BJP's tally in Lok Sabha went up to 120 in 91, 161 in '96, 182 in '98, 182 in 1999 
and 139 in '2004. The electoral consolidation in favour of the BJP was halted when 
the United Progressive Alliance (Post electoral alliance formed by the Congress, 
Left Parties and regional parties after the 2004 General Elections) came to power 
in 2004. 
Throughout the BJP's reign at the centre and in States the Sangh Parivar 
aimed to implement the ideology of Hindu cultural nationalism as propounded by 
the Sar Sangh Chaalk whom the BJP pay its obeisance. For example the Saraswati 
Vandana was made compulsory in government run schools and offices during BJP 
rule in Madhya Pradesh and in Uttar Pradesh, the order of singing saraswati 
vandana was protested by the minorities which ultimately led to its suspension. 
In 2000, the NDA- BJP coalition government at the centre had appointed a 
National Commission for the Review of the Constitution because BJP believed that 
the Republican Secular constitution of India was not in conformity with the 
ideology of the practitioners of Hindu Raj. 
The BJP and the Sangh Parivar always criticize Muslim's Madarsas 
(Islamic School). They believe that Islamic education imparted in these institution 
encourages anti-national activities. The Sangh Parivar always wants that these 
Madarsas must be shut down. Whereas the Sangh Parivar (RSS) itself is involved 
in large school education programme for the promotion of Hindutva consciousness 
among the Hindu children (These schools are Saraswati Vidhya Mandir and 
Sheeshu Mandir). Besides these the Sangh Parivar activists always target the 
Muslims visiting the Holy Mecca for Haj with the support of government subsidies 
while huge amount of money is spent on Hindu ritualistic festivals (Kumbh Mela). 
The Sangh Parivar had brought into active public life Saints and Sadhus to spread 
the message of Hindutva. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad and other leaders of the 
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Sangh Parivar have always maintained that every activity regarding the movement 
for Ramjanambhoomi should be decided by Dharam Sansad or Sant Sammelans. 
During the decade of 1990's the Sangh Parivar with the full patronage of BJP 
government activated all religious and mythologically associated Saints and 
Sadhus to take message of Hindutva to the masses of India. The discourse of 
Hindutva and the instruments for the spread of the message of the Parivar's 
ideology of Hindutva had been actively supported by the BJP govemment.^^ The 
real goal for the Sangh Parivar was to create a complete Hindu-Muslim divide and 
in the pursuit of this objectivity they tried to project the temple mosque dispute as a 
conflict between two religious communities.^^ 
The Indian Constitution has made India as Sovereign Democratic 
Republican State and the State was the legitimate guarantor of the 'rule of law' and 
the rights of citizens, irrespective of their religion, faith or creed. The basic 
structure of the constitution was threatened if priests and not an elected Parliament 
become the real representatives of the 'General will' of the people of India. 
Elections provide legitimacy to democratic governance with the mandate that 
public affair was managed by its institutional mechanism. In an elective democracy 
priests had no authority' in public affairs. India was witnessing a complete 
subversion of constitutional democracy by the emergence of anti-constitutional 
centres of power represented by the priestly class. 
The tragic happenings in the Gujarat State (Godhra riots 2002) under the 
BJP government was the outcome of the Hindu- anti-minority agenda persuaded by 
Chief Minister Narendra Modi. The Sangh Parivar in Gujarat was fully engaged in 
excercising State power for the purposes of establishing Hindu Rashtra before the 
beginning of riots. 
In February 2002 the State of Gujarat witnessed the worst communal riots 
that ever took place in the State. The riots were sparked off when the Sabarmati 
Express carrying Kar Sevaks was set on fire allegedly by some youths belonging to 
the minority community. 
The State witnessed the communal holocaust between the Hindu- Muslim 
" Bhambhri, C. P., Op. cil., p. 16. 
^Ibid, p. 22. 
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community because the State apparatus was controlled by fanatic Hindus. The 
State apparatus was used by the BJP government to either physically liquidate or 
completely terrorize and marginalize the minority communities. According to VHP 
International General Secretary Praveen Togadia, the Godhra carnage was the 
proof of Hindu awakening. Even the National Human Rights Commission Report 
on Gujarat stated 'that there was a comprehensive failure of the State machinery to 
protect the constitutional rights of the people of Gujarat'^^ 
No help was provided to Muslims, their properties were burnt and they 
were hacked to death by the Hindu fanatics. The riots, which were sparked in 
February 2002, continued till April 2002. The secular face of India was put to 
shame on the world scenario. 
There was no law and order in the State when it was burning, the Sangh 
Parivar wanted elections to be held during such a disturbed situation. The Sangh 
Parivar wanted the newly awakened Hindus of Gujarat to vote for the Hindu Party 
which would teach lesson to the minorities. The VHP's Kendriya Margdarshak 
Mandal warned Muslims that "if continue to take the country towards partition, 
they would have to stay in refugee camps like in Gujaraf .^ * 
The Gujarat pogrom changed the outlook of Muslims and the feelings of 
Lnsecuritv' overtook the feeling of being an Indian citizen. No one could deny the 
fact that the community was oppressed and subjected to discrimination. The 
community was directionless. 
When UPA (United Progressive Alliance formed in May 2004) government 
was formed at the centre it decided to implement some of the recommendations of 
Rajendra Sachar Committee. The seven members committee headed by Rajendra 
Sachar, a former Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court was set up to go into the 
social, economic and educational status of Muslims. The committee, which 
submitted its report on November 17, 2006 was set up in March 2006. The report 
came against the backdrop of the Prime Minister's (Manmohan Singh) observation 
that Muslims should get a "fair share", triggered a debate. He felt the need to 
devise innovative plans to ensure that minorities particularly the Muslim minority 
'ibid. pp. 11-12 
^ Ibid 
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is empowered to share equitably in the fruits of development. 
The UPA government assurance that it would implement the 
recommendations of Sachar committee had created a ray of hope for the 
discriminated Muslim minority, while on the other hand Sangh Parivar along with 
BJP had raised the serious question mark on the very formation of the committee, 
calling it as unnecessary and being against the interest of the Nation. 
Sachar Committee had submitted its report in November 2006. The 
committee found that the Muslims were way behind the national averages in most 
of the parameters of social developments, its economic status had been sliding 
seriously its representation in jobs, bank loans was abysmal and its representation 
in the political process had been very poor and was worsening on the top of that. In 
sum and substance, Muslim community was under represented in most of the areas 
of societ)'. The committee had recommended that an 'Equal Opportunity 
Commission' should be set- up, a national data bank should be started, a 
nomination procedure should be started to ensure their participation in public 
bodies. It was a matter of conjuncture whether the UPA government was really 
serious about it or was it a mere replay of the earlier broken promises. 
(c) The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism 
The quest for India's National identity through the route of Hindu religious 
Nationalism began in the nineteenth century and continued ever since. In recent 
years, however, it has received an unprecedented boost from those communal 
forces which brought a virulent version of Hindu cultural chauvinism to the centre 
stage of contemporary politics. 
The roots of Hindu Nationalism go back to the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The Arya Samaj which was founded in 1875 by Swami 
Dayananda Saraswati (1824-1883) created a new aggressive and militant spirit 
among the Hindus in the northern part of India. During the twentieth century, the 
Samaj became the starting point for a movement of reconversion of Muslim or 
Christian converts to Hinduism. 
Those emerging ideas later became fundamental principles of the Hindu 
Mahasabha and of the Jana Sangh. Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) was the main 
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ideologue of neo Hindu Nationalism. He introduced the Shivaji and Ganpati 
festivals in which the patriotic songs were sung. The liberal ideas of some of his 
associates in the Freedom Movement were vehemently criticized by him. He 
continued the campaign against cow slaughter which was initiated by Swami 
Dayananda. 
The concept of Hindutva was first articulated by V.D. Savarkar (Hindu 
Mahasabha) in 1923. It encompassed the entire gamut of cultural, social, political 
and linguistic aspect of Hindu life. According to him "India should belong to only 
those whose forefathers were born in India and who had not embraced any faith 
whose origin could be traced beyond the borders of India. The religions that 
originated on Indian soils were Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism. Only 
their adherents, therefore were eligible to be called Hindu".*^ This militant 
characteristic of Hindu Nationalism found expression in Savarkars slogan: 
"Hinduise all politics and militarise Hindutva"™. 
The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was founded by Dr. Keshav Hedgewar 
in 1925 at Nagpur. Since 1940 it was headed by M.S. Golwalkar. According to him 
the word Nation was the compound of five distinct factors fused into one 
indissoluble. The famous five unities were, Geographical (country). Racial (Race), 
Religious (Religion), Cultural (Culture) and Linguistic (language). India was the 
Land of Hindus and was the terra firma for the Hindu Nation alone to flourish 
upon . We must bear in mind that so far as the Nation is concerned, all those 
who fall outside the five fold limits of that idea had no place in the National life, 
unless they abandon their differences and completely merged themselves with the 
national race'. He further had added, "there is a triangular fight, we Hindus are at 
war at once with the Muslims on the one hand and British on the other"^' 
The concept of Hindu Nationalism was strengthened more with the 
formation of the Ram Rajya Parishad in 1948 by the members of Princely states. It 
was the most orthodox Hindu Party. The party aimed to return to the glorious days 
of Rama's rule, where everybody was contented, prosperous and religious. The 
*' Ghosh, Partha S., "The Congress and the BJP: Struggle for the Heartland", in Ajay K. Mehra, 
D.D. Khanna, Gert W. Kueck (eds.), Op. cit, p. 226 
™ Hartman, Horst., Political Parlies in India, Meerut, Meenakshi Mudranalya, 1984, p. 112. 
' ' Ghosh, Partha S., Op. cit., p. 227. 
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party was against any reform of the caste ridden society. But soon tiie Ram Rajya 
Parishad vanished. 
A new party, the Bhartiya Jana Sangh was founded in 1951 to give impetus 
to the Hindu ideology. The Jana Sangh was the political expression of the cultural 
renaissance. The Jana Sangh stated its fundamentals as 'one country, one nations, 
one culture and the rule of law'. The Jana Sangh stood for 'Bhartiya Sanskriti' 
which meant ancient Hindu culture According to its ideology Indian Nationalism 
and Hindu Nationalism were one and the samething and who soever tried to 
distinguish between the two was working against the interest of India's Nation 
building. The Nationalism finds its first expression in the religious and communal 
nationalism of the majority community. 
The Congress under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi believed that India 
being socially plural, Hindu Nationalism itself would not be enough to build the 
National Movement. Moreover because of the fact that the Hindus themselves 
were stratified on caste and sectoral lines the conceptualization of Hindu 
Nationalism itself was problematic. As a result the Congress decided to identify 
itself with all communities and caste groups both individually and collectively so 
as to represent the cross section of the Indian masses. Both the Hindu and Muslim 
traditionalists found an equally important place under its canopy though they 
sometimes talked at cross purposes. This strategy was never implemented which 
treated Indian and Hindu Nationalism as one and the samething. For example the 
Hindu Mahasabha which represented the Hindu nationalistic ideology, also found a 
place in Congress strategy.^^ 
However with the introduction of liberalization of the economy during the 
Janata Party government (1977), the Congress could no longer rely on its 
customary vote bank which cut across regional, caste and religious differences. As 
the Congress Party's Parliamentary majority foundered, the Hindu majority 
became more and more assertive. The uncertain political situation compelled the 
secularist Congress to appropriate the advantages of Hindu nationalism. That is 
why the ascendancy of the Congress during 1980s was largely attributable to the 
growing importance of religion in Indian Politics. 
^^/6W, p.226. 
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The Janata Party split into factions was because of the association of some 
of its members with the RSS. The members of the former Jana Sangh who had 
links with the RSS were not prepared to give up their associations and hence they 
along with some others founded a new party which came to be known as the 
Bhartiya Janata Party. It declared the Gandhian socialism as its guiding 
philosophy. This declaration evoked heated controversy among the delegates, 
because people brought up and trained in a different atmosphere could not easily 
digest the Gandhian ideals. 
By the mid eighties the party seemed to have reached an impasse. The 
tactic of openness, intended to make it heir of the Janata Party and thus an 
alternative to Congress by virtue of a socio-economic "people-oriented" 
programmes had not enabled it to enlarge its base and its policy of making 
alliances had misfired." 
The ideological dilution manifested by the BJP and its electoral reverses 
seemed to have substantially added to the RSS's doubts. Whether it was capable of 
promoting the Hindu Nationalist cause. Some sections of the RSS did not approve 
the BJP's effort to attract Muslims. It argued that the Congress (I) was successful 
in the 1984 General Elections because it had acted as Hindu Party. 
According to B.K. Kelkar "the political ideology is or at least should be the 
main justification of its existence. BJP should therefore shed the politics of 
alignment and focus on its ideology and political strategy to promote correctional 
and creative politics. The Hindu vote going to be politically important in the 
coming decade. The political parties feel shy about the usage of the word "Hindu". 
But BJP should have no shyness or complexes and organize it on the idea of Hindu 
renaissance"'''. 
During 1987 the RSS did not support the BJP unconditionally because the 
latter wanted to show to its workers that it believed in Hindu consolidation and 
high moral values. As a result, in order to remain the sole entity at the national 
level the BJP's interest collided with the Hindu nationalist culture of the RSS, on 
which it continued to be heavily dependent. The programme and strategies of the 
" Jaffrelot, Christophe, Op. cit., pp. 318-319. 
'" Kelkar, B.K., "BJP and the Crisis of Political Alignments", Organizer, April 10, 1988, p. 7. 
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BJP during 1980-87 were based on the moderate Hindu nationalist ideology. As a 
result the BJP shifted from a 'mixed strategy' to one based exclusively on ethno 
religious mobilization. The strategies helped BJP in capturing power at the centre 
in latter years.^ ^ 
The increasing prominence of religious symbolism in Indian Politics in 
1980s was initiated by the Congress Party in order to secure and consolidate a 
perpetual Congress majority in national electoral politics. The political 
manipulations in Punjab in the 1980s and the subsequent creation of a "Sikh 
menace" paid off in the massive victory of Congress in 1984 General Elections due 
to the wave of sympathy and national rage in the wake of the assassination of 
Indira Gandhi . The then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was targeted for 
desecrating the Holy "Golden Temple' of the Sikhs at Amritsar, which had given 
asylum to the Sikh separatists and terrorists. 
The massive victory of the Congress after the 1984 General Elections 
demonstrated how the Hindus felt concerned about their Nations territorial 
integrit}' which seemed to be endangered by the non Hindus whether they were the 
Sikhs of Punjab, the xMuslim of Kashmir, the Christians of the North-East or the 
Muslim settlers in Assam 
The BJP did not take much time to realize that the illusory 'Hindu vote' 
that it unsuccessfully chased for decades had ultimately materialized but it was 
grabbed by the Congress. Its own strategy of broad basing its support with an 
emphasis on Gandhian principles failed miserably as the result of the 1984 
parliamentary elections demonstrated. It captured only two seats with 7.68 percent 
votes. As a result the BJP shifted from a mixed strategy to one based exclusively 
on ethno-religious mobilization.''* 
In the race for the 'Hindu vote the Congress could not match the BJP 
rhetoric because of its secularist image. The Congress was in a dilemma. If it went 
in favour of the Hindus it might alienate the minorities which had traditionally 
supported the party. If it did not do so, the BJP was waiting to take advantage of 
the situation by making further inroads into the Hindu vote bank. It was against 
" Jaffrelot, Christophe, Op. cil., p. 328. 
'* Hansen, Thomas Blom, Op. cit., p. 148. 
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this background that two controversies came in handy for the BJP, one was the 
Babri mosque issue and the other was the Shah Bano case7^ 
The BJP reacted to Shah Bano controversy by raising the question of a 
Uniform Civil Code which carried appeal amongst the Hindu classes. In order to 
counter this, Rajiv Gandhi's regime opened the shrine of Babri Masjid and allowed 
the Shilanayas at the Ramjanmbhoomi site at Ayodhya. 
Similarly the issue of Ayodhya was not on the scenario of the Indian 
Political system since 1950, but the arch light was felt when in 1984 the first 
Dharam Sansad unanimously adopted a resolution demanding the liberation of the 
site at Ayodhya. In May-June 1984 the VHP established a militant wing, the 
Bajrang Dal under the leadership of Vinay Katiyar, who had been organizational 
Secretary and RSS Pracharak since 1980. As a main strike force the Bajrang Dal 
was at first used by the VHP on the pretext of liberating the Ram Temple.''^  
On July 27, 1984 Ramjanambhoomi Mukti Yagna Samiti was founded 
under the leadership of the Mahant Avaidyanath. On September 25, it launched a 
procession which set off from Sitarmahi in Bihar with the mission of liberating the 
temple of Ayodhya. The procession was marked with the Hindu Nationalist 
slogans. Saints and Sadhus from all parts of the country had come to take part in 
the Liberation Movement. Mahant Avaidyanath asked people to vote only for those 
Political Parties which explicitly promised to give the Hindus their sacred places 
back." 
The core of the dispute (Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid) was a small 
platform, inside the mosque, allegedly constructed on the site of Ram's birth place 
and worshipped by the Hindus. In 1949 the Hindu Mahasabha members installed 
sacred Ram Lala idols inside the mosque. The Masjid was again sealed off for 
worship and a title suit was filed by local Muslims, demanding the removal of the 
idols and reopening of the Masjid for worship. In 1985 the Local Court in Faizabad 
ordered reopening of the Premises. There was little doubt that swift action was 
promoted by the Congress leadership as another transparent attempt to 
" Ghosh, Partha, Op. cil., p. 230 
''Ibid 
" Organizer, April 22, 1984, pp. 1-2. 
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accommodate the rapidly growing constituency for Militant Hindu Nationalism. 
The main reason for the success of the Sangh Parivar was the adoption of ethno-
religious mobilization strategy. These strategies helped the BJP in enhancing its 
electoral gains. As a result the Congress party during its electoral campaign in 
1989 in Faizabad openly appealed to communal sentiments among Hindu voters 
and promised Ram Rajya (Rule of Rama) if re-elected. This strategy failed and 
Congress was for the second time in Independent India voted out of power at the 
hands of Janata Dai's anticorruption slogans, and by the Hindu communal 
campaign of the BJP deriding the "Pseudo secularism" of the Congress.*^ 
The Results of the 1989 General Elections marked a decisive breakthrough 
for the BJP, which emerged as the third largest party in the country. It yielded as 
many as 89 seats out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha because of the seat adjustment 
with the Left and center coalition the National Front. '^ 
The unexpected electoral gains made by the BJP in the 1989 General 
Elections opened the possibility of the BJP, RSS-VHP coalition (Sangh Parivar) 
using the Hindu card much more vigorously than before. TTie relation between the 
National Front and the BJP reached a breaking point with V.P. Singh's 
announcement in September 1990 that his government intended to implement the 
Mandal Commission's recommendation of 27 percent reservation of educational 
seats and government jobs for OBC communities. Within the Sangh Parivar and its 
upper-caste constituencies there were widespread apprehensions regarding the 
Mandal formula, which was opposed on the pretext of its inclusion of certain 
Muslim communities in the OBC category. At the same time, it was obvious that a 
flat refection of the Mandal formula would jeopardize the Party's protracted drive 
to attract support from lower-caste groups. The BJP encouraged by strong forces in 
the RSS and the VHP, dissociated itself from V.P. Singh and embarked more 
strongly than before on the platform of Hindutva and the Ramjanambhoomi 
agitation in order to oppose what was seen as the dangerously divisive effects of 
the Mandal formula on a prospective Hindu majority nation.^ ^ 
During 1991 General Elections the BJP embarked more aggressively on the 
*° India Today, October 31, 1984, pp. 70-71. 
*' Hansen, Thomas Blom, Op. ell, p. 150. 
*^  Ibid, p. 163. 
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theme of Hindutva. Had it not been the assassination of Congress President Rajiv 
Gandhi during the course of the 1991 General Elections the Congress would have 
fared very badly. Almost half the number of constituencies went to the polls after 
the tragedy, the sympathy wave made some significant difference in favour of the 
Party. The BJP's growth was noticeable. From 89 Parliamentary seats it improved 
its position to 120 seats in 1991 General Elections. Its gain was in the entire Hindi 
heartland. This gain was largely on account of the Ram temple agitation and the 
tirade against the so-called 'minorityism'. For the first time since Independence the 
government at the centre and U.P. belonged to competing parties (P.V. Narasimha 
Roa led Congress government at the centre and Kalyan Singh led BJP government 
in Uttar Pradesh). 
The Babri-Masjid was demolished during the tenure of Kalyan Singh in 
Uttar Pradesh on December 6, 1992. The Babri Masjid was demolished by a mob 
belonging to the Hindutva Parivar, which included some top BJP leaders L.K., 
Advani, Murli .Manohar Joshi and Uma Bharti. The Rao government at the centre 
did linle to prevent the demolition. Large scale riots broke out in cities all over 
India. Leaders who instigated the mob at the Babri Masjid site were arrested. The 
BJP run State government in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal 
Pradesh were dismissed on the grounds that they were unable to maintain law and 
order and prevent riots from raging. 
All these legal repression worked as an instant energizer for the BJP and 
the Sangh Parivar. The RSS had clearly sensed that inspite of the government 
actions against the movement, the demolition of Babri Masjid had created a sort of 
Hindutva wave, a wave of untrammelled pride in Hindu strength. The 
triumphalism came out in frequent comments in this period about "teaching the 
minorities a lesson," "do not take on the Hindu wrath". These fragments of Hindu 
nationalist gained enormous popularity and ubiquity fueled by the fear of violent 
Muslim reactions.^'' The demolition of the Babri Masjid marked the end of the so-
called Ramjanambhoomi campaign orchestrated by the Sangh Parivar (1985). The 
BJP, the Chief Parliamentary representative of Hindu communalism, was at least 
temporarily without a central issue around which it could mobilize the masses. 
" Ibid., p. 164 
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In order to strengthen its declining base the members of Sangh Parivar did 
indulge in violent activities in order to revitalize the Hindu nationalism concept. 
For example the attack on Christian Missionaries in India by the member of Sangh 
Parivar. The Christian Missionaries were accused of converting Dalits and Hindus 
to Christianity by offering them financial assistance. These events were deplored 
as bringing disrepute to Hinduism and killing its secular spirit and mutilating the 
history of multi-lateral culture of India.^ '' 
Similarly the Godhra Train carnage on February 27, 2002 and its aftermath 
was first of its kind since the time of partition in 1947. The whole government 
(state) machinery failed to stop the carnage. 
The emergence of Hindu nationalism has only heightened communal 
tension and poisoned the atmosphere of the country. It is still the reigning concept 
of Indian Political system. 
(d) The Genesis of Muslim Politics 
Since Independence Muslims in India are in dilemma. The Muslim 
community has always been used as a 'vote bank' by various political parties and 
once the election was over, no one cared for them. They are left with the sole 
option of voting out a party in self-defence. Muslim Politics does not move beyond 
the game of survival wherein they vote a party to protect their very identity only. 
This is indeed frustrating for the Muslim community. Muslims in India are victims 
of the worst kind of communal violence but they are also at the lowest rung of the 
development in the country. Their literacy rate is abysmal. Their job representation 
in both public and private sector is shockingly low. Their representatives in 
legislative bodies also dwindle. They are no longer willing to vote merely for their 
security but want growth and development as well.^ ^ 
The post partition Muslim generation is impatient to match up with others 
in terms of development. It has contributed no less than any other community or 
caste to the national development index in every walk of life. Yet it suffers from all 
manner of problems ranging from security to unemployment. This generation of 
Muslims wants empowerment and is rightly disappointed with all political parties. 
*" Ibid, p. 184 
''Ibid 
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The history of Muslims political consciousness and their political 
participation is that in the beginning of the 20"^  century Muslims formed Muslim 
League with the patronage of the British government. Till the Non-cooperation 
Movement both the Muslim League and Congress were very close. In later years 
the Muslim League became a mass organization and more anti Congress and 
communal in approach. In 1940, the Muslim League demanded a separate 
sovereign State for Muslims and as a result Pakistan was formed. However 
Muslims in India due to lack of dynamic leadership became the most backward in 
all walks of life. Their drawback is that they are not politically united. Though few 
efforts were made but they were all futile. 
In the post Independence era in order to strengthen the Muslims politically 
a convention of Muslim leaders were held at Lucknow in 1964, Muslim leaders of 
all shades of opinion joined hands together to solve their problems and an 
organization came into existence known as Majlis-e-Mushawarat . That 
convention \<.as presided by its President Dr. Syed Mahmood, a veteran Congress 
Muslim leader. A number of resolutions were passed at the convention. The main 
resolution \>.as to remove Muslim grievances. It was also decided to constitute a 
committee consisting of Jamate Islami, Muslim League, Jamaetul Ulema and 
Tamir-e-Millat of H>drabad and leaders of other Muslim organizations. It was 
expected that with the formation of the organization (Majlis-e-Mushawarat) there 
will be a unity among all the Muslim parties in order to boost political action at all 
levels.^^ 
The Majlis-e-Mushawarat presented a number of demands regarding the 
Status of Urdu, restoration of the Minority character of Aligarh Muslim University, 
the Preservation of the Muslim Personal Law, the revision of the text books etc 
before the government. 
Some of the federating units of the Mushawarat were not in favour of its 
taking part in active politics especially in contesting elections. Dr Faridi, a 
prominent Muslim leader of Uttar Pradesh was of the view that the opposition 
*^ Abid, Mohammad, Politics in Uttar Pradesh 1950-1980, Aligarh, Kitab Ghar Educational 
Publisher, 1986, p. 159. 
"/6W., p. 160. 
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parties of secular outlook should be supported by the Mushawarat . 
The fall of the Congress Party in the 1967 Uttar Pradesh Assembly 
Elections can be attributed to the role of Mushawarat. In some constituencies the 
Muslims damaged the prospects of the Congress. The Congress government lasted 
only for 18 days and Charan Singh after the defection from C.P. Gupta Ministry, 
installed the SVD government headed by him. It was admitted that mainly because 
of the opposition of Mushawarat the Congress had to step down. Later, it was felt 
by Muslims that they should enter politics directly and send maximum number of 
Muslims to the U.P. Assembly. Jamate-e-Islami did not concur to this idea. Thus a 
new political party named as Muslim Majlis came into existence in Uttar Pradesh. 
But it was decided that the Muslim Majlis shall be a federating unit of the central 
Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat and would co-operate with it in all matters relating 
89 
to the community. 
Dr Faridi was of the view that the Problems of Minorities, Scheduled caste 
and the Backward classes were the same. He called a convention of the backward 
classes, scheduled caste and other minorities which was held at Lucknow on 
October 12, 13, 1968. The convention decided to constitute an organization known 
as the Federation of Backward classes. Scheduled castes and Other minorities. 
Main emphasis was given on reforms of educational system, electoral reforms, 
establishment of welfare state, safeguarding of Muslim Personal Law, preservation 
of mother tongue, establishment of a ministry for backward classes, scheduled 
castes and other minorities, social reforms and religious trusts^". 
During 1971 Lok Sabha polls the Majlis renewed its policy and on 
invitation by Congress (N), Dr Faridi met Mrs. Indira Gandhi and appraised her of 
the grievances and problems of the Muslims. Mrs. Gandhi assured him that the 
Muslims grievances and problems would be looked into and sought support for the 
Congress. After getting assurance from Congress Party, Muslim Majlis decided to 
support it wholeheartedly. Muslim Majlis candidates contested in five 
constituencies however they all were defeated. Dr. Faridi claimed that the greatest 
achievement of the Majsli was that it had infused a sense of confidence and 
"/A/a!, p. 161. 
^ Ibid, p. 162. 
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courage among the Muslim community and had made them feel that they 
commanded balancing power in the politics of the country. 
The promises made by the Congress were fulfilled. However the new 
Amendment Act of 1972 curtailed the autonomous and the Minority Character of 
the Aligarh Muslim University. This act completely alienated the Muslim Majlis 
from the Congress Muslim Majlis also decided not to support the Congress in the 
Assembly Elections of 1974 and made an alliance with BKD and SSP.'' 
In the 1977, Lok Sabha elections, the Muslim Majlis decided to support the 
Janata Party. Under this alliance two seats were allotted to the Muslim Majlis. The 
All India Muslim Majlis working committee met on April 28, 1977 and decided 
that the Majlis should have an electoral agreement with the Janata Party. In Uttar 
Pradesh Assembly Elections 10 seats were allotted to the Majlis out of 425 seats. 
Among the Majlis candidates there were Harijans, Qureshis and Ansaris. The main 
issues of Majlis were A.M.U, Urdu as second official language, representation of 
Muslims in government services and establishment of Urdu university at Rampur. 
Out of 10 candidates 8 were elected in U.P. Assembly Elections. 
The Majlis had representation in the central as well as in Uttar Pradesh 
governments having one minister in each. But they never raised voice for Muslim 
problems or Majlis issues. The selfishness of Muslim legislators, rivalry with 
Muslim League and death of Dr. Faridi, lack of leadership had contributed to the 
poor performance and negligible role of the Majlis.'^  
In later years the concept of Secular Nationalism drifted towards the 
Religious Nationalism. Religious Nationalism has primarily taken two forms; 
Muslim and Hindu Nationalism. Muslim Nationalism as said had emerged in the 
first half of the 20* century leading to the birth of Pakistan in 1947. Hindu 
Nationalism was to a quite extent a mirror image of Muslim Nationalism. 
According to Hindu Nationalists, Hindus must have cultural and political primacy 
in shaping India's destiny. The formation of Rashtriya Syawam Sevak Sangh, 
Bhartiya Jana Sangh, Bhartiya Janata Party, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dai 
etc are some of the product of Hindu Nationalism. 
" Ibid, p. 164. 
^ Ibid. p. 166. 
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Earlier the Congress central government h ^ maintained its goal 6f socio-
economic development and secularism as two pillars bf Secular politics. As such 
all these strategies and developments led Congress in 1980 to manipulate 
communal themes at the highest level as part of its political strategy to attract 
support from masses. In the 1980 General Elections the Congress returned to 
power and during the first six weeks after the government formation Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi visited dozen of temples situated all over the country. Moreover the 
Central government thwarted the opposition government in the State by all 
possible means including the questioning of some secular principles in the name of 
stability at the centre and national unity. For example in Jammu and Kashmir the 
National Conference was blamed for discrimination manifested by Srinagar 
towards the Hindus of the State and against the anti-national role played by Farooq 
Abdullah.'^ 
With the Shah Bano affair the Indian Politics became more communalized. 
A: the same time the judges expressed regret that no effort had been made by the 
administration to draw up a uniform civil code, as Article 44 of the Directive 
Principles Section of the constitution required to do it. '^' 
The Supreme Court decision angered the Muslim parliamentarians and 
organization like the Muslim League, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Muslim Personal 
Law Board, which in 1973 had tried to have Muslims exempted from section 125 
during a revision of the code of criminal procedure. These organizations also 
denounced the Supreme Court for presuming to interpret the Quran. 
The Muslim Leaders regarded the verdict as an infringement on the cultural 
autonomy of Indian Muslims and called for Public Protests. All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board organized a 'Shariat Protection week' in October 1985 which 
demanded for upholding the status of Muslim Personal Law, the rally organized by 
it indicated the frustration and a sense of insecurity among the Indian Muslim.'^ 
According to Asghar Ali Engineer, a liberal Muslim reformer considered 
the above agitation as the biggest ever launched by Muslims since Independence. 
" Jaffrelot, Christophe, Op. cii., p. 330. 
"* Ibid, p. 334. 
''^Ibid, p. 335. 
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He thus explained the root cause of mobilization; firstly, the Muslim felt insecured 
because of the VHP's campaign following the Meenakshipuram conversions in 
Tamil Nadu, (various Ekatmata Yatras were organized and Ganga Jal was 
distributed throughout India in order to awaken the Hindu masses about their 
religious identity) and the Supreme Court judgment was then perceived as attempt 
to destroy the autonomy of their religion, secondly, for the Muslim leaders who 
articulated the protest movement this judgment was blessing in disguise as it had 
united all Muslims of different sects and opinions to oppose it.'^  
The then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi promised to amend the Section 125 
of the code of criminal procedure. On February 27, 1986, the government 
introduced a Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill whereby a 
Muslim man would not be obliged to pay alimony to his divorced wife beyond the 
term of iddat. After that period, the divorced wife had to be supported by her 
family and if she had no relatives to care for her, magistrate could compel the waqf 
to provide for her needs.'^ 
On May 8, 1986 L.K. Advani the then President of Bhartiya Janata Party 
attacked the bill in the Rajya Sabha, claiming that it was directed against the 
interest of .Muslim women, he was able to present the BJP as a party whose 
advocacy of a common civil code was based on a modem and progressive outlook. 
Moreover the illegal immigration to India of thousands of job seekers from 
Bangladesh and Pakistan was portrayed by the BJP as an organized Muslim 
invasion and infiltration into India. This argument became in the later years a 
standard element in the building of the specter of a threatening Muslim menance of 
destabilization, job snatching and exploitation of good hearted Hindu, which other 
parts of the Sangh Parivar had been building up for years.^ * 
Another cause for Muslim disenchantment was the Babri Masjid which had 
been legally contested by the Hindu and the Muslim organizations since the 
nineteenth century and was sealed for decades by the Britishers. 
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad began its agitation in 1985 by filing a writ 
''Ibid. 
" Ibid. p. 336. 
'* Hansan, Thomas Blom., Op cit, pp. 159-160. 
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petition in the local court in Faizabad requesting a reopening of the disputed 
structure for Hindu worship. To everybody's surprise, a court order reopening the 
premises was issued within a week. In September 1989, the government allowed 
the VHP to undertake the Ram Shila Puja, a nationwide procession of consecrated 
bricks collected all over the country for the construction of a large Ram Mandir in 
Ayodhya. The government also declared the plot adjacent to the Babri Masjid to be 
undisputed. Six days later the government attempted to accommodate the Muslim 
protest by ordering the VHP to stop the construction work.^' 
These developments only aggrevated tensions between the Muslims and the 
Hindus. The Hindus in particular sided with their ideology promoting party that is 
Bhartiya Janata Party with its sister organization being the RSS, VHP and several 
small units. They had their say at national level due to the high stature leadership 
in the party. Whereas there was always a lack of powerful public leadership 
amongst the Muslims. In this vacuum, leaders such as the Populist Syed 
Shahabuddin who advocated cultural equality, and the conservative Imam Bukhari 
of the Jama .Masjid in Delhi emerged as Muslim leaders on an outspoken and 
culturally conser\'ative platform. 
In order to consolidate the OBC within its fold V.P. Singh played the 
Mandal card. Commission report turmoiled the political scenario. In the 27 percent 
reservation for OBCs in government jobs the commission also included some 
backward caste Muslims communities which infact agitated the BJP. 
In order to counter the Mandal mobilization of the OBCs by the Janata Dal 
the BJP acquired all possible campaign for temple construction at Ayodhya, Its the 
then President L.K. Advani undertook a Ram Rath Yatra from Somnath to 
Ayodhya. But on the arrest of Advani BJP withdrew its support from the National 
Front government. 
During the Congress reign (1991) the Muslim leaders at a convention held 
on October 9, 1994 at Delhi demanded for reservation of seats for the Muslims in 
the government services. The convention was inaugurated by Sita Ram Kesri 
(Social Welfare Minister in P.V. Narasimha Rao government). He championed the 
^ Ibid, p. 150. 
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cause of reservation for the Muslims. He had even gone to the extent of saying that 
the constitution be amended if necessary to give reservation to the Muslims. This 
all was done to appease the Muslim community which had just suffered the stroke 
of Babri Masjid demolition on December 6, 1992. These lucrative opportunities 
failed to revive the Congress Party's fortune which went blank after the demolition 
of Babri Masjid at Ayodhya. Moreover the Bahujan Samaj Party and the 
Samajwadi Party also expressed their desire of giving reservation to the Muslim 
community. But no party had ever made serious efforts. 
To win back the Muslim vote bank the Congress Party Chairperson Mrs. 
Sonia Gandhi had apologized on behalf of the Congress Party for its inability to 
save the Babri mosque from demolition and denied an election seat to P.V. 
Narasimha Rao, a senior leader of the Congress Party and Prime Minister when the 
mosque was torn down. The Congress party had further promised to create a 
ministry of minority welfare. 
The 2004 General Elections were a difficult one for Muslims. They were 
confused and bewildered especially after the appeal from the then Prime Minister 
.Atal Bihari Vajpayee to vote BJP- a party that has never hidden its prejudice 
towards the minorities.''^ '' 
The new-look BJP brought out a vision document that put aside earlier hard 
line issues like the Muslim Personal Law and special constitutional status granted 
to Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, the NDA adopted the Ram Temple 
construction in its agenda which made for the Muslims difficult to find out the real 
face amongst these gimmicks.'°' 
There had hardly been any option for Muslims because the Congress's 
attitude towards Muslims has always been 'vote us but don't expect anything from 
us'. The regional parties proved hardly any difference for the Muslims. If Muslims 
voted for Mulayam Singh and Mayawati in U.P., they in effect would be voting for 
BJP because there was no guarantee that these parties may not hold up the BJP in 
Delhi after the elections. 
In order to woo the Muslim community. The then Deputy Prime minister 
100 
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L.K. Advani disclosed during the election campaign for Lok Sabha (2004) that 
"some quite progress had been made in the past 6-8 months towards negotiated 
settlement of the Ayodhya dispute we have already made progress without giving 
any publicity to the formula being worked out to resolve the Ayodhya issue and I 
am confident that we will be able to reach an agreement involving Hindu and 
Muslim representatives shortly after the new government is in place and moreover 
NDA has no objection to it".'°^ 
He had claimed that there was a perceptible change in the mindset of 
Muslims in the country. It would be no exaggeration to say that the principal 
factoring removing fear from their mind was good governance by the Vajpayee 
government during the last five years. Negotiated settlement would not only 
strengthen Hindu-Muslim bonds but also unity and integrity of the country.'*'^  
Moreover Atal Bihari Vajpayee during the election rally at Lucknow on 
April 27, 2004 urged the Muslims to stand by Mulayam Singh Yadav. He appealed 
the community not to desert Samajwadi Party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav at this 
crucial juncture of election. His remarks took political circles by surprise, was the 
remark an outcome of concem over-increasing Muslim Sympathy for Congress or 
was it an attempt to strength the perception that there was a tacit understanding 
between NDA and Mulayam Singh Yadav."^ 
TTie remark was certainly true in its respect because BJP was worried by 
the increasing Muslim sympathy for Congress and secondly after few months, it 
became apparent about the understanding between the BJP and the Samajwadi 
Party.'°^ 
TTie Muslim intellectuals favoured the Congress party during the 2004 
General Elections. They accused the Samajwadi party of having hand in glove with 
the BJP. Muslim organization like the Milli Council also expressed similar feeling 
urging Muslims to support the Congress in the elections (2004).'°^ 
However Mulayam Singh Yadav remained unfazed. He had said that he 
'"^  The Times of India, New Delhi, April 7, 2004. 
'°'lbid 
"^ The Times of India, Lucknow, April 28, 2004. 
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was the only one who was responsible for fighting against the communal forces in 
U.P. The Bahujan Samaj Party had never entered into such debates. Instead the 
BSP believed in the principle of nominating Muslim candidates strategically.""^ 
Taking advantage of the general Muslim disenchantment with traditional 
secular parties and the growing political fad for communal and caste parties in the 
country, a group of Muslim Politicians thought of starting Muslim parties at the 
provincial level. Muslims constituted a large chunk of the votes in numerous 
assembly segments in Uttar Pradesh. If they voted as a united bloc, they could be 
the deciding factor in many elections. Two Muslim Outfits were formed in Uttar 
Pradesh Maulana Kalbe Jawwad of Lucknow formed, the People's Democratic 
Front (PDF) whereas Imam Ahmed Bhukhari of Jama Masjid Delhi, headed the 
other, the Uttar Pradesh United Democratic Front (UPUDF). The PDF attempted to 
bring together the All India Muslim Forum, National Loktantrik Party, Momin 
Conference of India, All India Muslim Majlis, Parcham party of India and the All 
India Muslim Mushwarat among others. Both blamed Secular Parties for 
neglecting the Indian interest of the .Muslims and both came from a religious 
background. 
In the Present era of caste and communal parties a move by Muslims to 
have Muslim Party seemed to be appealing and logical. After more than half a 
centun.- to the independence of India, not a single political party has ever bothered 
for the socio-political and economic upliftment of Muslims rather Muslims are 
considered as a community responsible for the division of India and formation of 
Pakistan Indeed, .Muslims who live in India had nothing to do with Pakistan. They 
played no role during partition nor do they have any lingering sympathy for 
Pakistan. There is a perception that the Indian Muslims are the enemies of Hindus 
and are working to carve out another Pakistan. That is why the Sangh Parivar has 
been successful on this Hindu siege mentality and has managed to build a Hindu 
vote bank and has also marginalize Indian Muslim in Indian Politics. Both the 
Muslim Personal Law Board and the Babri Masjid Action Committee ostensibly 
worked to defend the Muslim cause but in actual terms they only indulged in the 
politics of cacophony using high decibel Muslim rhetoric. This tickled the Hindu 
' ° ' Jbid 
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sense of siege and it was the BJP that soon became the Hindus Hero. 
Therefore in the present age the people should keep aside the question of 
militant ideology of Hinduism or Islam and only progress and peace should be the 
motto 
61 
CHAPTER - II 
THE QUEST FOR POWER: CASTE AND COMMUNAL 
MOBILIZATION 
(a) The Nature of Indian Politics after Independence 
(b) The Caste Factor: Mandalization of Indian Politics 
(c) The Religious Factor: Advani's Rath Yatra and Beyond 
(a) The Nature of Indian Politics after Independence 
Politics in India, after independence, within a structural framework of 
Parliamentary Democracy is the politics of national reconstruction, the politics of 
modernization, the politics of integration and the politics of development. In this 
context the party system in India was supposed to play the role of a political 
instrument of socio-economic change. It was to mobilize people not merely for 
electoral politics but more importantly for building awareness and enthusing 
people for nation building, State building and democratic identity building.' 
Since Independence, the Congress party had dominated the political scene. 
The party had a broader support base in most of the states of the Indian Union than 
had any other party. It is a known fact that political parties had always considered 
Uttar Pradesh as the ultimate yardstick of political dominance at the centre. The 
history of Uttar Pradesh bears testimony to the fact that the Congress party, which 
held the reins of the country for more than 45 years, could not hold out at the 
centre once it lost its grip over the country's most populous state. 
During the five General Elections held in 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967 and 
1971, the Congress Party had virtually controlled the politics of the country. The 
Fourth General Elections of 1967 ended the era of one party domination. The 
Congress failed to secure majority in eight states. Its majority at the centre was 
reduced to a narrow margin of 54 percent of Lok Sabha seats. The 1967 General 
Elections marked the beginning of the decline of one-party dominance, both in 
terms of percentage of votes and seats. 
Centralisation of power in one person and the increasing gap between 
promise and performance had a disastrous effects on the organization and ideology 
of the Congress. It became a party of self-serving political entrepreneurs who 
found the role of intermediaries more rewarding than the business of serving and 
representing their constituencies. As a result, during 1970'$, when the economic 
hardships of the people mounted severely causing civic protests of various 
varieties, the Congress party found itself more and more cornered. Those protests 
were galvanized into a significant new political movement by Jaya Prakash 
' Narang A.S., Indian Government And Politics, New Delhi, Gitanjali Publishing House, 2005, 
p. 321. 
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Narayan. The Jaya Prakash Narayan Movement had an important impact on 
national politics. Firstly, it appealed to the urban intellectual and students with its 
emphasis on Gandhian morality and tactics. Secondly, it resuritated the fragmented 
political opposition and thirdly, it threatened to split the Congress itself. The 
movement was a powerful challenge to the ruling Congress.^ 
To thwart this challenge Indira Gandhi aligned herself with the ideology of Hindu 
nationalism to bolster her mass appeal. She started making publicized visits to 
Hindu temples and talking of the rights and fears of the majority community as 
never before. However this strategy could not fully blossom during that period as 
she was dislodged from power in the General Elections of 1977, following 18 
months of Emergency Rule. This was possible because of the Janata Party. Janata 
Party consisted of Bhartiya Jana Sangh, the Socialists and the former Congress 
members. In the 1977 General Elections the Muslims had totally deserted the 
Congress for its forcible family planning drive, which at many places was directed 
particularly towards them.^  
TTie Janata Party collapsed because of its inherent contradictions. The Janata Party 
never succeeded in becoming anything more than a loosely knitted coalition of 
ambitious politicians and parties, whose aim was to dinged on to power. The 
Congress part> gained from this collapse, within the erstwhile Janata Party the only 
faction that seemed to be in a position to take on the Congress was the former BJS. 
One of the causes of Janata Party's collapse was the controversy over the split 
loyalty of the BJS faction. The point of contention was whether a Janata Party 
member could simultaneously remain loyal to the RSS. In 1980 General Elections 
the Congress party made a come back under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. 
The Bhartiya Jana Sangh was revived in April 1980 under a new banner called the 
Bhartiya Janata Party. Significantly, it allowed its members to retain their RSS tag 
but did not insist that all its members must owe their loyalty to the RSS. According 
to the party constitution the BJP was "committed to Nationalism and National 
Integration, Democracy, Gandhian Socialism, Positive secularism" i.e. "Sarva 
^ Ibid., p. 654 
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Dharma Samabhav" and value based politics/ 
The ascendancy of the Congress during 1980s was largely attributed to the 
growing importance of religion in Indian Politics. The Khalistan movement with 
its thrust on Sikhism, the Assam agitation on the issue of unauthorized Muslims 
settlers from Bangladesh, the use of the Hindu card by the Congress in Jammu and 
Kashmir State Assembly Elections, the controversy over the Meenakshipuram 
conversion, the massive "Ekat Mata Yagna", the assassination of Indira Gandhi by 
her Sikh bodyguard and the resultant anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, all these happenings 
in the first half of the 1980s were clear indications of this trend. The massive 
victory of the Congress party in the General Elections of 1984 demonstrated how 
the Hindus felt concerned about 'their' nation's territorial integrity which seemed 
to be endangered by the non-Hindus whether they were the Sikhs of Punjab, the 
Muslims of Kashmir, the Christians of the North-East or the Muslim settlers in 
Assam.^  
The Bharti\a Janata Party got only two seats out of 542 seats in the 1984 General 
Elections. TTiis defeat uas taken by it as a proof that moderate policy would not 
work and Secularism and Gandhian Socialism pledged by it at its formation were 
not a political mantras for it. Thus the party reverted to its original communal 
ideology. 
The political developments during mid eighties were fully explored by the BJP. 
The Shah Bano controversy and the Ramjanambhoomi controversy proved to be 
Godsends for it. The Muslim leaders exploited the Shah Bano controversy for their 
own political needs and to negotiate their own political course. They mobilized the 
Muslim masses by taking full advantage of their sense of insecurity created by the 
BJP's Hindutva rhetoric. More the Muslim leaders adopted the confrontationist 
posture, more the BJP benefited from it. 
In order to combat the Bhartiya Janata Party, the Rajiv Gandhi administration in 
1989 allowed the VHP to undertake the Ram Shila Puja for the construction of a 
Ram Mandir in Ayodhya. The government also declared the plot adjacent to the 
Babri Masjid to be "undisputed land". On this plot VHP was allowed construction 
" Ibid. 
^ Ibid, p. 230 
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of the Temple. Six days later the government attempted to accommodate Muslim 
protests by ordering the VHP to stop the construction work. The BJP exploited the 
Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid issue to its fullest inorder to consolidate the Hindu 
votes. The BJP's accent on Hindutva paid its dividends at the cost of the Congress 
that was visible in electoral results. 
All this process culminated in dissent of the Congress Party and finally its defeat in 
the 1989 General Elections. The 1989 General Elections was the indicator of the 
emergence of a coalition era in Indian Politics. Secondly, the process pointed out 
that the party system has acquired a multi-partisan character. Thirdly, the 
accentuation of conflict between urban and rural elite classes on the one hand and 
castes on the other resulted in power shifts in the political process. The 1989 
Elections, did not have a single dominating issue or slogan. Political frustration, 
factionalism and Personality clashes preceded the election scene. 
A coalition government (National front) was formed with V.P. Singh as the Prime 
.Minister after the 1989 General Elections. The BJP was a partner of the coalition 
but decided to support the government from out. The Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) was also one of its allies. The BJP got an opportunity to consolidate its 
gain when the V.P. Singh government decided in 1990 to implement the decade 
old Mandal Commission Report to provide reservations in jobs to the Other 
Backward Classes (OBCs). Since the plan had the potential of dividing the Hindu 
community vertically between the upper and lower castes, which was going to 
destroy the BJP's hard earned, Hindu vote bank the party saw an inherent danger in 
the Mandalisation of India Politics. To counter the Political threat, in August 1990, 
L.K. Advani decided to launch his Ram Rath Yatra from Somnath to Ayodhya. 
The march was supposed to reach Ayodhya on October 30, 1990, to start the 
construction work for the Ram Temple at the Babri Mosque site. During the course 
of his Rath Yatra, L.K. Advani was arrested by the then Chief Minister Laloo 
Prasad Yadav. In Protest the BJP withdrew its support from the V.P. Singh 
government, which resulted in its collapse on November 16,1990. 
During the 1991 General Elections the then Congress President Rajiv Gandhi was 
assassinated (May 21, 1991). Almost half the number of constituencies went to the 
* Narang, O;?. Cit.. p. 457. 
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polls after the tragedy, the sympathy wave made some significant differences in 
favour of the Party. In 1989 it had polled 39.5 percent votes but in 1991 it polled 
only 36.6 percent. However in a multi-party democracy it raised its tally from 197 
to 244 seats out of 511 seats contested. Compared to this, the BJP's growing 
strength was noticeable. From 86 Parliamentary seats and 11.5 percent votes in the 
1989 General Elections it improved its position to 120 seats and 20.1 percent votes 
in 1991. This gain was largely on account of the Ram Temple agitation and the 
tirade against the so-called "Minorityism". Opinion polls conducted in early 1991 
showed that 42-54 percent of the Hindus in the Northern and Eastern India 
endorsed L.K Advani's indictment of 'Minorityism' and his party's stand on the 
Ayodhya dispute.'' 
The 1991 General Elections witnessed a Congress government headed by 
P.V. Narasimbha Rao at the centre. But a major part of the Hindi Heartland went to 
its rival Bhartiya Janata Party. Its governments were formed in Himachal Pradesh, 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. For the first time since 
Independence the government at the centre and at U.P. belonged to competing 
parties. The Ramjanambhoomi- Babri Masjid controversy was brought to the head 
on December 6, 1992 when the Babri Masjid was demolished by the mob 
belonging to the Hindutva Parivar, which allegedly included some top BJP leaders. 
The Mosque was demolished despite its assurances to the National Integration 
Council and the State government affidavit to the Supreme Court that the Kar Seva 
would not amount to the demolition of the mosque.^  
The demolition of the mosque did not tuned the electoral prospects of the BJP. In 
November 1993, State Assembly Elections its performance was below 
expectations. Barring Rajasthan, it lost Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and 
Uttar Pradesh. In UP it remained the majority party but the government was 
formed by a coalition of the Samajwadi party and the Bahujan Samaj Party which 
earned the support of almost all the non-BJP opposition parties including the 
Congress and the Janata Dal.^  
' Ghosh, Op. at, pp. 233-234. 
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The BJP however, realized that while the Congress had lost its popularity 
amongst the Muslims and the lower caste Hindus, the same had not come to its 
fold. The real gainers were the SP and the BSP. The BJP's strategy was, therefore 
to woo these groups without of course causing any damage to its Hindutva base. It 
was a difficult tightrope walk for the BJP because the Congress too vied for these 
very votes. 
In between 1996 and 1999, three General Elections were held, which 
showed the fragility of coalition governments in India and the shifting of political 
loyalties of the parties. In the elections of 1996, no party won an absolute majority 
in Parliament. The BJP with its tally of 161 seats out of 543 seats contested 
emerged as the Single largest party. In terms of popular votes it registered a swing 
of 1.2 percent in its favour as compared to the 1991 elections in which, it had 
received 20.1 percent votes. In 1996, it got 21.34 percent of votes. The 
performance of the Congress was worse compared to the 1991 elections. It won 
140 seats and 28.8 percent votes in 1996 as against 244 seats and 36.6 percent in 
the 1991 Elections. In the elections of 1998 the BJP won 182 seats and 25.6 
percent votes and the Congress had won 141 seats. The Congress's fortune 
declined, while that of the BJP was on the ascendancy. This tendency was 
reinforced in the General Elections of 1999. While the BJP retained its position in 
Parliament with 182 seats the Congress figure fell to 114 seats. The BJP contested 
only 339 seats in 1999 as against 388 seats in 1998. The Congress and its allies 
contested 453 seats, won 114 seats and garnered 28.3 percent votes in 1999 as 
against Congress's earlier performance of 26.4 percent votes in the 1998 Elections. 
The Decline of the Congress party was attributable to the fact that from Indira 
Gandhi era onwards this balance was destroyed. She concentrated all the powers in 
herself. Several leaders of group identities felt marginalized, which led to the 
formation of new parties with specific ethnic or group agendas. Some of her 
policies were persuaded in a highhanded manner, such as the family planning drive 
during the mid I970's had alienated sections of the Muslims too. All this made a 
dent in the Congress's support base, which could not be compensated by its new 
strategy to woo Hindu sentiments. 
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The BJP tried hard to enlist the support of the Scheduled Castes. It protested 
unequivocally against the Supreme Court judgment (November 1992) which stated 
that the reservation for the Schedule Caste's and Schedule Tribes should pertain 
only to their recruitment and not to their promotions. The BJP reiterated this 
stand.'*' 
In respect to the Muslims, the BJP's efforts were subtle. On the eve of the 1996 
General Elections, it created a Minorities cell within the party, which prepared a 
comprehensive package offering the Muslims taleem (education), tanzeem 
(organization) and tijarat (employment). It organized Muslim's conventions at 
various places and toned down its rhetoric about the re-conversion of mosques into 
temples. However nothing worked to register the support of the community, which 
even Atal Bihari Vajpayee conceded. 
In 1999 General Elections the BJP came to power under the banner of National 
Democratic Alliance. It was a coalition of 24 Political Parties. The 1999 NDA 
coalition was not the first that the Hindu Nationalists had come to power in India-
they had been elected at State level in the early 1990's and had come to power at 
national level for 13 days in 1996- vacating office when it became clear that they 
could not command a majority in the Lok Sabha. The NDA coalition completed its 
full five-years term. The BJP failed to win the 2004 General Elections the 
Congress party with its allies formed the government at the centre under the banner 
of United Progressive Alliance. The Congress party was back to power after long 
political banishment. 
The most remarkable political development among all these events and ups and 
downs of politics was the rise of Left Ideology Parties. The Left Parties are no 
more confined to the States of West Bengal and Kerela. They are the 'New King 
Maker' in Delhi. During the 1989 General Elections the Left Parties supported the 
V.P. Singh government while in 1996 elections the CPI even joined the National 
Front government. In 2004 General Elections the United Progressive Alliance was 
possible only with the efforts of Left Front [a coalition of the CPI, CPI (M), RSP 
^"ibid., p. 228 
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and Forward Bloc]. These were the decisive force in the policy malcing at the 
centre. The Left Front performance has increased in all these years." 
The Indian Politics since Independence has passed through numerous 
phases of goodwill, crisis, stability, instability etc. The dominance of the Congress 
party since 1952, the Coalition politics, the Emergency period of 1975, the 
overthrow of the Congress Party by the Janata Party in 1977, the rise of the 
Secessionist forces in India, the Communal politics of 1980's, the Mandal- Mandir 
controversy and the worst being the demolition of Babri Masjid at Ayodhya, the 
decline of the Congress party and the rise of the BJP, all these developments 
marked the real nature of Indian Politics. 
Thus keeping aside all these events the political parties should concentrate on the 
development of the nation rather than on encouraging such tendencies, which 
divide the Nation. 
(b) The Caste Factor: Mandalisation of Indian Politics 
The caste s> stem, which has its origin in the early Vedic times has been one 
of the main causes of social inequality in India. The caste system in the Vedic 
pveriod was also known as the Varna system. It was originally based on colour. The 
origin of the caste system can be traced from the Rigveda, the earliest written 
Sanskrit document. According to Rig Veda there were four Vamas each with 
specific task allotted to vamas. Those were the Brahmins, the Kshatriyas, the 
Vaishyas, and the Shudras. The Antyajas Avamas were those who did not belong 
to any field. 
Manu is considered to be the founder of a social and moral order, who for 
the first time dealt with the problem of human- social relationships. His basic 
principle is differentiation and a theory of checks and balances all along the line. 
There is no equality of status and emoluments. He made the four-fold division 
practically functional. He further adds that, "it is better to do one's own duty badly 
than another's well".'^ 
" India Today, May 24,2004. 
'^  Andre, Betille, The Backward Classes In Contemporary India, New Delhi, Oxford University 
Press, 1992, p. 117 also see Pal, Sudha, Uttar Pradesh, Agrarian Change and Electoral Politics, 
New Delhi, Shipra Publications 1993, pp 128-129. 
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India and its citizens are the unique example of multi-racial, multi-lingual 
and multi-religious society. In order to protect the identity of Hindu religion, the 
Hinduism hardened itself into a rigid codes of rites, rituals and purity and divided 
into castes and sub-castes. Various reform movements were undertaken by the 
religious reformers to reform the Hindu society but their impact was not significant 
enough to change the lives of the victims the 'untouchables'. The traditional Hindu 
caste system, which placed Brahmins at the top and the untouchables at the bottom 
of the caste pyramid is one of the most obvious institutions of equity. There are 
approximately three thousand castes in India, some are derived from tribal or racial 
elements, others are members of a common guilds or crafts while some are 
religious in origin.'^ 
During the British rule all the socio-religious reform movement attempted 
the elimination of untouchability as an important part of their programme. The 
Brahmo Samaj, the Sat>'a Bhodhak Samaj, the Arya Samaj, the Rama Krishna 
Mission and the Prathna Samaj were all motivated by the spirit of social equality.''* 
The emergence of .Mahatma Gandhi on the national scene completely 
changed the scenario of Indian Politics. He was a victim of the Apartheid Policy of 
Racial Discrimination of whites in South Africa, as a result of which he decided to 
break down the restrictions of casteism and bring the depressed classes within the 
accepted fold of society. He asked the untouchables not to join hands with the 
British but to help him to win Swaraj. Whereas the British officers in India were 
strongly motivated to work for the social upliftment of the depressed classes. 
The Simon commission came to India in 1928, the depressed classes 
attended it whereas the Congress and the other political leaders boycotted the 
proceedings. Therefore the commission stated that in all the eight provinces there 
should be some reservation of seats for the depressed classes and the number of 
these seats in relation to seats in general constituencies should be three quarters of 
" Ibid. 
'"Vedt, Gail Om, "Twice- Born Riot Against Democracy", Economic and Political Weekly, 
September 29, 1990, p. 2195. 
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the proportion of the depressed classes population to the total population of the 
electoral area of the Province.'^ 
The Poona Pact was a fallout of the report of the Franchise committee 
which was set up to decide the means of enfranchising the depressed classes. The 
Communal Award which gave separate electorates to the Muslims, Sikhs, 
Europeans and Christians, sought the ideal balance of depressed class identity in 
the Hindu community. The Award stated that all depressed class voters who were 
otherwise qualified could vote with caste Hindus in general constituencies. In 
addition they would be entitled to an extra vote for the next twenty years in the 
special seventy-one depressed classes constituencies. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar rose to 
the position of supreme leader and spokesman of the depressed community. With 
the efforts of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar the depressed classes secured reserved seats in 
legislative bodies, in educational institutions and reservation in government jobs 
too.'^ 
After Independence in 1947, the constitution of India made a special 
provision for socially and educationally backward classes. These provisions were 
made under the Fundamental Rights of the citizens in the constitution of India. The 
Government of India constituted various commissions and committees for the 
betterment of the Scheduled caste/ Scheduled tribe and the Backward caste. As a 
result the first Backward Class Commission was set up under Article 340 of the 
constitution on January 29, 1953. The report was submitted on March 30, 1955 
under the chairmanship of Kaka Saheb Kalelkar. According to its 
recommendations, in all government and local body services the reservation for 
socially and educationally backward classes was to be 25 percent in class I 33 Vs 
percent in class II and 40 percent in class III and IV services respectively." 
Many State government had set up their own commissions or committees 
for defining the criteria for backwardness and drew up lists of such communities. 
The then Prime Minister of India Morarji Desai had announced in Parliament on 
December 20, 1978, that the Janata government had taken decision to set up a 
'^  Rupa, C, Reservation Policy Mandal Commission and After, New Delhi, Sterling Publications, 
1992, pp. 31-40. 
''Ibid. 
" Chaudhary, Kameshwar., "Reservation For OBC's: Hardly An Abrupt Decision", Economic and 
Political weekly, September 1-8, 1990, p. 1929. 
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Backward Classes Commission under the Chairmanship of B.P. Mandal and five 
others. The report was submitted on December 12, 1980'*. 
Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal was bom on August 25, 1919 at Banaras. He 
belonged to the Zamindar family of Madhopura. He joined the Indian National 
Congress in order to participate in the freedom movement and right from the 
beginning he was associated with many social reform movement, such as the mass 
observance of the Janau or thread ceremony by castes who had been deprived of 
this right. Later due lo sonic differences witli tlic Congress party he had joined 
Samyukta Socialist party. He left the SSP too and formed his own party, the Soshit 
Dal. When Mandal became the Chief Minister of Bihar in January 1970, for a brief 
period, it was a historical event in the caste- ridden State. Later on he resigned his 
Bihar Legislative Assembly seat at the behest of Jaya Prakash Narayan in 1974. On 
the Janata Party ticket he was elected to Parliament in 1977. He did not get a 
ministerial birth in Morarji Desai's cabinet Instead he was appointed the Chairman 
of the Backward Classes Commission in 1978." 
When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, he rejoined the Congress 
part}. After submitting his report on December 31, 1980, he retired from active 
politics and died on April 13, 1982 at Patna. 
The term of reference of the Backward Classes Commission were as follows. 
1. To determine the criteria for defining the socially and educationally 
backward classes. 
2. To recommend steps to be taken for the advancement of the socially and 
educationally backward classes of citizens so identified. 
3. To examine the desirability or otherwise of making provision for the 
reservation of appointment on posts in favour of such backward classes of 
citizens which are not adequately represented in public services and posts 
in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. 
Ibid. 
" Rupa, Op. at., pp. A5-A6. 
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4. The commission also examined the recommendations of the first Backward 
Classes Commission and assessed the factors which stood in the way of 
their acceptance.^" 
Unlike communalism casteism too has struck deep roots in the Indian 
society and it poses a serious danger to smooth functioning of Democracy. 
According to Rajni Kothari the importance of caste had increased with democratic 
politics and mass mobilization of people. Despite the efforts of the constitution 
makers to establish a casteless society, caste has acquired new importance 
especially in politics and elections, which is basically a number game. Caste 
mobilization for electoral gains is seen in every election in every state. Caste 
associations are serving an important channels for political action, with leading 
castes like Rajputs, the Kayasthas, Yadavs and Jats forging nationwide links and 
acting as pressure groups. '^ 
The Mandal Commission Report came to the forefront after 1989 
Parliamentary Elections, when National Front Government was formed. The 
National Front Government constituted of the Left Parties, the Janata Dal and the 
BJP. The BJP one of its allies was constantly in disagreement with the government 
on vital issues on national unity and the Ayodhya dispute. Many leading forces in 
the BJP feared that the party would soon jeopardize its credibility and its new-
found mass constituency. 
The tension between the National Front and the BJP reached a breaking 
fwint with V.P. Singh's announcement in 1990 that his government intended to 
implement the Mandal commission's recommendation of 27 percent reservation of 
educational seats and governments jobs for OBC (backward) communities. Within 
the Sangh Parivar and its upper caste constituencies there were wide spread 
apprehensions regarding the Mandal formula, which was opposed on the pretext of 
its inclusion of certain Muslim communities in the OBC category. At the same 
time, it was obvious that a flat rejection of the Mandal formula would jeopardize 
the party's protracted drive to attract support from lower caste groups. As a result 
the BJP dissociated itself from National Front government and it embarked more 
^°Ibid.. p. 44. 
^^/bid.. p. 52. 
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seriously on the platform of Hindutva and the Ramjanambhoomi agitation, in order 
to oppose the effects of the Mandal formula on a prospective Hindu majority 
nation'^ .^ 
Vishwanath Pratap Singh, the ninth Prime Minister of India was the person 
who was responsible for re-operating the caste question and injecting an entire 
generation with the caste virus. His discourse on social justice was loaded with 
socialist reference and his plan of action drew inspiration from the modus operandi 
of Ram Manohar Lohia (a socialist thinker). 
Even before the Janata Dal came to power V.P. Singh had promised to 
reserve 60 percent of posts within the party for OBC's. The main achievement of 
V.P. Singh was to make a broad number of castes coalesce under the umbrella of 
the OBC label, and consequently more than ever before. The implementation 
aroused suspicious because of the timing of the announcement just before Devi 
Lai's rally. It generated caste consciousness among the urban elites, sharpened 
animosities among caste conscious societies and prepared a fertile group for caste 
politics. 
V.P. Singh played the reservation card with the help of his two Lieutenants, 
Sharad Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan. He polarized the nation, revived sectional 
animosit\- and raised political and social temperatures for political gains. As a 
result of the .Mandal menace there was the dormant feelings and prejudice which 
resulted in the self-immolation by the young students all over the State. 
The caste-based reservation was such an issue that no Indian politicians or 
political leader could openly oppose the principle of extending reservations to the 
backward classes, as the policy already existed in principle for the scheduled castes 
and scheduled tribes No one could risk alienating either the scheduled castes, the 
scheduled tribes or the backward classes because they constituted a sizeable 
segment of the electorate^^ 
Vir Sanghvi Editor of Sunday Magazine said about Mr. V.P. Singh's style 
of functioning, "invent an essentially hollow and fraudulent vision ensure that it 
^^  Hansen, Thomas Blom., The Saffron Wave, Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 164. 
^' The Times of India, New Dellii, September 7-16, 1990. 
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has little to do with India's real problems and frame your position so that nobody 
dares oppose you ". 
The implementation of the Mandal commission report was part of the 
commitment made in the National Front election manifesto. The common people 
as the main backbone for any government in winning and losing the election were 
let down by such policies and it were those who were the first victims. 
Even before the Central government notification of implementing the 
recommendations of the Mandal report and providing 27 percent reservation in 
government jobs for socially and educationally backward classes with effect from 
August 7, 1990 the violence in the States had already started. 
The then labour and Welfare Minister, Ram Vilas Paswan also announced the 
reservation in public sector undertakings, in financial institutions and in banks by 
the department of public enterprises and Ministry of Finance. There was no 
decision on fixing the duration of the reservation period although the Mandal 
commission had recommended twenty years. At the same time, he announced the 
government's decision in extending job reservation in central government services 
to economically backward sections of the upper castes and minorities.'^ 
The Mandal Commission Report caused erupfion of violence and protests 
all over the country. On August 14, 1990, a writ petition challenging the decision 
of the Union government on the 27 percent reservation was filed by Mr. Ujjal 
Singh President of the all India Anti- Reservation Morcha before the Supreme 
Court in India. The petition stated, "The decision of the central government to 
implement the report by reserving 27 percent of seats to backward classes is only a 
political decision meant as a vote catching exercise 
Later, the Supreme Court passed a stay order on the implementation of the 
National Front government orders on the Mandal Commission Report. A nine 
member constitutional Bench was presided over by the then Chief Justice M.H. 
Kania on November 16, 1992 on the disputed points. A few of the Principal 
findings of the Bench contained in the six hundred-page Judgments were as follow: 
•^* Rupa, Op. cil., p. 94. 
"/Wo'., p. 95. 
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(1) Para 838 permits reservation of 27 percent for OBC\ '^in*civil governmental. 
posts. However, reservation may not apply to certain\ategortes of posts 
sucii as defence services, engineering, medicine and mathematical 
research.^ ^ 
(2) Reservation is valid at the point of entry into service, but not applicable in 
the case of promotion (Para 819-31) 
(3) Backwardness does not cease merely because of a person changes his or 
her religion. This is significant because backward class/ caste Hindus who 
have in the past embraced Christianity, Islam or Sikhism could not avail 
themselves of the benefits of reservation on the ground that their new 
religion did not recognize caste (Para 848). 
(4) Certain decisions of the Bench, relating to the question of backwardness are 
closely interlinked with economic criteria. The Mandal commission's 
contention that caste constitutes the sole criterion of backwardness is 
closely analyzed in the Supreme Court judgment. While the constitution 
refers to the backward classes, the Mandal commission sticks to the term 
"backward castes'. The Supreme Court Judgement has pointed out the close 
affinity between 'castes' as used by the Mandal commission on the one 
hand and on the other, occupational classes and groups. Thus it referred to 
dhobis (washermen), nais (barbers) etc which refers both to occupation and 
to caste affiliation. According to the judgment, caste would appear to 
provide reasonable criterion for poverty in this specific sense^ .^ 
(5) One of the major criticisms levelled against the recommendations of the 
Mandal Commission was that the benefits of reservation would be collared 
by a few castes, which have access to education, wealth and political 
influence. An economic criterion is needed in order to prevent this 
advantaged segment of society from taking unfair advantage of its caste 
status. The Bench rejected this view and stated that the principle of 
exclusion applied to caste group as a whole and not to individual families. 
^^  Chatterjee, P.C, "Reservation: Theory and Practices" in T.V. Sathyamurthy (ed.), Region 
Religion Caste Gender and Culture in Contemporary India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 
1998, vol. Ill, p. 311. 
"/A/a'., p. 312 
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In other words, the OBC's should be kept under review in order to 
determine whether a particular caste should be kept on the list at a given 
time.^^ (Para 794-97) 
(6) The Congress party's order during the reign of Narasimha Roa for 
reserving 10 percent of vacancies for the persons who were economically 
but not socially deprived was quashed down by the Supreme Court on two 
grounds. First, the government has not yet come forward with a suitable 
and well-defined economic criterion. Second, under the provisions of the 
constitution it is incumbent on the government to state that a particular 
class of citizens is inadequately represented in the services. (Para 798-800) 
(7) The Supreme Court advised the Central and State governments to set up 
machineries charged with the remit of carrying out a periodical scrutiny of 
their lists of OBCs in order to ensure that some groups were not wrongfully 
excluded; 
(8) While the Supreme Court judgment may not have resolved all questions 
arising out of the Mandal Commission Report, it provided ample guidance 
for the implementation of its major recommendations".^^ 
Since no political party or political leader could go against the Mandal 
report or against reser\'ations perse, the political parties objected minor details such 
as the caste versus class, the caste versus economic criteria and the categories of 
pyeople who would mopped up to come within the purview of the privileges 
extended by the report. 
Even the Congress party was also of the view that the equation of caste 
with class had become an unfortunate reality of Indian socio-political life and that 
it was disturbed at the trend of promoting social equality on the basis of caste 
which was contrary to the national objective of establishing a casteless and 
classless society.^" The Left Parties had also demanded certain modification in the 
implementation of the Mandal report. The Left Parties demanded that economic 
criteria should be the basis of granting reservation. 
''Ibid. 
'Ubid., p219. 
'" Kashyap, Subhash C, The Ten LokSabhas (1952-1991), New Delhi, Shipra Publications, 1992, 
p. 218. 
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The Bhartiya Janata Party was hit hardest by the Mandal missile as it 
sought to defeat their ploy of uniting all Hindus under their Saffron emblem. At the 
all party meeting convened on September 3, 1990 by the central government to 
discuss the issue of job reservation, L.K. Advani said it would have been best if the 
government had held such a meeting prior to taking the reservation decision. While 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee observed that since all parties were thinking in terms of 
elections the BJP would be forced to do the same and since caste based reservation 
would create a "sharp divide" in society, he felt that an economic dimensions 
should be added.^' 
The dissident activities within the Janata Dal were building up even as the 
Prime Minister and his trusted lieutenants were convinced that the caste card 
would work and it would win him next elections V.P. Singh was convinced that 
despite the anger of Rajiv Gandhi, Jyoti Basu and L.K. Advani at the caste- based 
formulas, none could risk the dunking concept of reservation. 
At the ripe time for communal politics, L.K. Advani cashed the situation by 
starting the Ram Rath Yatra and was adamant that on October 30, 1990 Kar Seva 
would take place on the disputed Ramjanambhoomi- Babri Masjid complex. It 
became clear that time was running out for V.P. Singh, with Advani wending his 
wa\ to Uttar Pradesh via Bihar. Moreover the BJP had threatened that it would 
v i^thdraw the support from National Front government if L.K. Advani was arrested 
during the course of his Rath Yatra. It became a race between the two Yadav Chief 
Ministers as to who would arrest Advani ultimately; it was Laloo Prasad Yadav 
who did so on October 23 in Samastipur. The Advani's arrest led Atal Bihar 
Vajpayee return to Delhi from Calcutta on the same day and he called on the 
President and appraised him the political crisis at the centre and also formally 
withdrew support from the V.P. Singh govemment.^^ 
As a result V.P. Singh sought some time to prove his majority on the floor 
of the House. November 7, 1990, was fixed as the date for the vote of confidence 
in Parliament. On November 7, 1990, in the show of strength trial V.P. Singh was 
defeated on the floor of the House and the leader of breakaway Janata Dai, 
'^ Ibid 
^^  The Times of India, New Delhi, Oct. 24, 1990. 
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Chandra Shekhar was sworn in as the Prime Minister on Nov. 21, 1990 with the 
support of the Congress party. The Mandal Monster unleashed by V.P. Singh 
finally consumed him even as it left in its wake a hurt and wounded nation divided 
against itself on the vexed question of caste- based reservations.^^ Later Congress 
party withdrew its support from the Chandra Shekhar government. It was alleged 
by the Congress that the residence of its President Rajiv Gandhi was under 
surveillance by the cops. [On the orders of central government]. The withdrawal of 
support caused the downfall of the Chandra Shekhar Government and fresh 
elections were declared for May 1991. Besides Mandal and Mandir issue the main 
issue highlighted by the Congress (1) was stability, as it put forward before the 
electorate that the two non-Congress governments since 1989 had ruined the 
economy, increased communal and caste tensions and provided no leadership 
worth name. 
During 1991 General Elections campaign the then Congress President 
Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by LTTE militants at Sriperambadur in Tamil 
Nadu. The Congress Party won the election but with slender majority. The party 
formed its government under the Prime Ministership of P.V. Narasimha Rao 
A government notification on September 25, 1991 issued by the Narasimha 
Rao government provided 10 percent seats to the poorer sections among the other 
backward classes within the 27 percent reservation notified in the August 13, 1990 
order. Additional 10 percent of the seats in the central services were reserved for 
the poor amongst the forward classes taking the quantum of reservation to 60 
percent.^ 
Although the Mandal formula ensuring 27 percent reservations in central 
jobs for the OBC's appeared revolutionary, the National Front decision was 
probably prompted by the following factors showing the extent to which political 
expediency conditioned the decision. 
(a) It was the populist vote catching device as the OBC's constituted the 
majority of Indian population. 
" The Times of India, New Delhi, Nov. 22, 1990. 
^^  Rupa, Op. cil.. p. 163. 
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(b) A move to upstage the Haryana leader Devi Lai who was threatening the 
V.P. Singh led coalition with rural urban polarization. 
(c) To shift the focus from the Ramjanambhoomi issue that singularly created a 
solid vote bank for the BJP especially after the L.K. Advani led 1990 
October Rath Yatra.^^ 
The National Front government accepted the Mandal commission 
recommendation due to the well- calculated design of mobilizing the support of the 
OBC elites. By virtue of its unique status in the OBC society, its wealth, its 
relatively high educational level and its hegemony in a majority of caste councils, 
the OBC upper crust was viewed as the significant power brokers in the Hindi 
heartland. Thus the Mandal Report was for creating and sustaining a secured vote 
bank for the National Front. 
The Front decision to implement the Mandal formula was also 
characterized as an effort to effectively draw on caste sentiments for victory in 
elections. The .Mandal commission was thus described as a 'caste commission' that 
was seen as a "passport to power". 
Whatever the advantages the Mandal formula may have held for the 
National Front, reser\'ation for the backward castes and for the religious minorities 
were directed towards maintaining a balance of power in India's caste-ridden and 
highK stratified social structure. The Mandal recommendations deserved 
appreciation because it stroked a balance between the privileged upper castes and 
the neglected OBC's. However, in reality the better off sections of the OBC's reap 
the benefit at the cost of the more deserving sections within these castes.''^ 
(c) The Religious Factor: Advani's Rath Yatra and Beyond 
Lai Krishna Advani's Ram Rath Yatra was the magical wand that changed 
the destiny of the Bhartiya Janata Party, till then condemned to wait on the 
sidelines. It was due to his Rath Yatras that Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Bhartiya 
Janata Party scaled the heady heights. Had Advani Rath not seared a stormy path 
through the Hindi heart land, arousing passions among the people for Hindutva, the 
" Chakrabarty, Bidyut., "The Third Front or the Third Force: A Political Maze or An Ideological 
Oasis" in Ajay K. Mehra, D.D. Khanna, Gert W. Kueck (eds.), Op. cit, p. 259. 
^^ Ibid., p. 260. 
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BJP would not have touched the Pinnacle point in Politics. Infact the Advani's 
Rath Yatra helped the BJP so much that in latter years it became the Single largest 
party after the Congress''^ . 
The BJP maintained that these Yatras were an unquestionable, spontaneous 
expression of religious community unrelated to the 'impure' realm of the politics 
full of strategies, calculations and secure ideology open to debate and 
30 
questionmg. 
L.K. Advani undertook his first Ram Rath Yatra when V.P. Singh the then 
Prime Minister (National Front Government) announced his intention of 
implementing the recommendations of the Mandal Commission Report in August 
1990. The Mandal Report caused a widespread apprehension in the Sangh Parivar 
because it also included certain Muslim communities in the OBC category. At the 
same time, it was obvious that the flat rejection of the Mandal formula would 
jeopardize the pam's protracted drive to attract support from lower caste groups. 
Encouraged by the Sangh Parivar the BJP decided to break from the V.P. Singh's 
government (the BJP gave an external support to the National Front government of 
V.P. Singh) and to embark more strongly than before on the platform of the 
Hindutva and the Ramjanambhoomi agitation.^ ^ 
Therefore to counter the political threat from the Mandal Commission Report, L.K. 
Advani decided to launch his first Rath Yatra from Somnath in Gujarat to Ayodhya 
in Uttar Pradesh for the construction of the Ram Temple at the Babri mosque site. 
L.K. Advani chose Somnath as the strating point of his Ram Rath Yatra 
because it is the living symbol of an ancient nation where the Hindu temples and 
shrines were destroyed by the Islamic invaders in 1026 A.D. by Mahmud of 
Ghazni. In 1950, the destroyed temples were rebuilt at the initiative of Sardar Patel 
as a symbol of resurgent Indian Nationhood. 
a) The Ram Rath Yatra: The Bhartiya Janata Party President L.K. Advani 
launched the Party's prestigious 10,000 Km long Ram Rath Yatra on September 
" The Times of India, New Delhi, March 5, 2004. 
'* Hansen, Thomas Blom, and Jaffretot, Christophe, (eds.), The BJP and the Compulsion Politics in 
India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 136. 
" Hensen, Thomas Blom, The Saffron Wave Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modem India, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 164. 
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25, 1990 with a call for strengthening the unity of India and promoting 
Nationalism. He however rejected the demand for halting his Ram Rath Yatra, 
saying that it was channelising the Public sentiments on the Ramjanambhoomi 
issue in a peaceful manner.'**^  
He dismissed as baseless the imputation that the Rath Yatra was fuelling 
communal tension. He remarked that a section of the opposition leaders were 
trying to mislead the Muslims on the issue of Ramjanambhoomi- Babri Masjid. He 
further had said that there could be a peaceful resolution of the dispute if the Babri 
Masjid was shifted 5 Km away from its present site in Ayodhya. He had said that 
those opposing the Ramjanambhoomi temple movement were not only hurting the 
sentiments of the Hindus but also creating a fear complex to terrorized the ordinary 
Muslim just to gain the favour of Muslim leaders for political mileage. 
In a move to resolve the temple issue the Prime Minister V.P. Singh had talks with 
the BJP leaders L.K. Advani and Atal Bihari Vajpayee on the Ramjanambhoomi 
issue. The Prime Minister also had discussions on the issue with the senior leaders 
of the Babri Masjid Action Committee and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. However, 
despite lots of persuasion L.K. Advani was adamant to go ahead with the Yatra. 
Therefore in order to fmd an amicable solution the central government was in 
touch with the political and religious leaders to resolve the Ayodhya dispute. The 
building of a Ram Temple at the disputed site at Ayodhya without disturbing the 
Babri Masjid was one of the suggestions, which found favour at the meeting of 
Hindu Religious leaders convened by V.P. Singh."^ 
The Hindu religious leaders, however made it clear in the meeting that 
there could be no other compromise and if this was not acceptable then they would 
go ahead with the plan for construction of the temple at any cost. 
However, in the meeting it was also strongly felt that nothing should be 
allowed to hurt the feelings of the Muslim community and to disturb the status-
quo. The dispute needs to be settled through negotiations, failing which the verdict 
of the court should be respected. The National Front government had again assured 
"" The Statesman, New Delhi, October 7, 1990. 
"' The Statesman, NewDeJhi, October J 7, 1990. 
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in the meeting that it was committed to protect the Babri Masjid in accordance 
with law. 
The Congress and the Bhartiya Janata Party welcomed the National Front 
government Proposal to request the High Court to appoint a special bench for 
expeditious hearing of the case. The National Front leaders were in contact with 
the Congress and the BJP leadership as well as with the Hindu and the Muslim 
religious leaders in order to find out a negotiated settlement.''^ 
Efforts to persuade L.K. Advani proved futile, as he was adamant on his 
stand to continue with the Rath Yatra for the construction of the Ram Temple at 
Ayodhya. Therefore, it was decided to involve the National Front Chairman N.T. 
Rama Rao in the compromise efforts. The talks were centered for avoiding any 
confrontation between the Front and the BJP. 
Therefore in order to stop the Rath Yatra from entering Uttar Pradesh the 
then Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav employed all possible means to stop 
the Rath Yatra. Even V.P. Singh also gave clear indications that he was ready to 
quit rather than compromise with the erosion of the constitution. He further said 
that no cost is great, be it office or the government in upholding the constitution. 
Prime Minister V.P. Singh presented a three-point plan on October 23, 
1990 to the conference of Chief Minister's; in order to overcome the immediate 
problems arising from Rath Yatra and Kar Seva at Ayodhya. The second point of 
the formula was that the central government should be given six months time more 
to solve the dispute. The third point of the formula was that a special bench of the 
High Court should be constituted to hear the dispute from day to day to reach on 
expeditious decision'^ . 
All the Chief Minister's present at the meeting stressed the need for 
conciliation and felt that efforts for a settlement should continue. All present in the 
meeting held the same view, as "no attempt should be made to aggravate 
communal tensions that already existed. They stressed that issues should be 
"^  The Statesman, New Delhi, October 18, 1990. 
••' The Statesman, New Delhi, October 23,1990. 
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resolved amicably by negotiation. In the country's interest, communal harmony, 
peace and tranquility and secular values should be preserved"'*'* 
In the meantime the decision of the Supreme Court and of the Lucknow 
bench of the Allahabad High Court came that the march of the Pilgrims to 
Ayodhya should not be stopped and no obstruction should be put on their way and 
to restore all facilities for the pilgrims going to Ayodhya for a "Parikrama", 
religious ceremony on October 30, 1990. This decision encouraged the communal 
spirit of the BJP to go ahead with the Rath Yatra. 
During the course of the Rath Yatra L. K. Advani was arrested. This led the 
BJP and its allies to withdraw its support from the National Front government of 
V.P. Singh. However V.P. Singh refused to resign and instead offered to prove his 
majority on the floor of the House. The President acceded to his request and asked 
him to prove his majority on the floor of the House by November 7, 1991 .'*^  
Before the House could meet on November 7, 1991, a split occurred in the 
Janata Dal on November 5, 1991. One faction was headed by Chandra Shekhar to 
be known as Janata Dal (Socialist) and the other by V.P. Singh. Chandra Shekhar 
submitted to the speaker, a list of 58 Lok Sabha members who elected him as their 
leader. The Congress (1) parliamentary party decided to support from outside the 
government headed by the leader of Janata Dal faction Chandra Shekhar."*^  
The V.P. Singh's National Front Government was defeated on the floor of 
the House. On November 8, 1991, the Congress (I) in a letter to the President 
conveyed the party's decision to extend support to the Chandra Shekhar, leader of 
the breakaway Janata Dal group to form a new Government. Later Chandra 
Shekhar was sworn in as the Prime Minister of India. 
The support of the Congress Party to the Chandra Shekhar government did 
not last long and on the charges of surveillance at the residence of Rajiv Gandhi by 
the Haryana cops led to the downfall of the Chandra Shekhar Government at the 
Centre. As a result the Ninth Lok Sabha was dissolved on March 13, 1991.'*^  
44 
45 
"* Ibid. 
Ibid, 
Kashyap, Subhash C, Op. cit., p. 218. 
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In between all these events the Ram Rath Yatra was a tremendous success 
no other efforts at political mobilization had drawn such a popular response. The 
moral and revolutionary dimensions of the Ram Rath Yatra made it comparable to 
the Salt Satyagraha or 'Dandi March' of Mahatma Gandhi in 1930 during the 
struggle for India's Independence. The Yatra effectively drove home the point that 
if Ram represented the ideal of conduct, Ram Rajya represented the ideal of 
governance. The sheer magnitude of popular support made it comparable to Tilaks 
appropriation of Ganesh Chaturthi to mobilize public opinion against colonial rule. 
The Mandal-Mandir issue had nearly extincted the Janata Dal from the 
political scene. The BJP was criticized for raging communal hatred in the country. 
Criticizing the BJP the Congress blamed that the Rath Yatra was nothing but a 
"Vote Yatra' adding that it was not the love of Hindutva but a desire for votes that 
had motivated the Yatra. Due to the Rath Yatra the communal tension had erupted 
in the countn,, which forced the then Congress President Rajiv Gandhi to 
undertake a Sadbhavana Yatra, in order to maintain communal harmony. 
During the course of the Advani's Ram Rath Yatra the BJP's Ayodhya 
campaign caused Congress defeat badly in the States as well as at the centre. While 
the base of the Congress's flattened, the BJP regained because of it aggressive 
President L.K. Advani, who had extended its organizational structure in the 
districts on the pattern of the RSS network in order to strengthen its dream of a 
Hindu Nation. The Congress support base got eroded by its inability to either 
convince Muslims that it was a staunch defender of secularism or convince Hindus 
that it was their best ally. As a result the BJP had overwhelming victory in the 
1991 General and Assembly Elections at the Centre as well as in Uttar Pradesh due 
to the religious and communal feeling among the voters. After 1991, the BJP 
consolidated its base in Uttar Pradesh as well as at the Centre while that of the 
Congress's eroded.''* 
b) Ekta Yatra: A Yatra for Unity: The BJP's Political progress took another turn 
with a new symbolic campaign. Twenty-five months after L.K. Advani's Rath 
rolled out of Somnath on its way to Ayodhya, another chariot was decked up for a 
longer march from Kanya Kumari to Kashmir. According to the then Party General 
' Hansen and Jaffrelot, Op. cit., p 76. 
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Secretary Govindacharya "This Yatra will give an effective political dimension to 
the basic ideological perspective of the party by emphazing the Kashmir 
problem """ 
The Kashmir Valley was chosen by the BJP for the Yatra because the 
whole State was engulfed in the flames of separatism and fundamentalist terrorism, 
aided and abetted by Pakistan. The bloodshed forced the Kashmir Pandits to flee 
from the State and take refugee in camps. Moreover Article 370 had proved 
counter productive both to the interests of the Kashmir and also to that of the rest 
of the country. The State Assembly was under suspension and the President Rule 
was imposed in the State. ^ ° 
The State of Jammu and Kashmir had been given special status under 
Article 370. According to it the President of India cannot declare the National 
Emergency without the consent of the State government. Similarly, the Financial 
Emergency (Article 360) cannot be imposed in the State without its consent. 
There is a separate constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir which 
was drafted by the Constituent Assembly of the State. The State constitution came 
into force on January 26, 1957. If the government of Jammu and Kashmir does not 
run according to the provisions of the State constitution, the Governor's Rule is 
imposed for a period of six months. The President Rule can be imposed under 
Article 356 of the constitution of India, if the President is satisfied that the 
government of State does not run according to the provision of the constitution of 
India. 
Moreover, the provisions of the Directive Principles of state policy are not 
applicable in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The rights to acquisition of 
property and residence are given only to the permanent residents of the State. 
Parliament cannot change the name and boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir 
without the prior consent of the State Legislature. The Powers and jurisdiction of 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Election Commission and the Supreme 
Court have been extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The other 
"" Gaba, Daljit Kaur, Great Personalities life Sketch, Series 3, Life and Times of Lai Krishna 
Advani, New Delhi, Pentagon Paper Backs, 2002, p. 49. 
«/6W. 
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provisions of the constitution of India may extend to the State with prior consent of 
the State Legislature of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The Article 370 became operative on November 17, 1952 by an order of 
the President issued with prior recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of 
Jammu and Kashmir to that effect. 
The Article 370 cannot be amended by the Parliament. It can be made 
inoperative by an order of the President which can be issued with the prior 
recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State to that effect. For this 
purpose, a fresh Constituent Assembly will have to be constituted in the State. 
That is why Article 370 is always in controversies and there is a constant 
demand by the people and by various political parties to repeal Article 370 in the 
interest of the Indian union, but till date nothing of that sort has happened. 
The Ekta Yatra was undertaken by Murli Manohar Joshi with the aim to 
presen'e the unit}' of the country in the face of adversity. The Yatra commenced on 
December 11, 1991 from Kanyakumari to Kashmir. The Rath Yatra was 
undertaken on December 11 because it marked the Birth anniversary of the 
Nationalist Tamil Poet, Subramanyam Bharti and it also marked the martyrdom of 
Guru Teg Bahadur who had taken upon himself to protect the Hindus of Kashmir 
from being persecuted by the Mughals and their Subedars. '^ For the BJP the Yatra 
was an opportunity to streamline the party organization that is why a "Kesari 
Vahini" a saffron brigade was raised on the lines of the Bajrang Dal during the 
Yatra, batches of youth displaying their saffron insignia administered an oath in the 
name of Nationalism by Murli Manohar Joshi at various points of his itinerary.^ ^ 
After the 47 days the scheduled Yatra culminated at Srinagar on January 
26, 1992 after covering 14 States. The Ekta Yatra marked the turning point in the 
battle against terrorism. The main motif of the Party that its presence be felt in the 
valley was achieved because it wanted to lure the violence affected people 
especially the Kashmiri Pandits towards the Bhartiya Janata Party. 
" Ibid, p. 50. 
" The Statesman, New Delhi, Nov. 17, 1991. 
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c) Janadesh Yatra: During the Congress reign of 1991 the Prime Minister, P.V. 
Narasimha Rao's government introduced two bills in the Parliament the 80'*' 
Amendment Bill of the constitution and the Representation of people 
(Amendment) Bill with the purpose of banning religion from public life. The BJP 
accused the Congress for introducing the two draconian bills which were infact 
designed to deny political space to the BJP. The main aim of these legislation 
according to the BJP were minority appeasement and crass vote bank politics. The 
BJP stalled the Bills in the Parliament and the debate was deferred, the Bills were 
not withdrawn inspite of all these.^ '^  
While criticizing the Bills L.K. Advani said "we strongly object religion 
being translated, as dharma .... for the average Indian irrespective of whether he is 
a Hindu or a Muslim or a Christian, his respective religion is for him and 
inspiration for righteous conduct. By ousting religion from politics, we will be 
weakening the moral base of public life. Politics should be cleansed of adharma, 
not dharma. It should get rid of corruption and criminalization, not of probity and 
integrin..'" 
The BJP accused the Congress for the Bills on following bases: 
(1) Firstly, it aimed to subvert the basic scheme of election and allowed pre-
emptive disqualification. 
(2) Secondly, it provided the constitutional legitimacy to ban religious 
organizations. 
(3) Thirdly, to make the state irreligious rather than one which respects all 
religions equally. 
(4) Fourthly, the bill allowed the summary deregistration of political parties.^' 
In protest to those bills L.K. Advani launched four Janadesh Yatras, to be 
led by senior leaders of the Party during September, 1993 against the draconian, 
anti-democratic and anti-people measures. 
" Gaba, Daljit Kaur, Op. cit.. p. 53. 
^ Ibid., p 54. 
'Ibid. 
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The Yatra commenced on September 11, 1993, the centenary day of Swami 
Vivekananda's Chicago address, and culminated on September 25, 1993, the birth 
anniversary of Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhaya at Bhopal. 
L. K. Advani commenced his Yatra from Mangalore and travelled through 
Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. Dr. Murli Manohar Joshi started from 
Porbander and covered Gujarat and Maharashtra. Kalyan Singh undertook his 
journey from Calcutta and travelled through West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. 
Bahiron Singh Shekhawat initiated his Yatra from Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal 
Pradesh, Chandigarh, Haryana, Delhi and Rajasthan.^^ 
These four political leaders during their fortnight long journey addressed 
public meetings and rallies at several places. They travelled about 15,000 Km and 
over 14 States and two Union territories of Delhi and Chandigarh. 
According to L.K. Advani the mission of the Yatra was "Loktantra 
Rakshana>a. Dharma Chakra Parvartanaya" (to define democracy and to establish 
the rule of dharma). 
The Yatra's specific aim was to tell the people how the Congress move to 
delink religion from politics could undermine democracy. However Ayodhya was 
the main focal point of the Yatra. According to Advani the Ayodhya movement is 
a National movement. The movement reflected the sentiments of crores of people 
whose psyche is essentially religious. He further added that the controversial 
Religious Bill (80'^ Amendment of the constitution and the Representation of 
people (Amendment Bill) came up because of his party's growth following the 
Ayodhya movement. 
According to Murli Manohar Joshi, the people should reject the bill. He 
described it as an "onslaught on India's great cultural heritage'. He charged that 
the aim of the Bill was delinking the BJP from electoral politics and the party 
would fight by "ideological battle". The Proposed Bill contravened all the five 
aspects of democratic electoral process. Those included free and fair elections, no 
court instructions during electoral process, provision of judicial review to go into 
* The Statesman, New Delhi, Nov. 17, 1991. 
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electoral malpractices and no law should be permitted to convert a multi party 
system into a one party rule.^^ 
Even Bhairon Singh Shekhawat also held the same views as that of Murli Manohar 
Joshi. According to him "dharma in Indian context did not mean a sect a creed, or 
an ideology and was quite different from the English word religion". For us 
''Dharma" means non-violence, truth, patience, tolerance and forgiveness.'* 
The four Janadesh Yatras undertaken by the BJP leaders in different 
corners of the country helped the BJP to awake the people against the intensions of 
the Congress party that is to create one party system in the country in the name of 
delinking religion from politics. The Bills were never passed due to the 
controversial nature of its contents. 
d) Suraj Yatra, the Rath Yatra to Boast Party Morale: The year 1996 proved to 
be the watershed of Indian politics. The exposure of Scams had broken the ethos of 
Indian political values and had resulted in the collapse of governing system. The 
corruption charges engulfed the Congress Party and the Suraj Yatra undertaken by 
L.K. Advani proved to be an effective tool in weakening the Congress party 
structure. 
L.K. Advani undertook the Suraj Yatra, when he was charge sheeted by the 
CBI (1996), during the Hawala Scam under the Congress regime. Therefore he 
resigned his seat in the Lok Sabha and took a public vow not to enter Parliament 
till cleared of the charges and in a desperate political gamble to counter the stigma 
of the Hawala case against him, L.K. Advani embarked on another Rath Yatra 
from March 9-April 14, 1996. 
The Yatra was flagged off-from Emakulam in Kerela by Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee. The Yatra winded its way through 16 States, covering 10,000 Km in 35 
days before ending in Delhi. The Rath had a saffron flag, sporting a portrait of 
Subhash Chandra Bose and carried as its main symbol the BJP's lotus emblem'^ 
The aim of the Rath Yatra was to spread the four point message of the 
Party. Suraksha (Security), Shuchita (Social harmony), and Swadeshi (Self 
" Gaba, Daljit Kaur, Op. cii., p. 56. 
''Ibid. 
^' Indian Express, February. 23, 1996. 
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Reliance). The BJP accused the Congress government at the centre for bogging 
down the case against Advani in legalities and technicalities, the party decided to 
leave, the legal battle to the lawyers and to take the fight on the political plane 
through a Janjagran Yatra. The Yatra was a clear indication that the BJP President 
had hoped to get himself and the Party out of the Hawala rut which had crippled 
the Party. 
The Suraj Yatra was undertaken in 1996, since the year 1996 marked the 50 
years of self-rule (the interim government headed by Nehru was installed in 1946) 
as well as the birth anniversary of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, the theme for this 
Yatra named "Suraj Yatra" was from Swaraj to Suraj^ *^  
The purpose of the Yatra was Delhi Chalo (the slogan raised by Neta 
Subhash Chandra Bose) became an inspiring slogan for all patrioits. Delhi chalo at 
that time was a slogan aimed at Swaraj (Self government). Through the Suraj Yatra 
the BJP wanted to spread the message of Subhash, Shuchita, Samarasta and 
Swadeshi and its ideology of culture Nationalism (Hindutva) to the people. 
B\ the time the Yatra ended in Lucknow, the BJP's objective had been 
achieved. The Congress part\' suffered the worst ever defeat in the Parliamentary 
Elections of 1996. The people had registered their mandate for change, their 
endorsement for Suraj proved Seudo-Secular cassandras wrong.^' 
e) Swarna Jayanti Rath Yatra: The Bhartiya Janata Party had organized the 
Swama Jayanti Rath Yatra to commemorate the Golden Jubliee of India's 
Independence. The Rath Yatra was focused as a major mass contact and mass 
education campaign on a landmark event in the history of modem India. 
According to L.K. Advani the Swama Jayanti Rath Yatra was a political 
pilgrimage for him (A Rashtra Bhakti Ki Teerth Yatra). Enabling him to visit 
places sanctified by the struggles and sacrifices of the heroes of the Freedom 
Movement and to pay the humble tributes to their immortal memory. 
The Swarna Jayanti Rath Yatra had the following four objectives; 
^ Gaba, Daljit Kaur, Op. cil., p. 58. 
^^ Ibid, p. 59. 
^^Jbid. p. 62. 
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1. Firstly, to rekindle the dimming flame of patriotism by paying homage to all 
the martyrs and freedom fighters as also by recalling the proud pages of the 
glorious struggle for Independence. 
2. Secondly, to take stock of the successes, shortcomings and failures of the first 
50 years of free India. 
3. Thirdly, to catalyse a serious debate on the important issues and problems 
confronting the country. 
4. Fourthly, to project the BJP's vision for national reconstruction with specific 
focus on transforming Swaraj (self governance) to Suraj (good governance) 
The aim of the Swarana Jayanti Rath Yatra was to revive cultural 
Nationalism as India's true National Identity.^^ 
The Bhartiya Janata Party was proud of having held aloft the banner of 
India's true national identity in the name of cultural nationalism. The Ram Rath 
Yatra of 1990 in support of the demand for the construction of a Mandir at 
Ramjanambhoomi in Ayodhya was the first initial attempt of the BJP to present 
'cultural nationalism' in the form of a Yatra. Through the Swama Jayanti Rath 
Yatra the Part>' attempted once again to conduct a massive mass education 
campaign on the issue of'nationalism' reminding the people that nationalism alone 
could strengthen India's unity and serve as a dynamo for sides progress.^'' 
Even during the Swama Jayanti Rath Yatra the Ayodhya Movement was at 
the centre stage of BJP's agenda. The BJP President termed the Ayodhya 
movement as the greatest public movement since Independence. During the course 
of Swama Jayanti Rath Yatra L.K. Advani pledged to construct the Ram Temple at 
Ayodhya. Therefore he called upon the people to elect the BJP govemment with an 
absolute majority in times to come. 
The central theme of the Swaran Jayanti Rath Yatra was a call to the people 
to wage and win the 'Second Freedom Struggle', freedom from the bondage of 
Bhookh (hunger), Bhay (fear), and Bhrashtachar (Corruption). 
^^Ibid. p. 63. 
^Ibid, p. 64. 
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The three point Swarna Jayanti pledge was enthusiastically accepted by 
millions of people. The three commandments of the pledge were as follows: 
1. On the occasion of the Swarna Jayanti of India's Independence one should 
neither take nor give bribes. 
2. One should work with honesty, dedication and discipline. In the spirit of a 
new work culture one should give priority to patriotic duty over narrow 
self-interest. 
3. One should not discriminate on the basis of caste and creed, but instead, be 
guided solely by rational consideration and interest of motherland.*^ 
Unlike the previous Yatras undertaken by the BJP, the Swarna Jayanti Rath 
Yatra was not a single-issue exercise. It had a very wide canvas of concerns 
pertaining to India's performance in the first fifty years of freedom. The Swarna 
Jayanti Rath Yatra succeeded in propagating the message of Samajik Samarasata 
(Social Harmony) rooted in the philosophy of cultural nationalism. 
The Swarna Jayanti Rath Yatra earned tremendous good will for the BJP 
and increased its mass support. The party was hopeful that it will get electoral 
benefits from all these developments because the people of the country were fed-
up with the corruption, criminalization, casteism and communalization of Indian 
polity during the reign of the Congress party. The BJP was successful in its 
attempts to woo the voters on the above charges, by forming its government with 
the help of its allied partners (National Democratic Alliance) in 1998 for a brief 
period of 13 months and full fledged five years term government in 1999 under the 
leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpyaee. 
f) Bharat Uday Yatra: The Bharat Uday Yatra was undertaken by L. K. Advani 
during 2004 General Elections. It was an attempt to legitimize himself as Atal 
Bihari Vajypayee's successor and was also an attempt to mobilize the RSS support 
for the BJP's election campaign (2004 General Elections). On March 2, 2004, L.K. 
Advani sprang a surprise not just upon the public and his National Democratic 
Alliance partners, but also upon most Bhartiya Janata Party leaders themselves by 
^^Ibid, pp. 66-12. 
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announcing his plans for a Ratli Yatra to be routed through 121 Lok Sabha 
constituencies and covering 8, 891 Kilometres 66 
The basic purpose of the Yatra was seen in the context of the BJP's 
keenness to speed up the process of succession to the NDA's leadership from 
Vajpayee to Advani and in the light of the party internal power dynamics. The 
Yatra's principal objective was threefold. Firstly, to project Advani not just as the 
BJP's number two campaigner, but as leader of great stature in his own right 
independent of Vajpayee. 
Secondly the Rath Yatra was to stress the continuity between Advani's 
present venture and the original Yatra of 1990 and to remind the party that it was 
he who built up the BJP's strength from a pathetic two seats in the Lok Sabha 
Elections of 1984 to 86 seats in the 1989 General Elections and then on to three 
digit number. The Key to this success was Advani's strategy of mobilization 
around the Ayodhya temple issue and the Ram Rath Yatra. 
Thirdly, to launch Advani not as the BJP's organizational boss, but as 
someone who could quickly take over from Vajpayee as the leader of its 
Pajliamentar> wing. However there was a huge deception involved in this because 
the BJP had so far centered its election campaign exclusively on Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee. 
Besides repositioning Advani within the BJP, the Bharat Uday Yatra served 
other purposes too. It characteristically organized Hindu religious motifs, for 
example the Yatra was flagged off from Delhi on the way to Kanyakumari amides 
chants of "Jai Shri Ram". The Yatra was clearly meant to galvanished the BJP and 
especially the RSS cadres in areas where the BJP was weak. 
The Bharat Uday Yatra was Advani's third major Yatra. The first was the 
Ram Rath Yatra in 1990 in support of the demand for the construction of a Ram 
Temple in Ayodhya. The other Yatra was the Swama Jayanti Yatra in 1997 to 
commemorate the Golden Jubilee of India's Independence and to popularize the 
BJP's resolves to transform Swaraj (self governance) into Suraj (good governance) 
L.K. Advani said that there was an intrinsic link between the Bharat Uday Yatra 
The Times of India, New Delhi, March 3,2004. 
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and his earlier Yatras. "There was common conceptual and emotional thread of 
resurgent nationalism that runs through all of them". The aim of the Bharat Uday 
Yatra as claimed by Advani was about the regeneration of the nation, but the 
emphasis was on economic and governmental rather than cultural regeneration-
stimulated by the stability of Prime Minister Vajpayee's towering personality.^ ^ 
During the course of the Rath Yatra BJP was certain that the NDA would 
win the General Elections (2004). The reason for this was the good fortunes they 
had observed in December 2003 when the BJP swept the polls during the State 
Assembly Elections in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chattisgarh defeating in 
each the Congress Party by huge margins in terms of seats won. 
The BJP used slogans like 'India shining' and 'Feel Good Factor' during its 
Election campaign but these slogans failed to enthusiase the general masses. This 
overconfident attitude resulted in the defeat of the BJP. 
The Bharat Uday Yatra was unfortunately a failure for L.K. Advani, the 
Yatra failed to consolidate Hindu votes for the BJP. This happened because the 
secular forces did their utmost to deconstruct and dismantle the BJP's centered 
"Feel Good" propaganda campaign and raised issues that were concerned to the 
masses in general. The secular forces focused on the actual politics of the BJP 
v\hich uas based on communalism. The people in general were too eager to get 
away with the ideology of Hindutva. As a result they preferred Congress in 2004 
General Elections. 
The BJP lost the 2004 General Elections to the Congress. L.K. Advani 
failed to get the position of Atal Bihari Vajpayee as expected due to the internal 
tiffs within the party on the succession issue. Rajnath Singh from Uttar Pradesh of 
BJP unit replaced L.K. Advani as the President of the Party, (due to the favourable 
remarks made by Mr. L.K. Advani for Mohd. All Jinnah the founder of Pakistan) 
during his visit to Pakistan. This caused a lot of differences within the party. 
Since 2004 General Elections the BJP has weakened due to internal tiffs 
and tussles within the party organization. As a result other political parties are 
trying hard to enhance their political fortune at the cost of the BJP. 
*' Adeney, Katharine and Saez, Lawrence., (eds.), Coalition Politics And Hindu Nationalism, 
Routledge: Taylor and Frances Group, 2005, p. 37. 
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CHAPTER-III 
THE ELECTORAL POLITICS IN UTTAR PRADESH 
(a) General Political Background and Electoral Politics 
in the State since Independence 
(b) The Role of Religion in Uttar Pradesh's Electoral 
Politics 
(c) The Role of Caste in Uttar Pradesh's Electoral 
Politics 
(a) General Political Background and Electoral Politics in the State since 
Independence 
The core of the Indian mainstream is the Hindi heartland consisting of nine 
Hindi speaking States i.e. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Haryana, Himachal 
Pradesh, Jharlchand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand. All these States 
have traditionally played a crucial role in the electoral battle for New Delhi'. 
Uttar Pradesh is India's largest State and one of the most socially and 
economically backward in the Northern heartland. The State has lagged behind in 
terms of economic and social developments, but it is the most prized possession for 
any political party in the country. The State of Uttar Pradesh is located in the Indo-
Gangatic basin and sends 80 members to Lok Sabha, the highest amongst all the 
States. The party, who wins majority of seats from this crucial State, only makes it 
to the centre. That is why every political party wants to muster large number of 
seats from this State but none has the monopoly over the State. 
Uttar Pradesh, India's largest and politically most important State is 
generally described as a prime example of the political crisis into which the Indian 
Political System has slowly descended from the late 1960s onwards. 
During National Movement and even after Independence too the State of 
Uttar Pradesh was the stronghold of the Congress party. The Congress had become 
the part>' of consensus because it carried with it all those classes and sections of 
Indian societ>-, which had taken part in the freedom struggle. By adopting a centrist 
position, the Congress had won the support of both the poor masses and 
bourgeoisie. Consequently' Uttar Pradesh witnessed a State of considerable 
poHtical stability in a situation of "One Party Dominance". 
As the Congress politics of consensus lost its nerve, the ideologies and 
interests of other political group acquired greater relevance and crystallized. The 
Fourth General Elections of 1967 witnessed the rise of regional parties which had 
based themselves on the specific regional or local issues, local interests and local 
influential lobbies. These regional parties based on caste, language and ethnic 
platforms succeeded in carving out a place for themselves in the State because of 
' Ajay K. Mehra, D. D. Khanna, Gert W. Kueck (eds.), Political Parties And Parly 
Systems, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2003, p. 42. 
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their persistent work among people^. 
In the Fourth General Election (1967) the Congress had faced a great 
setback both in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. Out of total 507 Lok Sabha 
seats the Congress had secured only 280 and at State level out of a total of 3,5 63 
seats in all the Assemblies the Congress had secured only 1,0 90 seats. In U.P. the 
biggest State of India, the Congress could secure only 198 seats out of 425 seats. 
The break-up was Jana Sangh 97 seats, SSP 44, Communist (R) 14, Swatantra 12, 
PSP 11, Republican 9 and the Communist (L) one seat only. The stronghold of the 
Congress party in Uttar Pradesh, which was continuing since Independence thus, 
came to an end. 
The most important developments at the political and parliamentary levels 
in India during the period (1967) were phenomenon of defections and party splits. 
TTie Congress, which had lost its dominance in the Lok Saba was further weakened 
b\' the split in the part>'. The Congress party had failed to secure a clear-cut 
majorin. even in the State Assembly, although it emerged as the single largest 
part) in Uttar Pradesh. At that time there were two candidates for leadership-
Charan Singh and C.B. Gupta. The central leadership chose C.B. Gupta in the 
belief that he commanded the support of the majority, the agreement leading to 
Charan Singh's withdrawal was said to have made it incumbent upon C.B. Gupta 
to consult Charan Singh in the choice of the personnel for the ministry. 
In March 1967, the Congress had formed Ministry under C.B. Gupta with 
die support of Independent members. However his ministry could not survive 
because of frequent defections. Congressmen defected along with followers from 
the Congress party and joined hands with the opposition. On April I, 1967, Charan 
Singh along with 17 Congress members defected from the Congress and crossed 
the floor in the Assembly, announcing that C.B. Gupta's intransigence had 
compelled them to take this decision. Soon after Charan Singh formed a coalition 
government as leader of the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal. The defection within the 
United Front continued unabated. While five of its members left to form the 
Progressive Party, subsequently even the members of Swatantra Party and the 
^ Narang, A.S., Indian Government And Politics, New Delhi, Gitanjali Publishing House, 
2005, p. 625. 
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communist party of India also withdrew their support- Ultimately Charan Singh 
was forced to tender his resignation on February 17, 1968 and the State was placed 
under Presidential Rule .^ 
In the mid term poll of 1969, no Single party could secure a clear cut 
majority. On February 16, 1969 C.B. Gupta of Congress was sworn in as the Chief 
Minister with the support of Independents and Swatantra Party. Though the 
collective strength of opposition parties was more than the Congress had, yet it 
could not make government because of division in their own ranks'*. 
The government headed by C.B. Gupta too could not last long because of 
split in the Congress party. In 1969 Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister and 
Morarji Desai was the Deputy Prime Minister of the country. At the time of 
President of India's Election, Indira Gandhi's Presidential candidate was V.V. Giri 
whereas Morarji Desai's candidate was Sanjiva Reddy. V.V. Giri won election 
Indira Gandhi asked Morarji Desai to quit, on this split took place. Congress (N) 
supporters were Kamalapati Tripathi, Jagjivan Ram, H. N. Bahuguna, Fakhruddin 
Ali Ahmad. After the split, the other faction was Congress (o) Morarji Desai 
group. Its supporters were C. B. Gupta, Nijaiingappa etc. 
C.B. Gupta supported Congress (0) while Tripathi group supported 
Congress (N). To form a ministry in the State, each faction of Congress i.e. 
Congress (N) and Congress (o) required support of BKD having 98 seats. Both 
sides tried to woo Charan Singh to win his support for making government, 
Kamalapati Tripathi was successful. As a result Charan Singh withdrew his 
support from C.B. Gupta's government. As a result C.B. Gupta tendered his 
resignation on February 10, 1970 and advised Governor to invite opposition leader 
Charan Singh to form government (his advice was to prevent Kamalapati Tripathi 
Congress (N) becoming Chief Minister). 
There were long meetings and negotiations between Charan Singh and 
Kamalapti Tripathi as to who would head the government and finally it was agreed 
that Charan Singh will make his Single party government initially, and Congress 
^ Abid, Mohammad, Politics In Uttar Pradesh 1950-1980, Aligarh, Kitab Ghar 
Educational Publishers, 1986, p. 3. 
"ibid, p. 14. 
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(N) will support it from out and at an appropriate time Congress (N) will join the 
ministry. 
On February 17, 1970 Charan Singh was sworn in as Chief Minister of 
Uttar Pradesh and headed BKD Single party government. After two months, on 
April 17, 1970 Congress (N) also joined it. BKD- Congress coalition continued till 
October 1, 1970.^ 
The major reasons for the break-up of ties between the BKD and Congress 
(N) were two; one, Charan Singh's call of merger of BKD with Congress (N) was 
rejected by the National Executive of BKD. Two, BKD MP's in the Parliament had 
voted against the wishes of Congress, as they had voted against the abolition of 
Privy Purses. This move of the BKD had not only strained relations between 
coalition partners but the tension grew so high that Charan Singh asked 13 
Congress (N) Ministers to resign from the Ministry, when they declined his advise 
to quit, Charan Singh immediately recommended their dismissal to the Governor. 
On this Kamaiapati Tripathi withdrew his support to Charan Singh. The Governor 
seeking advise of the Attorney General asked Charan Singh to resign as Chief 
Minister and also recommended to the President imposition of'President Rule' in 
Uttar Pradesh''. 
However the State Assembly was not dissolved to enable political parties to 
reach some sort of accord to form government. Charan Singh was not ready to 
resign as he commanded support of opposition parties with the following of 223 in 
a House of 426 and wanted show of strength, as Assembly was to meet on October 
6, 1970. 
On September 30, 1970 Charan Singh sent a cable to the President of India, 
V.V. Giri, who was at Kiev [Soviet Union] requesting him not to Sign any order 
for 'The President's Rule' in U.P. till his return to India''. 
However B. Gopala Reddy asked Charan Singh to resign by the evening of 
September 28, 1970 and President V.V. Giri signed a proclamation taking over the 
administration of UP and suspended the State Assembly on October I, 1970*. 
^ Ibid, p. 184. 
* Ibid. p. 54. 
''fbid, p. 60. 
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Welding themselves into a new Samyukta Vidhayak Dal, the five U.P. 
Parties namely Congress (o), BKD, Jana Sangh, SSP and Swatantra along with 
some independents chose T.N. Singh Congress (O) member of Rajya Sabha as 
their leader and having strength of 250 members in the House of 426, staked claim 
to form Ministry in the State. Thus T.N. Singh, as SVD leader was sworn in as 
Chief Minister of U.P. on October 18, 1970.^  
Immediately after the mid-term poll to Lok Sahba in 1971 Chief Minister 
T.N. Singh said he would quit on March 18, 1971. BKD in the mid-term poll had 
done very badly. In UP it had contested 67 seats and could win one. In other States 
out of 33 seats contested could win none. Demoralized with the performance of 
BKD in the Elections many BKD MLAs defecting from the party joined Congress 
(N). 14 Independent MLA's also joined Congress (N). With over a dozen more 
SVD members defecting to Congress (N), T.N. Singh Ministry lost its majority in 
U.P. Its total strength from 250 seats was reduced to 189. The Congress (N) with 
212 members urged Governor to dissolve the SVD Ministry. Thus T.N. Singh 
Government formed on October 18, 1970 met its end on April 3, 1971. Governor 
B. Gopala Reddy immediately invited Kamlapati Tripathi-leader of Congress (N) 
to form Government on the same day. Kamlapati Tripathi's government lasted till 
General Elections of March, 1974. Congress in the elections of 1974, returned to 
power with a majority of 213 seats in the 425 members Assembly" .^ 
On March 5, 1974 H.N. Bahuguna was sworn in as Chief Minister of Uttar 
Pradesh. Charan Singh accused Congress of resorting to "illegal and dishonest 
practice in securing their election victory". In a Statement he charged some civil 
servants of having done active work for the success of Congress against law and 
rules". 
After H.N. Bahuguna, N.D. Tiwari took over as the Chief Minister of Uttar 
Pradesh and the Congress in U.P. remained in power throughout the Emergency 
phase (1975-77). 
^ lbid,p.6\. 
'^ Ibid. p. 69. 
'° Ibid. pp. 71-72. 
" Ibid. p. 73. 
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The Emergency Period gave a sharp turn to Indian politics setting a new 
frenzied pace to events and initiating an entirely new style of government in the 
country with different norms and values. 
The Election petition filed by Raj Narain [Socialist leader] in the Allahabad 
High Court had resulted in the disenfranchisement of Indira Gandhi for six years 
[June 12, 1975]. She was held guilty of corrupt practices under section 123 (7) of 
the Representation of People Act, for obtaining assistance of government officials 
in her constituency Rae-Bareilly in order to enhance her election prospects'^. 
All the opposition parties welcomed the verdict of Allahabad High Court. 
National Executive of Bhartiya Lok Dal under Charan Singh leadership had passed 
a resolution that Indira Gandhi had no moral right to continue as the Prime 
Minister after the court's verdict. 
After the Allahabad High Court verdict the political crisis had deepened 
and as a result President of India Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad imposed National 
Emergency on June 25-26 1975. This was followed by arrest of all important 
opposition leaders who were put to jail. On June 26, 1975 Charan Singh too was 
arrested under MISA. This news was not considered shocking under the then 
prevailing circumstances. People were so demoralized that there was no sign of 
any protest or agitation b\ any one from any comer in the country. 
In the Fourth week of July 1975 the Legislative Council and the Assembly 
of UP had met. On July 30, 1975, Brahm Dutt (member of UP Legislative Council) 
wrote letter to the Chairman of the Legislative Council informing him that the 
ELD, Jana Sangh and Congress (O) had decided to boycott the session because of 
the restriction imposed on their functioning due to National Emergency. In the 
meantime, several meetings of the opposition parties in the UP Legislature were 
called to discuss the steps to be taken. The legislators were not ready even to forgo 
their DA and they advanced the argument that in the Parliament also, the 
opposition members had decided to go to the House so that they could draw their 
DA, but would not participate in the proceedings. Brahm Dutt opposed this. By 
going to the House and drawing DA their participation would be on record. 
^^Jbid.p. 190. 
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Majority of the BLD members, who were outside the jail were of the view that 
they should issue a Statement condemning the declaration of Emergency and 
arrests, clarifying at the same time that the BLD, was functioning as a responsible 
opposition party and had nothing to do with the alleged subversive activities. There 
was so much confusion among the leaders and legislators that no regular resolution 
could be passed'''. 
The Jana Sangh legislators were panicky and they did not want to co-
operate with allied parties. Nobody could persue the President and the Secretary of 
the BLD to convene a meeting of the State Executive. Bhanu Pratap Singh 
President (BLD) was trying to contact Congress MP's and was in search of a 
solution. Nobody paid any attention to him. The response of the party workers was 
very poor. They were not ready to associate with these activities. Charan Singh 
publicly rebuked the people when he came out of jail after this apathy. 
Owing to personal differences the relations among political prisoners were 
strained in jail. During August 1975, the prisoners detained in jail were becoming 
anxious to be released. Subsequently the prisoners favoured the suspension of Jana 
Sangharsh Samiti activities, as these activities were merely prolonging the 
detention period. 
On February 15, 1976 Mrs. Gandhi asked the Opposition parties to follow 
the path of democracy so that democratic system could function in the country. A 
large majority of the people detained in the jails were in favour of a reconciliation. 
Only a hardcore opposed it. Leaders were released from the jail. This gave an 
opportunity to Jaya Prakash Narayan to invite leaders of opposition parties in 
March 1976 to form a new political party, Janata Party. 
On January 16, 1977 Emergency was relaxed and Lok Sabha Elections 
were announced. On January 23, 1977 the Janata Party was launched with Morarji 
Desai as Chairman and Charan Singh as Deputy Chairman. 
The Janata Party gave a remarkable performance both in Lok Sabha and 
Assembly Elections (1977). It had secured 345 seats out of 539 seats. In the U.P. 
Assembly out of 423 seats, the Janata Party had secured 350 seats. Congress 46 
'^/bid, pp. 83-84. 
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seats, CPI 9, CPI (M), Independents and others secured 16 seats. Morarji Desai 
was sworn in as the Prime Minister of India. 
The Janata Party interpreted its victory at the centre as a defeat of the 
Congress and a challenge to the moral right of Congress to continue to rule in the 
Northern States. As most of these Assemblies had already completed their term of 
five years, the Janata Party thought it desirable to seek the verdict of the people. 
These States were Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal. When the Chief Ministers of 
these States refused to oblige the Janata Party, the government decided to invoke 
Article 356 of the constitution without the recommendation of Governors of these 
States. The President of India dissolved these Assemblies'''. 
After the Lok Sabha Polls, in the first trial of strength in UP Assembly on 
April 1, 1977, the Congress with the help of CPI, defeated the non-CPI 
opposition's amendment to the motion of thanks for the Governor's address by 46 
votes, thus frustrating the attempt to topple the N.D. Tiwari Ministry. 223 members 
including 15 of the CPI voted against the amendment and 177 for it. 
On the advice of the Prime Minister Morarji Desai, the acting President 
B.D. Jatti dissolved 9 State Assemblies including UP on May 1, 1977. In the 1977 
Assembly Elections the Janata Party won 350 of the 422 seats in U.P. The 
Congress could secure only 46 seats. The party had won 216 seats in the 1974 
elections. Its poll ally could secure only nine seats as against 16 in the last 
.AssembK Elections. The CPI (M) got only one seat. Ram Naresh Yadav was 
sworn in as the Chief .Minister of the State. 
Soon the Janata Party met the same fate as SVD had met in U.P. The cracks 
had appeared within the party. On June 29, 1978, the crisis in the Janata Party 
deepened further when the then Prime Minister Morarji Desai asked Charan Singh 
and Raj Narain to resign from the Union Cabinet. The Prime Minister had objected 
in particular to Charan Singh's Statement, criticizing the government for delay in 
taking legal action against Indira Gandhi and calling for her immediate arrest. Not 
only both of them had resigned but the whole lot of Charan Singh supporters also 
^^ Ibid. p. 93. 
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resigned from the party. At the State level, in UP 200 members of Janata Party 
submitted a memorandum to the Governor demanding the removal of Chief 
Minister Ram Naresh Yadav. 
Ram Naresh Yadav was removed in July, 1978 due to the strong 
reservation of Charan Singh against him. Banarsi Das was sworn in as Chief 
Minister of the State, who continued till the Assembly, was dissolved and 1980, 
State Assembly Elections held. In the elections of 1980 the Congress (1) swept the 
poll and captured 306 seats in a House of 425 as against only 46 in 1977. The 
Janata Party was almost wiped out securing only four seats. Its breakaway group 
Bhartiya Janata Party secured 11 seats and Janata only 4 as against 351 seats in the 
House of 425 in the year 1977. Thus once again Congress (I) government in the 
State was formed under the Chief Ministership of Vishwanath Pratap Singh. 
It was the performance rather non-performance of the various non-
Congress government that put the people off and so its was the Congress again in 
1980. The Congress was back in the saddle in a big way. The Congress party had 
avenged its defeat of 1977. The Janata Party soon collapsed and thereafter 
fragmented into various political parties and groups'^. 
Congress (I) had lost the 1977 General Elections primarily because the 
Muslims had totally deserted the Congress for its forcible family planning drive, 
which at many places was directed particularly towards their community. Even in 
the 1980 General Elections the Muslim voters had not completely reconciled with 
it. Therefore the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, reoriented her political policy 
towards the Hindus and began to court them to make up for the deficiency in the 
Muslim votes. She even tried to court the Vishwa Hindu Prarishad, an RSS front, 
which had become politically quite active after conversion of few dalit families to 
Islam in Meenakshipuram district of Tamil Nadu. 
The 1980s began with the baggage of the political developments of the 
1970s. On the one hand, fragmentation of the Janata Party had become an 
unending process, on the other hand there was personalisation and 
deinstitutionalisation of the Congress by Indira Gandhi. She had imposed personal 
"yWd, p. 194. 
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and dynastic rule on the political system and the party. The National Congress was 
termed as Congress (I)'^. 
Another significant development of 1980s was the backward caste 
mobilisation in North India particularly in Uttar Pradesh. The 1980 had also seen 
another form of political mobilisation by Agrarian lobby not within any of the 
major political parties but under the leadership of Mahendra Singh Tikait in 
western Uttar Pradesh. As a socio-political laboratory, the region western Uttar 
Pradesh was one of the first to witness the advent of backward caste politics in the 
State under Charan Singh in the late sixties, which grew into a farmers movement 
led by Mahendra Singh Tikait in the Eighties. [At that time there were fifty eight 
constituencies spread over ten districts in this prosperous Sugar belt of western 
U.P. The popular base of the BKU was the Jat Peasantry]. 
Similarly the emergence of Hindu Nationalism and the birth of caste and 
communal politics in Uttar Pradesh during 1980s was also one of the important 
developments. Another significant development was the creation of Bhartiya 
Janata Party. The new and modified version of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh, that was 
founded on October 21, 1951 under the Presidentship of Dr. Shyama Prasad 
Mukherjee. In 1980 the erstwhile Jana Sangh members along with some others 
came out of the Janata Party and formed Bhartiya Janata Party. 
The Congress (1) in order to strengthen its base amongst the people after 
the upheavals of 1970 had manipulated communal themes at the highest level as 
part of its political strategy. This strategy led to an increasing legitimisation of 
communal idioms of political discourse." 
It also had shifted its ideological posture to court the votes of the Hindu 
majority across North India by making appeals on Hindu Chauvinism and the 
notion that India's unity was in jeopardy; As an instrument of popular mobilization 
the Ayodhya issue [Ramjanamboomi-Babri Masjid] was revived in 1985, the issue 
which was forgotten since 1950. The BJP had capitalized from this issue. 
According to BJP India was culturally a Hindu Nation. The Muslims should have 
'* Mehra, AJay K., Op. cit., p. 33. 
" Jaffrelot, Christophe, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925-1990, New 
Delhi, Viking, 1996, p. 366 
107 
accepted this as a straightforward historical fact and had maintained that many of 
the communal tensions that bedeviled the nation would disappear if they did so. 
The party was immensely benefited from its ideology of Hindutva and thus during 
1990 it had assumed the status as that of Congress by becoming the single largest 
party at the centre. 
As a result, the progressive rise and consolidation of the Hindu wave from 
1989 onwards had significant and far-reaching implications for the party system in 
the country. It was the Congress, which had started the politics of caste, creed, 
religion, sect and region in India, and Uttar Pradesh was no exception to it. '^  
The consolidation of Hindu wave from 1989 onwards soared BJP's 
political stock. Following the 1989 General Elections, a coalition government 
(National Front) was set-up with V.P. Singh as the Prime Minister. The BJP being 
partner of the coalition had decided to support it from out [National Front was 
formed earlier on September 17, 1988 by seven parties namely the Janata Party, 
Lok Dal, Jan Morcha, DMK, Congress (S), Telegu Desam and Assam Gana 
Parishad. BJP and Left Parties [CPI and CPI (M)] were not in this front but part of 
the opposition unit>'. 
Whereas in Uttar Pradesh Janata Dal had decided to contest 355 seats out of 
425 Assembly seats in the 1989 Assembly Elections. The Congress party was 
routed out both in the Lok Sabha and the Assembly Elections (1989). In the Lok 
Sabha, the Congress got only 14 seats out of 85 seats. Janata Dal got 54 and the 
BJP 08 seats only in the Uttar Pradesh. 
Due to division of votes on caste and religion bases no party was able to 
gain absolute majority in the UP Assembly. However the Janata Dal gained 208 
seats and was able to form a government. The Janata Party had won 1 seat. 
Congress 94, BJP 57, Lok Dal (B) 2, CPI-6, CPI (M) 2, BSP 13, Independents 40 
and others 2. Thus in 1989 Mulayam Singh Yadav of Janata Dal was sworn in as 
the Chief Minister of the State. 
In 1990, V.P. Singh government had decided to implement the decade old 
Mandal Commission Report to provide reservation in jobs to the other backward 
The Timesof India, Lucknow, April 26, 2004. 
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classes. BJP intensified the Ramjanambhoomi Movement so that all Hindus were 
united for the construction of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya. Moreover in order to 
counter the political threat, in August 1990, L.K. Advani decided to launch his so 
called Ram Rath Yatra a march from Somnath to Ayodhya. But on way to 
Ayodhya L.K. Advani was arrested in Bihar. In protest of his arrest the BJP 
withdrew its support from the V.P. Singh government-causing fall of his 
government on November 16, 1990. 
Since the formation of National Front there was resentment within it 
because to a significant section of the Janata Party, Chandra Shekar was the natural 
choice for the leadership for his relentless crusade against the authoritarianism of 
Indira Gandhi during the 1975-77 Emergency. V.P. Singh was then in the Congress 
and was closely associated with the Congress. He was identified with those who 
were instrumental in imposing a dictatorial regime in the country. So, the Front 
seemed to have begun its first innings with an internal feud over leadership that 
gradually became the Achilles heel for the National Front government.'^ 
As a result Chandra Shekhar was bent upon election for the post of 
leadership of the National Front Parliamentary Party, a sleight of hand was planned 
to tackle this issue. Devi Lai's name was proposed and seconded for leadership and 
Prime Ministership. Devi Lai got up and announced that persons of his age in 
Haryana were known as 'Tau' (elderly uncle) and generally people seek their 
advice. He would retain the status for himself and offered the leadership of the 
Janata Dal and National Front parliamentary party to V.P. Singh. However, the 
status of Tau did not prevent him from accepting the chair of deputy Prime 
Minister. This angered Chandra Shekhar.^ ° 
The unsatisfied leadership desires within the Janata Dal led to its 
disintegration. What added fuel to this fire and altered the fate of National Front 
government rose from the Political camp of Devi Lai, the then deputy Prime 
Minster whose son, the then Haryana Chief Minister Om Prakash Chautala, was 
forced to resign on May 2, 1990 for his alleged involvement in violence and 
" Chakrabarty, Bidyut, "The Third Front or the Third Force" in Ajay K. Mehra, D.D. Khanna, Gert 
W. Kueck (eds.) in Political Parties and Party Systems, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2003, p. 
253. 
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rigging in his own election from the Meham Legislative Assembly constituency in 
Haryana. Unable to swallow this, Devi Lai, resigned from the cabinet on March 16, 
1990, but on persuasion took back his resignation three days later Chautala had to 
quit as Chief Minister despite being elected to the Assembly. Stung by this 
'personal' affront to him and his family Chautala struck back by forwarding a 
forged letter to the President, allegedly written by V.P. Singh in 1987 implicating 
Arun Nehru in the Bofors deal and made accusations of financial misdemeanour 
against Arun Nehru and Arif Mohammad Khan and also made derogatory remarks 
against the Prime Minister. He was dropped from the cabinet on August I, 1990. 
He stayed in the Janata Dal till Chandra Shekhar and Devi Lai along with 25 
members were expelled from the party and declared unattached by the speaker. 
This was a serious blow to the government.'^' 
Later, Chandra Shekhar and Devi Lai formed Samajwadi Janata Party in 
1990. After V.P. Singh's resignation (his government failed on the motion of non-
confidence) Chandra Shekhar with the help of Congress (1) became the Prime 
Minister. He was totally dependent on Rajiv Gandhi for his government survival. 
In March 1991, Chandra Shekhar resigned citing inability to function as Prime 
Minister and advised the President to call fresh elections. In the elections to the 
tenth Lok Sabha held in May-June 1991, the Janata Dal was reduced to 52 seats 
and SJP got 5 seats only. The Mandal card and the inner tussle within the party on 
leadership crisis led to Janata Dai's disintegration at the centre and in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
The Mandal upsurge also helped BJP to strengthen it in Uttar Pradesh in the 
relatively short period of time between 1989 and 1991. While the growth of the 
Party, in this period was linked to communal agenda and the Ramjanamabhoomi 
Movement. The Mandal controversy was also instrumental in establishing its base 
especially among the upper castes. 
Moreover the Mandal controversy was also instrumental in the formation 
and growth of the caste based political parties in the State, e.g. Samajwadi Party 
and the Bahujan Samaj Party [BSP was founded on April 14, 1984 by Kanshi Ram 
but, it rose to prominence during 1990s in the State]. The growth of these parties 
'^ Ibid. p. 254 
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symbolized the process of exclusivist political formations, catering respectively to 
the Dalits and Yadavs. 
The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh represented one of the most 
socially mobile and politically articulate Dalit group: the Jatavs, part of the 
scheduled caste elites. Mayawati (its chairperson) had come to symbolize Jatav 
Pride, as a counterpoint to the social identities of other caste groupings?^ 
In Uttar Pradesh, the OBC mobilization of the 1990's was spearheaded by 
the Yadavs. The rise to power of Muiayam Singh Yadav from 1989 onwards was 
largely due to the support of the Yadav community. His reservation policy in the 
administration also favoured Yadavs over other castes. This policy alienated other 
OBC's particularly the Kurmis from the Samajwadi Party.'^ '' 
This imbalance provided the BJP with an opportunity to bring within its 
fold through its policy of social-engineering-other OBC's particularly those who 
resented the position of the Yadavs. The BJP had taken care to give tickets to 
Kurmis as well as to Lodhis. Hence it was able to build a support base among 
groups that did not form a large part of any other party's base.^ "* 
The BJP promoted non-Yadav OBC leaders most notably a Lodh, Kalyan 
Singh in order to broaden its base particularly in the immediate post Mandal 
period, when lower caste mobilization was at its peak. Kalyan Singh became the 
architect of the BJP's Mandalisation strategy in Uttar Pradesh. This was due to the 
fact that the political parties had found caste based selection of candidates and 
appealed to the caste based interests of the Indian electorate to be an effective way 
to win popular support. The backward classes were such a substantial constituency 
that almost all parties vie for their support. 
In the 1991 Assembly Elections, the BJP with the help of Mandir-Mandal 
card formed its government in Uttar Pradesh. Kalyan Singh was sworn in as the 
Chief Minister of the State. The Elections were held for 404 seats out of 425 for 
the State Assembly. The Janata Dal and Samajwadi Janata Dal in sharp contrast 
were able to win only 92 and 34 seats respectively. The BJP was able to win 211 
^^  The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, April 27, 2007. 
'' Ibid. 
''Ibid 
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seats, gained clear but slender majority. The Congress fared badly and got only 46 
seats. The BSP won 12 seats. The Left Parties gained 5 seats^ .^ 
There was hardly any doubt that the gain to the BJP was because of the 
Ram Temple Movement. Following 1991 General and State Assembly (U.P.) 
Elections the Congress government at the centre was headed by Narasimha Rao 
and subsequently in Uttar Pradesh, government was installed by its rival party the 
BJP with Kalyan Singh as the Chief Minister. During Kalyan Singh reign the Babri 
Masjid was demolished on December 6, 1992 by a mob belonging to the Hindutva 
Parivar. 
As a result, the Kalyan Singh government was dismissed in the wake of 
Babri Masjid demolition. The Election to the new Assembly was held in 1993. The 
demolition had helped the BJP to better its electoral ground. In the State the BJP 
had emerged as the largest party but lacked majority support. As a result the 
government was formed by a coalition of Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj 
Party. Congress gave an external support to this coalition. The total strength of the 
House was 425, BJP had secured 177, SP 109, BSP 67, Congress 28, Janata Dal 
27, BKKD 0, Left 4, FN'C (T) 0, Samata 0, and Others 10. The Samajwadi Party 
and the Bahujan Samaj Party were the real gainers in the aftermath of the 
demolition of mosque in the State. Communal flare of BJP had given such a blow 
to the Congress that it lost grounds ever to come to power in Uttar Pradesh. 
The SP-BSP coalition collapsed when the BSP withdrew its support from 
the Samajwadi Party in June 1995. The coalition collapsed because the SP had 
cornered the BSP by taking credit for reservation in schools, appointment of Urdu 
teachers inducting the backwards especially the Yadavs in the State Police Force 
and by many more lucrative schemes for the backwards. The deteriorating relations 
between the SP-BSP culminated in the form of an ugly and infamous incident that 
took place in a circuit house in June 1995, in which the SP legislators physically 
assaulted the BSP legislators when the BSP withdrew its support from the SP. The 
BJP was successful in bringing down the Mulayam Singh Yadav's government by 
'^ Jaffrelot, Christophe, and Jasmine Zerinini, Brotel, "Post Mandal Politics In Uttar 
Pradesh And Madhya Pradesh" in Pratap Bhanu Mehta, John Zavos, Thomas Blom 
Hansen, Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.) Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics, New Delhi, 
Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 159. 
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subverting the SP-BSP alliance forged in the 1993 Legislative Assembly Elections 
between the SP and BSP. BJP had then helped Mayawati in becoming the Chief 
Minister of the State. This BSP-BJP alliance too had collapsed in 1997. Reason for 
the collapse was that Mayawati had refused to step down in rotational arrangement, 
which was initially agreed, between the two. Kalyan Singh with the support of BSP 
dissidents and others took the reign of the State who continued as Chief Minister of 
State till 1999. Kalyan Singh was expelled from primary membership of the party 
for the anti-party activities and was then replaced by Ram Prakash Gupta. Due to 
Gupta's inability to govern, he too was replaced by Rajnath Singh who continued 
in power till 2002 Legislative Assembly Elections. Inspite of back stabbing by the 
BJP in 1997 Mayawati after the 2002 Legislative Assembly Elections once again 
had allied with the BJP. 
In 2002 Assembly Elections no party had gained an absolute majority in the 
State. BSP didn't want to ally with the SP and as a result the BSP allied with the 
BJP. Majawati was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. The BSP-BJP 
alliance too broke down in the wake of Taj Heritage Project. Moreover, many BJP 
leaders in the State were dead against Mayawati's autocratic style of functioning. 
The breaking down of BSP-BJP alliance gave an opportunity to the SP to form 
government in the State with the help of BJP. On February 2003, Mulayam Singh 
Yadav was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State and continued in power till 
2007 Assembly Elections. 
The coalition era came to an end in 2007 Assembly Elections when BSP 
secured an absolute majority in the State. The BSP secured 207 seats out of 403 
Assembly seats, Congress 22, BJP 50, SP 97 and others 9. 
Thus the party system in Uttar Pradesh from 1993 onwards was 
characterized as a highly polarized and fragmented. With the exception of the 
period between 1991 and 1992 all governments were either coalition or minority 
governments. No government in Uttar Pradesh lasted its full term. All political 
alliances between major political parties since 1993, were formed primarily to 
prevent one of the contending parties to achieve a dominant position in the party 
system. In this regard all these alliances had surprisingly proved successful inspite 
of their short durations. 
13 
During three years span from 1996-98 even at the centre India had 
witnessed three General Elections showing political instability of coalition 
governments as well as frequency of defection by legislators. The decline of the 
highly centralized Congress party resulted in the decentring of politics and had 
shifted its centre of gravity from New Delhi to the State. The collapse of Congress 
party and its disintegration attributed to the growth of oppositional politics of 
farmers, other backward classes and Hindutva. 
With the fall of the Congress in the States the BJP was immensely 
benefited. The party had done very well during the 1996-98 General Elections, 
when it captured 52-57 Lok Sabha seats respectively from the State. However the 
party down slided from 1999 onwards due to internal infighting between the pro-
OBC Kalyan Singh led faction and other faction led by Kalraj Mishra, Rajnath 
Singh and Lalji Tandon who all belonged to Upper castes. In the Late 1999 these 
conflicts culminated in the expulsion of Kalyan Singh from the BJP. He was 
replaced by Ram Prakash Gupta as the Chief Minister of the State. 
Factional infighting that continued unabated even afterwards was attributed 
to the Brahmin- Thakur rivaln.'. This caused the voters turning away from the BJP 
in the Februan. 2002 Assembly Elections. The party had come third with only 88 
seats, after the Samajwadi Party's 143 seats and the Bahujan Samaj Party's 98 
seats. The BJP could return to office only because of its alliance with the BSP. The 
BJP-BSP alliance had collapsed in September 2003. The Samajwadi Party formed 
its government with Mulayam Singh Yadav as the Chief Minister of the State. Out 
of total strength of the House of 403 members, the break up of the party position 
was Samajwadi Party 152 seats, Loktantrik Bahujan Dal 33, Congress 15, RLD 15, 
UP Loktantrik Congress 2, CPI (M) 1, Akhil Bhartiya Congress I, Independents 
16, Unattached 6, BJP 83, BSP 67, Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Mahasabha 1, members 
without voting rights 9, vacant 2. 
In order to revive the sinking fortune of the Party in the State in 2004, 
Kalyan Singh's expulsion was revoked. The infighting within the BJP was 
attributed to its collapse in the State during 2004 General Elections. The Party 
could secure only 10 seats out of 80 Lok Sabha seats, the Congress could manage 
10 seats and SP 38, BSP 19, seats respectively. After BJP's debacle in the 2004 
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General Elections the party was firmly back on the Hindutva platform. In a 
National Council Session in Lucknow on December 24, 2006. Kalyan Singh had 
asked delegates to use "Hindutva to help create a volcano that would burn and kill 
Muslim's appeasement forever. Let us not be shy of saying that all terrorists who 
had attacked the Akshardham Temple, Raghunath Mandir and Parliament were all 
Muslims. The BJP should not be ashamed of what happened in Ayodhya on 
December 6, 1992 when the Masjid was brought down by the Hindu Parivar""^ .^ 
Describing "all talks or measures to help Muslims develop educationally, 
socially and economically as "vote bank politics" the resolution said this would 
give "special citizenship" status to Muslims that would "pave the way for a second 
partition". The party would resist all attempts to give religion based benefits"'^ ^. 
The Bhartiya Janata Party once again had decided to return to the politics of 
Ram Temple. Being the homeland of Lord Ram (Ayodhya) it was believed that the 
promise to construct the Ram Temple would generate enough religious sentiments 
to catapult the BJP to power in Uttar Pradesh. 
However, all attempts of the BJP to invoke the name of Ram was a 
desperate act that could hardK appeal to the people for a second time. The temple 
agenda did not hold much of a promise for the BJP. 
The Ram Temple agenda failed to gamer votes for BJP in the 2007 
.Assembly Elections in the State. The BJP recorded its worst performance since 
1991. From 1999 onwards it had been one long downwards journey for the 
Hindutva Party whether in the Lok Sabha or in the State Assembly. In the 2007 
Assembly Elections the BJP had secured 50 seats only. 
Throughout the campaign and much before it, the BJP deliberately had 
resorted to test water with its 'aggressive Hindutva' platform. It had attempted to 
raise the communal temperature through recourse to inflammatory campaign 
material including the poisonous compact disc (the disc content contained ill 
feeling towards the Muslims). The BJP leaders had made sectarian speeches 
focusing on issues - terrorism, Mohd Afzal's hanging, the Rajendra Sachar 
committee report. They thought all these would polarize vote on communal lines. 
*^ The Times of India, Lucknow, January 10,2007 
" The Hindu, New Delhi, December 24,2006. 
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The strategy backfired. Hindus and Muslims alike refused to swallow the bait, 
which ultimately resulted in the debacle of BJP in the State. 
The Congress Party too failed badly in the Assembly Elections of 2007. 
Even after fielding Rahul Gandhi as Star Campaigner the Congress couldn't attract 
votes. The Congress had hoped that Rahul Gandhi would somehow bring in votes, 
enabling the Congress once again to become the catch all party that ruled 
imperiously for decades. However, he managed to breathe new life into the 
moribund State unit. The party leaders had belief that his entry would help the 
party in securing more seats in the State Assembly Elections. Those dreams came 
to an end on May 11, 2007 when BSP got an absolute majority in the State. The 
Congress had to be contended with only 22 seats in a house of 403. 
The BJP got its severe setback in the 2007 Assembly Elections when 
Mayawati wooed Brahmins for electoral benefits. Mayawati had realized that 
electoral arithmetic was against BSP if support to it remained restricted to Dalits, 
who constituted about 21 percent of UP's population. So she wooed the Brahmins 
who though at the other end of the caste spectrum had been consistently 
marginalized in U.P. politics over the last two decades. This was a clever 
exploitation of caste politics and an inversion of caste logic . 
Mayawati's strategy of sewing up a rainbow coalition, particularly wooing 
Brahmins and other upper castes paid rich dividends to BSP in the UP Assembly 
Elections, 2007. The BSP aligned with upper castes, against whom her party had in 
the past carried out a consistent campaign. The BSP steered to a spectacular 
victory in the Uttar Pradesh and secured an absolute majority in the 403 seats 
Assembly. It was the first time since 1991 that any party had won a majority in 
Uttar Pradesh. The BSP had secured 207 seats out of 403, SP 98, BJP +50, 
Congress +22, and others 25. Mayawati was sworn in as a the Chief Minister of the 
State. 
Thus what happened politically in Uttar Pradesh had a direct bearing on its 
past politics. The Congress was considered responsible for the prevailing socio-
economic political stalemate in the State. The caste based political parties of the 
^'Ibid. 
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State i.e. the BSP and SP which had a foothold in the State were considered to be 
indebted to the Congress for creating the green pastures for them to grow. The sad 
irony was Congress had yet refused to accept its blunder^'. 
Moreover the agrarian and caste-class issues played an important role in 
changing the political scenario of the State. Democracy was steadily getting 
trampled by 'might is right' in Uttar Pradesh. The politics of the State in recent 
time had been overshadowed by criminals turned politicians called 'bahubalis'''°. 
"Uttar Pradesh is the Chief locate for the transition to a post-Congress 
polity and is the pivotal site of contest between non-Congress groups. Inter caste 
conflicts, assertive lower castes and Hindutva politics all manifest themselves in 
Uttar Pradesh. Potentially the most radical challenge to upper caste hegemony. The 
outcome of which would affect the overall structure of social inequality is manifest 
in Uttar Pradesh. The way in which conflicts between castes and communities take 
place in the State would certainly influence the course of democratic politics in 
North India and would alter the ways of wresting and sustaining political power at 
the National level"'''. 
Thus potent brew of religion, politics, agriculture and crimes marked Uttar 
Pradesh a gripping theatre of political experiments. 
(b) The Role of Religion in Uttar Pradesh's Electoral Politics 
Religion seems to be a natural, populist political force articulating people's 
cultural and national identity at a level of emotive meaning more basic and 
fiindamental than other kinds of political affiliations. Religious identities naturally 
take over politics when constraints on their expression are weakened.^^ 
The political scenario of India has always witnessed an escalation of 
communalism and a consolidation of sentiments around symbols of religious 
identities and perceptions of threat to these identities. Communal ideologies have 
gained much wider social acceptance forcing a retreat from even the liberal 
rhetoric of secularism. The role of State in communalizing the political process in 
^' The Times of India, New Delhi, May 12, 2007. 
°^ The Times of India, Lucknow, April 26, 2004. 
'^ The Times of India, Lucknow, December 13, 2005. 
" Ludden, David, (ed.) Making India Hindu Religion Community and the Politics of Democracy In 
India, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996 p. 4. 
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overt and covert ways is the peculiar feature of the present phase. Indian State was 
conceived in a secular and non-communal mould and there was an acceptance of 
the agenda of secularism and a broadly secular ideology as the basis of 
integration^^. 
Religion has always played a very significant role in the electoral politics 
of Uttar Pradesh. Even after Independence the first three Chief Ministers of Uttar 
Pradesh in the 1950s and early 1960s - G.B. Pant, Sampumanand and C.B. Gupta 
were extremely conscious about, "the northern origins of Hinduism" and they were 
committed to a right of center consensus. Some of their major concerns, such as 
the Hindi - only language policy in government and education, the exclusion of 
Urdu were incorporated in Congress politics. Consequently political Hinduism 
could not produce any significant uprising of Hindu Nationalist sentiments and was 
unable to replace the Congress party. This was the main reason for the Jana 
Sangh's inabilit>- to achieve a decisive electoral break through in Uttar Pradesh in 
its initial years'^. 
The Fourth General Elections of 1967 proved to be a major turning point in 
Indian politics. The Congress could not form a government in eight States of the 
Indian Union including Uttar Pradesh and the 'Congress system' came under 
eclipse for the first time. Among the groups disenchanted with the Congress were 
large sections of Muslims. They felt that the Congress had not been able to protect 
their interest and it had taken their vote for granted in the previous election. 
The fall of Congress in Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections of 1967 was 
attributed to the role of Majlis-i-Mushawarat (established in 1964). It comprised 
the remnants of a number of earlier organizations such as Muslim League, Jamaat-
i-Islami and Jamiyat-al-UIema. In some constituencies Muslims damaged the 
prospects of Congress. In the General Elections of 1967, the Congress had secured 
198 seats of the total 425, the Jana Sangh had 97 seats, SSP - 44, Communist (R) 
14, Swatantra 12, PSP 11, Republican 9 and the Communist (L) one seat only. As a 
" Hasan, Zoya, "Changing Orientation of the State and the Emergence of Majoritarism in the 
1980s"in K.N. Panikkar (Ed.), Communalism In India History Politics And Culture, New Delhi: 
Manohar Publications, 1991,p.l42. 
'" Hasan, Zoya, "Communal Mobilization and Changing Majority in Uttar Pradesh", in David 
Ludden (Ed.), Making India Hindu Religion Community and the Politics of Democracy In India, 
New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 89. 
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result the Congress government could be installed with the support of Independent 
MLA's but it lasted only for 18 days. Charan Singh after defection from C.B. 
Gupta's Ministry, installed the SVD government headed by him. C.B. Gupta had 
admitted that it was mainly because of opposition of Mushawarat that the Congress 
had to step down. The U.P. Majlis - Mushawarat became very disillusioned by the 
attitude and performance of U.P. Assembly members whom it had supported in the 
Elections of 1967. It was thus felt by Muslims that they should enter politics 
directly and send maximum number of Muslims to the U.P. Asembly. Jamaat-e-
Islami did not agree to this idea. Thus it was decided to form a new political party 
in U.P. and the Muslim Majlis came into existence. But it was decided that Muslim 
Majlis shall be a federating unit of the Central Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat and 
would cooperate with it in all common matters relating to the community^ .^ 
In December 1971 the Lok Sabha was dissolved and fresh elections were 
held. The Majlis renewed its policy and after getting assurance from Congress (N), 
Muslim Majlis decided to support it whole-heartedly. The Muslim Majlis 
candidates were badly defeated in the constituencies of Moradabad, Kanpur, 
.Amroha, Ghaziabad and Muzaffamagar in U.P. 
The Fifth Lok Sabha (1971) saw the return of the Congress to its dominant 
position, with more than a nvo-ihird majority in the House. Out of 518 Lok Sabha 
seats Congress (R) secured 350 seats. 
Inspite of its debacle the Muslim Majlis maintained that the greatest 
achievement of the Majlis was that it had infused a sense of confidence and 
courage among the Muslim community and had made them felt that they 
commanded balancing power in the politics of the country. 
The new Amendment Act of 1972 curtailed the autonomous and minority 
character of the Aligarh Muslim University. This Act completely alienated Muslim 
Majlis from Congress and a number of Muslim volunteers including its President 
Dr. Faridi, the SSP leader Raj Narain and Vishwanath Kapoor MLA were arrested. 
This agitation was against the closure of A.M.U. and for the restoration of minority 
character. Muslim Majlis then decided not to support the Congress in the Assembly 
" Abid, Mohd, Op. cit., pp. 161-162. 
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Elections of 1974 and made an alliance with the BKD and SSP. These parties 
entered in an electoral adjustment and decided to contest the election on BKD 
tickets. BKD and SSP included the demands of Muslim Majlis in their 
manifestoes. In the 1974 U.P. Assembly Elections the Muslim Majlis contested 
twenty-six seats, but could win only three. 
In the 1977 General Elections the Muslim Majlis had decided to support 
Janata Party. Under this alliance two seats were allotted to Muslim Majlis. In the 
1977 U.P. Assembly Elections also 10 seats out of 425 were allotted to the Majlis. 
The main issues of Majlis were A.M.U's minority character, Urdu as second 
official language, representation of Muslims in the Civil Services and 
establishment of Urdu University at Rampur. In the Uttar Pradesh Assembly 
Elections of 1977 out of 10 Majlis candidates only 8 were elected. Out of 351 
Janata Pary MLAs the number of Muslim MLAs were 37. Among these 37 MLAs, 
Majlis MLAs numbered only 8.^ ^ 
The Majlis had representation in the Central as well as in U.P. governments 
having one Minister in each. The selfishness of Muslim legislators, cracks in 
Muslim League, death of Dr. Faridi and lack of leadership had contributed to the 
pxx)r performance and negligible role of the Majlis^^. 
.After the 1977 General Elections debacle the Congress tried to move into 
the terrain, which was traditionally occupied by the rightist parties. 
In 1980 when Congress returned back to power, it made positive attempts 
to win over the Hindus to consolidate its base amongst them. At that time 
Indira Gandhi's credibility with the Hindus grew up so much that she was able to 
drive a wedge between the BJP and the RSS. The covert link with the RSS was 
carefully nurtured through a series of actions, speeches and political signals. She 
also used the services of various Hindu religious leaders whom she used to visit 
frequently during that period. She had gone a step further and had said minorities 
should learn to adjust in India. A close political relationship between the Congress, 
Shiv Sena and the RSS was forged. The RSS leader Bala Saheb Deoras tilted the 
entire weight of the RSS in favour of Mrs. Gandhi and her party. After her 
^^ Ibid, p.\65. 
"/A/Vf, pp.165-166. 
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assassination the RSS iiad openly backed the Congress in the 1984 General 
Elections^*. 
The 1980s also saw a diversification in the activities of the RSS. Not only 
was the Vishwa Hindu Parishad strengthened and its activities widen but VHP was 
treated as a mass front of the RSS so that those Hindus who hesitated to identify 
themselves with the RSS could also join in the spreading of the Hindu political 
message^'. The last phase of the Indira Gandhi era had witnessed a marked 
polarization of Indian society on communal and sectarian lines. The gradual 
diminishing of the Congress base had made it possible for communally oriented 
groups to step in to the political vacuum. The Congress had responded by 
appropriative communal themes, especially themes of Hindu hegemony that 
appealed to the Hindi Heartland. 
The communal sentiment was activated in U.P. (1980) when a group of low 
caste Hindus converted to Islam in Meenakshipuram, far away in South India, in 
Tamil Nadu. The opposition to conversions was very strong in U.P., the VHP and 
the BJP organized numerous meetings and demonstrations in major cities to 
highlight the dangers of conversions to Islam. BJP leaders walked out of the 
.Assembly to protest vvhat they alleged to be the indifference of the government to 
Dalits conversions to Islam. During this period the Hindi-Urdu controversy had 
once again surfaced due to the government's half-hearted proposal to make Urdu 
the second language of the State. During this period the communal politics 
centered around this issue'"^ . 
From 1983 onwards, the VHP organized a series of elaborate processions to 
foster Hindu unity. Uttar Pradesh figured prominently in the Ekatmata Yagna 
programmes. During these processions, the VHP leaders repeated the theme of 
"Save Hinduism" and condemned conversions, the concessions to Urdu and 
politicians who pampered Muslim vote banks'". 
' ' Panikkar, K.N., (ed.) Communalism In India History Politics And Culture, New Delhi, Manohar 
Publications, 1991, p. 4. 
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Ludden (ed.), Op. cil, p. 90. 
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In Uttar Pradesh the efforts of Sangh Parivar was by no means confined to 
an internal consolidation of the Hindu community alone. The cohesion of the 
community was based on rejection of cultural pluralism and the exclusion of 
Muslims who had formed an important part of U.P's social and cultural milieu for 
centuries and who had contributed significantly to the high culture of Awadh. The 
polarization of the Sangh Parivar along religious lines was bolstered by the 
Muslims population in Meerut, Moradabad, Bulandshahar, Ghaziabad, Rampur 
and Aligarh, some of whom had been eager to defend the symbols of their religious 
identity. The last few decades had also seen the economic advancement of some 
sections of Muslim weavers, artisans and craftsman who were benefited from the 
rising demand for handicrafts and expansion of exports. Muslim economic 
prosperity in the 1970s and 1980s threatened Hindu domination of trade and 
industry and bred resentment and anger among those Hindus accustomed to the 
Muslim invisibility and deference. The growth area of Sangh combine was western 
and central U.P., where Muslims were either economically prosperous or culturally 
visible'^ 
The inter-community feuds between the Hindu-Muslim had resulted in 
communal riots. A spate of communal rioting took place in U.P. from February 
1981-1987 with a significant spread to rural areas. It was noteworthy that nearly 
all-major riots during the 1980s occurred in towns with a concentration of Muslims 
or in areas where .Muslims had attained a measure of economic stability through 
their traditional artisan and entrepreneurial skills (Aligarh, Varanasi, Moradabad 
and Meerut). Communal politics and violence's had played a decisive role in 
weakening the Congress base in Uttar Pradesh. 
However, of the 1990's, riots in Uttar Pradesh, many had taken place in 
towns like Ghaziabad, Agra, Gorakhpur, Khurja, Bijnor and Saharanpur which had 
no earlier history of communal violence. Most of these riots occurred around the 
BJP's procession to Ayodhya in October 1990 and December 1992. Others 
coincided with some events that the BJP turned into a pretext for violence like 
Ram Shila Pooja, which had triggered riots in several States in September-October 
1989 or Advani's arrest on October 24, 1990, which precipitated riots in Gujarat, 
42 Ibid 
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Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The BJP's electoral gains and particularly and its 
victory in U.P. were undoubtedly influenced by preceding riots'* . 
The subsequent court order to unlock the Babri Masjid, which had earlier 
been sealed by the administration on account of a previous dispute was acclaimed 
as victory by the Hindus during the Rajiv Gandhi regime. This unlocking led to a 
heightening of the tensions between the Hindus and Muslims. 
The Ramjanambhoomi Action Committee came into being on October 7, 
1984 which had launched a "Tala Kholo" agitation and a Rath Yatra but Indira 
Gandhi's assassination led to its suspension. The campaign was revived again from 
25 places on October 23, 1985, In February 1986, the local district court had 
ordered to open the gates of the Babri Masjid on the argument that the locking was 
no longer necessary for the maintenance of law and order and the protection of the 
idols. The temple was opened on February 1, 1986. The opening of the temple was 
masterminded by the political authorities to appease and conciliate the VHP and 
the Ramjanambhoomi Mukti Samiti who had organized a movement to pressurize 
the Rajiv Gandhi government to accommodate Hindu sentiments. The strategies 
emplo>ed by these leaders were communal. The Muslim leaders also had 
threatened to bo\con the Congress if Babri Masjid was not restored to Muslims. 
Infact the decision to enact the Muslim Women Bill (the Shah Bano Case) was a 
sequel to the pressure mounted by Hindu organizations agitating for the reopening 
of the Ramjanambhoomi Temple at Ayodhya''^. 
It was under sheer compulsion with the interest of garnering votes. The 
Congress government later had permitted the Shilanyas at a site described by the 
Allahabad High Court as disputed. The Congress government's clarification that 
the foundation stone was laid at an undisputed site was clearly designed to fudge 
the issue. The Shilanyas ceremony resulted in communal violence in many parts of 
the country. All that could not have happened without an acceptance of the Ram 
*^ Basu, Amrita, "Mass Movement or Elite Conspiracy? The Puzzle of Hindu Nationalism", in 
David Ludden (ed.), Op. cit, p. 72. 
** Hasan, Zoya, "Changing Orientation of the State and the Emergence of Majoritariarism in the 
1980's in, K.N. Panikkar (ed.). Op. cit, p.l49. 
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Shilaniyas message at the popular level and a high tolerance of its consequences at 
the official level''^  
The opening of the locks of Babri Masjid sparked violence in Barabanki, 
Varanasi, Lakhimpur, Meerut, Rampur, Moradabad, Kanpur and Allahabad. 
Indeed Meerut riots in April 1987 signified a sharp escalation of communal 
conflicts. Congress government's action evoked strong protests of Muslim leaders 
who vitiated the communal atmosphere by launching a strident campaign for the 
restoration of the Status quo in the Ayodhya dispute. Even Janata Dal leader Syed 
Shahabuddin warned the Muslim community that if they do not raise themselves 
from slumber the day is not far off when each and every Masjid will be snatched 
away from the Muslims. 
The reopening of the locks created wide spread friction and strife in Uttar 
Pradesh and intensified communal politics and threatened the structural stability of 
the political system. As a result the 1989 General and State Assembly Elections 
marked a decisive shift in the Muslim vote, while the party's attempt to garner a 
Hindu vote shifted the balance of power decisively in favour of political 
Hinduism'* .^ 
During the Congress rule the 'Ayodhya Strategy' was devised in order to 
reverse the sinking fortune of the Congress party however it contributed 
profoundly to the part\''s down fall. During Congress rule, the "Ayodhya Strategy" 
was unfolded in several different ways. The places mentioned in the Ramayana 
were developed, Ayodhya Ghats (banks) and the Parikrama procession around the 
town of Ayodhya were beautified and the Ramayana Study Centre was established. 
The government announced that the Hindi language Trust (Hindi Bhasha Nidhi), a 
government organization would publish low-priced editions of Tulsidas's 
Ramcharitmanas. The State government was instrumental in facilitating the 
unlocking of the Babri Masjid in 1986. The "Ayodhya Strategy" was crafted by the 
government to appease and conciliate the VHP-BJP combine that had mounted an 
''Ibid 
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Ludden, (ed). Op. cit., p. 93. 
124 
emotive movement to pressurize the Prime Minister (Rajiv Gandhi) to 
accommodate Hindu sentiments''''. 
The Bhartiya Janata Party was the chief beneficiary of the increasing 
communalization of politics in U.P. From zero Lok Sabha seats in 1984, it had won 
8 in 1989 and 51 in 1991 (when Ayodhya agitation was at its peak). At the same 
time its numbers in the Assembly rose sharply from 16 in 1985 to 221 in 1991. No 
party had received such remarkable support in such a short time. The BJP had 
achieved this success after it moved away from the phase of liberalism identified 
with Gandhian Socialism to a clear identification with Militant Hinduism of the 
RSS. The change in orientation was strengthened by two decisions in 1989. The 
first was the decision to accept an alliance with the Shiv Sena and the second was 
the decision of the National Executive to fully endorse and support the 
Ramjanambhoomi campaign of the VHP. It was the Ram Shila Poojan and the 
VHP's agitation that ensured victory for the BJP candidates in 1989'* .^ 
The BJP had faced the greatest difficulties in establishing itself in U.P. 
because its base was narro\-.l\' confined to urban traders. It was further weakened 
by the emergence of OBC"s as a major political force in the State. That is why in 
L'ttar Pradesh the BJP had most freely and militantly voiced Hindu Nationalist 
appeals'*. 
The necessity for the Janata Dal to seek the BJP's support from out as 
outside coalition partner in order to form government in 1989 had provided the 
BJP with an unprecedented opportunity to attain power at the centre. At the same 
time by remaining outside the ruling coalition, the BJP had retained its autonomous 
objectives and character^ * .^ 
The Janata Dal government's decision to implement the recommendations 
of the backward classes commission headed by B.P. Mandal [the Mandal 
Commission] for providing reservations in all institutions of public education and 
employment for other backward classes heightened the salience of caste over 
•" Ibid. p. 92. 
*^ Hasan, Zoya, "Changing Orientation of the State and the Emergence of Majoritarianism in the 
1980", in K.N. Panikkar, (ed). Op. cit.. p. 150. 
•" Basu, Amrita, Op. cit., p. 70. 
^ Ibid. p. 57. 
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religion and thus threatened to fragment the BJP's constituency. The BJP was in a 
dilemma. By openly opposing the government's implementation of Mandal 
recommendations, the BJP would expose upper caste supporters. But by supporting 
Mandal reform it would alienate the upper castes and strengthened a reform that 
heightened caste divisions. The BJP opted to support formally Mandal 
recommendation at the National level while undermining it at the local level, 
particularly in places where it relied on upper caste support. The BJP's most 
effective response to Mandal was Hindu Nationalism^'. 
In U.P., the BJP was against the then Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav 
(1989) who was a living symbol of the growing power of the OBC's. He was a 
powerful proponent of Mandal but also a bitter opponent of Hindu Nationalism. In 
addition to the Mandal Commission Report, the U.P. government passed an 
ordinance to raise the reserved quota for backward castes in the State government 
by 12 percent. The reservation policy provided significant new opportunities for 
social mobility to the backward castes, who were under represented in the central 
and U.P. government. This reservation policy was rejected by the upper castes who 
dominated the bureaucracy and public institutions. Accordingly, the issue of 
reservation polarized the backward and upper castes in towns and villages 
throughout the State, which broke into an orgy of violence". 
The upper castes thrust remained intact till the Congress party remained 
dominant in Uttar Pradesh. Its defeat in the 1989 General and Assembly Elections 
(Uttar Pradesh) heightened the anxieties of upper castes as they sensed a political 
and economic threat to their domination. The Mandal Commission Report created 
the impression of an imminent transfer of power from upper to backward castes. 
The stability of the Congress party had rested on the accommodation and co-
optation of a wide range of classes, castes and communities. The main challenge to 
the Congress domination in Uttar Pradesh was from the backward castes. The party 
made no attempt to include the backward castes within its fold^ .^ 
'^ Ibid. p. 58. 
''Ibid. 
" Hasan, Zoya, "Communal Mobilization and changing Majority in Uttar Pradesh" in David 
Ludden (ed) Op. cit., p. 86. 
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During 1970s and 80s the upper caste representation in Congress Ministries 
and also in the State and district leadership remained high. The Congress was 
dominated by the Brahmins because the 40 percent of Brahmins in India live in 
Uttar Pradesh the heartland of Arya-Varta. No political formation could ignore 
such a powerful group or disregard the fact that it enjoyed a high ritual status, 
controlled land and dominated government jobs. However, the political domination 
of the upper castes was threatened with the advent of Mandal upsurge in the 
State'^ 
The decline of the Congress party opened the space for communal and 
caste assertions. The Mandal Commission Report created the impression of an 
imminent transfer of power from upper to backward castes. For the BJP the 
political fall out of Mandal was damaging to its project of Hindu Nationalism and 
its unifying symbol. That is why the VHP had decided to send Kar Sevaks to 
Ayodh\ a for the construction of the Ram Temple. The construction of the Ram 
Temple provided the opportunity to the BJP to unite upper and the lower caste 
Hindus. This unifying content took the heat off the Mandal issue, it shifted 
anention away from intra-Hindu divisions into communal discourse. The caste 
conflict was turned into Hindu-Muslim polarization and rioting. 
The high communal frenzy was most evident in 1990. Inflammatory 
pamphlets and provocative slogans were raised during VHP March's. Those were 
instrumental in unleashing violence geared towards achieving political ends. Most 
of the riots took place during or after L.K. Advani's Ram Rath Yatra from 
Somnath to Ayodhya. The Rath Yatra created a tensed atmosphere in the towns it 
traversed. From November 1990, onwards the greater proportion of communal 
violence was concentrated in U.P. In November 1990, thirty-four towns of U.P. 
were under curfew. 
The political disorder (Mandir-Mandal Issue) in Uttar Pradesh from August 
1990 to June 1991 contributed to the fall of the Janata Dal government in New 
Delhi as well as in Uttar Pradesh. The Bhartiya Janata Party had gained from these 
communal upheavals immensely. 
''Ibid 
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Through the State Assembly Elections of 1991, the BJP came to power in 
Uttar Pradesh. The VHP had expected that the Chief Minister, Kalyan Singh would 
fulfill party's commitment to build the Ram Temple. Thus in July 1991, the Sangh 
Parivar (VHP, Bajrang Dal and BJP) demanded legal and other obstacles in the 
way of temple construction be removed before November 18, 1991. 
The compromise solution worked out by Kalyan Singh in September 1991 
was in acquiring 2.77 acres of land adjoining the Babri Masjid under the pretext of 
developing a tourist complex and providing amenities to the pilgrims. Of this plot 
2.04 acres were acquired from the VHP, which allegedly had earlier acquired it by 
purchase or gift from the previous owners. The ultimate aim was to include the 
Mosque in the land acquired and to build a temple. However this acquisition was 
challenged in the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court^ .^ 
The RSS-VHP cadres were eager to resume the Kar Seva. On July 9, 1992 
Kar Sevaks and Sadhus began to build a concrete platform in contravention of the 
order issued by the High Court and reiterated on November 5, 1991 by Supreme 
Court. On JuK' 11, 1992 the latter made an order so as "no permanent structure 
would be or is being intended to be put on the acquired land". Prime Minister P.V 
Narsimha Rao asked the Kar Sevaks to abandon the Kar Seva and to give him three 
to four months time to revive the efforts initiated by the previous governments to 
bring about a 'negotiated settlement'. The talks between the VHP and the Babri 
Masjid Action Committee failed and the latter announced that the construction of 
the temple would resume on December 6, 1992. 
On December 6, 1992 the Babri Masjid was demolished at Ayodhya by the 
members of Hindu Parivar (BJP, VHP, RSS, Bajrang Dal and Shiv Sena). The 
demolition of the Babri Masjid completely transformed the terms of the strategy of 
ethno-religious mobilization that the RSS-VHP-BJP combination had been 
pursuing for almost a decade. The RSS-VHP-BJP had channeled the anti-Muslim 
sentiment of Hindus towards the Mosque as a symbol of their former 'humiliating 
domination' and simultaneously exploited their feelings of devotion of Ram^^ . 
" Jaffrelot, Christophe, Op. cit.. p. 457. 
'^ Ibid. 
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If we go back and look Eighties onward, we find that since 1980's the 
Hindu Nationalists were gradually providing a focus for anti-Muslim sentiments 
and building up an emotional wave in the name of Ram. This process contributed 
steadily to the consolidation of their position. The situation was considerably 
altered by the demolition of the Babri Masjid. The Sangh Parivar believed that the 
demolition enabled the Hindus to regain their supposedly wounded self-esteem, a 
sign of humiliation, a relic of Muslim historical domination had been brushed 
aside^ .^ 
The Hindu Nationalist Movement had gained popularity because of the 
demolition of the Mosque. The Hindu Nationalist leaders probably regarded it as a 
new symbol, which could be manipulated in the years to come in the context of a 
strategy of ethno-religious mobilization. 
The demolition of the Masjid resulted in communal riots in Uttar Pradesh 
and in other parts of the country. Riots were also sparked off by the victory 
processions organize by Hindu leaders to celebrate the demolition of the Babri 
Masjid. On the evening of December 6, 1992, President Rule was imposed in Uttar 
Pradesh shortly after Kalyan Singh resigned from his post as Chief Minister. In the 
aftermath of the demolition, the BJP realised that this association with fire brands 
rVHP-RSS-Bajrang Dalj had tarnished its reputation and jeopardized its hold on 
the political initiative. 
In the 1993 Assembly Elections the BJP was voted out of power in Uttar 
Pradesh The OBC-Muslim-Scheduled caste alliance emerged as a formidable 
political force in the State. The Samajwadi party formed the government with the 
support of BSP. The BJP suffered its worst defeat in central and western Uttar 
Pradesh the heartland of the Ayodhya agitation. Although it made some gains in 
western part of the State^l 
Even in the Assembly Elections of 1996 the Hindu voters did not give a 
clear verdict in favour of the BJP. The election were held for 425 seats in which 
BJP had secured 174 seats, Samajwadi Party won 110 seats out of 281 seats it 
'Ubid. 
'^ Basu, AmrJta, Op. cit., p. 69. 
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contested. The Congress gave its worst performance, it won 23 of the total 126 
seats it contested, BSP 67 seats while others got 41 seats only. 
The smooth sailing of the BJP was interrupted in the State due to the inner 
tussle within its State unit. The tussle was between the backward caste and upper 
caste leadership of the State unit. As a result in the 1999 General Elections the BJP 
managed 29 seats out of 85 Lok Sabha seats whereas in the 1998 General Election 
the party managed 57 seats from the State. Two seats went to its allies U.P. 
Loktantrik Congress. While the alliance backed Independent Maneka Gandhi 
retained the Pilibhit seat. The Congress (I) secured 10 seats. The Congress (I) 
allied partner Ajit Singh led Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD) secured two seats i.e. 
Baghpat and Kairana from western Uttar Pradesh The BSP had secured 14 seats 
and SP added 26 seats. 
In the State BJP unit Kalyan Singh was replaced by Ram Prakash Gupta as 
the Chief Minister of the State. Later Kalyan Singh was expelled from the party for 
6 years for his anti-party activities. Ram Prakash Gupta was a weak administrator 
and was facing a lot of difficulties to sustain his position. In order to strengthen his 
position in the State unit, in March 2000, Ram Prakash Gupta's government 
introduced a Bill on the places of worship. The bill was widely condemned as 
being harmful to minority interests. 
The Bill, introduced in the name of checking the activities of Pakistan's 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), prohibited the construction of places of worship -
temples, mosques and churches without the prior permission of the District 
Magistrate. It also gave powers to the District Magistrate's to demolish existing 
structures, if it was suspected that they were used for criminal activities. 
The bill ostensibly covered all religions but the general impression was that 
the main target, in keeping with the Sangh Parivar's long-term interests were the 
minorities, especially Muslims. The then Chief Minister Ram Prakash Gupta had 
repeatedly said before the passage of the bill that Madarsas (Islamic religious 
schools) had become sanctuaries for the ISI. 
Infact the bill was introduced in order to ensure the longevity of the Ram 
Prakash Gupta's government, which was in rubble due to inner party tussle. Ram 
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Prakash Gupta's detractors demanded that he be replaced with Rajnath Singh 
because the party's fortune in the State was on a down swing. 
The Statewide agitation against the bill led to the reservation of the 
legislation (bill) by the State Governor for the approval by the President. The bill 
however failed to get approval of the President. This action of the BJP government 
of Uttar Pradesh was ruthlessly criticized for while dealing with places of religious 
worship. 
The bill controversy failed to save the chair of Ram Prakash Gupta and he 
was replaced by Rajnath Singh. Rajnath Singh worked hard but failed to secure a 
majority in the 2002 State Assembly Elections. 
In the 2002 Legislative Assembly Elections the BJP had secured 88 seats, 
whereas the SP had secured 143 seats, BSP 98 seats, RLD 15, Congress 15, U.P. 
Loktantrik Congress 2, CPI (M) 1, Akhil Bhartiya Congress 1, Independents 16, 
Unattached 6, Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Maha Sabha 1, members without voting rights 
9, vacant 2. The social bloc of the backward castes, Dalits and Muslims displayed 
their preferences for the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party. The upper 
castes voted for the BJP. The electoral verdict was not only against Hindutva but 
was also a clear expression of preference for the non-high caste social bloc of 
parties. BSP allied with the BJP for the government formation in the State. BSP 
Supremo Mayawati was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. However her 
government failed when the BJP pulled out in the wake of Taj Heritage Corridor 
Project, Agra. The breakdown of BSP-BJP alliance gave Samajwadi Party the 
much-awaited opportunity to form its government in the State. Mulayam Singh 
Yadav was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. 
The Bhartiya Janata Party lost because it could not do any thing at the 
central as well as at State level for the construction of Ram Temple at Ayodhya. 
The mass hysteria over Ram Temple was over and hard realities were staring in its 
face (the Godhra carnage and rising prices of daily essentials). Moreover, being 
part of the coalition government (National Democratic Alliance) it could not afford 
to antagonize its secular partners. Inspite of the absence of unity among the non-
BJP forces, the party suffered a setback in Uttar Pradesh during 2004 General 
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Elections. The elections were held for 80 Lok Sabha seats. The BJP had secured 
10, Congress 10, Samajwadi Party 38, Bahujan Samaj Party 19 and others 3 seats. 
After its setback in Uttar Pradesh and at the centre the BJP had once again 
racked up Hindutva card for electoral gains. The party promised the Ram Temple 
at Ayodhya if the party got an absolute majority at the centre. 
According to Salman Khurshid (the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee 
President) "the Ayodhya issue could have been amicably solved had people faith in 
the constitution and followed court verdict in the case. The differences in the 
stands of various parties and groups were due to those who wanted to make 
political capital out of that. He further said that Congress party had always stood 
for justice and not for appeasing any religion or class. Citing the Rajendra Sachar 
Committee report, he said that the main issue was education of the minorities. The 
unemployment among the minorities should be dealt with by providing them 
education. The central government should also look at how National scheme like 
'Sarva Siksha Abhiyan' could be made more beneficial to the minorities. The 
differences between the "haves and haves nof should be lessened. Such measures 
should not be termed as "minority appeasement". The BJP had raised the serious 
question mark on the ver\ formation of this committee calling it unnecessary and it 
being against the interest of the Nation^ .^ 
The Hindutva card failed miserably as it could not attract voters any more. 
Against 403 Assembly seats, BJP and its allies secured 50 seats, Congress and its 
allies could muster 22 seats whereas SP secured 98 and BSP 207 and others 25 
seats. Thus Bahujan Samaj Party had won an absolute majority in the State and 
Mayawati was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State on May 15, 2007. The 
party thanked upper caste for reposing faith in the party. Mayawati's strategy of 
wooing Brahmins and other upper castes, appeared to have paid rich dividends to 
BSP in the U.P. Assembly Elections. The BSP had shed its image of pro-Dalits 
only and aligned with upper castes whom the party had in the past always abused 
and cursed in the campaign^°. 
" The Times of India, New Delhi, Dec, 25, 2006. 
* The Times of India, New Delhi, May, 12, 2007. 
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(c) The Role of caste in Uttar Pradesh's Electoral Politics 
The phenomenon of caste has probably aroused more controversy than any 
other aspect of Indian life and thought. 
India's earliest expressions of caste ideals can be found in the vast body of 
sacred writings known as the Vedas. These texts were compiled between 1500 and 
1000 BC. One of the sections of the Rigveda describes the primordial act of blood 
sacrifice from which the Gods created the four Human Vamas. 
The Sanctity of caste is extolled too in the Bhagawad Gita, the great 
exposition of spiritual teaching which is contained within the ancient Mahabharata 
epic. Without caste, says the Gita, there would be corruption of humanity's most 
precious standards of domestic honour and sexual propriety^'. 
The principles of caste as a universal law of life are further elaborated in 
the Manavadharmasastra or Manusmriti, an encyclopaedic treatise in verse on 
human conduct, morality and sacred obligations. 
According to Hindu mythology all men in the world are divided into four 
castes - Brahmanas [Priests]. Kshatriyas [Warriors], Vaishyas [Common people] 
and Shudras [Servants]. The precedence of these castes is in the order of 
enumeration. .All other castes are produced by intermarriage either with pure or the 
mi.xed castes. These differences in the castes are innate and cannot be obliterated 
or concealed*^. 
Thus in keeping with Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of India as a casteless and 
egalitarian nation State, the Indian constitution was framed around the concept of 
fundamental rights of citizenship. 
These rights are deemed to inhere in the individual rather than in castes or 
ethno-religious 'communities'. The Indian constitution therefore requires the State 
to treat all citizen equally, without regard to birth, gender or religious affinity. It 
contains no references to Brahmans, gods, sacred scriptures or concept of ritual 
purity, thus apparently ignoring virtually everything that a modern anthropologists 
would define as fundamental to both caste and Hinduism^^. 
*' Bayly, Susan, The New Cambridge History of India, Caste, Society And Politics in India from the 
Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age, New Delhi, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p-13. 
*^  Ketkar, S.V., History of Caste In India, Jaipur, Rawat Publications, 1979, p. 19. 
" Bayly, Susal, Op. cit., p.268. 
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One irony of Indian polity is that its Modem Secular Democratic tendency 
has enhanced the growth of caste-based political parties. This is due to the fact that 
the Indian political parties have made the caste-based selection of candidates and 
explored the caste-based interests of the Indian electorate to be an effective way to 
win popular support. 
During 1950s the lower and backward castes were not politically mobilized 
and were badly dominated by the upper castes in all walks of life. There is no 
history of any anti-Brahmin movement in north India during colonial period. But 
1960s observed lower and backward castes as newly emerged important political 
force, opposing and giving stiff resistance to Higher castes having domination over 
political power in India. 
Charan Singh was able to use caste as an important tool of political 
mobilization. The Bhartiya Kranti Dal was formed by Charan Singh to mobilize 
the backward castes by emphasizing their position in the caste hierarchy, their 
distinct economic interests and hence claiming proportional representation in 
politics. He tried to identify the Congress party as a government that served the 
interest of upper castes and industrialists. He hence appealed to the backwards to 
counter upper caste dominance'^. 
The Bhartiya Kranti Dal later named as Lok Dal was described as a party 
primarily of the peasants, backwards and cultivating castes which were involved 
since 1967 in a continuous struggle with the Congress party that represented the 
rich peasantry, former landlords, the upper and lower castes. The BKD was 
successfiil in its mobilization mission because it used caste rather than class as a 
basis of political mobilization^ .^ 
While caste is considered as important mobilisation tool in the hands of 
political parties but class based changes in fact have been of primary importance. 
They both formed the underlying factors, which made large-scale caste based 
mobilization possible. The BKD / LD represented the emergence of rich peasantry 
amongst the backward castes in Uttar Pradesh. 
^ Pai, Sudha, Op. cit., p.50. 
^^ Ibid. p.5]. 
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The BKD infact was originally perceived as just another caste movement 
which aimed at appeal, primarily to those castes in the rural areas which as 
cultivators and herders (Jats, Yadavs, Kurmis, Koeris etc.) had positions in the 
traditional caste system. While in 1967, the backward castes were merely a rising 
class, due to the economic gains. By the end of 1970s the backward castes had 
begun to acquire the characteristics of a 'class for itself^ .^ 
The peasants mobilized by the BKD belonged to the Jats and the Rajput 
castes who earlier had enjoyed Zamindari rights under the British and also 
dominated the politics and leadership of most political parties in the western 
district of Uttar Pradesh. They infact were benefited from the Green Revolution 
and provided support base to the BKD and later BLD^^. 
The BKD had participated in three coalition governments formed after the 
1967 election. In those coalitions the backward castes for the first time had 
experienced political power for three brief periods. In the first Samyukta Vidhayak 
Dai [SVD] coalition government headed by Charan Singh formed in April 1967, 
30 percent of the Ministers were from the backward castes, 11 percent from the 
scheduled castes. 11 percent Brahmins and 14.82 percent were Kshatriyas .^ 
In the 1980s after the break up of the Janata Party, BLD [formed in 1974 
after split in BKD b\ Charan Singh. His BKD faction and seven other political 
panics like the Swatantra Party, Utkal Congress and the Socialist faction of Raj 
Narain etc], was badly affected by internal factionalism leading to a split. Death of 
Charan Singh led to a serious crisis within the party. 
Dalit loyahies towards the Congress remained unflinched since 
Independence till late 1980s, barring their brief honeymoon with Janata Party in 
1977. The backward remained glued to the Congress party because they considered 
it as the only platform through which their grievances could be redressed. 
The leadership in the Congress, specially after the exit of Charan Singh and 
his followers from the party in 1967 was drawn mainly from the ranks of Hindu 
Upper castes [Brahmans, Thakurs and Banias]. Their dominance in the ruling party 
^ Ibid, p.52. 
''Ibid 
"^ Ibid 
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meant that upper castes monopolized the vast resources of the State in Uttar 
Pradesh. At the same time, the dispersion of the individuals belonging to the 
subordinate ethnic categories among multi-ethnic factions and the reluctance of the 
Congress to recognize ethnic identity as the basis of legitimate political action, 
prevented them from organizing effectively to protect their interests^'. 
Although the upper castes got represented by the BJP also and continued to 
be influential in Uttar Pradesh, the attempt by the Samajwadi Party and the 
Bahujan Samaj Party to mobilize subordinate ethnic categories as cohesive 
political bloc produced a shift in the balance of political power in the governments 
and legislatures of Uttar Pradesh™. 
Between 1980 and 1989 the strength of upper castes had declined in U.P. 
politics. In 1989, in the Uttar Pradesh's council of Minister, half of the posts were 
occupied by the members of upper castes category. It however was, even at the 
lowest point on the graph. Upper castes were not only numerically dominant but 
also had controlled the important portfolios. 
The backward castes rose within the Congress governments since 1980. By 
1989 their representation had doubled from 9 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 
1989. However they were excluded from plum portfolios. Scheduled castes like 
backward castes by and large remained outside the position of real power and 
influence^'. 
The gap between the upper castes and subordinate ethnic categories was 
dramatically narrowed down in 1989, when Janata Dal had come to power and the 
then Prime Minister V.P. Singh had announced the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Mandai Commission Report, which favoured 27 percent 
reservation for the OBC's in government jobs and in educational institutions. The 
implementation of the Report got BJP agitated. As a result BJP withdrew its 
support from the V.P. Singh's National Front government. To counter VP Singh, 
attempt to attract Dalit votes L.K. Advani President of BJP launched his Ram Rath 
Yatra from Somnath to Ayodhya. Thus the mobilization around lower caste 
*' Roy, Rama Shray and Wallace, Paul, Indian Politics and the 1998 Election, New Delhi, Sage 
Publications, 1999, p.88. 
™/6/W., p.89. 
" Ibid. p.90. 
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identities and Hindutva, emerged as two crucial poles in the political field in India. 
The Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute was used by the BJP in a planned 
manner in order to mobilize the issue politically in such a way that it countered the 
issue of Reservations, which was intended to help the Janata Dal politically''^. 
The implementation of the Mandal Report was aimed to counter the 
growing popularity of the BJP in North India. However, by doing so the Janata Dal 
lost the votes of the upper caste Hindus and the Rajputs who were opposed to the 
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. The split in Janata Dal due to 
the Mandal Report led to loss of support of the Yadavs and some other backward 
castes who had drifted towards Mulayam Singh Yadav. 
The rise of lower caste and other backward communities in the wake of 
Mandal Commission Report eroded the base of the Congress party in Uttar 
Pradesh. Traditionally the leadership of the Congress party had been in the hands 
of the Brahmin community. In order to counter the issue of reservations and to earn 
votes from the lower and backward castes, the Congress leadership deliberately 
attempted to give tickets to the backward castes. However this strategy did not 
work out in L'rtar Pradesh. The upper caste diverted almost towards the BJP, while 
the lower and backward castes votes were splitted among the BJP, Janata Dal and 
the Samajwadi Part>. The lower castes preferred the Bahujan Samaj Party. The 
Brahmin lobby in the Congress was badly divided due to the Mandir issue. Hence 
from 1991 onwards the Congress lost vote bank of its own . 
The Congress part>' had always won majority of seats till the 1989. 
Generals Elections from Uttar Pradesh. It was only in 1977 General Elections that 
Congress had failed to muster conventional majority. It too had been the ruling 
party in Uttar Pradesh for most of the post independence period, barring three brief 
intervals of opposition rule that summed up only to four years. The 1989 General 
and Assembly Elections, however marked the beginning of the precipitous decline 
of the Congress party in the politics of Uttar Pradesh. 
The year 1989 is also the turning point in the electoral history of the 
successor parties. The BJP surged ahead between 1989 and 1991, and since then 
" Pai, Sudha, Op. cit., p. 124. 
"/6W, p.128. 
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became the single largest party in Uttar Pradesh. It had won 36 percent of the vote 
in the 1998 election. The Janata Dal, a newly created party in 1989 Assembly 
Elections, obtained majority of the Parliamentary seats and a plurality of seats in 
the State Legislative Assembly Elections of 1989. The Samajwadi Party was the 
outcome of series of splinters in the Janata Dal in the year 1992 and became the 
second largest party in U.P. The BSP formed in 1984 also had obtained a mass 
support in 1989 and became the third force in Uttar Pradesh politics^''. 
Caste based political mobilization had been an important constituent of the 
Indian political reality. It acquired a great importance during the past decade. It 
was during the last 10 years or so that caste based politics which emerged was 
looking for separate political space for itself rather than being a part of the larger 
mainstream". 
Among the caste based parties the most important and openly acclaimed 
part>' is the Bahujan Samaj Party with the prime objective to build up a cadre, 
de\'oted to educate the Dalits of their rights. 
According to Congress view the BSP's existence was a political prank of a 
seasonal part>- which would meet the same fate as had met the Republican Party of 
India. However, in less than a decade, the BSP became a political force to the 
extent that it could influence the electoral fortunes of the major political parties 
like the Congress and the BJP. The BSP in the 1985 Assembly Elections had 
mustered a mere four percent votes which shot up to 9.33 votes in the 1989 
Assembl\- Elections and won 13 of the 373 seats fought. In the 1991 Assembly 
Elections, the BSP won 12 seats with the percentage of votes shot up to 11. In the 
1993 Assembly Elections, the BSP had alliance with the Samajwadi Party to keep 
BJP at bay. The party won 67 seats out of 425 seats. The BSP got the support of 
the Jatavs, Dohre and Chammars which constituted 50 percent of the 21 percent 
vote bank of Dalits. The remaining sub-castes of Dalits were splitted between the 
Congress and the BJP. 
'" Roy, Rama Shray, Op. cit., p. 124. 
" Prakash, Amit, "Social, Cultural And Economic Dimensions of The Party System" in Ajay K. 
Mehra, D.D. Khanna, Gert W. Kueck (eds.), Op. cit, p. 141. 
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As a strategic move, the BJP by the end of 1995 had agreed to support 
Mayawati as the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in order to overthrow Mulayam 
Singh Yadav's government [formed in 1993]. It was also to improve its image 
among the scheduled castes because indirect dalitization seemed to be the only 
way for BJP to circumscribe the Yadav's, whose interest were embodied in 
Mulayam Singh Yadav^ .^ 
In joining hands with the BSP the BJP had hoped that alliance would help it 
to expand its electoral base amongst the Dalits but on the other side the BJP also 
eroded its upper caste base. The rejection felt by the upper caste members during 
the six months of Mayawati's government, introduced a new variables in the 
politics of the State. The wrong alliance (BSP-BJP) ultimately resulted in halting 
the BJP's consolidation drive to secure the Hindu vote bank in the State. 
When the BJP was forging for OBC vote bank, the BSP increased its 
efforts to approach upper castes, during 1996 General Elections. Prior to the 1996 
General Elections the BSP mobilised the 'Bahujan Samaj' by polarizing the 
electorate against the upper castes, obtaining political power. The early history of 
the BSP in Uttar Pradesh was described mainly as a means of avenging humiliation 
by displacing the upper castes from their superior position. In the 1996 Lok Sabha 
elections the BSP for the first time had allotted tickets to upper castes candidate in 
the Uttar Pradesh In the 1996 Assembly Elections 17 percent of the BSP tickets 
went to the upper caste candidates. In the 1998 Assembly and General Elections, 
the BSP not only allotted the same percentage of tickets to upper caste candidates, 
but made the induction of upper castes a BSP's a major election issue; lauding the 
upper castes for their 'Change of heart', Mayawati declared the BSP to be a party 
of Sarva Samaj (all people) and simply the Bahujan Samaj^'. 
The BSP began to supplement its traditional vote base with upper caste 
inspite of serious internal resistance. Reason was that the scheduled castes who 
formed the core of BSP support were not strong enough in any constituency to 
ensure its victory. The central dilemma for the BSP as for every other party in 
'* Jaffrelot, Christophe, Op. cil., p.70. 
" Roy, Rama Shray, Op. cil., p. 71. 
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U.P., therefore was to find ways of supplementing its core vote sufficiently to 
permit it to win electoral battles. 
The BSP tried hard to win over upper caste vote bank during 2004 General 
Elections and was successful to some extent in its venture. However, one thing 
static about BSP was that its strong base among the Dalits proved so strong that no 
other party seemed to be able to make a dent in it. It proved strong base among the 
Jatavs (86 percent) and the SP and the Congress got 17 and 15 percent votes 
respectively. This puts the stamp of a 'single caste party' on the BSP. The BSP 
awakened the Dalits by giving them a new voice of assertiveness^*. 
The Samajwadi Party arising out of the split in the Janata Dal became 
successful in Uttar Pradesh due to its pronged strategy persuaded by its leader 
Mulayam Singh Yadav since 1989 by taking advantage of the caste base 
consciousness. It carved out a backward caste initially upon the 'AJGAR' strategy, 
which was broadened to include more groups. The SP's support base is made up of 
the backward castes and particularly the Yadav community. 
The Samajwadi Party gave more emphasis on non-ethnic categories than 
the BJP and the BSP. It described itself as a party of farmers, of the poor, of the 
>oung or of rural India. The Samajwadi Party initially highlighted only aggregate 
caste divisions among Hindu "forward castes', 'backward castes' and 'scheduled 
caste'. 
Even in the 1993 Assembly Elections when SP-BSP alliance had come to 
power by drawing a sharp line between the 'forwards' composed of the Hindu 
upper castes and the 'backwards' composed of the backward caste, scheduled 
castes and Muslims, the SP had been more conciliatory towards the upper castes 
than the BSP. In the 1996 Assembly Elections the SP had made a bid to attract 
upper castes support by allotting approximately 21 percent of its tickets to upper 
caste candidates. In 1998 General Elections, the SP however began to press deeper 
into caste subdivisions within the backward castes among both Hindus and 
Muslims, and to a lesser extent, the Hindu 'forward castes'. However it allotted 25 
percent of its tickets to upper castes and openly appealed for upper caste support in 
''Ibid 
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its 1998 campaign^^. Scheduled castes were excluded from the SP category. During 
1998 General Elections Mulayam Singh Yadav accused scheduled castes of 
misusing the Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act to 
humiliate members of other caste categories. The SP called upon the Muslims, 
upper caste and backward castes to come together to defeat the BSP. 
The Samajwadi Party in the Assembly Elections of 2002 had emerged as 
the Single largest party in the Uttar Pradesh but was short of majority. The BJP 
supported the BSP in government formation in the State. Evidently the BJP had 
done that with the belief that its company would fetch it electoral benefits in the 
Lok Sabha elections of 2004. The BSP too announced that in exchange for the 
BJP's support in Uttar Pradesh, it would support the government (NDA) from out. 
However, as usual this Alliance did not work out and the Samajwadi Party 
Government led by Mulayam Singh Yadav was installed in the State with hidden 
support of the BJP. 
The caste polarization around Mandal issue led the BJP to pay greater 
attention to the social composition of constituencies. The Mandal controversy had 
forced the BJP to rely more on the OBC's members than on Brahmin-Bania duo, 
because the Brahmin-Bania duo could have proved disastrous for its winning 
strategy'. That is why the BJP gave particular attention to the proportional balance 
of MLA's of different caste groups from 1991 onwards. It was to balance them and 
to integrate some of the smallest castes*°. 
However, the upper castes being backbone of the BJP electorate and 
Brahmin have always loudly voiced their support for the BJP whereas other castes 
seemed more reserved or undecided. The Alliance between the BJP-BSP (1995) 
contributed to the weakening of upper castes ascendancy in Uttar Pradesh and 
intensified feelings of insecurity bom of the economic rise of the backward castes. 
Moreover the changing features of caste mobilization from one region to another 
' '/Wd, p.80. 
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made it difficult for the BJP to build a stable base around the larger caste groups in 
the whole State^'. 
The BJP in Uttar Pradesh attempted to court backward castes in, mainly by 
increasing the representation of members of these categories in its candidate lists 
and Ministers. However due to resistance from its upper caste core such increase 
were made modest. Backward caste's MLA's belonging to BJP between 1989 and 
1993 jumped from a plateau of 16 percent to 21 percent in 1996. The backward 
caste ministers in the BJP council of Ministers jumped from 21 percent in 1991 to 
27 percent in 1997. It attempted to boast its credibility among backwards in 
general and among scheduled castes in particular through its support of BSP led 
government in 1995 and 1997^1 
The strategies proposed by the BJP leaders to broaden their base among 
backwards and scheduled castes included two main options, the first was a more 
substantial incorporation of backward castes into the BJP in Uttar Pradesh The BJP 
was locked in fierce competition for the support of the backward castes with 
Samajwadi Parts and the Bahujan Samaj Party, both were pursuing backward 
castes b> explicitly promising them a share in power in proportion to their 
population''. 
Since 1996 the BJP has tried in the Assembly Elections not only to further 
balance proportion of lower castes with members of other caste but also to give 
them wider responsibilities and hearing in the party. This OBC assertion made 
some of the upper caste leadership in the party uneasy about the impact of 'Social 
Engineering' evolution which ultimately resulted in severe tensions between the 
General and Assembly elections of 1996, over the interpretation of the results 
between Kalyan Singh's group and the upper castes lobby headed by Kalraj Mishra 
and Lalji Tondon. In the 1996 General Elections nearly 80 percent of the BJP 
backward caste candidates were against 45 percent of the forward castes. This, 
together with the nomination of OBC's at positions of power in the party's 
*' Ibid, p. 89. "' ., p. 89. 
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organisation in Uttar Pradesh contributed to a growing dissatisfaction among the 
members of upper castes^*. 
The results of the 1996 Assembly Elections led the central leadership of the 
party (BJP) to introduce a counter weight to Kalyan Singh and to limit the dissent 
bom from his bias for the Backward. Inspite of all these in 1993, 31.8 percent of 
the members of his government came from the lower castes. The upper castes 
lobby resented the way OBC's were gaining power in the State and when the party 
got setback in the 1999 Lok Sabha Elections, Kalyan Singh's critics pressed for his 
removal from the chair of Chief Ministership* .^ 
During the General Elections campaign (1999) there was a consensus in the 
national leadership for replacing Kalyan Singh. According to party officials, it was 
the best way to strengthen the party in U.P. The leadership felt that upper caste 
groups such as Brahmins, Thakurs and Banias were increasingly getting alienated 
from the BJP because of what they perceived as the pro-backward class actions of 
Kalyan Singh. In the central leadership's perception, the upper caste support base 
could be retained if Rajnath Singh, a Thakur, becomes the Chief Minister. 
However after the elections Advani and close associates K.N. Govindacharya 
realized that the BJP was losing the support of not only the upper castes but also of 
the backward classes. In their estimation, the erosion of backward class support led 
the part>''s defeat in at least 15 constituencies (1999). They attributed the erosion 
mainly to the active campaign carried out against the party by Sakshi Maharaj, a 
former BJP member of Parliament who had turned a supporter of the Samajwadi 
Party. The campaign influenced a large section of the Lodh Rajputs, traditionally 
BJP supporters^^ 
Advani's group in the inner party meeting was of the view that the BJP has 
become a potent force in Uttar Pradesh since the 1980s only by expanding its 
support base, beyond the upper castes and including the backward classes. The 
group considered Kalyan Singh as having been responsible for this to a great 
*^  Mehta, Pratap Bhanu, Op. cil., p.95. 
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extent. Its leaders feared that any hasty action might further alienate the backward 
classes*^. 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his supporters such as Jaswant Singh and Lalji 
Tandon, were against the above mention assessment of L.K. Advani's group. They 
wanted the party to go ahead with the pre-election plan of replacing Kalyan Singh. 
The anti-Kalyan lobby intensified its pressure tactics and floated the name of 
Kalraj Mishra, a Brahmin as a possible replacement to Kalyan Singh^^. Kalyan 
Singh accused the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the Chief architect 
for his replacement. Finally he was replaced by a Bania Ram Prakash Gupta. All 
this resulted in the expulsion of Kalyan Singh for six years. Soon owing to 
mismanagement Ram Prakash Gupta was replaced by Rajnath Singh. In order to 
strengthen party's sinking base in the State, Rajnath Singh's decision on 'quota 
within quota' gave a new Uvist to the politics of reservation in Uttar Pradesh. 
Rajnath Singh had to face his political rivals, i.e. Samajwadi Party's 
.Mula>am Singh Yadav and the Bahujan Samaj Party's Mayawati tied up in knot 
over his decision 'quota within the quota' for the most backward castes among 
other backward classes and the Dalits. However 'quota within quota' was banned 
fk>m implementation by the Supreme Court. Rajnath Singh hopes of political 
reward from the reservation were belied in Assembly Elections of 2002. 
After the Assembly Elections of 2002, the BJP supported BSP in the 
formation of government in Uttar Pradesh which aimed to attract the Dalit votes 
towards BJP for the General Elections of 2004. However this strategy of BJP failed 
when it withdrew its support to the BSP on the charges of corruption. 
The BJP later decided that it would not obstruct the formation of an 
alternative government, even if it meant a government headed by Mulayam Singh 
Yadav. On August 28, 2003 Mulayam Singh Yadav formed the government with 
the support of Congress and Rasthtriya Lok Dal. His list included 15 BSP MLAs 
who told the Governor personally that they would support a government led by 
Mulayam Singh Yadav. It was at that point of juncture that the BJP's complicity in 
the installation of the government became obvious. Under the rules, the BJP had 
''Ibid. 
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argued that, the BSP MLA's support should not have been taken into account 
because they did not constitute one-third of the BSP Legislature Party. But the 
Governor Vishnukant Shashtri apparently ignored this and invited Mulayam Singh 
to take the oath as Chief Minister of the State. 
The BSP had a steady 21 percent Dalit vote bank ensuring the party around 
100 seats, barely one-fourth of the 403 seats of Uttar Pradesh Assembly. The 
BSP's crying need far an ally prompted the party to look towards the Brahmins 
(during 2007 Assembly Elections) who formed 9.2 percent of the State population. 
The BJP's downsizing in U.P. led Brahmins to drift toward the BSP^'. 
In the past, the combination worked in proxy when the BJP-BSP came 
together to form governments, first in 1997 and again in 2002. However in 2002, it 
didn't work. Underterred in 2005, the BSP leaders opted for a direct mass contact 
programmes, organized Brahmin Mahasammelans all over the State. The slogans 
changed from 'tilak, tarazu aur talwar, inko maaro joote char' to 'Brahmin Shankh 
Bajayega. Hathi Badta Ja>ega"^"'. 
In 2002 Assembl>' Elections, the BSP had given 30 seats to Brahmins, 
during 2007 .Assembh Elections this number was doubled to 86. Brahmin vote was 
crucial because of the Brahmin having access to every home, without him no ritual 
or Puja can be organised^'. 
Mayawati's effort to win over the Brahmins was boosted because of the 
fact that the BJP had made Kalyan Singh an OBC leader, its key man during 2007 
Urtar Pradesh Assembly Elections'^. 
The Bhartiya Janata Party was optimistic that Kalyan's huge following in 
the Lodh belt of western Uttar Pradesh would work in its favour. 
In 2002 Assembly polls the Rashtriya Kranti Party of Kalyan Singh (He 
founded Rashtriya Kranti Party when he was expelled from BJP for six years for 
his anti-party activities) emerged victorious on only four seats, it certainly added to 
the woes of BJP whose candidates suffered defeat owing to the presence of 
*' The Times of India, New Delhi, March 30, 2007 
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Kalyan's candidates. The RKP had fielded 335 candidates and out of these 315 had 
lost their security deposit but the 19 lakh votes polled in favour of the party was 
spread over several districts including Firozabad, Etah, Agra, Aligarh, 
Farrukhabad, Bulandshahar and Mathura'^. 
Dalits constituted 21 percent of the Uttar Pradesh population in the 2002 
Assembly Elections out of which BSP got 23.06 percent of votes and won 98 seats. 
In the Lok Sabha elections (2004), BSP garnered 24.67 percent of votes and won 
19 seats. In the 1992 Lok Sabha elections, BSP got 22.08 percent of votes and won 
14 seats. In the 1996 Assembly Elections, BSP had garnered 19.64 percent of votes 
and won 67 seats^"". 
During the last four elections, BSP's vote share in Uttar Pradesh hovered 
around 21 percent, which is the Dalit vote base in Uttar Pradesh though the party 
never claimed to be a part>' of Dalits alone. Since its birth in 1984, BSP always 
espoused the cause of Bahujans - SC/ST/OBC/ minorities. The BSP's Bahujanwad 
can be described as one of the biggest ideology driven mass campaigns in 
contemporan.' India^^ 
The BSP's performance was amazing in the 2007 State Assembly Elections 
on several counts. The Elections were held for 403 seats. The BSP emerged 
victorious with 207 seats. The SP had secured 98 seats, congress 22, BJP 50 and 
others 25. The stunning victory for BSP was a indication of Mayawati's long term 
strategy to reach out beyond the traditional Dalit base of her party. Weil before the 
elections, the BSP Chief had begun a series of Brahmin Jodo Sammelan where the 
party reached out to Brahmins and upper castes. Mayawati had realized that 
electoral arithmetic was against BSP if its support remained restricted to Dalits, 
who constituted about 21 percent of UP's population. So, she wooed the Brahmins 
who though at the other end of the caste spectrum, had been consistently 
marginalized in UP politics over the last two decades. This was a clever 
exploitation of caste politics and an inversion of caste logic'^. 
' ' The Times of India, New Delhi, April 12, 2007 
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The BSP's victory in UP could make it a force to reckon with in national 
politics. Throughout her campaign Mayawati had kept pointing to the list of her 
party's candidate for the UP polls 139 from the forward castes, 110 OBC's, 93 
from the scheduled castes and 61 Muslims. The impressive diversity of its 
candidates for cutting across caste and religion, clearly paid dividends for BSP. 
This could well become the party's USP if it decides to seriously contest elections 
in other States. Mayawati's strategy was, an inversion of Congress politics where 
the upper castes were the key players. Mayawati's strategy of inclusiveness stood a 
good chance of succeeding outside UP where Dalit politics had traditionally been 
virulently anti-upper caste'^. 
One of the factors which helped the Bahujan Samaj Party Supremo 
Mayawati to win the UP Assembly Elections was the Dalit-Brahmin combination 
forged by her and her emphasis on "Sarv Samaj". This social engineering formula 
was kept in mind while finalizing the names of the candidates for polls. 
Established citadels crumbled as Mayawati's elephant marched across the 
State, penetrating social blocks previously outside its reach. The feisty Supremo 
achieved for her party what B.R. Ambedkar could only dream of and what her 
no 
mentor Kanshi Ram envisioned but could not realize in his own lifetime . 
The BSP"s election campaign was conducted mostly away from the glare of 
the cameras - a strategically intelligent move that helped BSP's organization 
concentrate on the task at hand. The BSP's rival spent valuable time at the 
television studios. Mayawati's party worked silently and assiduously on the 
ground, wooing previously adversarial social groups through a series of 
bhaichara/caste amity/campaigns. The break through came with the success of its 
"Brahmin jodo abhiyan (take the Brahmins along project). To get a sense of this 
socio-political achievement, one should considered the traditional hostility between 
Brahmins and BSP since the formation of BSP. If Brahmins held the BSP in 
contempt, the latter ceaselessly targeted 'Manuwadis', reserving its choicest 
epithets for them. Interestingly, each time the BJP aligned with the BSP, the 
former's share of votes and seats went down. Attributing this to forward caste 
''Ibid 
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disapproval of the alliances, the BJP finally ended its off-on relationship with the 
BSP. Finally the Brahmins cohabited with the BSP during 2007 Assembly 
Elections was an irony too large to miss. However, it was not only Brahmins that 
the BSP co-opted as it went about enlarging its base. The Bahujan Party reached 
out to all sections through a network of committed zonal commanders, each on a 
mission to integrate one social group or another. Mayawati's party not only 
secured a large share of OBC votes but it also gained Muslim votes too^. 
Caste has attained, an important place in Indian politics while deciding the 
values and methods of democratic politics, caste is of immense consideration. 
Constitutionally the form of our polity is secular, the style is essentially caste 
oriented. 
In the last few years the policy of reservation has given further impetus to 
the role of caste in politics. This has increased the role of caste in different aspects 
of politics. For example the policies, programmes, and declaration of political 
parties are made, keeping in view the caste factor. Even different party positions 
within the party organisations are allocated with caste consideration. 
Caste factor has played an important role since the first General Elections 
on the basis of caste composition in the constituency. The voting in elections and 
mobilization of political support from top to bottom moves on caste lines. Now a 
days caste also plays role of pressure group in politics. The caste factor is dividing 
the people between the upper castes and lower caste which has adverse effect for 
the development of democratic society and polity. 
""/bid 
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CHAPTER - IV 
POST INDIRA GANDHI ERA AND POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS IN UTTAR PRADESH 
(a) The Rise and Decline of the Congress Party in 
Uttar Pradesh 
(b) The Development of Coalition Politics in Uttar 
Pradesh 
(c) The Demolition of Babri Masjid and its Aftermath 
(d) The Rise of BJP in Uttar Pradesh 
(a) The rise and decline of the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh 
The Indian National Congress was founded on December 27, 1885 by 
Allan Octavian Hume at Bombay. It is the oldest Party not only in India but in the 
whole of the developing world of Afro-Asian countries. A.O. Hume formed the 
Indian National Congress because he wanted to create an organization which 
would be under the supervision of British and which would let the British 
government know the demands of the Indian people. Moreover, he wanted to 
prevent another nationwide outbreak of mutiny like the one that took place in 
1857. 
The Congress had a very modest beginning, whose main objectives were to 
bring together leaders from all parts of the country. To remove biases of race, 
religion and region. To discuss problems relating to India and to form an action 
plan to get concessions from the British. 
The Congress Party had been pre-dominant at the centre as well as in States 
because it was the Prime platform of a cause i.e. Independence. It had the support 
of all the people from all sections of society irrespective of his religion, caste 
language or community- or class. Moreover, it had the inestimable advantage of the 
leadership, for the countn, and for the Party as well of two most remarkable 
personalities of the post-colonial world Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.' 
After Independence, the Congress became the successor to the British 
Authority in India. When its mission of winning freedom for India was fulfilled, 
Mahatma Gandhi felt that the Congress Party be dissolved and turn itself in a Lok 
Sewak Sangh (society for the service of the people), because he did not want the 
child of his toils and symbol of national unity to become the play thing of politics 
and be reduced to the position of a mere party maneuvering for power. The 
Congress thus ceased to be an omnibus organization, which could contain almost 
any Indian, it became instead a political party which was at the same time the 
government of Independent India. 
The recruitment of the members from a wide spectrum of caste and interest 
' Chopra, Pran, "How Many parties are too many?" in Ajay K. Mehra, D.D. Khanna, Gert W. 
Kuecic, (eds.). Political Parties and Party Systems, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2003, p. 174. 
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groups was undoubtedly a source of strength for the Congress, as it increased 
immensely its vote catching capacity and Nehru could raise the slogan in 1953 that 
"the Congress is the country and the country is the Congress". But it gradually 
transformed into a source of weakness. 
The Congress party had nurtured and relied upon certain values and beliefs 
in order to sustain its dominance. In its electoral rhetoric, it denounced the parties 
based on casteism, regionalism and communalism. Infact while opposing such 
parties, it skillfully balanced within itself the requirement of different constituents 
derived from all three categories. Therefore it made an effort to delegitimise and 
isolate parties, which overtly appealed to and championed interests based on these 
categories.^ 
However, the centralization of the Party had no doubt smothered inner 
Party democracy but it had made the Party no more cohesive. It progressively 
diminished the central leadership's effectiveness since it was so deeply involved in 
sorting out parochial quarrels that would once have been settled locally. 
The decline of the Congress dominance was attributed primarily to three 
factors-Intra partv factionalism, the ability of the opposition parties in several 
States to form an electoral alliances and increasing pluralization of organized 
interests. These factors affected the Congress Party adversely. In north India, intra 
part>- factionalism was the decisive factor preventing Congress from power. The 
f)o!itics of alliances and coalition played an important role in debarring the 
Congress from power single handedly. The process of pluralization helped 
opposition parties, because the Congress had failed to redress the grievances and 
concede demands of different interest groups. 
The growth of the personal and internal factional politics has been the most 
important development in the Congress Party organization in Uttar Pradesh since 
Independence. Before Independence such politics was alongside politics of issues. 
But now internal affairs of the Uttar Pradesh Congress has became feature of the 
^ Arora, Baiveer, "Federalization of India's Party System", in Ajay K. Mehra, D.D. Khanna, Gert 
W, Kueck (eds.), Op. cit, p. 88. 
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domination of personalised and internal factional politics.'' 
In the early years divergent factions were drawn under the Congress party 
through persuasion, reconciliation and accommodation. But as powers devolved to 
leaders at the State level bossism, entrenchment and indiscipline also kept on 
growing. While national level Congress was made subordinate to the leaders in 
central government, the lower levels of the party organization were gradually 
captured by a new generation of politicians. As such the party organization became 
the vehicle for their own advancement, the agent of upward mobility for an 
aspiring new leadership.'' 
As a result, the changes in the States soon appeared at the national level. 
The groups who exercised control over the party apparatus in the States and which 
supported individual members of the central Congress leadership or of the central 
government became more stronger. The local leaders in Congress organization 
with their own vested interest became further important. These were the main 
cause of Congress Party debacle in 1967 General and Assembly Elections in Uttar 
Pradesh. The failure of the Party's Central Election committee to play its 
accustomed role over a thousand Congressmen against the official candidates was 
an eye opener. For the same reason the state in-charges were left free to prepare 
their own election lists, with the result that the minority groups were alienated to 
form orjojn one of the numerable 'Jana' Congresses.^ 
The Fourth General Elections (1967) is considered to be a major watershed 
in the political development of India. It completely altered the pattern of political 
power in the country. Earlier the Indian National Congress exercised virtually 
unchallenged monopoly over power at the centre as well as in the States. The 
Fourth General Elections saw an end of the era of one party dominance. Though 
the Congress retained power at the centre but its majority in Lok Sabha had 
declined. In eight out of seventeen States Congress had lost its majority and non-
Congress coalition governments were formed. 
' Brass, Paul R., Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, New Delhi, Chanakya Publications, 
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Thus the stronghold of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, which was 
continuing since Independence, came to an end. No doubt even after 1967 General 
Elections in Uttar Pradesh Congress was the single largest party but C.B. Gupta 
had to form the government with the support of Independent members. There was 
a wave of non-Congress movement. (In eight States the non-Congress governments 
were formed). C.B. Gupta Ministry could not last long and soon it collapsed 
because of too many defections of the members, which resulted in the formation of 
Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD) with Ram Chandra Vikal, an independent MLA as 
its leader. Subsequently, Charan Singh a prominent leader of the Congress whom 
the blow of anti-Congress wave could not spare, left the party and joined Jana 
Congress. This party also merged itself with the SVD and Charan Singh was 
elected as its new leader. Thus the ground was clear for the formation of the first 
non-Congress government in Uttar Pradesh under Charan Singh.^ 
Charan Singh's government could continue till February 1968 and then 
collapsed because of both inter party and intra party differences. The SVD 
government collapsed because SVD was a Party with different ideologies, 
programmes and principles uho were united with one point programme and that 
uas ouster of Congress government from the State. After the SVD rule in State the 
allied parties uanted their programmes to be implemented, but that was rather 
impossible since the aim and gain or achievement of one was loss against the 
interest of other coalition partner.' 
.•\fter Charan Singh's resignation from the SVD government and the 
dissolution of .Assembh. Charan Singh formally launched the Bhartiya Kranti Dal 
in September 1968, which however had come into being earlier in November 1967. 
The BKD ministr> formed by Charan Singh in U.P. as one party government 
survived for two months only, from February 17 to April 16, 1970 and then it was 
a BKD - Congress (N) coalition government from April 17 to October 1, 1970. 
The reason for the short tenure of BKD government in the State was strained 
relations which developed between the two coalition partners. The Congress (N) 
' Abid, Mohmmad, Polilics In Uttar Pradesh. 1950-1980, Aligarh, Kitab Ghar Educational 
Publishers 1986, p. 181. 
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came out with open allegations that the coalition government was deviating from 
the policy line approved by Congress (N). This was not liked by Charan Singh and 
he called on them to quit the ministry. The triction between the two was further 
accentuated following the decision of BKD MP's to vote against the abolition of 
Privy purses in the Parliament.^ 
The coalition government of the BKD and the Congress (N) did not rest on 
any kind of similarity in the ideologies, policies and programmes of the two. On 
the contrary, it was founded on a give and take basis. 
The drama of alliances, coalition governments and defections from one 
Party to another lasted from 19^7 to 1974. It appeared that the people got tired of 
the political chaos and got confirmed that just as at the centre, in U.P. too, only 
Congress (N) in their opinion could provide a stable government. This 
strengthened the position of Congress as witnessed by the 1974 elections when in a 
house of 425 Congress (N) secured 213 seats as against 211 out of 425 in 1969. 
Except Jana Sangh all other parties were almost drowned. The reason why 
opposition parties did not come together was that the leaders of opposition parties 
had perhaps realized and were convinced that joint ventures would not work any 
more.^ 
The political crisis in the country deepened when National Emergency was 
declared on June 26, 1975. The National Emergency was declared when Allahabad 
High Court, in its judgment on June 12, 1995 held Indira Gandhi guilty of corrupt 
practices in her election. The judgment converted a legal issue into a political one. 
To contain the political storm created by the judgment Indira Gandhi declared a 
state of internal National Emergency. The Congress Party was forced to admit that 
the consensus pattern could no longer work. Besides family planning excesses, the 
people were angry over the MISA and DIR arrests. 
During 1977 General Elections, the RSS, Jana Sangh's, Jamaatis, Muslim 
Leagues, old Congressmen, BLD and Socialists all came under the common 
whiplash of Indira Gandhi's authoritarian oppression that led to the formation of 
^ Ibid. p. \B4. 
^ Ibid, p. 189. 
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the Janata Party in 1977. The formation of Janata government at the centre and 
State levels was similar to that of SVD government in Uttar Pradesh. Soon the 
Janata Party met the same fate as SVD had met in U.P. Thus cracks had emerged. 
It was not UP Politics this time but national politics where Charan Singh played 
exactly the same role as he had played in U.P. during the non-Congress rule in the 
State. It was Charan Singh who managed to bring Banarsi Das as Chief Minister of 
Uttar Pradesh who continued till the Assembly was dissolved and 1980 elections 
held. In the Elections of 1980 the Congress (I) swept the poll and captured 306 
seats in a House of 535 as against 46 in 1977. The Janata Party's break away group 
Bhartiya Janata Party secured 11 seats and Janata Party only 4 as against 351 seats 
in the House of 425 in the year 1977. Thus once again Congress (I) government in 
the State was formed under the Chief Ministership of Vishwanath Pratap Singh.'° 
The ascendancy of the Congress during 1980's was largely attributed to the 
growing importance of religion in Indian politics by it. Communalism in one form 
or the other has always been used in Indian politics for electoral purposes. In 
almost ever>' election it occupied a strategic position. In order to replenish its 
dwindling political fortune, the Congress Party had decided to whip up the 
majorit> communalism on a scale it had never done before. The game cost Indira 
Gandhi her life. The communal card played by her continued thereafter in order to 
articulate the Hindu vote bank. Even the Rajiv Gandhi's regime was marked by 
communal strategies." 
The reopening of locks of Babri Masjid at Ayodhya (1985) was one of the 
biggest blunder committed by the Congress Party under Rajiv Gandhi reign. The 
site of the Babri Masjid had always been the cause of dispute between the Hindus 
and Muslims since the nineteenth century. The Masjid was sealed off for decades 
by the colonial authorities. The core of the dispute, was a small platform, inside the 
Mosque, allegedly constructed on the site of Ram's birthplace and was worshiped 
by Hindus. The Babri Mosque was constructed by Babar's lieutenant. Under 
tremendous pressure from the Hindu lobby, the Rajiv Gandhi government directed 
the officials to provide Hindu access to the shrine in Ayodhya and later allowed the 
'"ibid. p. 191 
" Narang, A. S., Op. cit.. p. 659. 
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Shilanyas ceremony in 1989 (the laying of foundation stone) for a Ram temple and 
thus resurrected a controversy that became perhaps the deadliest communal 
flashpoint in Post- Independent India. The Congress's attempt at playing to the 
Hindu sentiments failed to pay off and the Party lost the 1989 General Elections. 
The Bhartiya Janata Party benefited immensely from the 
Ramjanambhoomi- Babri Masjid issue. Infact the politics of religion based 
mobilization underlied its meteoric rise by the mid 1990s moving from two seats in 
1984 to 89 seats in the 1989, 161 in 1996, 182 in 1998, again 182 in 1999 and 138 
in 2004 General Elections. 
The Ramjambhoomi- Babri Masjid issue gave an opportunity to the BJP to 
revive its electoral base in the 1989 General Elections. The Janata Dal and Left 
combine led government was formed at the centre under the banner of National 
Front. The BJP gave an external support to this coalition. 
The National Front government decision to implement the Mandal 
Commission Report of granting 27% reservation to OBC's posed a formidable 
challenge to the BJP's politics of Hindutva. The proponents of the Mandal politics 
artached primacy to caste identirv' in politics, which had pitted the lower castes 
against the uppter and forward castes on the question of social justice. The BJP 
could not endorse this brand of politics, which created a fissure in the Hindu 
community. Yet the Party could ill afford to ignore the rising political strength of 
the backwards and dalits and it aspired to become a major all India force, for this, 
it had to be accommodative towards these social categories.'^ Whereas the 
Congress Party was neither supportive nor critical of the report. The Party had not 
taken any clear stand on the report. 
In order to counter the political threat arising out of the Mandal 
commission report the BJP intensified the Ramjamabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue so 
that its vote bank is not drifted towards the Janata Dal on caste issues. Aim of L.K. 
Advani's Rath Yatra was that all Hindus irrespective of higher and lower castes 
were united for the cause of temple construction at Ayodhya. Later the BJP 
'^  Basu, Partha Pratim, "Religious Cleavages, Politics and Communalism in India", in Rakhahari 
Chatterji (ed.), Politics India. The State-Society Interface, New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 
2001, p. 281. 
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withdrew its support from the National Front government of V.P. Singh when 
L.K. Advani was arrested in Bihar by the then Chief Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav. 
After V.P. Singh's defeat in the House, Chandra Shekhar took over as the Prime 
Minister of the country with the support of Congress party. 
The Hindu card played by the Congress during 1980s to strengthen its 
eroding base infact helped BJP to consolidate its vote bank. The Hindu-Muslim rift 
had widened during the course of L.K. Advani's Rath Yatra. The widening gulf 
between the two communities helped BJP whereas the base of the Congress Party 
was constantly eroded thereafter. As a result before the 1991 General Elections the 
Congress was engaged in an endeavour to win back the Muslim voters. 
Declaration of the BJP as enemy number one, support for the ban on Salman 
Rushdies Satanic verses and the opposition to the Chandra Shekhar government 
policies towards the gulf war and to refuelling of the US aircraft on Indian soil and 
visit to the Middle East by Rajiv Gandhi to demonstrate his sympathies for Iraq. 
All these were part of Rajiv Gandhi's electoral strategy to woo back the Muslim 
voters'^ 
However, due to the assassination of the then Congress President Rajiv 
Gandhi. The Congress reaimed back to power at the centre through General 
Elections of 1991. Out of the total 511 seats for which Lok Sabha Elections were 
held, the position of various parties was; Congress 227, BJP 119, Janata Dal 56, 
CPI (M) 35, CPI 13. P.V. Narasimha Rao was sworn in as the Prime Minister. In 
Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly Elections of 1991, the BJP had secured an 
absolute majority and Kalyan Singh was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the 
State. 
The final blow to the Congress Party at the centre and in Uttar Pradesh was 
the demolition of Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 during the tenure 
of P.V. Narasimha Rao. 
The Congress Party would never be able to escape the hardest historical 
denunciation on the Ayodhya issue. The demolition of the Babri Masjid resulted in 
severe riots in the country on December 6, 1992. The whole country was engulfed 
'^ Ibid., p. 278. 
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in communal riots and looting Narasimha Rao's statement after the demolition 
added fuel to the fire that the similar structure would be constructed very soon on 
the place of the demolition. He should have restrained from making such 
statements, being an able politician, he could have avoided the situation from 
turning ugly.''* 
Narasimha Rao was well informed in advance by his political and 
intelligence agencies for not to trust the assurances of the Kalyan Singh 
government rather to dismiss his government immediately, ultimately that became 
the precursors of the worst communal divide that convulsed the entire nation with a 
violent fury unknown, since the partition. Instead of offering to resign after his 
Himalayan blunder he took refuge in self-pity blaming the BJP for 'Perfidy and 
took hasty step to counter the situation'. This cost the Party dearly and it lost too 
badly thereafter in Uttar Pradesh. The Party lost its Muslim vote bank. Muslims 
were angr)' with the Congress because it compromised with its (Party's) own 
ideology, histor>' and traditions while dealing with challenges posed by the Sangh 
Parivar. 
.After sur\iving Ayodh\a crisis the Congress Party (Particularly Narasimha 
Rao) developed a thick skin for Prime Ministers accountability towards his own 
Party members and constitutionally towards the Nation though Party members and 
senior colleagues were involved in scandals after scandals and lost power bases in 
die States. All this caused the Congress Party a serious damage in terms of loss of 
senior loyalists and the seats in particular. The worst debacle of its kind had taken 
place.'^ 
P.V. Narasimha Rao's biggest mistake was perhaps to assume that he could 
take over the mantle from the Nehru-Gandhi family as the Party's main vote puller. 
Rao's growing insecurity and his inability to contain dissentment within the Party 
saw the exit of powerful leaders such as Arjun Singh and N. D. Tiwari, Rao had 
become autocratic and centralized all decision making processes. 
The Congress Party suffered its worst ever defeat in the 1996 General 
''' Jaffrelot, Christophe, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925-1990s, New 
Delhi, Viking, 1996, p. 464. 
" Rao, K Vikram, "The Scam Struck Year", Momentum, January 1997, p. 17. 
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Elections. Its strength in Parliament was reduced to 140 seats. The BJP emerged as 
the single largest party in the 11"^  Lok Sabha in 1996 with 161 seats and succeeded 
in receiving the Presidential invitation to form the government. On May 16, 1999 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee was sworn in as the Prime Minister who continued till May 
28, 1996. His government fell after 13 days because the party was short of absolute 
majority and it could not attract any ally to sustain it. 
The votes secured by the Congress dropped to an all time low of 28 percent 
during 1996 General Elections. The big question at that moment was would the 
Party that led India to independence would soon be reduced to a marginal player in 
national politics. Its status as the dominant secular alternative to the BJP was under 
threat. After being driven out of the Indo-Gangetic plains it lost its supremacy in 
South of the Vindhyas too. Worst, the national consensus of caste, regions and 
economic groups that the Party enjoyed also got considerably eroded.'^ 
After the downfall of Atal Bihari Vajpayee's government. The Congress 
gave an external support to the United Front government. With the external support 
fi-om Congress Party on June 1, 1996, H.D. Deve Gowda's 21-members central 
cabinet was sworn in. To his United Front Government, BJP had described as 
'Kahin Ki Eint, Kahin Ka Rocla Bhanumati Nay Kunba Joda' a 13 legged animal. 
No part> was in a position to form the government in 1996, 1999 or in 2004 on its 
own. H.D. Deve Gowda continued in office till April 21, 1997. He was replaced by 
I.K. Gujral owing to the differences between the then Congress President Sita Ram 
Kesri and the United Front. Sitaram Kesri was reluctant to support the incumbent 
Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda. Thus, on April 21, 1997 I.K. Gujral was sworn 
in as the Prime .Minister. However, he resigned on March 18, 1998 as the Prime 
Minister. Reason for his resignation was that the then Chief Minister Laloo Yadav 
was chargesheeted in the infamous fodder scam and the Prime Minister I.K. Gujral 
having earlier been obliged with a Rajya Sabha by Yadav, could not take a 
decision against him. Eventually Laloo Prasad Yadav splitted the Janata Dal to 
form his own Rashtriya Janata Dai.' 
The Times of India, New Delhi, July 19, 2005. 
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On March 14, 1998 Sonia Gandhi took over as Congress (I) President 
because its members and party workers were deserting it due to the ineffective 
administrative activities of Sita Ram Kesri. The party organization was getting 
weaker day by day. Many important leaders had left the Party due to the autocratic 
style of functioning of Sita Ram Kesri. Moreover under his leadership the party 
had declined in the State Legislative Assemblies. All these factors were 
instrumental to breathe new life in the party organization and it was only possible 
if Nehru-Gandhi family member took the reins of the Party. All these factors 
compelled Sonia Gandhi to take charge of the Party. 
Initially, inspite of her best effort to revive the party at the National and 
State level proved futile. The Party failed to muster majority in the 1998 General 
Elections. The Congress secured 141 seats, BJP 182, Janata Dal 6, CPM 32, CPI 9. 
On March 19, 1998 Atal Bihari Vajpayee was sworn in as the Prime Minister. His 
government failed to complete its term when AlADMK one of its allies withdrew 
its support from the Vajpayee's cabinet. AlADMK Chairperson J. Jayalalitha 
wanted diat the central government must pressurize the then Chief Minister of 
Tamil Nadu, Karunanidhi to withdraw cases against her from the Madras High 
Coun. As a result AlADMK withdrew its support from central government in 
.April 1999. The AIAD.MK had 27 MP's in Lok Sabha. 
On September 5, 1999 Lok Sabha Elections began and on October 10-13 
1999, Lok Sabha was constituted. On October 13, 1999, 70 member Vajpyayee 
government was sworn in. It was a 24 Party coalition government known as the 
National Democratic Alliance was formed. 
The Lok Sabha results from the Uttar Pradesh (1996) were not satisfactory 
for the Congress. In the 1996 General Elections the Congress had secured 7 seats 
out of 85 Lok Sabha seats, BJP 52, SP 16, BSP 6, Janata Dal 2, SJP I, CPI, 0, CPI 
(M) 0, BKKP 0; Samata Party 0, Independent 1. Whereas in the 1998 General 
Elections the Congress had secured no seats from the State, BJP had secured 57, 
SP 20, BSP 4, Janata Dal 0, SJP 1, CPI 0, CPI (M) 0, BKKP 0, Samata 2, and 
Independent 1, This was the worst defeat for the Congress where it failed to win 
even a single seat from the State. Similarly in 1999 General Elections Congress 
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had secured 5 seats, BSP 14, SP 26, BJP 51 seats. The elections were held for 80 
seats. After the seven years long spell of political banishment the Congress party 
had returned to power at the centre after 2004 General Elections whereas in Uttar 
Pradesh it was still fighting to stand on its own. The Party was still fragmented in 
the State though serious efforts were being made by the Congress Chairperson 
Sonia Gandhi and the State Congress Committee President Salman Khursheed to 
revive the party in the State. 
In 2004 General Elections the Congress Party had secured 9 seats IND 
(Congress) 0, UNS 0, BJP 10, JD (0) 1, CPI 0, CPI (M) 0, BSP 19, SP + 38, LKD 
3, and others 3 from the state. After the seven years long spell of political 
banishment the Congress party had returned to power at the centre during 2004 
General Elections whereas in Ijttar Pradesh it is still fighting to stand on its own. 
The party was still fragmented in the State though serious efforts were being made 
by the Congress Chairperson Sonia Gandhi and the State Congress Committee 
Presidents Salman Khursheed to revive the party in the State. 
Therefore, developments in the State demanded Congress to regenerate its 
image by taking firm stands and reposition itself in the minds of the electorates. It 
needed to reco\er considerable grounds it lost to parties like Samajwadi Party and 
the Bahujan Samaj Part) and the BJP especially in the Hindi belt. To do that even 
strategic alliance with caste based state leaders such as Mulayam Singh Yadav and 
Mayawati would be justified.'^ 
The Congress Party which had dominated the Uttar Pradesh till 1984, could 
count its electoral wins on its fingertips. Its vote bank had declined since 1990's in 
the State. The demolition of the Babri Masjid is considered a cause which had 
acted as a big havoc for its electoral base in the State. The Party lost badly in the 
three General Elections held in 1996, 1998 and 1999 respectively. Those elections 
also showed the fragility of coalition governments in India and the shifting of the 
political loyalties of the parties. 
As a result the Indian politics remained in flux ever since the beginning of 
the decline of the Congress Party. With the rise of numerous political formations 
'^  Momentum, Op. cil., p. 17 
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reflecting regional aspirations and those of the newly rising social forces, the base 
of the Congress Party got narrower and narrower.'^ 
In Uttar Pradesh the Congress Party declined because of three critical issues 
i.e. class, caste and community. The reason why it waffled was that the Congress was 
dominated by conservative upper castes who played to the tune of New Delhi, and 
were simply unwilling to share power with new emerging groups. The Congress lost 
the class issues relating to farmers interest to Charan Singh, the caste issue to Kanshi 
Ram and Mulayam Singh Yadav, and community issue to the Bhartiya Janata Party 
and to Mulayam Singh Yadav. No serious efforts were made by the Congress Party to 
develop and sustain new leadership across all communities.^ 
The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh suffered mainly because of the 
leadership crisis in it. There was hardly any Congress leader to meet the challenges 
or make the Congress presence felt in the State. None of the leaders appointed till 
date proved charismatic to inspire confidence in the Party ranks and among those 
who felt demoralized by the humiliating defeat they faced in the Parliamentary 
Elections held so far. Therefore the leaders in the State demanded the renewal of 
organizational set up in the Part)'. It was to fill the vacuum gapped by the 
disappearance of the Nehru Dynasty from the scene, till the entry of Sonia Gandhi 
in active politics as Congress Party Chairperson. The Party had never felt so 
forlorn as it felt now.- '^ 
In retrospect, it does seem that the treatment of the Uttar Pradesh Congress 
by the Nehru family was to a great extent responsible for the problems the Party 
has faced in the State. While Jawahar Lai Nehru was democratic enough to allow 
the popular leader to rule the State. Whereas Indira Gandhi throughout her reign 
allowed the Chief Minister to rule the State on her own terms. Whenever the Chief 
Ministers were found becoming self-regarding and powerful they were shifted to 
the centre. The same practice continued even during the tenure of Rajiv Gandhi. 
The practice of foisting leaders on the State from the top, instead of allowing 
" Dubey, Muchkund, "The Third Force, As An Ideology And As Reality", in Ajay K. Mehra, DD 
Khanna Gert, W. Kueck (eds.), Op. cil., p. 274. 
^'^ Economic and Political Weekly, July 31, 1999, p. 2127. 
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deserving and popular persons to grow from their roots in the Party was largely 
responsible for the Congress set back in Uttar Pradesh.^^ 
The Congress history in Uttar Pradesh especially during the past 15 years 
or so was a sordid saga of infighting, which was either deliberately encouraged or 
convened by the Party leader in New Delhi so that no towering leader could ever 
emerge on the scene. Late Vir Bahadur Singh the Chief Minister of the State 
during 1985 Congress regime used to spend more time in Delhi than in Lucknow 
countering the efforts of his detractors in the capital. 
The Congress Party decimated in the state because in the new political 
alignments that have emerged, a section of the traditional Congress base has 
gravitated towards the BJP, while other parts have fragmented between the Janata 
Dal, Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party. The Congress is itself to be 
blamed that it finds nowhere on the political stage of Uttar Pradesh which was 
being polarized between the BJP and other political parties. The continuous 
whittling dov'.n of the stature of its state level leaders have also contributed to its 
lack of credibility- as a potential Party of governance. 
The BJP created niche for itself in the heartland largely at the cost of the 
Congress Part>. The issue of Hindutva having its limitation was realized soon by 
the BJP. This could be observed through the growing efforts of BJP to woo the 
Muslims, Dalits and the OBC's. If the Congress Party lacked the support of the 
backward community and the scheduled caste, reason was that they had drifted 
towards the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party in the State^^ 
It was believed by political observers that the Congress high command's 
concentration and priority should not confine to the development of Amethi and 
Rae- Bareilly only. For its survival it was necessary that central and State 
leadership should give equal importance and pay due attention to the development 
and welfare of other constituencies of the State as well. 
The Congress Party had much broader social and regional bases in 
" Eswaran, V.V., "The BJP loses All Along The Line" Nation and the World, March 2002. 
^^  Ghosh, Partha S, "The Congress and the BJP, the Struggle for the Heartland" in Ajay K Mehra, 
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comparison to other parties, therefore taking advantage of its resources and bases it 
could become nucleus of an anti SP, BSP and BJP front in the State. 
(b) The Development of Coalition Politics in Uttar Pradesh 
The term political dominance has changed from centralized ploughing 
towards a more complex mechanism of alliance and coalition with the breakdown 
of one party dominance at the centre as well as in the States. The term as it is 
generally used in political science is a direct descendant of the exigencies of a 
multi-party system in a democratic set- up. It is a phenomenon of a multi-party 
government where a number of minority parties join hands for the purpose of 
running the government.^'* 
The term, coalition has been derived from the Latin world "coalitio" which is 
the verbal substantive of Co-alescere, Co-together and Alescere, which means to grow 
up or to grow together.^^ In the political sense the word coalition is used for an alliance 
or temporary union for joint action of various powers of States and also of the union 
into a single government of distinct parties or members of distinct parties.'^ ^ 
The essence of the politics of coalition is opportunism and the self interest 
wliether of a group or of an individual. Despite its shortcomings and limitations, 
the coalition provides the only feasible and viable alternative in a parliamentary 
democracy and also provides a bulwark and necessary safeguard against the 
unsung collapse of a democratic set-up. A coalition does not mean that one party 
has to merge with another, but only a common programme is needed. 
Going into brief history of coalition in India it is found that an alliance to 
oust the Congress was for the first time made in Kerela in 1957. Several opposition 
parties with the Communist Party playing the leading role had formed a United 
Front. That was the first non-Congress government in any State of the country. 
The stronghold of the Congress Party, which was continuing since 
Independence, came to an end at the centre as well as in Uttar Pradesh during the 
Fourth General Elections (1967). The Congress suffered a great setback in Lok 
"^ Chitkara, M.G., Hindutva Parivar, New Delhi, APH Publishing Corporation, 2003, p. 134. 
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Sabha as well as in the State Assemblies. Out of 507 Lok Sabha seats the Congress 
had secured only 280 seats and at State level out of total 3,563 Assemblies seats 
the Congress had secured only 1090 seats. 
In Uttar Pradesh, the Congress had secured only 198 seats out of 425 
Assembly seats. The Jana Sangh had 97 seats, PSP 14, Communist (R) 14, 
Swatantra 12, Republican 9 and the Communist (L) one seat only. 
In order to oust the Congress from power all opposition parties had come 
together as Samyukta Vidhayak Dal and formed a coalition government in 1967 in 
Uttar Pradesh. Their combined strength was 188 in a House of 425. The 37 
independents held the balance but later on they lent their support to the Congress. 
At that time there were two candidates for leadership Charan Singh and C.B. 
Gupta. The central leadership chose C.B. Gupta in the belief that he commanded 
the support of the majorit)'. But Charan Singh staked his claim and offered himself 
as a candidate for the leadership. Later Charan Singh withdrew his candidature. 
The agreement leading to Charan Singh's withdrawal was said to have made it 
incumbent upon C.B. Gupta to consult Charan Singh in the choice of the personnel 
for the ministp.. Charan Singh made some proposals and C.B. Gupta turned them 
down. The former therefore refused to join the ministry. But on the day when the 
Assembly was in session, some 30 members of the Congress met at Charan 
Singh's house and discussed the possibility of their leaving Congress Party. On 
April 1, 1967, 17 of the Congress members crossed the floor in the Assembly with 
their leader Charan Singh announcing that Gupta's intransigence had compelled 
them to take the painful decision.^^ 
The Assembly was that day to accept or to reject the Governor's address, 'a 
policy statement of the government'. The opposition moved an amendment and 
carried it through with the support of defectors from the Congress. The Congress 
government had to bow out and Charan Singh, the leader of the SVD took over as 
the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. For the first in time in U.P. a coalition 
government of assorted parties thus was formed.^' 
^ Abid, Mohd., Op. cil.. p. 7. 
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In Uttar Pradesh when the SVD government was formed in 1967 Charan Singh 
was urged to resign from the leadership of the SVD government and to join the BKD. A 
few months after the formation of SVD government in Uttar Pradesh an atmosphere of 
uncertainty was created by some constituents of the coalition government. 
The ministerial crisis depended further more on the decision of Chief 
Minister Charan Singh to boycott the meeting of the co-ordination committee. The 
general body of the SVD was being held in Lucknow to take stock of the latest 
development in the State. Charan Singh complained that since he had not been 
consulted about the holding of these meetings, he and members of his party did not 
feel proper to attend those. He felt that the Jana Sangh and other constituent unit of 
the Dal should have consulted him before calling these meetings because he was 
still the leader of the SVD. 
On February 17, 1968 Charan Singh had resigned and advised the 
Governor to dissolve the Assembly and to order mid term elections unless another 
leader elected by the SVD was thought capable of forming the government. After 
Charan Singh's resignation was accepted by the Governor, the SVD requested and 
tried to persuade Charan Singh to continue as its leader. But Charan Singh was not 
ready to accept the leadership an\more. On the confusion created by the SVD and 
its obvious failure to elect a leader acceptable to all its constituents, after Charan 
Singh's resignation, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh sent a report to the centre, 
recommending takeover of the State administration by the President.^" 
On February 25, 1968 Presidents rule was declared in Uttar Pradesh. After 
his resignation from the SVD government and the dissolution of Assembly, Charan 
Singh formally launched the Bhartiya Kranti Dal in September 1968, which 
however had come into being earlier in November 1967.^' 
In the mid term polls the Congress had secured 211 seats out of 425, with 
BKD trailing behind as the second highest, thereby becoming the opposition party 
in the Assembly. The Congress Party headed by C.B. Gupta with the support of 
Independents and Swatantra formed a ministry on February 16, 1969. The Gupta 
'° Ibid, p. 12 
'^ Ibid 
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ministry could not last long and its stability was shaken due to split in the 
Congress. The new Congress under the leadership of Kamlapati Tripathi joined 
hands with the BKD to topple the C.B. Gupta Ministry.^^ 
After the resignation of Kamlapati Tripathi from the Presidentship of 
UPCC, under the directive of the AICC, the group rivalries within the Congress 
became prominent as C.B. Gupta openly favoured H.N. Bahuguna. However, 
when the split in the Congress Party took place, C.B. Gupta supported Congress 
(O). While Tripathi group supported Congress (N). Charan Singh joined hands 
with the Tripathi group to topple the Gupta Ministry. 
On February 10, 1970 C.B. Gupta tendered his resignation to the Governor. 
Despite C.B. Gupta's resignation political situation in the State took a new turn 
when Charan Singh broke alliance with Congress (O) and reached an agreement 
with Congress (N) to form a single party government and the Congress (N) was to 
extend full support to his ministn.'. The BKD Ministry formed by Charan Singh in 
Uttar Pradesh as one part> government survived for two months only, from 
February 17 to April 16 1970 and then it was a BKD-Congress (N) Coalition 
government from .April 1 7 to October, 1 1970.-'^  
The reason for the short tenure of the BKD government in the State was its 
strained relations with the Congress (N), which had developed between the two 
coalition partners. The Congress (N) had come out with open allegations that the 
coalition government was deviating from the policy line approved by the Congress 
(N). This was not liked by Charan Singh and he called on those members to quit 
the Ministry. The tension between the two partners grew so high that Charan Singh 
asked thirteen Congress (N) Ministers to resign from his council of Ministers. They 
did not resign. Instead the leader of the Congress (R) legislative party Kamalapati 
Tripathi wrote to the Governor requesting him to ask Charan Singh to resign since 
the Congress (R) had withdrawn its support and that Charan Singh no longer 
commanded majority in the House. 
On September 27, 1970 the Governor had passed orders concerning with 
^^Ibid.pM 
^^Ibid. 184. 
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Charan Singh's action of withdrawing portfolios from 13 Congress ministers of the 
Cabinet rank. The Governor entrusted those portfolios to the Chief Minister. The 
Governor had not yet taken decision on Chief Minister's advice that all the 26 
Congress (R) Ministers should be removed from the office^ '* 
The Congress (R) in a counter move, withdrew its support on the same day 
to the six-month-old coalition government. All the Congress (R) ministers, through 
a letter to the Governor demanded the dismissal of Chief Minister on the ground 
that he did not enjoy the support of the majority party. Sharply reacting to their 
demand for his resignation Charan Singh recommended to the Governor the 
dismissal of all 26 Congress (R) minister on the ground of break of discipline. The 
National Executive of the PSP was of the view that Charan Singh should have 
resigned from office after his announcement of the termination of BKD- Congress 
(R) coalition. After obtaining the opinion of the Attorney General, the Governor B. 
Gopala Reddy asked Charan Singh to resign by the evening of September 28, 1970 
and President V.V. Girl signed a proclamation taking over the administration of 
U.P. and suspended the State Assembly on October 1, 1970.^ ^ The State was duly 
placed under Presidents Rule on October, 2 1970. However, the State Assembly 
was not dissohed to enable the parties to reach some sort of accord regarding the 
formation of the govemmeni. 
Soon after the declaration of President rule in UP on October, 2, 1970, the 
five opposition parties Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Swatantra, SSP and BKD joined 
hands to form the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal. On account of its strength of 250 in a 
House of 426, it asked the Governor to invite T.N. Singh to form the Ministry. On 
October 18, 1970 T.N. Singh was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. The 
T.N. Singh Ministry collapsed soon because the allied parties could not adjust with 
each other on various issues and as a result defections in SVD started. Moreover 
T.N. Singh was defeated in the Maniram by-election in 1971. As a result many 
MLA's defected from the SVD and joined Congress (N). Thus the Congress (N) 
with 222 members behind it, urged the Governor to dissolve SVD Ministry and 
Kamlapati Tripathi was sworn in as Chief Minister whose ministry lasted till 1974 
^'Ibid. 50. 
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elections and then H.N. Bahuguna from the same party took over as the Chief 
Minister on March 5, 1974.^ ^ 
The uncertain political fortune changed when in the 1974 Assembly 
Elections Congress secured 213 seats against 211 out of 425 in 1969 Assembly 
Elections. Other parties except Jana Sangh were almost drowned. N.D. Tiwari took 
over as Chief Minister of the Uttar Pradesh and Congress in UP remained in power 
throughout the Emergency phase (1975-1977). 
Large-scale defections took place in wake of the 1977 General Elections. 
Thus the process continued during the Janata rule as well as in the years after that. 
The political leaders defected from the Congress Party in order to join the newly 
formed Janata Party. In Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections (1977) the Janata party 
had captured 351 seats out 423 seats contested, Congress secured 46, CPI 9, CPM 
1 and Independents 16. Ram Naresh Yadav was sworn in as the Chief Minister but 
later he was replaced by Banarsi Das, who continued till the Assembly was 
dissolved and 1980 elections held. In the elections of 1980 the Congress (I) swept 
the poll and captured 306 seats in a House of 425 as against only 41 in 1977. The 
Janata party was almost wiped out securing only four seats. Its breakaway group 
Bhartiya Janata Part>- secured 11 seats and Janata 4 as against 351 seats in the 
House of 425 in the year 1977. Thus once again Congress (1) government in the 
Stale was formed under the Chief Ministership of Vishwanath Pratap Singh. 
From 1980 to 1989 there was no coalition government either at the centre 
or in Uttar Pradesh. From 1989 onwards the coalition era began at the centre and in 
Uttar Pradesh. The coalition era again came to an end in Uttar Pradesh when in 
2007 Assembly Elections the BSP secured an absolute majority in the State. 
The Congress Party ruled the State (Uttar Pradesh) and the centre 
uninterrupted from 1980 to 1989. It was routed in North India both in Lok Sabha 
and in Assemblies through elections of 1989. In the Lok Sabha the Congress got 
only 14, seats out of 85 Lok Sabha seats from Uttar Pradesh while Janata Dal was 
able to get 54 seats. No party got an absolute majority in the State Assembly 
Elections. In a House of 525 Janata Dal secured 204 seats, Janata Party 1, Congress 
^^ibid. 188 
169 
94, BJP 57, Lok Dal (B) 2, CPI 6, CPI (M)2, BSP 13, Independents 40, and others 
2. Janata Dal government was formed with Mulayam Singh Yadav as the Chief 
Minister of the State. Whereas at the centre V.P. Singh formed the government 
(National Front) with the external support of the BJP and the Left Parties (the 
elections were held for 529 seats. Congress Party had secured 197 seats, BJP 85, 
Janata Party & Janata Dal 143, CPI (M) 33, CPI 12 and others 59 seats). The 
National Front government collapsed when BJP withdrew its support on the pretext 
of V.P. Singh's government decision to implement the Mandal Commission 
Report. V.P. Singh's decision had divided the Janata Dal at the centre and in Uttar 
Pradesh. Mulayam Singh Yadav had opposed the Report as it was dividing the 
party into pro and anti-Mandal groups. His group consisted of the erstwhile Lok 
Dal (B) or the Socialist group while the opposing group was led by Ajit Singh and 
V.P. Singh. This division caused split in the Janata Dal at the centre. On 6* 
November some 70 MP's led by Chandra Shekhar left the Party to form the Janata 
Dal (Socialist) which led to the fall of V.P. Singh's government on the motion of 
no-confidence.^ '' 
.Mulayam Singh Yadav had decided to join the Janata Dal (S) in order to 
remain in power in the Slate. He was able to gain a vote of confidence on 
November 20, 1990 inspire of some reservations almost all Congress members 
voted for him. This led to a split in the Janata Dal in the State and Mulayam Singh 
Yadav was expelled from the party for colluding with the Congress. The split 
resulted in the break-up of the district units of the party in many areas and the split 
was directly responsible for the poor electoral performance of the party as it 
effectively destroyed its base in many areas. 
V.P. Singh tendered his resignation in November 1990, after losing a vote 
of confidence. Leader of breakaway Janata Dal (Socialist) Chandra Shekhar was 
sworn in as the Prime Minister with the support of the Congress on November 21, 
1990. He was totally dependent on Congress for his governments survival. In 
March 1991, Chandra Shekhar resigned citing inability to function as Prime 
Minister and advised the President to call fresh elections. 
^' Pai, Sudha, Uttar Pradesh, Agrarian Change and Electoral Politics, New Delhi, Shipra 
Publications, 1993, p. 125. 
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The fall of the Chandra Shekhar government at the Centre on April 5, 1991 
led to the resignation of Mulayam Singh Yadav and dissolution of the Uttar 
Pradesh Assembly. Mulayam Singh Yadav formed the Samajwadi Party in October 
1992 after breaking away from Janata Dal. 
In 1991 the General and State Assembly Elections were held 
simultaneously. By 1991, the Ramjanmbhoomi-Babri Masjid issue had assumed 
such importance that the issues such as the nature of secularism in India, the status 
of minorities, communal disharmony and the role of the State in these matters 
became important electoral issues for all political parties and the electorate as a 
whole. Due to the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi the Congress got the sympathy 
wave became victorious in the elections and its government was formed at the 
Centre. The elections were held for 511 seats Congress had secured 227, BJP 119, 
Janata Part\7 Janata Dal 56, CPI (M) 35, CPl 13. 
Elections were held for 404 out of 425 seats of State Assembly in Uttar 
Pradesh. The BJP was able to win 211 seats gaining a clear but slender majority. 
The xwo factions of the erstwhile Janata Dal the Janata Dal and Samajwadi Janata 
Dal were able to win 91 and 30 seats respectively. The Congress fared badly 
winning onh 46 seats. The BSP won 12 seats. The Left Parties gained 5 seats. 
Kalyan Singh of BJP was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. The 
demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 led to the dismissal of the 
Kalyan Singh government. 
The Elections to the new Assembly were held in 1993. The demolition had 
helped the BJP to better its electoral ground. In the State, BJP emerged as the 
largest party but lacked majority support and as a result the government was 
formed by a coalition of Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party. Congress 
gave an external support to this coalition. Mulayam Singh Yadav of Samajwadi 
Party was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. In a House of 425 seats the 
SP commanded 109 seats, BSP 67, BJP 176, Janata Dal 27, Congress 28, Left 4 
and others 10. 
The SP-BSP alliance was the only pre-electoral alliances in any Assembly 
Elections (U.P.) since 1993. The alliance once again had successfully prevented 
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the BJP from coming to power. SP-BSP alliance had collapsed in June 1995.^* 
The SP-BSP coalition heralded the eclipse of Mandal Politics, the 
unification of the lower castes to challenge the traditional upper caste hegemony. 
Moreover instead of being an issue based coalition of the lower castes and 
minorities the principle interest shared by the SP-BSP was a common desire to 
establish itself in the party system. Both perceived the BJP and the Congress to be 
their political enemies. The latters disintegration and the BJP's stagnation removed 
the obstacle and led to a situation where both partners aimed at emerging as the 
only viable alternative to the BJP. The SP-BSP coalition had lasted till June 
1995.^' 
The collapse of the SP-BSP alliance in the State gave an opportunity to the 
BJP to extend its support to the BSP leader Mayawati against her former ally 
Mulayam Singh Yadav. As a result, Mayawati became the first Dalit women Chief 
Minister of the State in June 1995. 
BJP helped Mayawati in becoming the Chief Minister of the State because 
the strategic pre-electroral alliance of Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati had 
resulted in the electoral setback to the BJP in the 1993 Assembly Elections. The 
alliance ber^veen the SP and BSP was only hurdle in the way of the BJP to gain 
control of the State government. In October 1995 the BJP withdrew its support 
from Mayawati causing her downfall. 
After the withdrawal of support by BJP from BSP the fresh Assembly 
Elections were held in October 1996. The Elections were held for 425 seats in 
which BJP had secured 174 seats, Samajwadi Party 110 seats and BSP could 
manage only 67 seats. The Congress gave its worst performance by winning 33 of 
the total 126 seats it had contested. Others had secured 41 seats. 
In the Elections no party got an absolute majority. Mulayam Singh Yadav 
had refused to support a BSP-Ied government with Mayawati as the Chief Minister. 
This paved the way for the BJP- BSP alliance in the State. The BJP-BSP agreed on 
•" Scheweck, Sebestian, "The Rationality of Politics in Uttar Pradesh: Towards a Re-evaluation of 
the Concept of Factionalism", Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, 
Working Paper No. 18, July 2003, pp. 9-10. 
^^ Ibid, p. 16. 
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six monthly rotational arrangement, according to it for the first six months 
Mayawati would rule and the other six month would be ruled by BJP (Kalyan 
Singh). As a result Mayawati was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. The 
BJP-BSP alliance aimed to prevent the SP from reaching a dominant position in 
the overall party system. 
While the BJP was aware of the risks involved in any engagement with the 
BSP, yet it valued a coalition with the party on the grounds that it might undo the 
party's upper caste image to some degree and attract Dalit votes in Uttar Pradesh 
and in other States also. Further it might enable the party to form a government at 
the national level either by ensuring a sufficient number of seats through an 
electoral alliance with the BSP which was generally seen as being capable of 
transferring its vote to any alliance partner or by providing another coalition 
partner at the national level in case this was needed. [In the 1996 General Elections 
the BJP as the largest party was invited to form the government but had failed in an 
attempt to make it for lack of support from smaller parties. Had the alliance in U.P. 
lasted, the BSP's support would have been a crucial factor in the number game at 
the national level"^ '*]. 
The BJP-BSP alliance met an end in 1997 due to the influence of the BJP's 
National leadership on the political strategies adopted by the State Party Unit. 
Moreover factional infighting in the BJP unit too was a reason for its collapse.'" 
The differences between the National and State level political leaders 
within the BJP were not issue based, but related exclusively to political strategy. 
Kalyan Singh faction in the BJP was not averse to co-operation with the BSP. It 
was rather perceived as an opportunity to challenge the Samajwadi party's 
increasing clout, and at the same time, offered a chance to either split the BSP or 
otherwise ensured BJP's predominance in a coalition agreement through the 
party's superior strength in Parliament. Attempts were made to win over the 
Mayawati and isolate Kanshi Ram within the BSP. Kanshi Ram's reassertion 
within the BSP's State unit was seen as an important factor leading to the coalition 
'°Ibid,p.\2. 
^^ Ibid, p. 11. 
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collapse just after a few months.''^ 
The term of the coalition agreement prevented Kalyan Singh from 
sabotaging the alliance prior to the end of the first rotational period. After 
replacing Mayawati as Chief Minister in 1997, Kalyan Singh proceeded to 
heighten tensions within the coalition and with the help of Rajnath Singh, managed 
to split the BSP and other parties, in order to strengthen his party's position in the 
State. 
The 'Pro-OBC Policies' of the Kalyan Singh government led to increased 
power struggle between various State level leaders. The leadership felt that upper 
caste groups such as Brahmins, Thakurs and Banias were increasingly getting 
alienated from the BJP because of the pro-backward actions of Kalyan Singh. The 
upper caste lobby demanded the removal of Kalyan Singh as the Chief Minister of 
the State. At the same time, tensions between the upper caste leaders prevented the 
emergence of a consensus candidate during 1999 General Elections in the State. 
Nevertheless Kalyan Singh was increasingly marginalized in the candidates 
selection process for the 1999 General Elections and thus he retaliated by 
encouraging dissidents and campaigning only for candidates belonging to his 
faction."*" 
Due to the inner tussle within the BJP, the party suffered badly in the 1998 
and 1999 General Elections in the State. The BJP got 29 seats out of 85 in 1999 
and 57 seats in 1998 General Elections. Two seats went to its ally Uttar Pradesh 
Loktantrik Congress. While the alliance backed independent Maneka Gandhi 
retained the Pilibhit seat. The Congress (I) secured 10 seats. The Congress (1) 
alliance partner Ajit Singh led Rashtriya Lok Dal bagged two seats, Baghpat and 
Kairana from western Uttar Pradesh. The BSP increased its tally from 4 to 14 and 
the SP added 26 seats.'*'' 
The significant loss of the BJP in Uttar Pradesh in the 1999 General 
Elections (30 seats) compelled the central leadership to expell Kalyan Singh for his 
anti-party activities. As a result he was expelled from the party for six years and in 
"^  Frontline, October 7, 1995, p. 26. 
•*' Schewecke, Op. cit., p. 15, 
^ Frontline, November 5, 1999, p. 113. 
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his place Ram Prakash Gupta was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State in 
December 1999. 
The removal of Kalyan Singh from the office of Chief Minister had failed 
to cure the ills of the BJP. After his removal the politics and policies of the 
Bhartiya Janata Party-led ruling coalition in Uttar Pradesh became more 
complicated. The party suffered a setback in the Assembly on April 9, 2000 during 
the introduction of the Trade Tax Amendment Bill 2000. It provided a glaring 
example of the coalition's inefficiency. The government simply had not done 
enough groundwork in terms of floor co-ordination before introducing the bill. 
Sensing the Treasury benches short of number, the opposition unitedly sought a 
division, the bill could not be introduced as 83 MLA's opposed it while only 55 
had voted for it.'*^  
The opposition then stalled the proceedings and demanded the resignation 
of government. Leaders of opposition parties including the Samajwadi party, the 
Bahujan Samaj parts and Congress (I) met Governor Suraj Bhan and staked their 
claim to form an alternative government. However, the Ram Prakash Gupta's 
Ministr. was eventually saved from further embarrassment by means of some 
clever tactics b> speaker Kesri Nath Tripathi. The Speaker contended that the 
government was not bound to resign since the bill had not become a money bill.''^ 
During the Rajya Sabha Elections in the last week of March 2000, the lack 
of co-ordination and the absence of direction in the coalition were in evident. The 
Rajya Sabha elections were marked by unprecedented cross-voting and horse-
trading and the election results upset all political calculations. Significantly, it was 
the BJP that was the worst affected and the UPLC (Uttar Pradesh Loktantrik 
Congress) the biggest beneficiary. While the UPLC's Rajiv Shukla topped the 
winners with an amazing tally of votes in the first round itself, three of five BJP 
candidates- Balbir Punj, Ramnath Kovid and Ram Bux Singh- had to wait until the 
third, fourth and fifth rounds respectively to get through. Interestingly, the UPLC 
had only 20 members in the Assembly while the BJP had more than 175. The 
travails of the BJP candidates proved that more than 20 members of the party had 
"' Frontline, May 12, 2000, p. 28-29. 
'^/A/4p. 30. 
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resorted to cross voting. The two BJP candidates wiio had won in the first round 
were Rajnath Singh and Sushma Swaraj. However, these stalwarts were no match 
for Rajiv Shulcla a journalist- turned politician-they won fewer votes than Shukla. 
Shukla's victory was ail the more significant because a section of the 20 UPLC 
MLA's led by Amar Mani Tripathi had opposed his candidature. Apparently 
Shukla secured votes from the BJP, the Congress (I) and the Jantantrik Bahujan 
Samaj Party (JBSP). He also got third preference votes from the Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP)."^ 
The cross-voting had tarnished the BJP's image, as it was evident that the 
party had become susceptible to electoral malpractices and the misuse of money 
power, much in the same way as the Congress (I). Apart from exposing the 
indiscipline in the party's ranks, the elections highlighted the lack of coordination 
within the state BJP leadership.''^  
By all indications, it was the cumulative effect of the election results on the 
party in general and on the leadership of Ram Prakash Gupta in particular that 
impelled the then Chief Minister, unrestrainable in the best of times, to lash out at 
the UPLC (Uttar Pradesh Loktantrik Congress). Initially the central leadership tried 
to soft pedal the cross voting issue by stating that the beneficiary after all, was a 
"^endly party"."^ 
The ineffectiveness of Ram Prakash Gupta leadership not only made Uttar 
Pradesh a cauldron of political and administrative confusion but also sowed 
confusion at the centre. 
All these events forced the central High Command to change the state 
leadership. As a result in October 2000 Ram Prakash Gupta was replaced by 
Rajnath Singh as the Chief Mnister of the State. Rajnath Singh continued as the 
Chief Minister till 2002 legislative Assembly Elections. The damages wrecked to 
the BJP during the regime of Ram Prakash Gupta seemed irreversible. 
In February 2002 Elections to the State Legislative Assembly were held. 
"' Frontline, April 28, 2000, p. 32. 
''Ibid 
'" Ibid, p. 33. 
176 
The elections were held for 403 seats in which Samajwadi Party had secured 152 
seats, BSP 100 (latter 33 MLA's of BSP had splitted and had formed Loktantrik 
Bahujan Dal), Congress 15, BJP 83, RLD 15, UP Loktantrik Congress 2, CPI (M) 
1, Akhil Bhartiya Congress 1, Independents 16, unattached 6, Akhil Bhartiya 
Hindu Maha Sabha 1, members without voting rights 9 and vacant 2. The newly 
elected Assembly was under suspended animation as no political front was able to 
cobble up the requisite support for government formation. The SP had tried to form 
a post-poll alliance of like minded parties but did not succeed. The Samajwadi 
Party emerged as the Single largest party in Uttar Pradesh Assembly. The BJP 
stood by its decision not to support any party to form the government and to sit in 
the opposition. The BSP announced that it would not support a government led by 
either the SP or the BJP. The Rashtriya Lok Dal of Ajit Singh which had won 14 
seats, also made it clear that having fought the elections as a partner of the 
National Democratic Alliance it had no intention of supporting a government led 
by SP which had staked its claim.^° 
.As a result, Mula\ am Singh Yadav failed to submit a list of supporters to 
prove his majorit> as demanded by the Governor, Mayawati had not forgiven 
Mulayam Singh Yadav for the June 2, 1995 incidents at the State Guest House in 
Lucknow in which Mulayam Singh Yadav's supporters had physically assaulted 
her part) Legislators after the BSP withdrew from the SP-BSP coalition 
government. Mayawati had not only fielded candidate in elections in such a way 
that they damaged the prospects of SP more than the BJP, but gave the Governor a 
written statement that she would not support a government led by either the SP or 
the BJP. She kept her MLA's together through 'deft method'. Later Mayawati 
allied with the BJP in the State and took over as the Chief Minister of State.^' 
The State hurtled from one impossible situation to another soon after the 
Bahujan Samaj Party-Bhartiya Janata Party coalition came to an end with the BJP 
withdrawing its support to the Mayawati government and the latter recommending 
the dissolution of the House.^^ 
^° Frontline, March 29, 2002, p. 38. 
'^ Ibid 
^^ Frontline, September 13,2003, online edition. 
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Mayawati sprang a surprise on the BJP, her relations with it had remained 
troubled ever since the controversy over the Taj heritage corridor project broke out. 
In an unexpected move, she called an urgent meeting of the cabinet, prior to BSP's 
convention. On August 25 in the Cabinet meting she got recommended the 
dissolution of the Assembly and to severe ties with the BJP to the utter shock of 
the coalition partners (the BSP had supported the National Democratic Alliance 
(BJP) government barely a week earlier during the debate on the no-confidence 
motion in the Lok Sabha). The BJP members of the cabinet could do nothing but 
staged a noisy walkout. Later BJP Legislature Party leader Laiji Tandon gave a 
letter to the Governor conveying the Party's decision to withdraw support to the 
government; Mayawati had recommended dissolution of the Assembly, imposition 
of Presidents Rule and the holding of fresh elections. The BJP, finally as a strategic 
move had decided that it would accept Presidents Rule though it was utterly 
unprepared for fresh elections. It also had decided that it would not obstruct the 
formation of an alternative government, even if meant a government headed by its 
betenolre Mulayam Singh Yadav.^ ^ 
Mulayam Singh Yadav met the Governor and staked his claim to form the 
govenmient and pressed for a trial of strength on the floor of the House. He said 
that since the SP was the single largest party in the Assembly, it should be invited 
to form the government. 
Mulayam Singh Yadav took the oath of office on August 28, 2003. 
"Operation break BSP" began in right earnest and by September 6, the number of 
BSP defectors had swollen from 14 to 37, the required one-third. Mayawati as a 
result resigned from her membership of the Assembly on August 28, in order to 
escape the humiliation of having to lead a party that was reduced to the third 
position in the House.^ '* 
The Congress and the BJP had their own reasons to be friendly towards 
Mulayam Singh Yadav. Once Mayawati deserted it, the BJP was left without the 
support of her huge Dalit constituency. Besides Mayawati's despotic and brazen 
style of functioning and the sectarian Dalit agenda had marginalized the BJP's core 
''Ibid. 
'Ubid 
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upper caste vote base. Her mis-governance had left the party without any issue to 
approach the voters. So it suited the BJP to have Mulayam Singh Yadav at the 
helm for a while.^^ 
Besides, it was also felt that in order to undo the harm done by Mayawati to 
the BJP's upper caste voters, the best way was to use Mulayam Singh as the 
counter. If there was a backlash against Dalits in the rural areas, Mulayam Singh 
would be blamed and not the BJP, thus it would escape being dubbed anti Dalit. 
Moreover, Mulayam Singh was also viewed as the only one who could take on 
Mayawati.^^ 
It was reported that later Mayawati had regretted her decision to snap ties 
with the BJP in such a haste. Her remorse came out at the Press conference she 
called on September 4, 2003 to explain how her government fell. She tried to put 
things in perspective and undo the damage she had done by attacking the then 
Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee and the entire BJP. She had tried to mend 
fences b> sa% ing that she felt a victim to internal groupsim within the BJP. Even 
though Vajpasee wanted Mayawati's government to complete its tenure, he was 
forced by the members of his group to topple her government. Mayawati gave a 
clean chit to L.K. Advani who always wanted her government to complete its 
terms. Inspite all these events Mayawati was ready for an electoral alliance with 
the BJP during the 2004 Genera! Elections. However, no alliance between BJP-
BSP took place. The BSP won 19 seats out of 80 seats in the 2004 General 
Elections from Uttar Pradesh.^'' 
The Congress despite keeping a negotiating process on with both the SP 
and BSP eventually failed to strike a deal in 2004 General Elections. Mayawati had 
categorically denied any seat adjustment with the Congress. The BSP earlier had a 
pre-poll alliance with the Congress (I) in the 1996 Assembly Elections but the 
party did not gain much and the Congress had failed at that time to help her 
become the Chief Minister. After almost one year of President rule, it was the BJP 
that had helped her to become the Chief Minister, under a six-monthly rotational 
''Ibid, 
''ibid, 
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arrangement. Besides, she was aware that the Congress (I) with a plethora of senior 
leaders around would never give her the long rope that the BJP did. 
From holding 52 seats in 1998 General Elections, the BJP could win only 
10 seats in 2004 General Elections, caste combinations wrecked havoc against the 
party's much vaulted and trusted but misinformed media campaign. The Brahmin 
support was missing, so much so that party icons such as Murli Manohar Joshi, 
Vinay Katiyar and Swami Chinmayanand all had lost their seats. In the 1999 
General Elections the BJP had held all these seats. 
The Congress Party was able to secure 10 seats out of 80 seats in Uttar 
Pradesh in the 2004 General Elections. The All India party's position in the 2004 
General Elections was that the BJP had secured 138 seats out of 545; Congress 
145, Left (CPI + CPI (M) 61, SP 36, BSP 19, Janata Dal (S) 4, RLD 3, National 
Conference 2, Assam Gana Parishad, 02, BhartiyaNav Shakti Party 01, Loktantrik 
Jan Samta Party 01, Loktantrik party 01. Congress Party under the banner of 
United Progressive Alliance formed its government. 
After the setback in the 2004 General Elections the BJP had decided to 
return to the politics of Ram Temple. Its decision to relaunch the temple movement 
was reminiscent of what it did in the 1990s. The temple issue then generated so 
much passion that the BJP was able to ride to power on its strength, although it left 
in its trail many dead and injured. 
Being the homeland of Lord Ram, it was believed that the promise to 
construct the temple would generate enough religious sentiments to catapult the 
BJP to power in Uttar Pradesh. Once Uttar Pradesh was captured Delhi would not 
be very distant. The BJP's fortune shined bright during the civic polls in November 
2006 in Uttar Pradesh where it had captured 8 Mayor seats out of 12. Even the 
Samajwadi Party also performed satisfactorily in the 2006 civic polls. 
The Mulayam Singh Yadav coalition government received a setback when 
on January 9-10, 2007 the Rashtriya Lok Dal leader Ajit Singh withdrew three 
ministers of his party from the State cabinet. The Rashtriya Lok Dal led by Ajit 
Singh had supported the Mulayam Singh Yadav government internally at the time 
of its formation in 2003. The total strength of RLD was 15 in the House. The RLD 
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had often hinted that it was reviewing ties with SP but this was the first time it took 
a half step towards terminating the relationship.^^ 
By pulling out of the Mulayam Singh Yadav coalition, the Rashtriya Lok 
Dal became a key to many possibilities on the political landscape of Uttar Pradesh. 
This went much to the advantage of the Congress, which was already on a mission 
to outwit Mulayam Singh Yadav.^^ 
On February 14, 2007, Mulayam Singh Yadav government suffered another 
setback when Supreme Court disqualified 13 MLA's who originally belonged to 
the Bahujan Samaj Party and had crossed the floor and later formed the Loktantrik 
Bahujan Dal with the defection of another 24 MLA's. The Bench was however 
silent on the fate of 24 MLA's who had defected subsequently. The court had 
dismissed the special leave petition filed by all 37 MLA's and had upheld the 
Allahabad High Court decision. The High Court had set aside the speaker's 
decision recognizing the split and the merger, and asked him to decide the question 
of disqualification of the 13 MLA's but no direction was given in respect of the 
other 24 members. 
Initially, the strength of the breakaway group was only 13 and BSP had 
filed a petition before the Speaker seeking their disqualification. The Speaker kept 
the entire issue piending until the strength of the breakaway group went up to 37, to 
become one-third of the BSP's strength of 109. 
Thereafter, the speakers, while declining to disqualify 13 MLA's passed 
two order recognizing the breakaway group as LBD and also their merger with the 
Samajwadi Party the same day. 
As a result the opposition parties of the House demanded the dismissal of 
the Mulayam Singh government as the court verdict implied that the government 
was formed after engineering defection. The opposition demanded for President 
Rule in the State. The court verdict came in the nick of time when Mulayam Singh 
Yadav's tenure was about to over. 
In April-May, 2007 the State Legislative Assembly Elections were held. 
' ' The Times of India, New Delhi, January 10, 2007. 
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Tired of coalitions that saw more bickering tiian progress the voters opted for a 
single party government in this election. Out of 403 U.P. Assembly seats, BSP 
secured 207, SP 98, BJP and allies 50, Congress 22 and others 25. Mayawati was 
sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State on May 15, 2007. The Election result 
was almost one sided disapproving conventional wisdom that pointed to a fractured 
mandate. It was long back in 1991 when any party had won a majority on its own 
that was BJP which had secured 221 of 425 seats with a vote share of 31.45 
percent. The Saffron party rode to office on the back of a divisive campaign 
conducted in the backdrop of the Ramjanambhoomi Movement. 
On her victory after the 2007 Assembly Elections Mayawati had 
commented that "the thumping victory was the triumph of BSP's ideology". It 
would be after 14 years that a Single party government was formed in the State.^ ° 
The feeling of party members was that the people of the State had risen above caste 
and religion to vote for BSP. The party thanked upper caste for reposing faith in it. 
Mayawati's Strategy of sewing up a rainbow coalition, particularly wooing 
Brahmins and other upper castes, appeared to have paid rich dividends to BSP in 
the UP Assembly Elections. Seen by political observers as one of the biggest 
attempts at social engineering in recent years, the BSP Supremo has shed her 
image as Dalit leader only and aligned with upper castes against whom her party 
had in the past carried out a consistent campaign.^ ' 
Casting aside her 'anti-Manuvadi' stance her pet theme against the upper 
castes Mayawati ensured substantial number of tickets to Brahmins and also to 
others while keeping her Dalit votebank intact. 
BSP which earlier used to proclaim "Tilak, tarazoo aur talwar, maro inko 
Joote Char (Beat up Brahmins, Vaishyas and Kshatriyas) changed the tune 
completely. The new slogan-Haathi Nahin Ganesh hai Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh 
Hai. It is not elephant but Lord Ganesh symbolizing all gods and communities". 
Caught the attention of the upper castes, a sizeable section of which seemed to 
* The Hindu, New Delhi, May 12, 2007. 
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have voted in her favour.^^ 
Mayawati proved her detractors wrong who had impression that she would 
not be able to transfer her Dalit votes in favour of non-dalit candidates in 
substantial numbers and that her strategy was a doomed one.^ "* 
Mayawati's triumphant harvest of seats ended 14 years of coalition politics 
in the State. It also reflects that people of the State perhaps were fed up of coalition 
governments and now wanted a stable government. However credit goes to 
Mayawati, who through her social engineering, despite social cleavages on caste 
lines generated political consensus among people of the State. It was certainly her 
Brahmin Jodo Abhiyan' that paved way for Brahmins and Dalits coming together 
politically and Dalits had voted for Brahmin candidates, fielded on BSP's ticket. It 
is certainly her political strategy that had brought her to power as the Chief 
Minister of Uttar Pradesh.*^ 
(c) The Demolition of Babri Masjid and its aftermath 
The demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 was 
one of the gruesome event in the political history of India. The event will godown 
as the darkest da\ of Indian History. In a broad daylight the primacy of the 
constitution and the rule of law, which together form the very basis of the Indian 
Slate, were violated b> belligerent Kar Sevaks at Ayodha. By demolishing the 
Babri Masjid, the Kar Sevaks heaped shame upon every Indian, irrespective of his 
religious affiliation. What happened at Ayodhya was not only an act of cowardice, 
it was treacher>' of the worst order, an assault on the Nations honour and integrity. 
The blame for this squarely was on the Bhartiya Janata Party, the Rashtriya 
Swayam Sevak Sangh and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad"^^ 
The disputed mosque was razed to the ground with a barbaric savagery 
reminiscent of the crude traditions of settling scores in medieval history. The 
demolition of the mosque has delivered a lethal blow to the image of a secular and 
''Ibid 
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democratic India. The assurances from the BJP ruled government in Uttar Pradesh 
to the centre that it would not violate the court order and it would discharge its 
constitutional obligations proved insincere as it appeared to actively colluded with 
the savage and the destructive attitude of the Kar Sevaks surging forward to 
capture the disputed structure. The inaction of the State Police force coupled with 
the refusal of the District Magistrate to permit the central forces to act implied that 
the State government endorsed mosque's wanton destruction.^' 
The history of the Ram Janamabhoomi Temples dates back to a very early 
period. King Vikramaditya is said to have renovated this temple in the Gupta 
Period in the 5"" century A.D. In 12* century A.D. Govindachandra Gaharhwala 
got it completely reconstructed as was attested by an inscription found at the 
disputed site on December 6, 1992. According to the Ayodhya Mahatmya, of the 
Vaishnava Khanda of Skanda Purana, narrates the existence of Ram 
Janamabhoomi shrine at Ramkot, marking what was believed to be the birth place 
of Ram and held by the Hindus as one of the holiest spots in the 12-13 centuries. 
On the advice of Sufi Saint Jalal Shah, minister Mir Baqi was ordered by Babar to 
replace the temple by a mosque in 1528 A.D. as the Hindu community believes. 
According to the Muslim belief there was only mosque and nothing else. So why 
the mosque should be converted into a temple when the mosque exists on the site. 
As a result the Hindus and Muslims have clashed ever since 1S"' century.^ * 
In 1949 the local officials at Faizabad, nodded for the construction of Ram 
Temple by the side of the Babri Masjid. The District Magistrate was asked in July 
1949 to submit his recommendation and report on the said project with specific 
reference to the question "whether the land on which the temple was proposed to 
be constructed was a Nazul / Municipal land. The District Magistrate reported that 
the land where temple was to be constructed was of Nazul, the mosque and the 
temple both were situated side by side and both Hindus and Muslims performed 
their rites and religious ceremonies" and "permission could safely be given as 
Hindu population was very keen to have a temple at the place where Ram was 
*' Ibid, p. 99. 
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bom". During the course of the proceedings, the Chabutra alone was claimed to be 
the birth place of Lord Ram and the mosque was accepted as a place of Muslim 
worship, where Muslims were performing their rites and religious ceremonies 
without any hindrance, and without any objection by the Hindus, who had a similar 
and free access to the Chabutra nearby but outside the precincts of the mosque.^ ^ 
Nevertheless, on November 13, 1949 without any prior misapprehension or 
premonitions, the first blow against the peace and tranquility of Ayodhya was the 
installation of the idol of Lord Ram, by break opening the locks of the Babri 
Masjid by District Magistrate K. K. Nayer by an interim order of attachment. The 
administration took over the possession of the Masjid and barred the Muslims from 
entering the Masjid complex and offering prayers therein, but allowed the Hindus 
to have darshan of the idols and perform Puja, all in the name of law and order.^ ° 
It was the Congress Party under Rajiv Gandhi regime to get open the locks 
at Ayodhya and allowed the Shilanyas in it to seek electoral advantage without 
foreseeing the consequences of what it was doing at that time. The BJP leaders, 
afraid of losing a constituency, chose to ride the temple 'Rath' without realizing 
that they won't be able to control the forces they were unleashing in the process. 
-As a consequence there was a national crisis at the centre and in the State. 
The Hindus welcomed the step but the minorities were very upset by this 
act of the Congress Party and formed the Babri Masjid Action Committee and went 
at length by boycotting Republic Day celebrations of 1987 in protest against these 
orders. 
The centuries old struggle over the Babri Masjid Ram Janambhoomi came 
in a critical phase on November 9, 1989. When the first stone of the Ram 
Janambhoomi Mandir was laid in a grand Shilanyas ceremony. The actual 
construction had been announced for February but then the VHP leadership 
decided to give the newly installed National Front government some time. 
In July 1990, after the four-month period had elapsed, VHP announced it 
would start the temple construction on October 30, 1990. On August 7, 1990, V.P. 
*'Haqqi, S.A.H., Op. c;7., p. 1. 
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Singh announced that his government was going to implement the 
recommendations of the Mandal Commission Report giving 27 percent reservation 
in government jobs to the Backward Classes. It was a surprise move for which he 
had not even consulted his allies, the BJP and the Left Parties.^' 
The move was calculated to divide all other non-caste based parties along 
caste lines, to attract the massive OBC vote bank and to divide the 
Ramjanambhoomi movement, which was gaining momentum day by day. 
Prime Minister V.P. Singh worked out on a formula, which stated that the 
disputed area would be acquired by the government. For further decision it would 
be divided in the structure itself and the adjoining land including the Shilanyas site. 
The structure itself would be referred to the Supreme Court for determining its 
character. On the adjoining land, the VHP would be allowed to construct the 
temple. Since the part of the land was private property, it could only be acquired 
through the Land Acquisition Act Procedure, which would take at least three 
weeks even in an emergency formula. However, it could only be acquired under a 
special ordinance.'^ 
The formula was agreed upon by several ministers of the cabinet and the 
leaders of the BJP, VHP, RSS, but later on the formula was changed by the central 
government that the land considered disputed before the Allahabad High Court 
would be referred to the Supreme Court, and there was no question of handing over 
the Shilanayas area to the VHP. TTie formula was changed because it was believed 
that once the government has acquired the land, all disputes about the land titles 
would end and so no fiirther decision on the land surrounding the structure was 
needed.^^ 
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad felt it being taken for a ride, and got annoyed. 
The Muslim leaders on the other hand, whom the Prime Minister V.P. Singh had 
already tried to appease with his unilateral change in the ordinance, were not 
" Jaffrelot, Christophe, Op. cit., p. 413. 
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appeased. Later the ordinance related to the disputed area was withdrawn/'* 
The BJP President L.K. Advani set on a Rath Yatra from Somnath to 
Ayodhya for the construction of Ram Temple at Ayodhya. In Ayodhya he was to 
join the Kar Seva on October 30, 1990, the actual brick laying of the Ram temple 
at Ayodhya. It was for the first time that a political leader used propaganda of an 
overtly Hindu Nationalist Character.^^ 
On the other hand V.P. Singh was anxious not to lose the Parliamentary 
support of the BJP, tried to negotiate with the Hindu Nationalist forces till the last 
possible moment. The meeting called by him of all the political parties was 
boycotted by the BJP. On October 17, 1990, L.K. Advani announced that the BJP 
would withdraw its support from V.P. Singh's National Front government if the 
latter placed a prohibition on the building of the temple and suggested an early 
General Elections. The compromise solution in collaboration with Vajpayee didn't 
worked out. Which promted V.P. Singh to opt more firm action and authorized 
another Janata Dal leader, Laloo Prasad Yadav the Chief minister of Bihar where 
the Rath Yatra had entered, to arrest Advani. He was arrested on October 23, 1990. 
The agitation then entered a more violent phase.""^  
The detention of Advani led BJP to withdraw its support from V.P. Singh's 
minority government, which then faced the prospect of defeat in the trial of 
strength in Lok Sabha. On November 7, 1990, the V.P. Singh government lost vote 
of confidence in the Lok Sabha. Following his resignation Chandra Shekhar, the 
breakaway group leader of 'Socialist' Party was able to form another minority 
government with the support of Congress Party. However on March 6, 1991 
Chandra Shekhar had to resign after the Congress Party withdrew its support from 
it. 
During 1991 Parliamentary Elections campaign Rajiv Gandhi was 
assassinated and as a result the Congress Party regained relative majority due to the 
wave of sympathy. The VHP, meanwhile concentrated on the Ayodhya issue since 
the Uttar Pradesh State government was now in the hands of the BJP, the VHP 
^'* Ibid. p. 52. 
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expected that the Chief Minister Kalyan Singh would fulfill his Party's 
commitment to build the Ram Temple. 
In order to pacify the VHP and its allied organizations, the compromise 
solution worked out by Kalyan Singh in September 1991, was acquiring 2.77 acres 
of land adjoining the Babri Masjid under the pretext of developing a tourist 
complex and providing amenities for pilgrims. Later VHP invited Kar Sevaks at 
Ayodhya to begin the construction of the temple. But High Court intervened and 
restricted the State government from erecting any permanent structure. The State 
government also provided assurance to the Supreme Court no Kar Seva would take 
place and the mosque would be protected at all cost." 
The Hindu Nationalist leaders apparently asked the Union ministers and the 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to approach the High Court and the Supreme Court 
to expedite the judgment on the 2.77 acre plot, with the hope that the government 
of Uttar Pradesh or the previous owner the VHP, would be recognized as 
proprietors of at least 2.04 acres of land so that they could begin the Kar Seva in 
Ayodhya. At that stage the part>' had decided to send L.K. Advani and Murli 
-Manohar Joshi on a Yatra to explain the position of the party and its government to 
the people and to participate in the Kar Seva. They toured 28 Districts of Uttar 
Pradesh .'* 
On December 6, 1992, the Bhartiya Janata Party along its communal allies, 
the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bajrang Dal and the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak 
Sangh, had smashed the entire fabric of secularism by demolishing the Babri 
Masjid in Ayodhya. The biggest irony was that despite the repeated assurances by 
the BJP leaders like Lai Krishna Advani, Dr. Murli Manohar Joshi, Atal Bihar 
Vajpayee, Uma Bharti and others that the Kar Seva at Ayodhya on December 6 
would only be symbolic and the structure of the Babri Masjid will remain intact 
and the Kar Seva, they reiterated would only be in the form of Bhajans and Kirtans 
and formal Puja etc. Yet the Mosque was raised to ground. ^ ^ 
After the demolition of the Babri Masjid and clearing the site on which it 
"/6W, p.451. 
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had stood, the Kar Sevaks constructed a temporary temple in which the images of 
Lord Ram were placed. The demolition of the mosque led to the communal riots 
across the country and in neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The 
whole world community condemned the incident, L.K. Advani immediately after 
the demolition resigned from the post of leader of the opposition from Parliament. 
Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Kalyan Singh owing responsibility of the demolition 
also resigned from his post.^ ° 
An early response though unusual, came from the President of India 
Shankar Dayal Sharma expressing with eloquence the anguish and anger. He 
denounced the vandalism and its perpetrators in the clearest possible terms and 
requested Prime Minister to "initiate appropriate measures to uphold the rule of 
law, the maintenance of public order and the protection of citizens". He further 
appealed to the people to '"maintain peace and unity and co-operate with each 
another in curbing all anti-national elements".^' 
On the evening of December 6, 1992, Presidents Rule was imposed in Uttar 
Pradesh. Three days later, L.K. Advani, M.M. Joshi, Uma Bharti, Sadhvi 
Rithambara, .Ashok Singhal and Vinay Katiyar were arrested on the charges of 
inciting communal violence. The following day the RSS, the VHP the Bajrang Dal, 
the Jamaate-lslami and the Islamic Sevak Sangh (a newly founded association 
based in Kerela) were banned.**^  
On December 15, the BJP led governments in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan 
and Himachal Pradesh were dismissed on the charges that the governments of 
these States could not be carried on in accordance with the provision of the 
83 
constitution. 
On December 11, 1992 the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court 
gave its long awaited decision concerning the 2.77 acres of land adjoining the 
Babri Masjid whose acquisition by the Kalyan Singh government in 1991 had been 
challenged by the Muslim associations. Later the central government issued an 
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ordinance for the acquisition of all the disputed areas in Ayodhya.*'* 
The Justice Liberahan commission was set-up on December 16, 1992 to 
inquire into the causes of demolition, the forces and events that led to its 
demolition. It was stipulated that the commission would complete the inquiry 
within six months. However the commission till date has failed to nailed the 
culprit. 
On February 24, 1993 the central government presented the white Paper in 
the Parliament. The clean chit was given to Narasimha Rao government and 
painted the then Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Kalyan Singh as the main force 
behind the demolition. It admitted that from December 1949 till December 6, 1992, 
the demolished disputed structure in Ayodhya had not been used as a mosque. It 
charged the Kalyan Singh government with irresponsibility and abdication of 
power on December 6. ^ 
The BJP"s white Paper on Ayodhya was against the Narasimha Rao's 
government charges that the demolition of the disputed structure was a pre-planned 
conspiracy. The demolition it said was the result of the cumulative effect of both 
historical and immediate provocations. According to the BJP the demolition was a 
symbol of resurgence and represented "liberation" from a symbol of subjugation. It 
described the government's white Paper on the subject, as a "Blank paper" which 
tried to hide more than it revealed.^ ^ 
After demolition of the mosque a 12 point action plan was worked out by 
the BJP with the aim of putting pressure on the centre in order to precipitate mid-
term elections, (elections in the States formerly ruled by the BJP) and a lifting of 
ban on the Hindu Nationalist organizations. 
It was observed that if the central government not dragged the matter for 
long and had it dismissed the Kalyan Singh government a week earlier and taken 
over the Shrines, the situation could have been saved. The Prime Minister however 
took the promises of the BJP and the U.P. Chief Minister on their face value. But 
^ Ibid. p. 468. 
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the BJP belied all the expectations- they masterminded this act of national 
treachery. The BJP stabbed secularism. The whole nation had condemned the party 
in the strongest possible terms. It was an act of betrayal, vandalism and an affront 
to the judiciary." 
The overall National situation following the Ayodhya catastrophe had 
turned disturbingly murky. From a secular democratic point of view December 6, 
1992 will go down in Indian history as a day of infamy, a day of National shame 
and grief, whereas from 'Hindutva' standpoint it will remain a 'Red Letter Day' of 
glory and celebration. What happened on that day was a grievous blow to all 
principles of secularism, democracy and civilized nationhood that the people of the 
State were supposed to uphold as a precious part of their heritage.** 
The Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, appeased and compromised with 
the forces of Hindu communalisrn. He misjudged the situation repeatedly and with 
a vengeance, against better advice from non-BJP national opposition parties and 
some leaders within his own party, miserably failed to understand what was at 
stake and where events were leading. Narasimha Rao failed to act, on time to 
uphold the principles of secularism, the rule of law and the constitution and went 
inio a calamitous paraKsis of political and moral will as the catastrophe began to 
happen. All this ultimatelv resulted in the decline of the Congress Party.*' 
P.V. Narasimha Rao cited the Principle of Federalism as an excuse for not 
acting in time. The centre's excuse in implying Article 356 of the constitution. 
Which is implemented when the State machinery fails to works in accordance with 
the provisions of the constitution. Moreover Article 356 had been used by over 90 
times since 1950 by the Congress Party.'° 
Taking a brief account of the history of events that led to the demolition of 
Babri Masjid its aftermath. It was under Rajiv Gandhi regime that the doors of the 
mosque were unlocked on February, 1986 and the Hindu Communalists were 
allowed to establish a Ram Temple in the central Sanctum, whereas the Imam was 
' ' Indian Observer, New Delhi, December 7, 1992 
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not allowed to hold prayers in the mosque. This came through a court decision in 
which the Rajiv Gandhi government, attempting to play the "Hindu card" for 
presumed electoral gains (after the 1985 cave-in to Muslim fundamentalism on 
Shah Bano) had a collusive hand. If the Congress Party at that time had abstained 
from such order the December 6, 1992 blunder would not have taken place. 
Another blunder the Congress Party had made was that the Rajiv Gandhi 
regime a few days before the 1989 General Elections had allowed the V.H.P. to 
perform Shilanyas on November 9, 1989 on disputed land. It helped the VHP-BJP-
RSS combine to advance its reactionary and disintegrative campaign on 
Ramajanmabhoomi.^' 
All these blunders cost the Congress Party in its banishment from Uttar 
Pradesh and the centre too. Thereafter the Bhartiya Janata Party assumed a pre-
dominant position for itself from 1996 onwards. The Congress Party failed to win 
over the Muslim community or to make any significant gains in the Hindu 
Community. 
After the demolition of the Babri Masjid the Hindutva forces had become 
not only acceptable in the political process but also a strong contender for power. It 
ultimately gave rise to communalism. The communalism has became one of the 
most intractable in terms of political solution because leaders of religious 
minorities, who adopt the communal path have social, cultural, economic and 
political ambitions. Communalism unfortunately has become an integral part of 
socio-political life in India. 
Thus in a deeply religious society like India where religion permeates in 
every aspect of human life, it becomes a powerful instrument in the hands of the 
exploiting classes and politically ambitious forces to mobilize the common masses 
to achieve their goals. Thus after the destruction of mosque all these activities have 
heightened up and it can only be reduced by the promotion of genuine secularism, 
rapid economic development and by social transformation of society. 
" Ibid 
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(d) The Rise of BJP in Uttar Pradesli 
The growing Schism within the congress leadership led to vertical split in 
the party in 1969. There seemed to be no single political party which could fill up 
this vacuum. Neither faction of the congress too was in a position to claim the 
strength and position as had been enjoyed before the split. What emerged now was 
a 'Market Polity'. The result was the on set of coalition politics. 
Mrs. Gandhi's new political process with a pyramidal decision making 
structure undermining and dismantling established structure of the party, making 
direct appeal to the voters for the congress, the party system in India began to 
disappear in less than half a decade.^ ^ She had imposed personal and dynastic rule 
on the political system and the party. The National congress was termed as 
congress (I). Since many of her trusted colleagues and supporters of (1969-71), had 
deserted her in 1975 and 1977-80, she placed premium on personal loyalty. 
Mrs. Gandhi had virtually been in a confrontational course with the 
opposition leaders throughout her tenure. Those who dared oppose her, she didn't 
hesitate to brand them as anti-national. The power struggle within the congress, 
which had witnessed yet another vertical split, clearly reflected that the influence 
of people at regional and national level had penetrated deeply. This weakened rule 
by diktat paradoxically as happened to Mrs. Gandhi. ^ 
During Emergency from June 1975 to January 1977 most opposition 
leaders were under detention in jails. On January 18, 1977 the then Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi had declared that elections to the Lok Sabha will be held in March 
1977 and ordered release of the leaders of opposition Political parties from the 
Jails. After the release from the jail, leaders of all the opposition parties were 
united to forge an alliance in order to give Congress a straight fight. On January 
20, 1977 Moraraji Desai declared that BLD, Jana Sangh, Congress (O) and SP had 
forged an alliance to contest elections as a Single Janata Party. On January 23, 
1977, Morarji Desai and Charan Singh were declared as Chairman and Vice 
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Chairman respectively of tlie National Committee of Janata Party to conduct the 
National campaign. On the same day Jaya Prakash Narayan had said "the choice is 
nothing less than between democracy and Fascist type of dictatorship. The Ruling 
congress which has been guilty of murder of democracy, of putting thousand of 
innocent persons behind the bars should never be elected to power again".^ "* 
In the General Elections of March 1977, the Janata Party and its allies the 
Congress for Democracy, the Akali Dal and the CPM won 328 seats out of 548 
seats in Parliament. On May 1, 1977, the Congress (O), the Bhartiya Lok Dal, the 
Jana Sangh, and the Socialist Party formally merged themselves with Janata Party. 
The Congress for Democracy was merged on May 6, 1977.^ ^ 
Morarji Desai as Prime Mini^cer of the Janata Government was sworn in in 
March 1977 but he had to tender his resignation because of large-level defections 
in the Janata Party. Thus he could continue in power till July 15, 1979. 
As the Bhartiya Jana Sangh was also one of the constituents of the Janata 
Parr\. Charan Singh. Raj Narain and some others had demanded that the members 
of the erstwhile Jana Sangh should severe their connections with the Rashtriya 
Swayam Sevak Sangh which to them was a communal organization. Both the Jana 
Sangh members and other constituents of the Janata Party refuted the theory of 
dual membership, but the ersuvhile Lok Dal members made it an issue and in 
protest left the Janata Party. The Janata Party including the erstwhile Jana Sangh 
group unitedly fought the elections in January 1980. 
After the defeat of the Janata Party in the 1980 General Elections, Jagjivan 
Ram again raised the issue of dual membership. Finally erstwhile members of the 
Bhartiya Jana Sangh and some other members of the Janata Party left the Janata 
Party and formed the Bhartiya Janata Party on April 6, 1980. Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
was elected as its first President. It was decided in the meeting of the BJP that it 
will have a separate constitution, a separate flag and a separate election. 
Ideologically its members reaffirmed their faith in Indian nationalism, Secularism 
and Socialism based on the Gandhian Principles and decentralization of political 
'" Mahajan, V.D., Select Modern Governments, New Delhi, S. Chand and Company, 1995, p. 510 
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and economic power. 
However its own strategy of broad basing its support with an emphasis on 
Gandhian principles failed miserably during the 1984 General Elections. The BJP 
secured only two seats out of 542 Lok Sabha seats. This led to rethinking within 
the party and return to old Jana Sangh line of Hindu communalism. Thus Gandhian 
Socialism and mask from its Hindu face were removed. The Poona convention of 
the Party in October 1985 marked the return to the old lines. The BJP now started 
attacking congress for minorityism and criticizing the concept of composit culture. 
It also openly associated itself with the construction of Ram Janambhoomi Temple 
at Ayodhya. This line paid dividends and in the 1989 General Elections it secured 
88 seats out 529 Lok Sabha seats (elections were held for 529 Lok Sabha seats 
instead of its 543 seats). It was not its own strength alone but also a result of 
electoral adjustment with the Janata Dal / National Front during the 1989 General 
Elections. In the elections of 1991, it secured 119 seats out of 511 Lok Sabha seats 
(in 1991 General Elections were held for 511 Lok Sabha seats). It was because of 
rise of communal fer\er and intensification of Ramjanambhoomi Movement, 
symbolished by Advani's Rath Yatra, which led to the fall of V.P. Singh 
govermnent. 
By using the HinduUa Platform the BJP carved out a single massive Hindu 
vote bank across the entire country and it was successful in its attempt. By doing 
this the BJP managed to create a constituency for itself not only in the upper caste 
area of the congress, but also among the dominant caste such as Kurmis, Lodhas 
and Sainis in U.P. All this was done in order to counter the effect of the Mandal 
Report in North India. Mandal Commission Report was implemented by National 
Front Government of V.P. Singh in 1990. The Report had recommended 27 
percent reservation for OBC's in government jobs. Later the stay order was passed 
by the Supreme Court on its implementation due to lot of agitation across the 
country. If the BJP had opposed the Mandal Commission Report it would have 
been viewed as an upper caste party, and if it had supported the report it would 
have lost the entire upper caste votes.'^ 
^ Pai, Sudha, Op. cit., p. 130. 
195 
The BJP triumphed in Uttar Pradesh due to the inter-related factors 
operating prior to the 1991 General and State Assembly Elections. First, *he 
Internal factionalism and the split in the Janata Dal in November 1990, rendered its 
base in U.P. ineffective for the 1991 elections. While many factors contributed to 
internal factionalism within the party, the Mandal Commission report and the 
agitation it led to, was a major reason for the division of the party. Second, the BJP 
planned its political mobilization around the Ramjanambhoomi- Babri Masjid issue 
in 1991 to counter the issue of Reservation, which was intended to help the Janata 
Dal. Third, the collapse of the Congress on the above issues provided an excellent 
opportunity for the BJP to consolidate its vote bank in the State. All these proved 
advantageous for the BJP in the State.''' 
Before the Eleventh General Elections (1996) the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya 
was demolished by the supporters of the BJP, VHP, RSS, Bajrang Dal and Shiv 
Sena at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992. The Masjid was demolished during the 
Congress reign at the centre. The Muslim accused the Congress for its 
understanding with Sangli Parivar. The community pledged not to vote for the 
Congress which resulted in the drastic decline of its vote bank in the State. The 
BJP realised that while the congress had lost its popularity amongst the Muslims 
and the lower caste Hindus, the same had not come to its fold too. The real gainers 
were the SP and the BSP. The BJP's strategy was, therefore, to woo these groups 
without of course causing any damage to its Hindutva base. 
In the 1996 General Elections the BJP had emerged as the single largest 
party. It won 161 seats out of 543 seats. In the Uttar Pradesh the party won 52 seats 
out of 85 seats. The President of India invited the BJP to form the government, but 
failed to win a vote of confidence and was forced to resign after 13 days. The rise 
of the BJP led the Socialist and the Communist Parties to minimize their 
ideological differences and to form an anti BJP coalition referred to as National 
Front-Left Front.'^ 
The reason for the BJP's good performance was the differences between 
^''Ibid. p.]24 
^ Kantha, Pramod K., "General Elections 1996", Economic and Political Weekly, November 29, 
1997, p. 3095. 
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the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party. The BJP gained not only 
because the ESP had cut the vote bank of Samajwadi Party but also due to the 
cracks within the BSP itself. Infact the BSP was able to edge out the Samajwadi 
Party as the main opponent of the BJP in many areas of Bundelkhand and Doab.^^ 
The 1998 General Elections too witnessed the marked improvement in the 
seat and vote share of the BJP alongside the total collapse of the Congress. The 
Congress failed to retain even a single seat from the State. The 1998 polls unlike 
the previous polls were marked by the caste and community appeal by various 
parties and the voting was on caste and community basis. If the upper caste mostly 
voted for the BJP then backward castes too voted for it. The Scheduled castes 
rallied behind the Bahujan Samaj Party. The Muslims largely supported the 
Samajwadi Party. The BJP increased its seats from 52 in 1996 to 57 seats out of 80 
seats in this election. One factor which marked in favour of BJP in Uttar Pradesh 
was the effort of BJP to woo the sugarcane farmers. By offering them maximum 
selling price for their sugarcane. There are 50 Lok Sabha seats in the Sugar belt of 
the State, which stretches from Saharanpur in the west to Deoria in the East. The 
BJP got 37 out of 50 seats (Lok Sabha Elections, 1998). Whereas the Samajwadi 
Part>' won 10 seats and the BSP three seats respectively.'*^ 
During the 1998 General Elections the BJP leadership kept aside the 
contentious issues and more emphasis was given on economic issues such as 
Swadeshi. The Party manifesto besides mentioning the abrogation of Article 370 
and the need to establish a common civil code, also mentioned that the party will 
build the Ram Temple, but by exploring the consensual legal and constitutional 
means'°' 
In the 1998 General Elections the BJP got 182 seats out of 543 seats. It 
succeeded in forging alliances with Parties in the States, outside the Northern 
Hindu Heartland, which meant the combined forces of the BJP and its allies in the 
^ Shankar, Kripa, "Lok Sabha Elections Balance Sheet in U.P.", Economic and Political Weekly 
May 25, 1996, p. 1243. 
"^ Rai, V.K., "In Search of a New Balance", Economic and Political Weekly, August 21-28, 1999, 
p. 2405. 
"' Pai, Sudha, "New Political Trends in Uttar Pradesh", Economic and Political Weekly, July 11, 
1998, p. 442. 
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Parliament amounted to 252 seats. The BJP and its coalition of 13 parties formed. 
National Democratic Alliance. In April 1999, the AIADMK withdrew its support 
from the coalition government. The congress (I) had engineered the April 1999 no-
confidence motion which deprived Vajpayee of his parliamentary majority, 
bringing his government to an end just 13 months after it took office. Sonia Gandhi 
managed to pursue some of Vajpayee's partners to bring down his government, but 
was herself unable to assemble an alternative government. Sonia's main 
accomplices in toppling Vajpayee were Laloo Prasad Yadav and J. Jayalalitha. 
AIADMK had 27 MP's elected in the 1998 General Elections. Due to its strength 
the AIADMK become a crucial component of Vajpayee's ruling coalition. It was 
her defection that brought down his government. Jayalalitha's constant tantrums 
during Vajpayee's reign centered on two main demands. One of these was implicit-
that Vajpayee should intervene to prevent government lawyers from pressing 
corruption cases against her in the courts, the other voiced openly and often, was 
that Vajpayee should use the power vested in him as Prime Minister to dismiss the 
ruling part) in Tamil Nadu (Jayalalitha's arch enemy) Karunanidhi's DMK for 
alleged misgovemance. On these two demands she withdrew her support from the 
ruling NDA. The Fresh Elections were called in September-October 1999.'"^ 
In the L'nar Pradesh BJP unit there was tiff and tussle between Kalyan 
Singh on the one side and the high caste leadership of the party like Kalraj Mishra, 
Lalji Tandon, and Rajnath Singh on the other side. The main cause of differences 
was the inclusion of large number of OBC members in the party by Kalyan Singh, 
this annoyed the high caste leaders. By 1999 Kalyan Singh clashed head on with 
the central leadership of the party when an attempt was made to discipline him. 
Kalyan Singh's closeness with Kusum Rai and his autocratic style of 
functioning had caused a revolt within the party. As a result, the BJP barely 
managed 30 seats out of 80 seats compared to 57 seats in the 1998 General 
Elections. Kalyan Singh was expelled from the party in December 1999 and after 
his expulsion he formed the Rashtriya Kranti Party. 
The 1999 General Elections witnessed the BJP-led National Democratic 
'"^  "Appearances and Reality in Indian Politics", Government and Opposition, vol. 35 (8) 2000, pp. 
49-66. 
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Alliance to power. In that election the BJP tried to shed its image of an upper caste 
Hindu Party and turned itself into a broad based aggregative party. In Uttar 
Pradesh bad governance and vicious party factionalism cost BJP a loss of 30 seats. 
Despite the visible changes in its functionary, the BJP did not emerge as a 
broad-based dominant party in Uttar Pradesh on the lines of the Congress Party. 
There was a limitation on the continued expansion of the BJP in U.P., because the 
Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party being well established political 
parties with strong social and regional bases in the State, built over a considerable 
period of time, had a stronghold on the politics of the State. 
Moreover, due to the rigid caste polarization the BJP was in difficulty to 
gain the support of either the Dalits or the Backwards who preferred BSP and the 
SP instead of the BJP. The Party's prospect was weak among the Muslims because 
they blamed it for the demolition of Babri Masjid at Ayodhya. 
During 2004 General Elections, the BJP leaders were certain that the NDA 
would win the forthcoming General Election. Tlie BJP used slogans like 'India is 
Shinning" and the 'Feel Good Factor'. This over confident attitude, which 
amounted to sheer arrogance, appeared as one of the reasons for the BJP's defeat in 
the elections. The Congress Part> won 145 seats and the BJP won 138 seats out of 
543 seats in the 2004 General Elections."^''' 
After the Elections many within the BJP along with its allied organizations 
came up with the arguement that the BJP lost elections because it chose to sideline 
the Hindutva platform. This was the main reason attributed for its downfall. 
In the late 1990's the BJP had come to power at the centre because of its 
electoral success in Uttar Pradesh where from it had secured at least 50 seats in the 
Lok Sabha Elections. Uttar Pradesh was not a strong hold of Hindu Nationalism 
until 1990's The Ayodhya movement catapulted the party to power in 1991 and the 
party was able to sustain its influence till late 1990's. Its peak was in 1998 when it 
had won 57 seats. The General Elections 2004 marked a steep decline of BJP in 
'"' Adeney, Katharine and Saez, Lawrence (eds.), Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism, 
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2005, p. 237 
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Uttar Pradesh in which it secured only 22.2 percent votes and JO seats."''' 
Despite absence of unity among the non-BJP forces, the BJP faced a 
setback in the elections of 2004. The Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj 
Party were the main achievers in the battle for Uttar Pradesh both in terms of seats 
as well as votes. The defeat of the BJP was almost absolute if its loss of seats is 
compared with the results of 1999 General Elections. Though other parties also lost 
seats to each other, the BJP's loss was colossal. It lost over three-fourth of seats it 
had won in the 1999 General Elections. Even L.K. Advani's Bharat Uday Yatra 
was a big failure. BJP had not taken seriously the issues and problems against the 
track record of five years, alienated its voters from it. The communal and caste 
based violence made the election campaign appear a sham.'"^ 
From the loss of BJP the Congress gained and with its allies formed United 
Progressive Alliance government at the centre on May 22, 2004. 
Many with the BJP and its allied organizations (RSS, VHP and the Bajrang 
Dal) had argued that the BJP had lost, because it chose to sideline the Hindutva 
Piarfonn. was the main reason attributed for its downfall. 
After iis debacle in the 2004 General Elections the Hindutva agenda was 
firmly back in the BJP. 
While addressing the National Council session of BJP (Dec, 24, 2006) 
Rajnath Singh challenged the Congress and the Samajwadi Party to say publicly 
that they would rebuild the Babri Masjid that was demolished on December 6, 
J 992 106 j^g j^gj asserted that the party was committed to build Ram Temple at the 
disputed site in Ayodhya, adopting a uniform civil code, abrogating Article 370 of 
the constitution that gives special status to Kashmir and scrapping any policy 
favouring the minorities. He was of the opinion that the National Democratic 
Alliance Government had failed due to certain compulsion of coalition partners. It 
could not do anything concrete for building a Ram Temple at Ayodhya. If the BJP 
returns to power with majority of its own, it would even go in for legislation to 
105 The Hindu, New Delhi, December 24, 2006. 
''^Ibid 
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enable construction of a grand temple at the disputed site. 
He gave a clarion call to party workers to "wear the garland of fire' in order 
to bring about a change that would catapult the BJP into the seat of power. 
A loud message that Rajnath Singh gave was "tushitikaran rajniti ka 
safaya" (end of appeasement politics). He hoped that it would be buried by 2016 
exactly hundred years after the demand for a separate electorate was raised in 
Lucknow at a Congress conclave in 1916'°^. 
However Hindutva agenda failed to ignite the masses once again in 2007 
Uttar Pradesh State Assembly Elections. Where it failed badly securing only 50 
seats. 
'''Ibid. 
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CHAPTER - V 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN UTTAR PRADESH 
SINCE 1984 
(a) Consolidation of Hindu Vote bank during BJP 
Rule in U.P. 
(b) SP and BSP in Fray to the Parliamentary Polls in 
U.P. 
(c) Political Banishment of Congress from the State 
(d) Decline of Hindutva Wave and General Elections 
of 2004 
(a) The Consolidation of Hindu Vote Bank during the BJP Rule in Uttar 
Pradesh 
The Bhartiya Janata Party was bom under stunning circumstances over 
which it had no control. Circumstances which were both tragic and grotesque 
because they marked the shattering of Jaya Pralcash Narayan's dream of building a 
party which was to be the national alternative to the Congress and was meant to 
safeguard the interest of the poor. Grotesque, because a set of dubious politicians 
without a political base but with unlimited and unprincipled ambition, succeeded in 
destroying mass party (Janata Party. 1977).' 
Despite the fact that Bhartiya Janata Party had no control over 
aforementioned circumstances, it was determined to have a complete control over 
its destin> because of its communal origin and character. It restorted the Fascist 
means to impose its Hindu majority views. The BJP worked unitedly with 
members of Sangh Parivar i.e. the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dal, Swadeshi 
Jagaran Nfanch and Rashtri>a Sua>am Sevak Sangh in order to bring about the 
ultimate triumph of the Hindut\a ideology. 
Tne Hindu \ote bank assumed more serious proportions when Congress 
party itself began to pla\ the communal card for its survival in power. After the 
National Emergency of 1975 the traditional supporters of the Congress the 
Muslims and Dalits had deserted it. The Muslim community deserted the Congress 
for its forcible family planning drive towards the community. As a result the party 
began its search for support elsewhere and found it in the politically emerging 
Hindu castes. The Party used the Meenakshipuram conversion of 1981, as the 
political storm it raised to win the Hindu support. The party further manipulated 
the Punjab Problem and fully exploited the concern generated among the average 
Hindu by the militancy shown by Bhindranwale. The 'Blue Star' operation further 
contributed in communalizing the Indian Polity (it created a rift between the 
Hindus and the Sikhs as a community). Similarly the Rajiv Gandhi's regime too 
was marked by communalization of politics. When in 1985 on the order of district 
court of Faizabad, the State Congress government reopened the locks of the Babri 
' Hartmann, Horst, Political Parties In India, Meerut, Meenakshi Mudranalya, 1984, p. 339. 
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Masjid at Ayodhya and later on allowed the Shilanyas Ceremony to take place at 
the mosque site. During 1989 General Elections campaign Rajiv Gandhi promised 
to establish 'Ram Rajya if returned to power. Ail this was an attempt to consolidate 
the Hindu vote bank,^  
The Hindu vote bank politics initiated by the Congress party was repeated 
by the BJP as an opportimity to consolidate its vote bank. The competition for the 
Hindu votes resulted as competitive communalism between the Congress and the 
BJP. It was the use of the Hindu card by the Congress party that compelled the BJP 
to resort to more blatant form of communalism and helped it to cast its political net 
much wider. 
The BJP's internal organization and functioning was more democratic in 
comparison to other political parties which helped BJP more in consolidating its 
Hindu vote bank. The Sangh Parivar (VHP, RSS and Bajrang Dal) formed a core 
element within the organization and maintained more coherence than found in 
most other parties although that coherence has diminished in recent years.^  
The BJP consolidated its base in Uttar Pradesh by storm, from a Lilliputian 
poshion in the 1984 and 1989 General Elections the party was catapulted into the 
top position in the 1991 General Elections. The BJP fought the 1991 General 
Elections on the single issue of Hindutva sentiments, the victory was explained as 
a vindication of Hindu unity against the so called pseudo-secularists. 
In order to consolidate its position further in politics, the BJP used the Ram 
janambhoomi controversy as a powerful religious symbol to create a sense of unity 
among the divergent Hindu castes and finally succeeded in this venture. All 
possible means were employed by the BJP to strengthen and consolidate its Hindu 
constituency. All this was suddenly halted when the V.P. Singh's National Front 
government (in alliance with the BJP and the Left Parties) announced the 
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report in August 1990. The Report 
recommended 27% reservation for OBC's in government jobs. Thus the BJP's plan 
^ Mehra, Ajay K., Khanna, D.D., Kueck Gert W., (eds.) Political Parties and Party Systems, New 
Delhi, Sage Publications, 2003, pp. 33-34. 
' Adeney, Katharine and Saez, Lawrence (eds.), Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism, 
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2005, p. 58. 
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to capture power at centre stood failed because of the Mandal Commission's 
Report implementation. 
Thus the caste polarization around the Mandal issue played an important 
role in BJP's evolution. The Mandal Commission Report recommended 27 percent 
reservation in educational institutions and in government jobs for the OBC's. 
There was widespread apprehensions regarding the Mandal formula, which was 
opposed on the pretext of its inclusion of certain Muslim communities in the OBC 
category. BJP was in dilemma because the rejection of Mandal formula would 
jeopardize its efforts to woo the lower caste Hindus. The BJP was hardest hit by 
the Mandal Report as it sought to defeat their ploy of uniting all Hindus under their 
saffron emblem. 
As a result the BJP was compelled by the strong forces in the RSS and the 
VHP to dissociate itself from V.P. Singh's National Front government and to 
embark even more strong!) than before on the platform of Hindutva. In order to 
strengthened its Hindu vote bank. 
The implementation of the Mandal Report led L.K. Advani to undertake the 
Ram Rath "I'atra from Somnath to Ayodhya. The Yatra evoked the militant 
religious sentiments among the Piindus and there was a show of unprecedented 
aggressiveness amongst the cadres of the BJP, VHP, Bajrang Dal and the Shiv 
Sena in different parts of the country. 
The Aftermath of the Ram Rath Yatra was that the Ramjanambhoomi issue 
was looming large on India's political horizon. The BJP exploited the issue to such 
a height that it became the only cause for its electoral success. The BJP used the 
issue of Ramjanambhoomi to its fullest during the 1991 General Elections because 
the BJP could hardly compete with other political parties as far as secular issues 
were concerned therefore the only alternative left for its was to exploit religious 
sentiments of the Hindus. The Ramjanambhoomi controversy came as a political 
gift from the Congress, because it was under the Congress party regime in 1985 
that the locks of the Babri Masjid was reopened and the Shilanayas ceremony was 
held. This controversy enabled the BJP to earn communal political reputation in 
whole of India. 
205 
The General Elections of 1991 changed the fortune of the BJP. These 
election were precipitated not merely by the withdrawal of support from the 
Chandra Shekhar government by the Congress but infact, because of the 
withdrawal of support by the BJP from the V.P. Singh government on the 
Ramajanmbhoomi Babri-Masjid controversy in October 1990. It was for the first 
time that a democratically elected government of V.P. Singh fell not on a major 
national issue but on a sectarian religious issue and the BJP saw in this unfortunate 
controversy an ultimate chance to come to power. The political parties (the 
Congress and Janata Dal) in the State (Uttar Pradesh) had internal strife and were 
passing through turmoil for not having strong internal party organization. This 
weakness of the rival parties paved way to the BJP to emerge as supreme to rule. 
Natural corollary of this unfortunate controversy was the unparallel 
communalization of Indian polity in the post- Independence period. This 
communalization nearly shook the very foundation of Indian secularism'' 
In the 1991 General Elections the BJP had won 51 seats from Uttar 
Pradesh. The Congress had secured 5, BSP 0, CPI 0, CPI (M) 4, Janata Dal (U) 21 
and Others 4. The BJP emerged victorious in the 1991 General Elections from 
Uttar Pradesh. 
The 1991 General and U.P. Assembly Elections results were different from 
all earlier elections because since Independence it was for the first time that the 
ruling parties at the centre and in the State were different. P.V. Narasimha Rao led 
Congress government was formed at the centre-whereas Kalyan Singh led BJP 
government was formed in UP. The important aspect of the 1991 State Assembly 
Elections was that Congress Party for the first time received less than 30 percent of 
the votes cast. Its vote bank was severely affected.^  
After the 1991 General and Assembly Elections in Uttar Pradesh the BJP 
was recognized as a Principal Political force after the Congress at the National 
level with Uttar Pradesh as its major political stronghold. The BJP rose to 
prominence in Uttar Pradesh due to the favourable political developments that took 
* Engineer, Asghar All, "Lok Sabha Elections and Communalization of Politics" Economic and 
Political Weekly, July 6-13,1991, p. 1649. 
^ Ibid 
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place during its reign in the State. For example, the Janata Dal in U.P. remained 
weak and was torn by internal strife and even the electoral setback in the 1991 
General Elections did not lead the party to take stock of situation. The infighting 
and repeated splits did dampen the party's credibility, further the expulsion of Ajit 
Singh caused another political crisis in it. Later Ajit Singh formed Rashtriya Lok 
Dal. Moreover the Left Parties were not averse to the idea of realigning themselves 
with Mulayam Singh Yadav, their erstwhile anti-communal hero of the turbulent 
Ayodhya days, who had fallen into disfavour after his break up with the Janata Dal 
and finally the Congress party due to the Mandir- Mandal controversy had suffered 
too badly in the State.* 
The BJP consolidated its Hindu vote banks not merely on communal 
mobilization of the Hindu Community on the religious issues but rather it was the 
effort of well-planned political mobilization by the party leadership. This was 
attempted in order to counter the effect of the Mandal Commission in North India. 
If the BJP had opposed the Mandal Commission Report it would have been marked 
as an upper caste part>, vshereas if it had supported the report it would have lost the 
entire upper caste votes. By using the Hindutva platform, the BJP carved out a 
massive Hindu vote bank across the entire country, though it was successful only 
in the Hindi belt and more specifically in Uttar Pradesh. By doing this, the BJP 
managed to create a constituency for itself not only in the upper caste areas of the 
Congress, but also among dominant castes such as Kurmis, Lodhas and Sainis in 
Uttar Pradesh. Due to these efforts the party consolidated its electoral base in the 
State.'' 
The smooth functioning of the Kalyan Singh government came to halt 
when on December 6, 1992 the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya was demolished by the 
Kar Sevaks of Hindu Parivar including the BJP, VHP, RSS, Bajrang Dal and the 
Shiv Sena. Despite assurances by the State BJP government to the Supreme Court 
of India and to the centre, the State machinery failed to prevent the demolition. The 
centre dismissed the BJP run State government. 
' Mishra, Amaresh, "New Beginning in U.P. Politics", Economic and Political Weekly, January 10, 
1992. p. 78. 
' Pal, Sudha, Uttar Pradesh Agrarian Change and Electoral Politics, New Delhi, Shipra 
Publications, 1993, p. 130. 
207 
The BJP could not reap the electoral benefits from the demolition of the 
Masjid and against all expectations the party could not sweep the Assembly 
Elections of 1993. This defeat was made possible when the Samajwadi Party 
teamed up with the BSP against the BJP. 
The ] 993 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections were held for 425 seats. The 
BJP had won 177, Congress 28, SP 109, BSP 67, Janata Dal 27, BKKD 0, Left 4, 
Samata 0 and others 10. 
During 1993 Assembly Elections in U.P. the electorate were splitted in 
three ways along caste lines, the upper castes and some OBC's went with the BJP, 
the Dalits consolidated in favour of the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Yadav's a 
politically dominant OBC segment, rallied round Mulayam Singh Yadav's 
Samajwadi Part>'. Another significant shift in the State politics was that the 
Muslims deserted the Congress and associated themselves with the Samajwadi 
Pam. thus forming a uinning Muslim- Yadav combination.^ 
Ho\se\er b> the end of June 1995, the BJP agreed to support Mayawati as 
the nev, Chief Minister of L'ttar Pradesh in order to overthrow Mulayam Singh 
Yac3.\'s go\emment and to improve its image among the scheduled castes. 
Indirect 'dalitization' seemed to be the only way for the BJP to circumscribe the 
Yadav's (whose interests were embodied in Mulayam Singh Yadav). 
All those strategies were determined by the BJP keeping in view the 
forthcoming General Elections (1996). The major plank of the BJP in this context 
was to highlight its support for the implementation of Mandal Commission 
recommendations. Infact this was the main reason for supporting the BSP (1995) in 
Uttar Pradesh.'° 
In the 1996 General Elections the BJP had won 52 seats, SP 16, BSP 6, 
Congress 5, Janata Dal 2, Congress T-2, CPM 0, SAP 1 and Independent 1 from 
Uttar Pradesh. The Elections were held for 85 Lok Sabha seats. In this General 
Elections the BJP had emerged as the Single Largest Party. It won 161 seats out of 
Frontline, June 22, 2001, p. 42. 
' Jaffrelot, Christophe, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925-1990, New 
Delhi, Viking, 1996, p. 70. 
'"Ibid 
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543 Lok Sabha seats. The congress had secured 140 seats, Janata Party/ Janata Dal 
46, Communist Party Marxist 32, Communist Party of India 12. The President of 
India invited the BJP to form the government, the party failed to win a vote of 
confidence and was forced to resign after 13 days. The rise of the BJP led the 
Socialist and the Communist Parties to minimize their ideological differences and 
to form an anti-BJP coalition, referred to as National Front-Left Front. 
After 1996 General Elections, the BJP leader Kalyan Singh insisted that the 
party should endorse an unprecedented large number of non upper caste candidates 
for coming Assembly Elections (1996) in the State. This was because the changing 
feature of caste mobilization from one region to another had made it difficult for 
the BJP to build stable base around the larger caste groups in the State. Therefore 
BJP nominated OBC candidates in 190 out of the 420 constituencies in the 
elecfions that took place in September 1996. This moves, however alienated the 
upper caste support base of the party and adversely affected its (BJP) fortunes in 
the State." 
In the 1996 Assembly Elections the BJP had secured 174 seats. Congress 
33, SP 10, BSP 67, Janata Dal 7, BKKD 8, Left 5, INC (T) 4, Samata 2 and others 
14. The Elections were held for 420 Assembly seats. Mayawati (BSP) was sworn 
in as the Chief .Minister with the support of BJP. 
In joining hands with the BSP during 1996 Assembly Elections the BJP 
hoped that this alliance would help it to expand its electoral base amongst the 
Dalits but infact the BJP actually eroded its upper- caste base. The rejection felt by 
the members of upper caste during the six months of Mayawati's government and 
their tilt towards Mulayam Singh Yadav because of his attention towards them 
introduced a new variables in the politics of the State.'^ The wrong alliances 
ultimately caused BJP's consolidation drive to secure the Hindu vote bank in the 
State. (There was a rotational agreement between BSP and BJP. It was decided for 
" Jaffrelot, Christophe, "Sangh Parivar" in Pratap Bhanu Mehta, John Zavos, Thomas Blom 
Hansen, Jaffrelot Christophe (eds.) Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics, New Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, 2004. p. 17. 
'^  Brotels, Jasmine, "BJP in Uttar Pradesh" in Pratap Bhanu Mehta, John Zavos, Thomas Blom 
Hansen, Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.), Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics, New Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, p. 99. 
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six month's BSP's Chief Minister will rule the State and the later six months will 
be ruled by the BJP's Chief Minister). 
The BSP-BJP alliance broke down when Mayawati refused to step down 
after the completion of six months. The BSP withdrew its support in 1997. 
On this BJP caused defections within the BSP and with the help of 
defectors Kalyan Singh ruled the State till 1999. However the consolidation drive 
of the BJP during the reign of Kalyan Singh in Uttar Pradesh received a setback 
when he tried to consolidate his OBC base by appointing an ever-larger number of 
low caste ministers. In 1999, Ministers in his government from lower castes were 
31.8%. The upper caste lobby within the BJP resented the way the OBC's were 
given representation out of proportion and gaining power. The party's setback in 
the 1999 Lok Sabha elections was attributed to incompetence of Kalyan Singh as 
Chief Minister.'^ 
As a result Kalyan Singh was asked to resign by the Party High command 
in November 1999 in order to strengthen the Part>' in Uttar Pradesh. The leadership 
felt that upper caste groups such as Brahmins, Thakurs and banias were 
increasing]) getting alienated from the BJP because of what they perceived as the 
pro-backuard class actions of Kal\an Singh.'•* 
.As a result in the 1999 General Elections BJP lost its support not only 
amongst the upper castes but also amongst the backwards. The BJP got 29 seats 
out of 85 Lok Sabha seats from Uttar Pradesh. Two seats went to its allies Uttar 
Pradesh Loktantrik Congress and the alliance backed independent Maneka Gandhi 
who retained the Pilibhit seat. The Congress (I) secured 10 seats. The BSP 
increased its tally from 4 to 14 and SP added 26 seats. The total seats secured by 
BJP was 182 out of 543 Lok Sabha seats. The congress had secured 114, Janata 
Dal (U) included Samata Party (Bihar) and Lok Shakti (Kamataka) 21, CPI (M) 
33, CPM 4. Atal Bihari Vajpayee was sworn in as the Prime Minister of the 
country. 
According to Party's estimate, the erosion of the backward class support 
_ _ _ 
'Ubid. 
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had led to the party's defeat in at least 15 constituencies. They attributed the 
erosion mainly to the active campaign carried out against the party by Sakshi 
Maharaj, a former BJP member of Parliament who turned to be supporter of the 
Samajwadi Party. As a result the election campaign (1999 General Elections) 
influenced a large section of Lodh and Rajputs, traditionally BJP supporters.'^ 
Kalyan Singh was replaced by a Bania, Ram Prakash Gupta. Kalyan Singh 
alleged that he was victimized by a Brahminical machination whose architect was 
no one less than Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee for suspending the 
construction of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya in order to please the BJP allies. As a 
result he was expelled from the primary membership of the party for six years. 
Later he launched a new party, the Rashtriya Kranti Dal (Party of National 
Revolution) in order to articulate the grievances of the OBC's.'^ 
To counter the effect of the Kalyan Singh's Rashtriya Kranti Dal the BJP 
thought of broadening its base amongst the OBC's as a result Ram Prakash 
Gupta's government in March 2000 consented the demand of Jats of Uttar Pradesh 
regarding their inclusion in Schedule one of the OBC's under Section 13 of the UP 
Public Services .Act 1994.'^  
On October 2000, the Rajnath Singh took over as the Chief Minister of the 
State. The damages wrecked during the regime of an ailing Ram Prakash Gupta 
were irreversible. He held talks with various support groups like farmers, teachers 
traders, labourers and sports persons in order to gain their support and to 
strengthen its party base amongst those groups. 
The 2002 Assembly Elections were held for 403 seats. In this election the 
BJP had secured 88 seats, BSP 98, Congress 25, SP 143, CPI 0, CPM 2, JD (U) 2, 
Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Mahasabha 1, Loktantrik Congress 2, Janata Party 1, Lok 
Janshakti Party 1, NLP I, RLD 14, RTKP 4 and Independents 16. The Samajwadi 
Party emerged as the Single largest Party in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections 
of 2002 but short of majority. The fractured electoral verdict delivered a hung 
'^  Frontline, Nov. 19, 1999, pp. 22-23 
"^  JafFrelot, Christophe, The BJP at the Centre: Central and Centrist Party, New Delhi, Oxford 
University Press, 1998, p. 338. 
"Ibid 
'* India Today, January 14, 2002. 
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Assembly and President Rule was imposed in the State. The Bhartiya Janata Party 
stood by its decision not to support any party to form the government and to sit in 
the opposition. The BSP also announced that it would not support a government 
led by either the SP or the BJP. The Rashtriya Lok Dal of Ajit Singh, which had 
won 14 seats, made it clear that having fought the elections as a partner of the 
National Democratic Alliance it had no intention of supporting a government if led 
by the SP, which had staked its claim to form government in the State.'^ 
On May 3, 2002 the BSP government supported by the BJP was installed in 
Uttar Pradesh. This was the third time when the BJP had supported the BSP. The 
BJP had supported it with the belief that such alliance would fetch it electoral 
benefits in the Lok Sabha elections of 2004. It believed that alliance with 
Mayawati would counter defend attempts if any by any of its allies to topple the 
National Democratic Alliance at the centre, in the wake of Gujarat riots of 2002. 
The BSP also announced that in return to the BJP's support to it in Uttar Pradesh it 
would support the NDA government externally. '^"' 
Ho\'.e\er this alliance failed to prolong and in the wake of Taj corridor 
con;rovers>" and corruption charges the BJP withdrew its support to the BSP 
government. TTiis resulted in installation of Mulayam Singh Yadav's government 
in the State uith latent support of BJP. 
Inspite of the absence of unity among the non BJP forces the BJP suffered a 
setback in the 2004 General Elections. The SP and BSP were in fact the real 
gainers both in terms of seats as well as votes. The BJP suffered because of inner 
group rivalries in the State BJP unit. The issue of Hindutva failed to reap electoral 
benefits for the BJP in the State. The BJP had secured 10 seats. Congress 9, LJNS 
0, NDA 11, JD (U) 1, Left 0, CPl 0, CPM 0, BSP 19, SP 38, and LKD 3. 
The party's debacle in the 2004 General Elections forced BJP to opt for 
cultural nationalism and strict opposition to minority appeasement as its main focal 
point during the 2007 Assembly Elections in Uttar Pradesh. The party emphasized 
on 'Sanskritik Rashtravad' [Cultural Nationalism, which is another term for 
" Frontline, March 29, 2002, p. 38. 
"^Ibid 
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Hindutva]. Hindutva was the broader issue, during its compaign.^' 
Moreover in a bid to prevent division of saffron votes in UP Assembly 
Elections 2007, senior BJP leader L.K. Advani called for truce with the Bhartiya 
Jana Shakti Party Chief Uma Bharti in an effort to unite in support of Hindutva. He 
said that all those people who had been with us should come in support of 
Hindutva. There should be no split in Hindu votes because of the row between 
Uma Bharti and BJP.^^ 
Uma Bharati was expelled from the BJP for her outbursts against party 
leadership, she launched Bhartiya Janshakti Party which, she said espouses the 
core Sangh ideology. She was able to make in roads into their party vote bank in 
Uttarakhand and was expected to cause potential damage in Uttar Pradesh's 
Bundelkhand region.^'' However her party was able to win just one seat and later it 
was merged with BSP. 
According to L.K. Advani the construction of a Ram Temple on the 
disputed site was a "national desire". He insisted that talks between leaders of the 
t\vo communities was the best way to "honour the nations desire" '^^  
The Part> was making desperate effort to consolidate its Hindu votebank 
once again in the State. The Hindutva slogan had degraded and the party's efforts 
proved futile to revoke the sentiments of the people. However the BJP failed in the 
2007 .Assembl> Elections. The elections were held for 403 seats. The BJP had 
secured 51 seats, Congress 22, BSP 206, JD (U) 1, RLD 10, SP 97, SBLTC 1, RPD 
2. RSBP 1. UPUDF 1 and others 9. 
(b) The SP and BSP in fray to the Parliamentary Foils in Uttar Pradesh 
In the Hindi-Heartland, socio-cultural and economic identities have become 
more assertive over the past decade. Therefore the rise of the socio-cultural 
identities in the Indian political system has profound affect on the Party System. 
The Electoral support to political parties promised on these identities has been 
rising over the past decade or more, leading to the 'fragmentation' or the rise of 
'^ The Hindu. Delhi, April 1, 2007. 
''Ibid. 
''Ibid 
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'centrifugal impulse's in the polity.'^ ^ 
In this regard the rise of the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party 
in Uttar Pradesh since 1990s symbolized the process of exclusivist political 
formations, catering respectively to the Dalits and the Yadavs. 
One of the beneficiaries and carriers of the Mandal upsurge in the North 
India has been the Samajwadi Party. It was formed out of series of splits from the 
Janata Dal in 1992. It represents the socialist tradition of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia. 
The Samajwadi Party implies two principal categories in classifying the electorate 
religion and caste. It is further divided between the Muslim minority and the Hindu 
majority. The two communities are further disaggregated by caste. The SP 
describes itself as a party of farmers, of the poor and of the youngsters of rural 
India. In comparison to BSP and the BJP its emphasis has been more on non-ethnic 
categories. That is why the Samajwadi Party is one of the major players in the 
politics of Uttar Pradesh, the largest State of the Indian union.'^ ^ 
Bahujan Samaj Party is the other important constituent of Uttar Pradesh 
politics after the Samajwadi Party. It was formed in December 1984 by Kanshi 
Ram. The 'Bahujan' or the majority consisted of the Backward castes. Scheduled 
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs or in other words "all 
those not included in the three upper Hindu castes. To BSP the division in the 
political community is basically the cleavage between caste Hindus.^ '' 
According to the BSP the 'Bahujan Samaj' is estimated to form 85 percent 
of the population, as a community of all those 'humiliated' by the Hindu upper 
castes. In 1984 when the BSP was founded it treated the backward castes as listed 
in the Mandal Commission Report as a single undifferentiated category. By 1996 it 
had begun to draw distinctions between the 'backward' castes and the 'most 
backward' castes. Both categories were in turn subdivided into a collection of 
" Prakash, Amit, "Social Cultural and Economic Dimensions of the Party System" in Ajay K. 
Mehra D. D. Khanna, Gert W. Kueck (eds.) Op. cit., p. 154. 
^ Roy, Ramashray and Wallace, Paul (eds.), Indian Politics and the 1998 Elections, New Delhi, 
Sage Publications, 1999, p. 76. 
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component castes. 
Ideologically SP and BSP are pole apart and aim to capture power at any 
cost by way of attacking each other, to capitalize by tarnishing the each others, 
image. For example if SP rules the BSP tries to find out ways to topple the 
government and if the BSP is in power the SP attempts the same. As a result both 
are always in fray in the Politics. Though SP and BSP had an alliance in the 1993 
Assembly Elections. The alliance was successful in forming the government, but 
their relations were not smooth and the experiment proved short lived. 
On June 1, 1995, the alliance between SP and the BSP had come to an end. 
Over this in a frustrated move, members of the Samajwadi Party on June 2, 1995, 
physically assaulted legislators of the BSP at Lucknow's State Guest House. This 
was in reaction as to why those legislators had withdrawn support to the Mulayam 
Singh Yadav government. Against this incident an inquiry was instituted and the 
report prepared by bureaucrat Ramesh Chandra held Mulayam Singh Yadav and 
one Beni Prasad Verma the then Union Communication Minister in the United 
Front go\emment guilt) of hatching a criminal conspiracy to abduct the BSP 
legislators v'.iih the intention to sta}' in power. The report was submitted to the 
State government on Jul> 4. 1995, when the BJP supported BSP government was 
there and Ma>a\».ati was in Office'^ 
Nothing came out of the Report during the Mayawati rule or in the period 
following its collapse in October 1995. The BJP raised the report issue on July 24, 
1996 in the Lok Sabha. The BJP MP's from Uttar Pradesh had demanded that the 
report be placed in Parliament, as the State did not have an Assembly at that time. 
BSP members led by Kanshi Ram also supported the demand of the BJP. On July 
25, 1996 BJP's leader of Opposition Atal Bihari Vajpayee placed the report on the 
table of Lok Sabha since the United Front government was not accepting the 
demand made by the BSP and the BJP members. The BJP also demanded that in 
the light of the report Mulayam Singh Yadav should quit as the Defence 
*^ Ibid, p. 69. 
-^Front/ine, August 23, 1996, p. 13. 
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Minister. 
The Samajwadi Party responded by rejecting the Vajpayee's demand and 
putting down the BJP's action as politically motivated. The counter attack at the 
SP convention at Lucknow was made by Kanshi Ram's campaign on the Report. 
BJP had successfully performed in its UP election (1996 Assembly Elections). 
According to party insiders, the resurrection of the report after over a year of its 
submission, the BSP's effort to turn the report into an emotional issue and the SPs 
fierce reaction to it had all gone exactly the way the BJP wanted. The Party's 
objective in undertaking this operation was to widen the Chasm between the SP 
and the BSP. Leadership felt that no issue would serve the purpose better than the 
June 2, 1995 incident at Lucknow's State Guest House. '^ 
The BJP's effort was considered vital to the partys' prospect in Uttar 
Pradesh for three reasons, first the 1996 Lok Sabha Elections had justified that 
anykind of alliance or electoral adjustment between the SP and the BSP would 
ensure the BJP's defeat in the State. Second, the possibility of a last minute 
rapprochement between the SP and the BSP could not be ruled out and third the 
BJP itself was facing the internal problems on the issue of formulating a policy of 
selecting candidates.^' 
The BSP also hoped that the controversy on the report would accelerate the 
effort it had taken up, in conjunction with a section of the Janata Dal, to isolate the 
SP within the United Front and in the politics of Uttar Pradesh. While the main 
component of the BSP's election strategy was to isolate the Mulayam's campaign, 
the party expected to win more votes than before by arguing and canvassing for the 
need to reinstall a Dalit Chief Minister in order to accelerate social 
transformation.^ ^ 
That is why in the 1996 State Assembly Elections of Uttar Pradesh there 
was pivotal contest of National Politics amongst the BJP, SP, and the Congress. 
Their stakes in the 1996 Assembly Elections were so high that the very course of 
'"ibid 
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their future politics depended on how they perform in Uttar Pradesh. For the BSP, 
the 1996 elections were the first major opportunity to consolidate the gains it made 
in the last two elections in the State that is the 1993 Assembly Elections and the 
1996 Lok Sabha Elections and emerged as the principal party of the oppressed 
castes by pushing the Samajwadi Party to the third spot. The BSP hoped to do it by 
increasing the poll percentage of the Dalit votes in the company of the Congress. 
As for the Congress, it perceived the 1996 Assembly Elections not only as a last 
chance to lift its sagging fortunes in U.P. but also as the beginning of a process to 
build a new socio-political combination that can help to revitalize it in other 
Northern States. The Congress party was in bad shapes since the demolition of the 
mosque in Uttar Pradesh. Its Muslim vote bank had drifted towards the Samajwadi 
Party, because of the Mulayam Singh Yadav's pro-stand for the Muslims during 
the Ayodhya Movement. Similarly the Dalits and Scheduled castes/ Scheduled 
Tribes being with the Bahujan Samaj party due to lucrative policies and stipends to 
Dalits of the State by the BSP. 
The Samajwadi Part\- was successful in Uttar Pradesh due to strategies 
pursued by Mulayam Singh Yadav since 1989. First by taking advantage of the 
increasing caste- based consciousness and the Agrarian prosperity in the State 
followed b> the second spurt of the Green Revolution, it carved out a backward 
caste base inilialK based upon the AJGAR strategy which had been broadened to 
include more groups. Second, it distanced itself from the BJP by promising 
protection to the Muslims and gaining their support. (However in recent time it is 
closer to the BJP for electoral gains). The base of the SP has been the plain of 
western UP and to a larger extent the Eastern Plains.^'' 
Whereas the base of the BSP since its inception remained confined to 
eastern UP and Bundelkhand and parts of central U.P. It tried to enter the western 
UP and had the support of Chamars and Jatav of this region. Its failure to do so had 
been due to the success of the BJP and to a lesser extent of the S.P. In the 1998 
General Elections the BSP was pushed back to the eastern district and did not won 
a single seat there. A major setback was the defeat of Kanshi Ram in Saharanpur 
''* Health, Anthony and Yadav, Yogendra, "The United Colours of Congress", Economic and 
Political Weekly, August 21-28, 1999, p. 2406. 
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Dalit majority area by a wide margin. However Mayawati was able to retain her 
seat with some difficulty.'^ ^ 
The other important pillar of the State politics besides SP and the BSP was 
the Bhartiya Janata Party. The BJP embarked on another political journey on May 
2002 when it supported the Bahujan Samaj Party leader Mayawati as the Chief 
Minister of Uttar Pradesh for third time. The BJP did all this in the belief that her 
company would bring it electoral benefits in the next Lok Sabha elections (2004). 
Besides, the BJP also hoped that the tie up with Mayawati would counterbalance 
attempts by any of its allies to rock the boat that is the National Democratic 
Alliance at the centre in the wake of Gujarat riots (Godhra). The BSP announced 
that in exchange for the BJP's support in Uttar Pradesh, it would support the NDA 
government from outside.''^ 
The Bahujan Samaj Party accused Mulayam Singh Yadav for pretending to 
be Secular Mayawati said that if Mulayam Singh Yadav was really secular he 
would have extended support to the BSP led government. He only pretends to be a 
messiah of Muslims while doing nothing for their development. The BSP clarified 
that it was not in a hurn.' to form the government. It waited enough for Mulayam 
Singh Yadav to prove his majority, which he couldn't in any case. As a result the 
BSP formed the government in order to save the people from further economic 
hardships'''' 
The installation of the BSP government with the BJP support in Uttar 
Pradesh in May 2002 further strained the relation between the SP and the BSP. 
This was the third time when the BJP had supported the BSP. The BJP had 
supported it with the belief that such alliance would fetch it electoral benefits in the 
Lok Sabha elections of 2004.^^ 
The BJP was well aware that it cannot reap long term political benefit from 
this alliance (BSP-BJP). This alliance proved futile for the BJP because in 2004 
General Elections the Party's upper caste vote bank drifted towards other parties. 
" Ibid. p. 2407. 
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The party won only 10 seats in the State. The BJP did not relied much upon the 
issue of Hindiitva. The BJP rose to prominence by combining the votes of upper 
castes and other non-Yadav OBC's. This was managed through the communal 
mobilization, based on Hindutva. The BJP's votes were divided between the SP 
and the BSP due to various inner tussels between the party and the frequent 
changes in the State leadership of the Party. Moreover the upper caste lobby was 
not at all interested in the upiiftment of the lower caste leadership. All that 
ultimately resulted in the drastic decline of its Hindu vote bank. 
In 2004 General Elections the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj 
Party were the net gainers in the battle for Uttar Pradesh both in terms of seats as 
well as votes. The Samajwadi Party led by nine extra seats. It got 35 seats out of 80 
seats. The BSP got 5 seats to its tally of 14 in the last Lok Sabha elections (1999), 
The Congress retained 5 seats only which it gained from the BJP, while losing 4 to 
SP and 1 to BSP. Thus the Congress was partially at loss in Uttar Pradesh. The real 
looser in Uttar Pradesh was the BJP, which lost 5 percent votes and 15 seats. 
Before the General Elections of 2004 the Mayawati government in the State 
v.as ousted in the uake of the controversy over the Taj corridor project. The BSP 
silleged that the BJP helped Mulayam Singh Yadav to form a government in Uttar 
Pradesh and to split the BSP. Mayawati accused the SP and the BJP that she was 
being penalized for not staying with them till the Parliamentary polls (2004 
General Elections). 
The last few years saw a remarkable growth in the BSP's electoral graph. 
The BSP's all India vote percentage grew from 3.8 percent to 4.7 percent in the 
1996 and 1998 General Elections. It was on this transferable vote' that the BJP had 
hitherto relied on, and its withdrawal could spell serious trouble. She also had 
accused the BJP and the SP of using the communal card. Mayawati said both BJP 
and SP were in tandem and were trying to divide the Bahujan Samaj by making 
Muslims and Dalits fight."" 
The Samajwadi Party was in bad shape in the State after its government 
•'' Yadav, Yogendra, "The Elusive Mandate of 2004" Economic and Political Weekly, December 
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was formed on August 29, 2003. On August 25, 2003, the State cabinet headed by 
Mayawati unanimously had recommended the dissolution of the Assembly. On 
August 26, she submitted her resignation to the Governor, On August 27, 13 of the 
BSP's 109 MLA's met the Governor. They urged the Governor to invite Mulayam 
Singh Yadav to form a government on the basis of identically worked letters of 
support. The letter made no claim that the BSP had splitted, not even that the 13 
are among a larger group of legislators who together constituted one third of the 
strength of the parent party. 
The Governor Vishnu Kant Shastri instead of considering the 
recommendation for the dissolution of the Assembly, invited Mulayam Singh 
Yadav to form the government. On September 1, 2003 the leader of the BSP's 
legislature Party, Swami Prasad Maurya, field a petition before the Speaker 
seeking disqualification of the 13 party MLA's under the tenth schedule. (Initially 
the strength of the breakaway group was 13 and BSP filed a petition before the 
Speaker seeking their disqualification. The Speaker kept the entire issue pending 
until the strength of the breakaway group went up to become one-third of the 
BSP"s strength of 109j. On September 5, Maurya filed a caveat seeking immediate 
hearing on his petition. On September 6, a group of 37 BSP MLA's including the 
first batch of 13, addressed application to the Speaker that the 37 BSP MLA's have 
formed themselves into a new party the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal and have merged 
with the Samajwadi Party.'*' 
The Speaker of the House Kesri Nath Tripathi in one go legitimized the 
split in the BSP and accepted that the 37 MLA's formed one third of their party's 
strength. He recognized the LBD and also its merger with the SP. 
However the Samajwadi Party was plunged into a deep political crisis 
following the disqualification of 13 MLA's belonging to Loktantrik Bahujan Dal, 
the breakaway faction of the Bahujan Samaj Party. The 13 MLAs were disqualified 
by the Supreme Court with retrospective effect from August 27, 2003. (The 
Supreme Court judgment came on February 14, 2007). 
The Bench said, "The Speaker totally misdirected himself in purporting to 
"' The Hindu,^ew Delhi, February 14, 2007. 
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answer the claim of the 37 MLAs that there had been a split in the party even while 
leaving open the question of disqualification raised before him by way of an 
application. This failure on the part of the Speaker to decide the application cannot 
be said to be merely in the realm of procedure. It goes against the very 
constitutional scheme of adjudication contemplated by the Tenth schedule read in 
the context of Article 102 and 191 of the constitution".''^  
The Supreme Court verdict turmoiled the Uttar Pradesh politics. It had 
revived the chorus for the Chief Minister's dismissal. The claim made by the 
opposition parties was that the retrospective disqualification rendered Mulayam 
Singh Yadav's government unconstitutional. 
The formation of the Mulayam Singh Yadav government of 2003 was aided 
and abetted by the Congress, the RLD, the Janata Dal (united) and the Samata 
Party. Mulayam Singh Yadav's government became retrospectively legitimate by 
these political parties, but later these parties called it unconstitutional insisting that 
it should be punished for a wrong means in garnering its formation. Inspite of all 
these Mulayam Singh Yadav was able to prove his majority on the floor- thrice on 
February 28, 2006, January 25, 2007 and in February, 2007. 
Even the Bhartiya Janata Party was also angry about the unconstitutional 
manner of Mulayam Singh Yadav's government appointment. Those clamouring 
for Mula\am Singh's dismissal should have journeyed back to October 1997- the 
mmultuous day when Kalyan Singh the then Chief Minister of the State assembled 
his jumbo Ministry and won the vote of confidence. Outraged by his audacity, the 
United Front government at the centre, egged on by the Congress, pushed for his 
dismissal, sending a proclamation under Article 356 to President K.R. Narayanan. 
However he turned down the demand by returning back the cabinets 
recommendation.''^  The Supreme Court Judgment infact became a tool for settling 
scores. 
The understanding between the BJP and the SP was more strengthened 
during 2004 General Elections campaign when Atal Bihar Vajpayee the then Prime 
"^  The Hindu, New Delhi, February 15,2007. 
"' The Hindu, New Delhi, February 19,2007. 
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Minister of India urged the IVfuslims of Uttar Pradesh in an election rally as not to 
desert the Samajwadi Parly leader Mulayam Singh Yadav. This remark of Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee was interpreted as the BJP's concern over the increased Muslim 
sympathy for Congress and was also an attempt by the BJP to strengthen the 
perception that there was a tacit understanding between the NDA and Mulayam 
Singh Yadav."" 
Both the BJP and the Congress hoped to take advantage of the rift between 
the SP and the BSP. The BJP instead of relying on Hindutva issue focused more on 
economic development of the country and propagated slogans like 'Feel Good 
Factor' and 'India Shinning'. The Congress on the other hand relied entirely on the 
magic of the Gandhi family. 
The Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party during 2004 General 
Elections campaign were cautious to avoid any negative campaign against social 
sections. If .Mulayam Singh extended his hands to the thankurs, Mayawati too did 
not mmd receiving support from the upper castes. Infact the Congress party was 
eager to have an alliance either with the SP or the BSP or with both. However both 
refused to oblige due to electoral interests."^ 
.As a result the BJP lost three-fourth of the seats it had won in 1999. The 
BJP faced erosion of its vote share in all the regions of the State, though it was 
stronger in Doab and the North-East region. The Congress to lost votes in most 
regions, except in the North-East, where it improved its vote share. 
In contrast the BSP and the SP improved their vote share in the 2004 
General Elections. The BSP improved in all regions except Bundelkhand. It was 
considered stronger in Eastern part of Uttar Pradesh than anywhere else. Infact it 
was the Samajwadi Party that got more than 30 percent of the vote in any region of 
the State. "^  
Similarly the rise of the Mulayam Singh Yadav and his Yadav politics 
helped the BJP get a foothold among the non-Yadav OBC's. The Congress 
" The Times of India, New Delhi, April 28, 2004. 
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somewhat improved its position amongst the upper castes on the one hand and the 
Muslim vote on the other. The BSP had a bacicing from the dalits and the jatav's 
also (86 per cent) and SP and the Congress got 17 and 15 percent votes 
respectively among the non-jatav dalits. Similarly the Samajwadi Party got the 
support of 70 percent Yadav's who voted for it. The 47 percent of Muslim 
population had voted for the Samajwadi Party and 14 percent voted for the 
Congress. The Muslim community was not exclusively with the Samajwadi Party. 
In the 1999 General elections the Samajwadi party got the support of 72 percent 
Muslim. The Bahujan Samaj Party also got 10 percent of the Muslim votes and one 
fourth of the Muslim votes got distributed among others.''^  
There was no strong issue around which the election campaign (2004) was 
worked out. This situation hampered the BJP. In the absence of any emotive issue, 
it failed to retain its "Hindu vote'. In the absence of community based mobilization 
by the SP and the BSP, the BJP could not attract the upper caste vote either. The 
issueless election temporarih' benefited the SP and the BSP in their attempts to 
attract voters across social sections. The SP earned a section of thakur votes too 
when the Raja Bhaiya had joined it. It also helped Mulayam Singh to build an 
image of a leader of all sections rather than the Yadavs alone.''^  
The Samajwadi Partv was dead against any alliance with the Congress 
party because Muslims as well as upper caste votes would probably turn to the 
Congress rather than the Samajwadi Party. Moreover an alliance with the Congress 
did not ensure the pre-eminence of the SP in the post election scenario. The BJP 
asked Mulayam Singh to keep away from Congress and save the country once 
again from a Prime Minister with foreign origin. ^  
Similarly the Bahujan Samaj Party did not go into any alliance whether pre-
post election. Infact the elections of 2004 were a major setback for the Congress 
and the BJP, though it was seen as the opportunity for the Congress to stage a 
comeback in UP Politics. It had improved a bit but yet it cannot overcome the 
" Ibid, p. 5465. 
"' Ibid, p. 5466. 
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stagnation of one decade.^° 
Of all the parties in fray the Bahujan Samaj Party in the 2007 Assembly 
Elections with broad based strategy won the Assembly majority and ended 14 
years of coalition rule. The Mulayam Singh Yadav led Samajwadi Party trailed far 
behind with fewer than half the BSP's number, while the Bhartiya Janata Party and 
the Congress were in distant third and fourth positions with two digit scores. 
The verdict sprung many surprises. Several political heavyweights and 
regional stalwarts from the SP, the BJP and the Congress were swept aside by the 
BSP Juggernaut. 
A significant reason for Mulayam's routing out was traced to his 
disenchantment with his performance and policies. The foremost demand put up by 
the Muslims in Uttar Pradesh for years was issuance of a fresh notification for 
transfer of Babri Masjid demolition case to Lucknow court, Member of All India 
Muslim Personal Law Board Zafaryab Jilani was of the opinion that, after this 
order was quashed in 2001 by the High Court on technical grounds, Rajnath Singh 
government desisted from issuing another notification.^' 
30 Muslim MLA's being with BSP, the minority community now is 
looking forward from Mayawati to deliver what Mulyam Singh promised but did 
not. 
Having cobbled the Muslim- Yadav vote bank Mulayam Singh Yadav 
moved towards wooing Thakurs among upper castes to make a strong combination 
during 2007 Assembly Elections. Around two decades after making Muslims his 
pocket borough the Yadav Chieftain faced a real threat on this score from the BSP 
Division of Muslim votes cost Mulayam Singh dearly. It'affected his fortune in 
western UP, cost him heavily in central and massively in eastern regions.^^ 
Infact Mayawati's Bahujan Samaj Party defied skeptics to win an 
astonishing number of seats in the 2007 Assembly Elections. The BSP pulled off 
this brilliant victory in the face of innumerable odds. A Bahujan Party with a core 
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Dalit vote, it laclced the social skills and visibility of its opponents a factor that 
seemed, paradoxically to work to its advantage." 
Another foremost casualty of the UP verdict was the third front dream that 
was conjured up on April 23, 2007, when Mulayam Singh Yadav gathered together 
in Allahabad assorted political personalities. The UP voter was sought to be 
impressed with the Samajwadi Party's national good will and friends. That show 
was meant to rekindle the hopes for an immediate change of dispensation in New 
Delhi after the UP votes. His attempt to create instability at the centre failed with 
the emergence of BSP as the Single largest party in the State and Mayawati as the 
Chief Minister of State.^" 
(c) Political Banishment of the Congress from the State 
Since Independence, the Congress Party in the State of Uttar Pradesh had 
its strong hold. Reason was that, the Congress Party even in the pre-independence 
days had enormous influence in the State. Congress hold over every aspect of 
political life in the State was so much that some political commentators described. 
'Indian Party System' even as 'the congress system'. 
The General Elections of 1967 witnessed the end of that strong hold which 
Congress had in Uttar Pradesh since Independence. 
Till mid sixties Congress continued as a single dominant party. Some of the 
opposition parties were continuously improving their positions and strength in 
Parliament and some of the State Assemblies. The emergence of a non-Congress 
coalition in Kerela in the Year 1956 was an exception. 
The Chinese debacle, Nehru's fading Charisma, developing organizational 
lethargy in the Party, Nehru's deteriorating health and the possibility of a 
succession tussle were the trying factors for the Congress during the first half of 
1960's^^ 
Prime Minister Nehru after fifteen years of Indian Independence told a 
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news conference: "An atmosphere is growing in India that I find not only 
disturbing but suffocating". Nehru found his work as that of some tcind of robot or 
automation " I was physically tit but getting querrulous, I sense coarseness and 
vulgarity growing in our public life, in the Congress party and the whole country 
idealism is fading out. We Indians suffer from a split personality. One part is of the 
highest moral standard, the other part completely forged about it. We are losing our 
sense of mission, what to do? I don't know".^ ^ 
Political leaders, who assumed power immediately after Independence, 
didn't have deep roots in their societies. The cosmopolitan elements in India had to 
yield ground to more parochial segments of their Societies. Provincial and State 
leaders had challenged the authority of the westernized and socialist liberal 
generation of leaders who had inspired the drives towards Independence. As the 
less cosmopolitan and the more parochial elements gradually acquired power, the 
political process of India moved away from the standard of the western world 
towards more indigenous ones. This resulted decline in efficiency and justice. 
Despite political stabilit> governments effort was less to change citizen in the right 
direction and more to accommodate and adjust itself to the existing condition. 
The Congress part> was no less affected by the trend of the era and was 
facing serious internal cracks and debacle. The groups who exercised control over 
the party apparatus in the States and which supported individual members of the 
central Congress leadership were becoming ever stronger. In these circumstances 
the role of local leaders became much more important. By the time of 1967 
General Elections this weakness stood fully revealed. As a result many of those 
who had been voting for the Congress became its opponents. The opposition 
parties grew more conscious and stood solidly against the Congress.^ * 
Moreover from 1967 onwards a large number of uncommitted voters had 
entered the electorate who were not enamoured by the memories of freedom 
struggle and also the old charismatic leadership of the Independence movement 
had departed from the scene. In the wake of democratization and economic 
developments new alliances of interests has begun to emerge in politics, marked by 
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a growing politicization of vast population of the middle and lower peasantry and 
the middle caste groups. This led to the large-scale differentiation of the electorate 
with diverse party identifications based on new interests and ideological 
alignments. All this ultimately resulted in the decline of the support base of the 
Congress since 1967 onwards.^^ 
Therefore, it was only after the elections of 1967 that some sort of life came 
in Uttar Pradesh Politics. In other words it was the beginning of the non-Congress 
movement that brought a change in the otherwise slow momentum affairs of the 
State, because Charan Singh had defected from the Congress after 1967 State 
Assembly Elections. This was the first split in the Congress party since 
Independence in Uttar Pradesh. Charan Singh had formed the government under 
the banner of Samyukta Vidhayak Dal. 
There was no political stability in the State from 1967 to 1974. The 
Political chaos forced the people to vote for Congress. This strengthened the 
position of Congress and as a result in the 1974 Assembly Elections in a House of 
425 Congress (S) secured 213 seats as against 211 out of 424 in 1969.*'^  
However the swift rule of the Congress was interrupted when the National 
Emergenc> v,as imposed b> Indira Gandhi on June 25-26, 1975 in the country. The 
imposition of National Emergenc\ gave a sharp turn to Indian Politics setting a 
new frenzied pace to events and initiating an entirely new style of government in 
the country with different norms and values. 
The Excesses of Emergency and the resultant trauma left greater impact on 
people and politics of Uttar Pradesh. The reaction was unprecedented. As a result 
in 1977 General Elections at the centre and in the State of Uttar Pradesh the 
Congress Party was voted out of the power. A non- Congress wave of such 
proportions and intensity was never experienced in the post Independent politics of 
Uttar Pradesh. The Janata Party's victory of 1977 brought jubilation and relief to 
the people of Uttar Pradesh, which was short lived. Due to the internal tiffs and 
factions the Janata coalition of the assorted parties had soon collapsed. Through 
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1980 General Elections the Congress was back to power.'^' 
The decade of 1980s proved crucial for the political parties and party 
system in India. The Congress Party despite maintaining its dominance from 1980 
to 1989 at the centre as well as in Uttar Pradesh, serious cracks had appeared in it 
due to the factionalism rampant in most of its units. Thus the decline of the 
Congress as an Institutionalized party representing a variety of conflicting, socio-
economic interests created a political vacuum. 
The Party lost its hegemony due to the departure of the nationalist 
generation, demise of internal democracy and the emergence of personalized mass 
appeal of the top leadership. As a result the Congress Party failed to accommodate 
conflicting social interests and to fulfdl the individual ambitions of those involved 
in its expansion at the provincial and local levels.^^ 
In order to secure and consolidate perpetual Congress majority in national 
electoral politics, the Congress leadership embarked on a communal arithmetic, 
practicing a shifting accommodation of both Hindu and Muslim communal forces. 
The then Prime .Minister Rajiv Gandhi's compromise on Secular front had 
complete!) eroded the electoral base of the Congress Party at the centre as well as 
in L'ttar Pradesh. Since then the party could not revive itself from the stings of 
Shah Bano case, reopening of locks of Babri Masjid and the demolition of Babri 
Masjid. 
In April 1985, the Supreme Court delivered a historic verdict declaring a 
divorced Muslim women payment of maintenance by her former husband by 
applying a section under the General Criminal Penal Code to the case. The 
decision broke with the legal precedents of treating matters of family dispute under 
the special provision stipulated in the Muslim Personal Law Application Act, 
which was interpreted by the members of the Ulema appointed by the Muslim 
Personal Law Board. The Muslims regarded the verdict as an infringement on the 
cultural autonomy of Indian Muslims and called for public protests. 
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In an attempt to win back Muslim Community the Congress party passed a 
bill annulling the Shah Banc verdict. The favourable attitude of the Congress 
towards the verdict failed to attract the Muslim community when Congress party 
passed "Muslim Woman's Protection Bill"." 
The Muslims were too annoyed with the Congress for it favouring the 
Supreme Court verdict in the case. This gave an opportunity to the Janata Dal and 
later Samajwadi Party to articulate the interests of the Muslim community in Uttar 
Pradesh by promising them reservations in government jobs and by creating posts 
of Urdu teachers in government schools and colleges in the State. Moreover during 
Ramjanambhoomi Babri Masjid movement the Janata Dal and the Samajwadi 
Party took a firm pro Muslim stand against Hindu Nationalist claims to the site of 
the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya.^ 
The reopening of locks of Babri Masjid in 1985 on the writ petition of 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad by the local court in Faizabad during Congress rule 
manifest the intentions of the Congress. It aimed at heightening communal tension 
between the Hindus and Muslims for electoral benefits. 
.Moreoser, the anger of the Muslim community towards Congress rule rose 
to extreme when Prime .Minister Rajiv Gandhi started his electoral campaign for 
1989 General Elections in Faizabad- the constituency in which the town of 
Ayodhya falls with promises of creating a Ram Rajya. However this strategy failed 
and the Congress party was voted out of power at the hands of Janata Dai's anti-
corruption slogans and by the Hindu communal campaign of the BJP. These 
maneuvers only aggravated tensions between the Muslims and Hindus in North 
India in the 1980's.^^ 
The Bhartiya Janata Party 'gained', what was actually harboured by the 
Congress. The BJP rose to prominence because of the Ramjanambhoomi- Babri 
Masjid conflict. It secured 89 seats out of 529 seats during 1989 General Elections. 
This was a remarkable performance for the BJP because in 1984 it had secured 
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only 2 seats out of 542. In due time the BJP became the second largest party after 
the Congress. 
The Ramjanambhoomi Babri Masjid issue took an ugly turn when the Babri 
Masjid was demolished in Ayodhya on December 6, 1992 by the members of 
Sangh Parivar and the Kar Sevaks of BJP. This shook the very foundation of 
Secularism in India. The entire Muslim community felt insecured as never before. 
The Babri Masjid was demolished during the Congress rule at the centre. The 
Muslims became furious and demoralized and pledged never to vote Congress in 
future. This demolition finally banished the Congress Party from Uttar Pradesh. 
Moreover the fast eclipse of the Congress party from the political scene 
during 1990's was also co-terminus with the rise of the regional parties which had 
stepped in to fill up the space created by the gradual but steady decline of the 
Congress throughout the 1980's, In this scenario the rise of the Samajwadi Party 
and the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh was very important because the 
Muslims, the Backwards and the Dalit votes turned towards them. TTie Samajwadi 
Part\'s stand during the Ayodhya issue strengthened the party's base in Uttar 
Pradesh. Similarly the rise of Bahujan Samaj Party also weakened hold of 
Congress over Dalits in North India. The Bahujan Samaj Party was an expression 
of Dalit resurgence that emerged slowly as a result of opportunities provided to 
them by a democratic system and exposed hypocrisy of the Congress party by 
using rhetorics of social justice and socialism but serving the interests of upper 
castes and classes.^^ 
The failure of the leadership was also one of the cause of Congress 
banishment from the State. Since 1970's the top leadership of the Party destroyed 
Party democracy by centralizing decision making process. Central leadership 
distorted party organizations by establishing its personal supremacy over all 
decision making organs.*^ 
Another cause for Congress party's banishment from the State was the 
weaknesses of party organization and its policies, infact was one of the primary 
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causes of its shrinking in the State. None of the promises made during Shimla-
Vichar Manthan Shivir (1993) were implemented. Like the demand to forge an 
alliances in the States, to revamp the structure of the party, to avoid factionalism 
and coterie within the party. Moreover there was no transparency in the system of 
governance in its ruled States or where it was batting for new lease of life.^ ^ 
The inactive participation of party workers had led to its exit from Uttar 
Pradesh. The Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee had four Presidents in the past 
five years- Salman Khurshecd, Shri Prakash Jaiswal, Arun Kumar Singh Munna 
and Jagdambika Pal. In some district the local heads had not been replaced for the 
past 15 years, despite inactive district bodies. As a resuU the number of party 
MLA's fell from 94 in 1989 to 25 in 2002 in the Assembly Elections. Moreover 
the Congress Legislature Party leader Pramod Tiwari was not replaced since 
1989. '^ 
The Frontal wings of the State Unit of the Congress Party- the Youth 
Congress, the MahiJa Congress and the NSUl were mainly defunct and had failed 
to take up any major programmes. Those units could not be made functional. 
Therefore, if Congress wanted to win, than it had to reform itself, otherwise the 
part>' thar touched the historic low of 112 seats out of 545 seat and 28 percent of 
the votes in 1999 General Elections had chances of being washed off from the 
political scene. 
The entry of Rahul Gandhi during 2004 General Elections, undoubtedly 
breathed a fresh air into an otherwise jaded Congress election campaign in Uttar 
Pradesh. Rahul Gandhi's entry into politics evoked a spontaneous response in an 
election that was largely managed on the basis of caste combinations and 
organizational resilience. In order to interact with the demoralized Congress in the 
State the people were interacted through the road shows organized by the party.'" 
In other parts of the Uttar Pradesh there was a growing ground swell of 
support and goodwill for the Congress but the party simply did not have the 
organizational machinery to take advantage of that mood and translate it into Lok 
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Sabha seats. It was only in its few remaining strongholds that the party had a 
semblance of a political structure. This was the point where the BJP led Congress 
because the latter formidable Sangathan Structure was much in place.^' 
During 2004 General Elections there was a three-comer contest in Uttar 
Pradesh between the Samajwadi Party, the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Bhartiya 
Janata Party. In the State the caste based votes played a major role. The 2004 
Elections galvanized Dalit aspirations in the State and hence anti-BJP parties 
emerged stronger. The VHP and other Sangh Parivar leaders accused the BJP of 
"betraying its Hindutva agenda, which eventually contributed to its downfall". 
The 14'*^  General Elections (2004) was a miracle for the Congress. After 
eight years in wilderness, the Congress was back to power. The Congress once the 
natural ruling party of India may not have fully regained the lost glory but it 
boosted its tally from 114 seats to 145 seats in the 2004 General Elections. The 
Congress party therefore discarded the 'Panchmarhi Resolution' of 1998 which 
forbidded it from an>' alliance with regional parties. As a result the party took into 
confidence ever\' opposition part>' leader who mattered like Harkishan Singh 
Suijeet, Mayawati, Mulayam Singh Yadav and Sharad Pawar etc. for alliances at 
the State and at the centre. 
In order to revive the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh the Party should have 
gone for a change at the State organizational unit. The party should have taken into 
consideration the whole of Uttar Pradesh instead of its primary constituencies 
(Amethi and Rae Bareilly). The Congress President Sonia Gandhi did not visit the 
UPCC headquarter in Lucknow for over four years. Her last visit was in 2000 to 
caste her vote in the Congress Presidential Election where she was challenged by 
veteran leader Jitendra Prasad. The President should have toured the district from 
time to time so that the party's base is rooted strongly in the State. 
Moreover the Apathy of the party at the lower level did not help, because 
most of the district and the city level units in the state became fiefdoms of leaders 
who were heading their office for more than a decade. The greatest grouse was that 
the office bearers rarely visited the party offices. While leaders came and went 
" The Outlook, February 16,2004. 
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none could bring about changes at the grassroots level or could give the party a 
semblance of revival. 
The Party should have made desperate attempts to woo back the Muslim 
community. That is why wooing back Muslim was the top agenda in the Assembly 
Elections 2007 for Uttar Pradesh Congress party which had been out in wilderness 
for the last 18 years. The party promised to offer the moon to the minorities if 
voted back to power.^ ^ 
During the election campaign the party think tank pulled out from all 
touchy issues that were the bone of contention for decades. The list began with a 
promise of minority status to Aligarh Muslim University. The master stroke was 
aimed at winning over intelligentsia and opinion makers in the community by 
conceding to the long standing demand. Next was the recognition of Urdu as the 
second official language in Uttar Pradesh. The issue had been hanging fire for past 
rvvo decades and all non-Congress regimes had often done little. The party even 
promised quota for Muslim backwards, if its government was formed in the 
State." 
The Parr> had promised to offer suitable amendments in the State 
Education policy. All school children under the age of 14 studying in the Urdu 
Medium school would have access to free education as guaranteed under 93'^ '' 
Amendment to the constitution.'''* 
Also on the anvil was Waqf Vikas Nigam that would be authorized to get 
loans directly from the Vita Vikas Nigam. There was also a clever move to encash 
Muslim insecurity by an assurance to withdraw all cases of harassment against 
"Muslim brethren"." 
The mood was upbeat among party leaders who saw the community biting 
the bait in wake of its disenchantment with Samajwadi Party. Mulayam Singh 
Yadav's slip-ups like failure to issue fresh notification in Babri case to his inability 
to show tangible Muslim friendly socio-economic measures during the three and a 
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half-year rule, the leaders felt that those could be to the Congress's advantage in 
the forthcoming Assembly Elections of the State.^" 
The Uttar Pradesh electorate gave a decisive verdict in the 2007 Assembly 
Elections. The Congress party failed to revive its strength in this election. Why the 
party failed to win even 25 seats it got in 2002, even after fielding, Rahul Gandhi 
as Star Campaigner was the matter to ponder upon for the Party managers. 
Even since his dramatic plunge into electoral politics in 2004, Congress 
workers had potentially waited for Rahul Gandhi to take charge. It took him nearly 
three years to be drawn into the cauldron of caste equations that was the Uttar 
Pradesh Politics, which could confound the best of politicians. 
Rahul Gandhi undertook an extensive campaign from Ghaziabad to 
Gorakhpur, Congress leaders and workers began to take heart. His caravan rolled 
through cities, town, villages and the dusty plains of Uttar Pradesh in the 
sweltering heat. Congress leaders of the State began believing that the party would 
end up an> uhere b€t^ veen 35 and 40 seats. They started entertaining the thought 
that a re\ived Congress v.ould hold the key to the formation of the next 
go\emment in the State. Those dreams ended on May 11, 07 when BSP got 
absolute majorirv in the State. 
It was a difficult task for Rahul Gandhi to revive the party in the State. No 
one had a prescription for reviving the party, which hardly had an organization in 
U.P. He had to manage the contradictions of caste dominated politics as against his 
own philosophy of tapping the talent of youth to break the mould. Added to this 
was his lack of experience in handling electioneering. According to party sources, 
Rahul Gandhi and his election management team worked in splendid isolation, 
depending heavily on data fed into the ubiquitous laptop. They also unleashed a 
PR-exercise that triggered a media stampede generating news reports in consistent 
with the ground reality. 
In the early part when negotiations for seat- sharing began, several party 
leaders came way with the impression that Rahul Gandhi relied too much on the 
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computer. It may be a good idea to call up on the computer screen all relevant data 
on caste combinations of each and every Assembly seat and juxtapose them with 
results of previous elections with a tap of a finger. However, the decision had to be 
finally taken, based on political instincts. 
There were reports that he personally screened the CVs of candidates and 
interacted with them and clearly indicated that all energies should be focused on 50 
to 100 seats. It was a laudable concept: instead of dissipating energies by spraying 
the party's limited arsenal, the firepower was to be tiirgeted with greater precision. 
The 2007 Assembly Elections gave a clear verdict to BSP in the State. The 
elections were held for 403 seats. The BSP emerged victorious with 207 seats. The 
SP had secured 98 seats. Congress 22, BJP 50 and Others 25. 
The Congress party infact got in action rather late in the day. The 
combination of Rahul Gandhi's road show and campaign made little impact in the 
last round. 
(d) Decline of Hindutva wave and General Elections of 2004. 
The concept of Hindutva was evolved and elaborated in 1920 by V.D. 
Savarkar, a Pune Brahmin b> birth and belief in the Andaman prison at a time 
when Hindu-Muslim uniry was at its peak during the Khilafat Movement.^^ 
Hindutva as specifically formulated by Savarkar, referred to a combined 
history of the religious communities, which regarded Hindustan as their 
Pitrubhoomi (fatherland) and Punyabhoomi (holyland). He further clarified that the 
Muslims, Christians and Parsis cannot be included as members of Hindutva. These 
communities may consider Hindustan as their fatherland, however their respective 
holyland lie outside its confines. Sanatanism, Buddhism, Jainism, Virasaivism and 
Sikhism etc are included in Hindu faith. The history of these religious faiths 
together constitutes the history of Hindutva. Later he also became President of 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad.'* 
For the unity of Hindus V.D. Savarkar coined the term 'Hindutva'. 
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According to this ideology the Hindus not only form a religious community, but 
also a nation, 'Hindu Rashtra'7^ 
As a result in order to promote the Hindu religion and tradition few 
political parties and organizations were formed before Independence which exist 
till date in order to promote the ideology Hindutva. For example, the Ram Rajya 
Parishad founded in 1948, was the most orthodox Hindu Party. It was the first 
choice of the Princely States. The Party wished to return to the glorious days of 
Rama's rule, where everybody was contented, prosperous and religious. The party 
was against any reform of the caste ridden society. The Ram Rajya Parishad is no 
more on the political scenario of India.*'^  
Similarly the Hindu Mahasabaha began as a protest movement against the 
Muslim League. It grew under the shelter of the Congress party and in the 
beginning had many leaders of national repute within its fold, but later on it 
degenerated into a fanatic communal part}'. It also disappeared from the political 
scene. "' 
The Rashtri\a Swa>am Sevak Sangh was founded by Keshav Hedgewar in 
1925 ai Nagpur. It aimed to project itself as a model for a regenerated Hindu 
society. -After the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi on January 30, 1948 by 
Nathuram Vinayak Godse, who had been associated with both the Hindu 
Mahasabha and the RSS, these two Hindu organization were suppressed by the 
government. Later the bans were lifted and the RSS members actively engaged in 
politics.^^ 
A new party the Bhartiya Jana Sangh was founded in 1950, to give impetus 
to the Hindu ideology. The party was formed by Dr. Shyama Prashad Mukherjee. 
According to its ideology Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism were one and 
the same thing and who so ever tried to distinguish between the two was working 
against the interest of India's Nation building. 
The Jana Sangh shadowed the Political scenario since its inception however 
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the BJP emerged with the Janata Party and became one of its major constituents. 
The Janata Party was formally launched in April 1977. But soon cracks had 
emerged in the Janata Party as some members of the Janata Party objected Jana 
Sangh members continuing to remain members of the RSS allegedly a communal 
organization. Due to their relationship with RSS they were accused of being 
communal, traditionalist, non-progressive and outside the mainstream of regular 
politics. After Janata party's defeat in 1980s General Elections the members of 
Jana Sangh broke away from the Janata Party to form the Bhartiya Janata Party.^^ 
The most important aspect of the Bhartiya Janata Party's ideology is 
cultural nationalism. Since its inception it has never hidden its belief in a restricted 
notion of nationalism favouring religion as a primary mark of identity. Because of 
this BJP is described as reactionary, communal and Hindu revivalist Party.^'' 
The present spate of Hindu revivalism started with the intensed campaign 
of Bhartiya Janata Party to liberate Babri Masjid for Hindus.*^ 
The controversial site of the Babri Masjid was always the site of fury 
between the Hindus and the Muslims since the nineteenth century. It was sealed for 
decades b> the colonial authorities. In 1949, the members of the Hindu Mahasabha 
installed die idols of Ra.m inside the .Mosque. The Masjid was again sealed off for 
worship and a title suit uas filed by local Muslims, demanding the removal of the 
idols and reopening of the Masjid for worship. The case had been left pending at 
the local court in Faizabad since 1950. The reopening of the locks under the 
Congress government only ignited the communal frenzy in the country.*^ 
Another incident, which strengthened the Hindutava wave was the Shah 
Bano case in which the Congress favoured Supreme Court ruling. It was a victory 
to the Hindu Nationalists who regarded the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Law) as 
violating national unity and human rights. 
The BJP was against the Muslim Women Protection Bill (on Divorce 
1986) because it wanted that Uniform Civil Code should be the deciding factor for 
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all the citizens of India irrespective of religion, caste, creed and colour and not the 
Shariat law of the community. 
The Babri Masjid issue and the Shah Bano case were the two controversies, 
which came in handy for BJP during the Congress regime. Which ultimately 
resulted in electoral gains for the BJP As a result in 1989 General Elections it won 
88 seats out of 529 Lok Sabha seats. Whereas in 1984 General Elections it won 
only two seats out of 542 Lok Sabha seats. The Congress tally fell from 415 seats 
in 1984 General Elections to 197 seats in 1989 General Elections respectively. By 
the end of 1980s the Hindutva forces became confident that the Babri Masjid 
controversy would split all parties vertically. The VHP and the BJP had challenged 
all parties by saying that those who would support and work for the cause of Ram 
Temple at .A.\odhya would get the votes. The BJP was absolutely right in its saying 
and the part%'s fortune had shined on this controversy. It was observed that the 
Congress pam had lost its \ote bank because of the Ramjanambhoomi-Babri 
Masjid issue. The Muslims, as \'.ell as the Hindus deserted it and diverted towards 
other political parties. The .Muslims aligned themselves with the Janata Dal and 
later with the Samajwadi Part> whereas Hindus aligned themselves with the 
Bharti>a Janata Part\.^' 
In the 1989 General Elections, a coalition government of assorted parties 
was formed with V.P. Singh as the Prime Minister (Janata Dal). The BJP gave its 
support from out to the National Front government. The V.P. Singh government in 
a significant move took a decision in 1990, to implement the decade old Mandal 
Commission Report in order to provide reservations in jobs to the other backward 
classes (OBC's) and to the backward Muslim Community turmoiled the Indian 
Political scenario, because it was going to divide the Hindu community between 
the upper and lower castes which would have certainly destroyed the BJP's hard 
earned Hindu vote bank. The party saw an inherent danger in Mandalization of 
Indian Politics. To counter the political threat because of the Mandal report L.K. 
Advani the then BJP President launched the Rath Yatra from Somnath to Ayodhya 
for the construction of Ram Temple at Ayodhya. The BJP intensified the 
"ibid, p. 149. 
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Ramjanambhomi- Babri Masjid movement in order to counter the effect of the 
Mandal Commission Report. During the course of his Ram Rath Yatra, Advani 
was arrested in Bihar by the then Chief Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav. Following 
the Advani's arrest the BJP withdrew its support from the V.P. Singh's National 
Front government. The government was allegedly reduced to minority but 
V.P. Singh's was adamant to prove his majority in the House. In the show of 
strength trial he lost the vote of confidence.^ ^ This gave an opportunity to the 
breakaway Janata Dal (Socialist) leader Chandra Shekhar to form government at 
the centre with the support of Congress from out. Later the Congress Party also 
withdrew its support from the Chandra Shekhar government on the charges of 
surveillance at the residence of Rajiv Gandhi. 
The Hindutva wave was at its Peak during the 1991-1996 General 
Elections. The 1991 General Elections, in addition were held in the background of 
uncertain and unclear verdict of !989 that had led to an unstable political scenario. 
For the first time no party was in a majority in Lok Sabha nor the coalition 
government was successful (Janata Dal, BJP and Left Parties led National Front 
government with V.P. Singh as Prime Minister was a failure). At the same time 
people had become conscious of their caste and class positions. Therefore 
allegiance lo panies representing their interests, rather stability through one party 
or coalition v.a5 their concern. However, the shocking assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi on Ma> 21, 1991 shook the nation. Rajiv Gandhi's assassination was 
followed b\ a public sympath>' wave with the Congress and as a result in the 
elections the Congress party won 232 seats out of 543 whereas the BJP secured 
only 119 out of 511 seats contested. It could have secured more but due to the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi the BJP was reduced to position of second largest 
party after the Congress. The BJP's populist base was its ideological apparel of 
Hindutva nationalism, its organizational strength, its ruthless tactics and the 
electorates rejection of the Congress party because P.V. Narasimha Rao's 
government was marked by corruption and criminalization of Politics. No efforts 
were made towards party building, communalism and casteism were allowed to 
^ Ghosh, Partha S., "The Congress and the BJP Struggle for the Heartland" in Ajay K Mehra, D.D. 
Khanna, Gert, W. Kueck (ed.), Op. cil., pp. 231-232. 
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grow. Support to Congress also got a setback because of internal disturbance and 
instability generated by separatist movement (Jammu and Kashmir). Communal 
and sectarian violence between Hindus and Muslims were heightened with the 
demolition of Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 by the members of Hindu 
Parivar, including the BJP, VHP, RSS, Bajrang Dal and the Shiv Sena at Ayodhya. 
Culmination of all this caused peoples alienation from the Congress. 
The demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya enhanced electoral gains 
for the BJP. The 1996 General Elections were a major milestone in Indian Politics. 
The BJP had emerged as the largest party in the Lok Sabha but could not manage a 
clear majority. The National Front-Left front parties and some of the regional 
parties formed the 14 party United Front coalitions, with Congress support from 
out. It was a move of Congress Party to keep the BJP away from power. The 
United Front was able to form a minority government under Deve Gowda, which 
ruled until April 1997. The United Front government soon collapsed when the 
Congress part\ u ithdrew its support from Jt. 
The then Congress President Sita Ram Kesri withdrew its support from I.K. 
Gujral government in November 1997. The I.K. Gujral government was installed 
\>.hen the then Congress President Sita Ram Kesri refused to support the H.D. Deve 
Gowda government. According to Sita Ram Kesri H.D. Deve Gowda was an 
incumbent Prime Minister and must be removed from his post. The Congress 
withdrew its support from Gujral government when he refused to oblige congress 
by dismissing the State government of Uttar Pradesh under the Chief Minister of 
Kalyan Singh. Another reason for his resignation was that the then Chief Minister 
Laloo Prasad Yadav (Bihar) was charge sheeted in the fodder scan and the Prime 
Minister I.K.Gujral having earlier been obliged with a Rajya Sabha by Yadav, 
could not take a decision against him. Sensing its bleak position if new elections 
were conducted. Congress forced the opposition parties to support a Congress's 
minority government. The congress failed to form its government at the centre and 
as a result 1998 General Elections were held. 
In 1998 General Elections BJP led National Democratic Alliance won 252 
89 Ibid. p. 235. 
240 
out of 543 seats. BJP got 180 seats. The Congress won 141 out of 543 seats and 
Congress lead alliance won 166 seats. The National Front- Left Front lost roughly 
half of its seats and votes. The Front got 96 seats. Thus there was a movement 
towards a bi-polar system in which the Congress and the BJP formed the two 
poles.^ ^ 
The National Democratic Alliance led by BJP was in power till April 1999. 
The AIADMK withdrew its support from the coalition government primarily on 
the basis of personality clash. AIADMK had 27 MP's in Lok Sabha. Though 
National Conference came forward for rescue of BJP led coalition's but it lost 
confidence vote in the Lok Sabha by a margin of just one vote. 
The 1999 General elections for the BJP and the Congress were no- issue 
elections. The BJP- led NDA fonned the government at the centre for full term for 
the first time. 
In between the 1998-1999 General Elections the vicious issue of temple 
construction at Ayodhya was tackled with care due to the alliance of BJP with 
political parties, which were not interested in any communal frenzy. Infact the 
BJP's Hindurva wave was in slow motion because of the etiquette of coalition 
politics. 
The Hindutva wave went further low when in 2004 General Elections BJP 
was defeated by the secular forces. In early 2004, the BJP leaders were certain that 
the NDA would win the General Elections and Atal Bihari Vajpayee would 
continue as the Prime Minister of India. Before the General Elections (2004) were 
held, the Bhartiya Janata Part>' was in a Jubilant mood when it won three State 
Assembly Polls (Rajasthan, Chattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh). It firmed their faith 
that the Congress was no longer a serious threat to the ruling NDA anywhere in the 
country. It was for the first time that the BJP refrained itself from raising 
controversial issues like the Ram temple. Article 370, or the Uniform Civil Code. 
But the party agreed to project only those candidates as Chief Mnister who were 
associated with hardcore 'Hindutva' ideology.'' 
'*' Narang, A. S., Op. cil., p. 463. 
" India Today, May 24, 2004, p. 32. 
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The then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his team were 
determined to create a political history by winning elections thrice in a row. As a 
strategy to win election the then Finance Minister Jaswant Singh was asked to 
consolidate the 'Feel Good Factor' and 'India Shinning' by presenting a budget 
that would boost the economy. This over confident attitude amounted to sheer 
arrogance, retrospectively appeared as one of the reasons for the BJP's defeat. The 
BJP gained 138 seats out of 354 and the Congress won 145 out of 414 seats 
contested during 2004 General Elections.'^ 
The 2004 General Elections were held without the shadow of major 
national crisis. It was thus difficult to unleash the energies of Hindutva. Ayodhya 
issue could have mobilized the Hindutva Politics but the BJP was silent because it 
was their government, which was in power at centre for five years and what they 
had done to resolve it could have become a difficult question to answer. 
The BJP lost because it neglected the Hindutva concept. None of the 
Hindutva themes- including the building of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya was a key 
issue throughout the (2004) General Elections campaign. The defeat of the BJP 
candidates in the constituencies of Ayodhya, Varanasi and Mathura reflected the 
diminishing influence of Hindu Nationalism over the voters (electorates). In those 
three constituencies the BJP had won repeatedly during the 1990s. In Uttar 
Pradesh, the BJP State President Vinay Katiyar (Ayodhya) and former Union 
minister of State for Home Affairs Swami Chinmayanand (Varanasi) also lost their 
Parliamentary seats. They were the main contenders for the demand of building a 
Ram Temple at Ayodhya.'^  
In the 2004 General Elections the defeat of BJP was considered by most 
constituents of the Sangh Parivar as the rejection of moderate line of conduct 
advocated by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. According to General Secretary of the VHP 
Praveen Togadia, "the Bhartiya Janata Party betrayed the Hindus. It has left its 
core ideology of Hindutva and thus voted out of power. For votes it tied up with 
the Jehadis"''' The RSS spokeperson Ram Madhav had said almost the same thing. 
^ Ibid, p. 3]. 
' ' Adeney, Katharine, Op. cil., p. 244. 
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He admitted, "there was a perception over four to five years that there had been 
dilution of the Hindutva ideology". That is why the RSS wanted the BJP to return 
to a Hindutva led programme in order to capture expectation of the people. 
The coalition politics restrained the BJP to support the Hindutva ideology 
because the rules of the coalition were so implied that the BJP's agenda got 
diluted. Reason was that the fonner socialists (Samata Party) and other self-
proclaimed secularists could not support the Hindutva oriented objectives, such as 
the building of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya, the proposed abolition of Article 370 of 
the constitution regarding the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir and the calls for 
the introduction of a uniform civil code. At the time of formation of National 
Democratic Alliance the BJP had put these issues on the back burner. For this it 
had taken approval from R.S.S. However after BJP's defeat in 2004 General 
Elections the RSS made it clear that it wanted the BJP to return to its core ideology 
of Hindutva, whereas on the other hand several constituents of the NDA had strong 
objection to this approach. 
In the Elections the Congress and its allies had secured 222 seats whereas 
BJP's National Democratic Alliance could win 189 seats. As a result the Congress 
and its allies formed the coalition government with the support of Left Parties 
under the banner of United Progressive Alliance at the centre. 
The coalition partners of the BJP who swallowed the Gujarat's Godhra 
massaCTC without demurring- began to worry about their Muslim votes. They also 
grew concerned about return of BJP to a more aggressive Hindu Nationalist move. 
For instance, soon after the NDA's defeat, the Janata Dal (United) informed the 
BJP tfiat it would leave the coalition if the party returned openly to espouse 
Hindutva issue. After the General Elections of 2004, the National Executive 
Committee of the JD (U) issued a resolution to this effect which declared that "we 
joined the National Democratic Alliance only after three controversial issues- i.e. 
construction of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya, Article 370 and the Uniform Civil 
Code were removed from the agenda of the NDA. If any effort is now made to 
revive those issues, we shall have to take another road"'^. Even TDP also adopted 
'^ Ibid. p. 225. 
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a similar line of conduct that if the BJP chose to adopt the communal agenda, we 
would severe ties with it. 
After debacle in the General Elections of 2004, the BJP seemed to be 
virtually divided between the moderates and the radicals. The party projected Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee as the moderate face of the BJP, when it was in need of a widely 
acceptable leader for constituting coalitions. The Sangh Parivar expected the BJP 
to remain firm on Hindutva and propagate its ideology but Vajpayee stressed to 
keep the NDA intact. The Sangh Parivar was aware that any return to a radical 
brand of Hindu Nationalist politics by the BJP would alienate its allies and 
postpone the party's return to power. 
The defeat of the BJP in the 2004 General Elections placed the party at the 
crossroads. The party received a serious setback in terms of seat. It reduced from 
182 to 138 parliamentary seats, despite the fact that in terms of share of the vote 
the BJP did better than the Congress. Its dream of ruling India as a single largest 
part}' and of installing a Hindutva Raj was shattered. This electoral set back has put 
an end to its twenty years of continuous electoral gains. 
The main reason attributed by the BJP for its defeat was its failure to 
implement fully the Hindutva agenda. It lost primarily due to its ignorance to the 
interests of the Hindus by marginalizing the Ramjambhoomi Movement.^ ^ Among 
several issues of policy and governance that agitated the electorates, two were of 
critical significance. First, the communalization of the State and Society that was 
wimessed during the tenure of the NDA government. Second, the NDA rule 
witnessed an unprecedented surrender of the Indian economy to the interests of the 
multinational capital. TTierefore, the nature of the campaign was so designed to by 
pass these crucial issues and to focus on the unreal and uncritical slogans such as 
'India Shining' and 'Feel Good Factors' were invented which it was hoped would 
arouse the patriotic pride of the people, but the life of common man was not 
shinning any where nor did he have any thing to feel good about. 
In this regard, Advani's Bharat Uday Yatra was a great distraction. His 
Rath Yatra was not at all rewarded by the people. Moreover the allies of the BJP 
^ India Today, May 24, 2004. 
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turned out to be the real antagonists. The DMK under Karunanidhi in 2004 left the 
NDA and delivered all the 39 seats to Sonia Gandhi. In 1999, when Karunanidhi and 
Murasoli Maran were manhandled by the Tamil Nadu police, the centre did not 
advice any strategy to punish the Jayalalitha government. Similarly Vaiko was 
another tainted picture for NDA (arrested under TADA for unsocial activities).^ ^ 
All those follies committed by the BJP resulted in its decline and the 
Hindutva wave was no more an effective tool to gain electoral Power. 
''Ibid. 
245 
CONCLUSION 
CONCLUSION 
Religion has always occupied a very important place in Indian politics 
since times immorial. Religion has played an important role in political identities, 
crystallization and mobilization. Tlie politicization of religion resulted in the 
communalization of politics. 
During the British rule, religion was used for political purposes in more 
subtle ways both by the rulers as well as by the leaders of the National Liberation 
Movement. Since independence this interplay had acquired a still newer form and 
various political parties found it more convenient to mobilize the support in their 
electoral battles with the help of religious factors. 
It were the Britishers who introduced the policy of divide and rule in India 
in order to strengthen their base in the country. In the long run this policy also had 
resulted in the partition of the country and creation of Pakistan. This policy was 
also successful in widening the gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims. 
Even the leaders of the Indian National Movement like Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak and later Mahatma Gandhi also found it more convenient to mobilize mass 
support against the British rule by using religion. They also used religious slogans 
and s\mbols in this regard. With the blessing of the British government the 
.Muslims, cultural organizations increased their religious activities. The net result 
of these British policies was that an element of Hindu - Muslim conflict gradually 
shadowed the National .Movement. The British government attempted to pitch the 
Muslim League against the Congress, which for all political purposes amounted to 
pitching the Muslim community against the Hindus. During the whole British rule 
religion and politics continued to be closely linked. Religion was used much more 
to serve political interests than the use of politics of adhieve religious objectives. 
India witnessed a great blood bath in 1947 when it got divided apparently 
on religious lines. Many people were slaughtered at the time. Since then on 
account of communal hatred, communal riots have kept on taking place between 
Hindus and Muslims taking thousands of innocent lives. 
The close affinity between religion and politics continued even after 1947. 
Infact this interplay was further strengthened by the existence of religion based 
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political parties. The number of such parties continued to increase with the passage 
of time. Such parties freely made use of religion for political ends. They did not 
subscribe to secular form of politics, Hindu Maha Sabha, Ram Rajya Parishad, 
Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh, Jana Sangh and now BJP all sought to mobilize 
political support by involving the religious sentiments of Hindus. These Parties 
adopted policies that were symbolically important to its Hindu constituency: 
advocacy of Hindi language and Ayurvedic medicine, an aggressive stance on 
defence including the acquisition of nuclear capability and the protection of the 
cow. Four fundamentals "guided the party: one country, one nation, one culture 
and the rule of law". 
Similarly the Indian Union Muslim League, Jammat-e-Islami, the 
Majlis-e-Ittihat ul-Muslimeen likewise exploited the religious sentiments of 
Muslims. Those parties took on themselves the responsibility of protecting and 
defending Muslim community from the alleged tyranny of the Hindu majority. 
Those parties often opposed the secular measures by invoking imaginary fears in 
the minds of Indian .Muslims, who had some apprehensions of Hindu dominance. 
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the new liberal-Left 
elites embraced Secularism as an article of faith and in the 1950s there was 
actually a notable subsidence of the communal forces in the country. But after 
Nehru's death in 1964, the communal monster once again raised its ugly head and 
engulfed not only the Hindus and Muslims but the Sikh community as well. 
The political landscape changed fundamentally after the Fourth General 
Elections in 1967. Inflation and severe scarcities caused by drought and the wars of 
1962 and 1965, the threat of famine and consequent mass agitations infact 
combined to produce a certain intensity in the atmosphere of the 1967 Elections. 
The 1967 General Elections results were stunning. The Congress failed to secure 
majority in eight States and its majority at the centre was reduced to a narrow 
margin of 54 percent of the seats. These results marked the end of one-party 
dominance. After the reverses of 1967, Congress began to centralize itself In an 
attempt to reform and strengthen the Congress party when Indira Gandhi took 
certain measures but that caused resentment in the central leadership and split in 
the party in 1969. After split in the party in 1969, Mrs Gandhi remodelled the party 
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as a tool to serve her political ends. Centralization of power in the hands of Mrs. 
Gandhi meant that State Party Unit with their organizations in disarray could 
neither represent local interests nor could implement national policies. Congress 
base gradually became narrower and narrower. No elections within the party were 
held between 1972-1991. 
The most important developments on the political and parliamentary scene 
in India during the period (1967-74) were the phenomenon of defections and party 
splits. The fifth General Elections held in 1971 saw the return of the Congress to 
its dominant position, with more than a two-third majority in the State. Although 
Indira Gandhi succeeded on the face of things in re-establishing the overwhelming 
dominance of the Congress in the country and virtually in all the States. By 1972, 
she knew very well that dominance was not secure in the States. Besides that 
Congress rule at the centre was always under threat because of the fear of split in 
the party of the States in the union. 
The Emergency period gave a sharp turn to Indian politics setting a new 
frenzied pace to events and had initiated an entirely new style of government in the 
countr>- with different norms and values. While a Proclaimation of Emergency 
issued earlier in December 1971 following the Pakistan aggression was already in 
operation, a fresh proclaimation was issued by the President of India on June 25, 
1975 on grounds of threatened internal disturbance. This was the first time since 
Independence that a State of Emergency was declared on the ground of a threat to 
national security from internal disturbance. 
The Allahabad High Court judgment will go down as a landmark in Indian 
history. The election petition filed by Raj Narain against Indira Gandhi resulted on 
June 12, 1975 in her disenfranchisement for six years. She was held guilty of 
corrupt practices under section 123(7) of the Representation of People Act under 
two counts: obtaining assistance of government officials for constructing rostrums 
and supplying power for loudspeaker at the meetings addressed by Mrs. Gandhi in 
Rae Bareilly on February 1 and February 25, 1971 and obtaining and procuring 
assistance of Yashpal Kapoor (an OSD Prime Minister's Office) during the period 
from January 7, 1971 to January 24, 1971 in furtherance of Indira Gandhi's 
election prospects. As a result Emergency was declared in the country by the 
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President of India Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad on the night of June 25-26-1975. 
Although the imposition of the Emergency continued her in power 
temporarily, but public reactions to various excesses committed by her government 
caused an unprecedented revulsion against Congress rule in North India that 
brought the Congress down and out of power in Delhi for the first time since 
Independence. The fifth Lok Sabha left behind the bitter memories of Emergency 
legislation, administrative excesses and political isolation of Indira Gandhi. In the 
aftermath of the Emergency, the sixth Genera! Elections in 1977 were held. The 
most important development during the period immediately preceding the 1977 
polls was the formation of Janata Party by Congress (0), BLD, Jana Sangh and the 
Socialist Party. The Elections were held for 542 Seats. The Congress had secured 
154 seats. Congress (o) 3, Janata Party 295, CPI-7 and CPI (M) 22 seats 
respectively. The Congress Party was badly battered. It failed to get a single seat in 
Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. Congress's 
thirty-year hegemony over India's national government and federal system was 
broken when Janata government took office in Delhi and in nine States of the 
Union. 
Ho\ve\er, serious fissures soon had emerged between the leaders and 
diverse groups who constituted Janata Party. Actually, the electoral outcome of the 
1977 was less a victory for the Janata Party's leadership, ideology or policies, than 
it was a protest vote against Congress's Emergency regime. One of the causes of 
the Janata Party's collapse was the controversy over the split loyalty of the BJS 
faction. The point of contention was whether a Janata Party member could 
simultaneously remain loyal to the RSS. The BJS was revived in April 1980 under 
a new banner called the Bhartiya Janata Party. In order to enlarge its mass appeal 
the party emphasized the Gandhian concept of development. 
The ascendancy of the Congress during 1980s was largely attributable to 
the growing importance of religion in Indian politics. The 1980s witnessed an 
unprecedented intensification of religious fervour, an exacerbation of sectarian 
feuds and an increased polarization of Indian society not along class lines, but on 
purely communal grounds. The 1980s was marked by politicization of religion in 
India. The Khalistan movement with its thrust on Sikhism and with active support 
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from Pakistan, the Assam agitation behind which was the issue of unauthorized 
Muslim settlers from Bangladesh, the massive Ekatmata Yagna, the assassination 
of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh body guards and the resultant anti-Sikh riots in Delhi, 
all these happenings in the first half of the 1980s were clear indication of this 
trend. 
The 1984 General Elections were marked by the grim tragedy of the 
assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The 1984 elections gave a 
three-fourth majority to the Congress, which the party did not command even 
during Nehru's time. The elections were held for 542 seats. Congress had secured 
415, Congress (S) 5, Janata Party 10, BJP-2 CPI 6, CPM 22, Lok Dal 3, Telugu 
Desam 30. The Congress had the vote share of 51 percent in 1984. During 1984 
General Elections there was the widespread perception that national unity was in 
danger. TTiis fear was crystallized due to the trauma of the assassination that was 
relentlessly exploited by the Congress. 
The BJP did not take much time to realize that the illusory 'Hindu vote' 
that it unsuccessflilly chased for decades had ultimately materialized. Thus BJP 
changed its philosophy of Gandhian socialism to the ideology of Hindutva. Its 
politics of religion-based mobilization, underlied its meteoric rise by the mid 1980s 
The resurrection of Hindu communal activities, extended periods of bloody 
Hindu-Muslim rioting, a growing feeling among urban based Muslim professional 
and service classes that their economic and educational interests had been 
systematically neglected by successive Congress governments fomented a sense of 
alienation not only among them but also in a large section of Muslims. Their anger 
poured out when the Supreme Court upheld the maintenance order under section 
125 of the Indian Penal Code of granting maintenance to Shah Bano, a Muslim 
divorcee from Indore. The judgment created a furore among Muslims and the arch 
conservative Muslims took to streets in protest. The Muslim Personal Law Board 
pressed hard for the annulment of the judgment. Rajiv Gandhi's government gave 
in and passed Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in 1986. The 
BJP projected the decision of the Rajiv Gandhi government (Muslim Women 
Protection of Rights on Divorce Act 1986) to undo the Supreme Court verdict in 
favour of the traditionalist Muslims as a retrograde step to appease the Muslims. 
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BJP took the opportunity to harp on the necessity of a Uniform Civil Code as a 
progressive move for the social integration of the nation. 
The reopening of locks of Babri Masjid during Rajiv Gandhi regime was 
another controversy that became perhaps the deadliest communal flash point in 
post- Independent India. The locks of the Masjid were open in order to appease the 
Majority community and to consolidate its (Congress) votebank which was drifting 
towards the BJP. On the eve of the 1989 General Elections, the Rajiv Gandhi 
government allowed the Shiianyas ceremony of the Ram temple on the disputed 
territory at Ayodhya against the ruling of a special bench of Allahabad High Court. 
He promised to build a 'Ram Rajya' if re-elected. However, those attempts playing 
to the Hindu gallery did not pay off that time and the party was voted out of power 
in 1989 General Elections. 
Infact the BJP was the ultimate winner in encashing the temple 
controversy. The BJP's accent on Hindutva paid its dividends at the cost of 
Congress was visible in the electoral results. From two parliamentary seats and 7.5 
percent votes in 1984, it improved its performance to 89 seats and 11.5 percent 
votes in 1989. The Congress tally fell from 415 seats and 48 percent votes to 197 
seats and 39.5 percent votes, respectively. The BJP's ideology based on Hindu 
nationalism and patriotism along with mobilizing the people's sentiment on 
religion proved effective in the 1989 and 1991 General Elections. 
The late 1980's infact from 1989 onwards there was the breakdown of the 
Congress from power both at the Centre as well as in the States. The Congress 
system had collapsed largely due to its internal weaknesses that gradually loomed 
over. Another cause of its collapse seemingly was its compromise with the 
communal forces. 
Following the 1989 General Elections, a coalition government was formed 
with V.P. Singh as the Prime Minister. It was named as the National Front which 
was a coalition of diverse parties. (The National Front government formation at the 
centre marked the era of coalition politics in India. The regional parties also played 
a very important role in its formation, i.e. Telugu Desam Party, Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (DMK) and Assam Gana Parishad). On December 2, 1989 V.P. Singh 
had become Prime Minister of country with the external support of BJP and the 
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Left Parties. 
The Indian political scenario had turmoiled once again in August 1990 with 
the V.P. Singh's government decision to implement the decade old Mandal 
Commission Report to provide reservations in jobs to the Other Backward Classes, 
(OBC). With the acceptance of the Mandal recommendations, submitted to the 
Government of India in 1980, the V.P. Singh's led National Front government 
brought about radical change in India's social fabric. The BJP was hit hardest by 
the Mandal Report as it destroyed its ploy of uniting all Hindus under saffron 
emblem. The Mandal Commission Report posed a formidable challenge to the 
BJP's politics of Hindutva. The Proponents of Mandal politics attached primacy to 
caste identity in politics which had pitted the lower castes against the upper and 
forward castes on the question of social justice. The BJP could not endorse this 
brand of politics which created a fissure in the Hindu community. Yet the Party 
could ill afford to ignore the rising political strength of the backwards and Dalits 
and aspired to become an all India major force. It had to be accommodative 
towards these social categories. 
To counter the political threat, in August 1990, L.K. Advani decided to 
launch his so-called Ram Rath Yatra from Somnath to Ayodhya. The march was 
supposed to reach Ayodhya on October 30, 1990 to start the construction work for 
the Ram temple at the Masjid site. 
The march was aborted when L.K. Advani was arrested in Bihar by the 
Laloo Prasad government. Following his arrest, the BJP withdrew its support to the 
V.P. Singh government which reduced his government to minority. However, he 
refijsed to resign and instead offered to prove his majority on the floor of the 
House. In the show of strength trial, he failed to prove his majority and tendered 
his resignation. The interim government was formed by Chandra Shekhar, the 
leader of breakaway Janata Dal (Socialist) faction with the support of the 
Congress. He was totally dependent on Congress for his government's survival. In 
march 1991, Chandra Shekhar had resigned citing inability to function as Prime 
Minister and advised the President to call fresh elections. 
Although the Mandal formula ensuring 27% reservation in central 
government's jobs for the OBC's appeared revolutionary, the Front's decision was 
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probably prompted by the following factors showing the extent to which political 
expediency conditioned the decision: 
a) Populist vote catching device as the OBC's constituted the majority of 
the Indian population. 
b) A move to upstage the Haryana leader, Devi Lai who was threatening 
the V.P. Singh led coalition with rural urban polarization. 
c) To shift the focus from the Ramjanambhoomi issue that had created a 
solid votebank for the BJP especially after the L.K. Advani led Ram 
Rath Yatra. 
d) Moreover reservation was such an issue that no party could dare oppose 
the National Front government because OBC's constituted around 52 
percent of the total population. 
When V.P. Singh government had projected the Mandal issue as a step 
fonvard in achieving the goals of social justice for the Indian Dalits, it was hotly 
contested by its opponents on the basis of their argument that the V.P.Singh had 
fiirthered caste and sectarian cleavages in the society. India witnessed a big 
political debate in the 1990s around the policy of caste based reservations, its 
supporters and opponents occupied the center-stage of Indian politics during the 
1990s. Pure Dalit or Bahujan Samaj Parties and leaders came to occupy an 
important space in the democratic politics of the 1990s. The growth of the 
Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party during Mandal upsurge was very 
important. Infact their growth in Uttar Pradesh since 1990s symbolized the process 
of exclusivist political formations catering respectively to the Dalits and the 
Yadavs. The Bahujan Samaj Party was formed in December 1984 by Late Kanshi 
Ram. The Bahujan or the majority consisted of the Backward Castes, Scheduled 
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs or in other words, "all 
those not included in the three upper Hindu castes. The BSP rose to prominence 
during 1990s in the State. 
The Ramjanambhoomi Movement and the L.K. Advani's Ram Rath Yatra 
in 1990 heightened the religious schism across India and gave BJP a new 
ideological belligerence, which it had sustained since then. In the 1991 General 
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Elections the BJP had emerged as the second largest party and L.K. Advani 
became the leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha. The elections were held for 
511 seats. The BJP bagged 120 seats, Congress 227, Janata Dal 56, CPM 35, CPI 
13 seats respectively. Earlier BJP's vote were concentrated in only six States -
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi and Himachal Pradesh. 
The year 1991 had given it a foothold in Uttar Pradesh. There was hardly any 
doubt that this gain was largely on account of the Ram Temple agitation and the 
tirade against the so-called 'minorityism'. 
During 1990's the State (Uttar Pradesh) had witnessed the upsurge of 
communalism during the Ramjanambhoomi-Babri Masjid issue. After the 1991 
Assembly Elections, the BJP formed government with Kalyan Singh as the Chief 
Minister of the State. Taking advantage of the situation that BJP ruled Uttar 
Pradesh, the party brought the temple controversy to a head. On December 6, 1992 
the Babri Masjid was demolished by the mobs belonging to the Hindutva Parivar. 
The demolition led to worst communal turmoil in the country, never witnessed 
since Independence. 
The Babri Masjid demolition marked the peak of the BJP's militant 
activism. L.K. Advani immediately after the demolition had resigned from the post 
of the leader of Opposition in the Parliament. Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Kalyan 
Singji owing responsibility of the demolition too resigned from his post. As a result 
the President Rule was imposed in Uttar Pradesh. Three days later; L.K. Advani, 
M.M. JoshL, Uma Bharti, Sadhvi Rithambara, Ashok Singhal and Vinay Katiyar 
were arrested on the charges of inciting communal violence. On December 15, 
1992 the BJP led governments in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal 
Pradesh were also dismissed on the charges that government of those States could 
not be carried on in accordance with the provision of the constitution. 
The Justice Liberahan Commission was set-up on December 16, 1992 to 
inquire into the causes of demolition of the Mosque, the forces and events that led 
to demolition. It was stipulated that the commission would complete the inquiry 
within six months. However the commission failed to nail the culprits. 
After the demolition of the Babri Masjid the Hindutva forces had become 
not only acceptable in the political process but also had become a strong contender 
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for political power and that ultimately gave rise to communalism. The 
communalism had become one of the most intractable in terms of political solution 
because leaders of religious minorities, who adopted the communal path had social 
cultural, economic and political ambitions. Communalism unfortunately became an 
integral part of social political life in India. 
The demolition of the Babri Masjid brought disrepute to the Congress 
party. The Muslim community in disgust had pledged that it would never vote for 
Congress. As a result the Congress base got badly eroded in Uttar Pradesh. From 
such developments the real gainers were the Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan 
Samaj Party. 
The erosion of Congress party's power also offered an opportunity to the 
Hindu revivalists particularly the BJP and the Sangh Parivar and its ideological and 
political members like RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal to expand their base. 
In the 1996 General Elections the Congress party was defeated badly. Its 
strength in Parliament was reduced to 136 seats. The BJP with its tally of 161 seats 
had emerged as the single largest party. In terms of popular votes, it registered a 
swing of 1.2 percent in its favour as compared to 1991 General Elections. In 1991, 
it had received 20.1 percent votes, and in 1996 it got 21,34 percent of votes. 
If the 1980's was a decade that witnessed the breakdown of the Congress 
party both at the centre and in the States, then 1990's was marked by the fragility 
of coalition governments at the centre and in the States, and the shifting of political 
loyalties of the parties. The collapse of the Congress Party brought an end of the 
era of one party dominance at the centre and in States. The decline of the highly 
centralized Congress Party had resulted in the decentring of politics and had 
shifted its center of gravity from New Delhi to the States. 
Three General Elections in quick succession during the period between 
1996 and 1999 had set a new trend with the installation of coalition government at 
the centre. The drive of the all India parties to solicit the co-operation of regional 
parties was another significant development that reinforced the importance of 
coalition as the only device to consolidate the apparent disparate groups. 
In the 1996 General Elections the BJP had won 161 seats out of 543 Lok 
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Sabha seats. The Congress had secured 140, CPM 32, CPI 12, Janata Party/ Janata 
Dal 46. Although BJP emerged as the single largest party in Lok Sabha but it 
lacked the required majority to sustain its dominance in the House. As a result the 
then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee resigned after 13 days when he lost the 
vote of confidence. 
The downfall of BJP's government compelled Left Parties, Janata Dal, 
Samajwadi Party and several regional parties like Telugu Desam Party (TDP), 
DMK, Tamil Manila Congress and Assam Gana Parishad to form United Front. 
The H.D. Deve Gowda led United Front had to rely on the Congress for survival 
because it lacked adequate majority to defend its existence in Parliament. Later 
H.D. Deve Gowda was asked by the Congress to quit from the post and in his place 
l.K. Gujral was installed as the Prime Minister of India. However constant tussel 
on the leadership issue and undue interference by the regional parties led to the 
collapse of the United Front. 
The uncertain political phase continued till 1998. After the 1998 General 
Elections although the BJP formed its government with the coalition of 24 political 
panics (National Democratic Alliance). The BJP government ruled the centre for 
13 months however the government collapsed when J. Jayalalitha of AlADMK 
with her 27 MP's withdrew support from the Vajpayee government. Later in the 
show of strength trial Vajpayee government was voted out of power. After the 
1999 General Elections the BJP formed its government with the help of coalition 
partners (National Democratic Alliance). This government completed its full term. 
For the first time in post-independent India, Hindu nationalists were in a 
position to rule the country between 1998 and 2004. The BJP had been voted to 
power to make a change that was after decades of Congress rule and two-years rule 
of the Third Front. 
The real gift BJP gave to India was political stability through setting up of a 
coalition pattern. Between 1989 and 1999, India had faced five General Elections 
and witnessed six Prime Ministers. Obiviously, the old Congress system had gone 
and nothing had replaced it. The BJP had displayed remarkable flexibility by 
admitting that it would not be in a position to govern India alone and that it would 
have to dilute its ideology to make alliances. Tlie creation of NDA in 1998 would 
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perhaps turn out to be a real milestone in Indian Politics. 
The BJP as a liberal gesture made three major concessions by putting 
Ayodhya issue, Article 370 and a Uniform Civil Code on the back burner. As a 
result, the NDA was in a position to prepare a common election manifesto in 1999 
and the Vajpayee government lasted for its full tenure five years, something a non-
Congress government had never achieved so far. The BJP's Hindutva was in slow 
motion because of the etiquette of coalition politics. 
Similarly in Uttar Pradesh also there was political uncertainty from 1993 
onwards. In 1993 Assembly Elections the BJP had emerged as the largest party but 
lacked majority support and as a result the government was formed by a coalition 
of Samajwadi Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party. Congress gave an external 
support to the coalition. Mulayam Singh Yadav was sworn in as the Chief Minister 
of the State. In a House of 425 seats the SP commanded 109 seats, BSP 67, BJP 
176, Janata Dal 27, Congress 28, Left 4 and others 10. The SP-BSP alliance was 
the only pre-electoral alliances in any Assembly elections since 1993. The alliance 
had once again prevented the BJP from coming to power. However, this coalition 
had collapsed in June 1995. The SP-BSP coalition heralded the eclipse of Mandal 
Politics, the unification of the lower castes to challenge the traditional upper caste 
hegemony. 
After the collapse of SP-BSP alliance, Mayawati allied with the BJP in 
1995 and became the first Dalit Women Chief Minister of the State. In October 
1995, BJP withdrew its support from Mayawati causing collapse of her 
government. 
In the 1996 Assembly Elections, the BJP had secured 174 seats, Samajwadi 
Party 110 seats, BSP 67 seats. The Congress gave its worst performance by 
winning just 33 of the 126 seats it had contested. Others had secured 41 seats. In 
the elections, no party got an absolute majority. The BJP and BSP had agreed on 
six monthly rotational arrangement. According to it, for the first six months 
Mayawati would rule and the other six month would be ruled by BJP. As a result 
Mayawati was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the State. The BJP-BSP alliance 
aimed to prevent the SP from reaching a dominant position in the overall party 
system. The BJP-BSP alliance met an end in 1997. Mayawati refused to step down 
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in rotational arrangement. As a result BJP broke its alliance with BSP and caused 
defection within the BSP and succeeded in forming its government. As a result 
Kalyan Singh took over as the Chief Minister of the State. With the help of Rajnath 
Singh, Kalyan Singh managed to split the BSP and other parties in order to 
strengthen his party's position in the State Assembly. 
The 'Pro-OBC policies' of Kalyan Singh government led to increased heart 
burning and power struggle between various State level leaders because of caste 
factors and most notably among them were Kalraj Mishra, Lalji Tandon and 
Rajnath Singh. The leadership felt that upper caste groups such as Brahmins, 
Thakurs and Bania's were increasingly getting alienated from the BJP because of 
the pro-backward actions of Kalyan Singh. The upper caste lobby demanded the 
removal of Kalyan Singh as the Chief Minister of the State. Who as a result was 
replaced by Ram Prakash Gupta due to his inability to govern. Ram Prakash Gupta 
too was replaced by Rajnath Singh, who continued in office till 2002 Assembly 
Elections. 
Due to the inner tussel within the BJP, the party had suffered badly in the 
1998 and 1999 General Elections in the State. The BJP got 29 seats out of 85 in 
1999 and 57 seats in 1998 Lok Sabha Elections. The significant loss of the BJP in 
Uttar Pradesh in the 1999 General Elections (30 seats) compelled the central 
leadership to expel Kalyan Singh for his anti-party activities. His suspension was 
revoked by the party in 2002 Assembly Elections where the party had managed 
only 83 seats. In 2002 Assembly Elections the BSP formed its government with the 
help of BJP. The BSP-BJP alliance collapsed due to the Taj Corridor Project 
controversy where Mayawati was booked for corruption charges. The ouster of 
Mayawati led Mulayam Singh Yadav to form his government with the support of 
BJP and BSP defectors. 
The uncertain political phase ended when in May 2007 Assembly Elections 
BSP emerged as the Single Largest Party in the State. The BSP had secured 207 
seats out of 403 Assembly seats, SP 98, BJP 50, Congress 22 and others secured 25 
seats respectively. 
The coalition era in Uttar Pradesh ended with the emergence of BSP as the 
single largest party in the State. The BSP applied clever tactics in winning the 
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elections it allied with the upper castes (Brahmins) in the State. The BSP Supremo 
had shed her image as Dalit's leader only and aligned with upper castes against 
whom her party had in the past carried out a consistent campaign. Casting aside her 
'anti-Manuvadi' stance her pet theme against the upper castes, Mayawati ensured 
substantial number of tickets to Brahmin's and also to others while keeping her 
Dalit vote bank intact. The BJP failed to ally with upper castes and its appeal of 
Hindutva also failed to enthusiase the masses. 
The Hindutva wave had gone low when in 2004 General Elections the BJP 
was defeated by the Secular forces. In early 2004, the BJP leaders were certain that 
the NDA would win the General Elections and Atal Bihari Vajpayee would 
continue as the Prime Minister of India. Before the General Election (2004) were 
held the Bhartiya Janata Party was in a jubilant mood. When it won three State 
Assembly Polls i.e. Rajasthan,Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh, it firmed its faith 
that the Congress was no longer, a serious threat to the ruling NDA anywhere in 
the country. 
The then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his team were 
determined to create a political history by winning elections thrice in a row. As a 
strategy to win election the then Finance Minister Jaswant Singh was asked to 
consolidate the 'Feel Good Factor' and 'India Shinning' by presenting a budget 
that would boast the economy. This over-confident attitude amounted to sheer 
arrogance, retrospectively appeared as one of the reasons for the BJP's defeat. The 
BJP gained 138 seats out of 354 and the Congress won 145 out of 414 seats 
contested during 2004 General Elections. 
The 2004 General Elections were held without the shadow of major 
national crisis. It was thus difficult to unleash the energies of Hindutva. Ayodhya 
issue could have mobilized the Hindutva Politics but the BJP was silent because it 
was their government which was in power at centre for five years and what they 
had done to resolve it, could have become a difficult question to answer. 
The BJP had lost because of its neglecting the Hindutva agenda. None of 
the Hindutva themes - including the building of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya were a 
key issue throughout the (2004) General Elections campaign. The defeat of the BJP 
candidates in the constituencies such as Ayodhya, Varanasi and Mathura reflected 
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the diminishing influence of Hindu Nationalism over the voters. In the 2004 
General Elections the defeat of BJP was considered by most constituents of the 
Sangh Parivar to be a rejection by the moderate line of conduct advocated by Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee. That is why the RSS wanted the BJP to return to a Hindutva led 
programme in order to capture expectations of the people. 
Moreover the Godhra (Gujarat) riots in February 2002 were one of the 
worst communal holocaust in which more than thousand had died and lakhs were 
rendered homeless due to looting and burning of properties. The Muslim 
community was the worst sufferer in those riots. The Godhra riots were also one of 
the reasons for debacle of Vajpayee government in 2004 General Elections. 
The main reason attributed by the BJP for its defeat was its failure to 
implement fully the Hindutva agenda. It lost primarily due to its ignorance to the 
interests of the Hindus by marginalizing the Ramjanambhoomi Movement. Among 
the several issues of policy and governance that agitated the electorates too were of 
critical significance. First, the communalization of the state and society that was 
witnessed during the tenure of the NDA government; (Godhra riots, Saraswati 
Vandana which was made compulsory in government run schools and the 
saffronisation of textbooks by HRD Ministry). Second, the NDA rule witnessed an 
unprecedented surrender of the Indian economy in the interests of the multinational 
capital. Therefore, the nature of the campaign was so designed as to by pass these 
crucial issues and to focus on the unreal and uncritical issues. Thus slogans such as 
'India Shining' and 'Feel Good Factor' were invented with which it was hoped that 
both would arouse the patriotic pride of the people. But the life of the common 
man was not shining any where, nor did he had anything to feel good about. 
In the 2004 General Elections, the Congress and its allies bagged 216 seats, 
BJP and its allies had 187 seats. The support of 61 members of the Leftist Parties 
brought Congress to the desirable majority. The Congress party with the help of its 
coalition partners formed National Progressive Alliance. 
After the 2004 General Elections it was realized that the Hindutva ideology 
was thoroughly discredited and no amount of efforts could revive it. The people 
felt cheated by the promises made by the Sangh Parivar and the BJP regarding the 
construction of Ram Temple at Ayodhya. 
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After its debacle in the 2004 General Elections the BJP once again tried to 
catapult the electorates with aggressive Hindutva platform. But the people had 
rejected the party's new emphasis on a return to sectarianism. The people had 
rebuffed the BJP's charge of "minority appeasement' be it the Sachar Report, the 
India-Pakistan Peace Process or the demand for deployment of security forces in 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
The Sachar Committee report was severely criticised by the BJP and its 
constituents because of favourable recommendations made in the report towards 
the Muslim community. 
The Sachar Committee had submitted its report on November 7, 2006. The 
committee found that the Muslims were way behind the national average in most 
of the parameters of social developments, their economic status had been sliding 
seriously, their representation in jobs, bank loans was abysmal and their 
representation in the political process had been very poor and was worsening. In 
sum and substance, Muslim community was under represented in most of the 
arenas of society. The committee had recommended that an "Equal Opportunity 
Commission' should be started, a nomination procedure should be started to ensure 
Muslims participation in F*ublic bodies. It is a matter of conjuncture whether the 
UPA government was really serious about it or was it a mere replay of earlier 
broken promises. The ultimate aim of UPA government is to give the minorities 
their due, so that its position is strengthened for the forthcoming 2009 General 
Elections. 
It is a fact that the power politics in India had diverted its approach towards 
religion and for the last two decades or so, religion has been dominating it in 
various ways. The rise of fundamentalism had become a threat to the democratic 
set up of India. 
The effect of religion on Indian politics has been staggering. The hatred 
that has for so many years put the country in political strife does not seem to be 
declining. The feeling between Hinduism and Islam are just strong as ever. This is 
due to the fact that India has a strong community sense. It is a fact that people with 
a strong community sense do not bother about other communities. Moreover when 
cultural practices of religious communities are given a priority, naturally the 
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authority of religious and community leaders is doubled. They are accorded special 
status and treatment. The people listen to them and submit themselves to their 
ideas. Reasonable and legitimate changes and amendments have to wait for their 
approval and so on. This is the reason why strong community identities have often 
been exploited by political parties in India for mobilizing the members of their 
community to politicise their sentiments and use them in their greed to power. 
From 1980's the politics was overshadowed by friction around religion, 
caste and regional identities. Religion became a key determinant of political 
activities and strong caste based affiliations had become an effective instrument of 
political mobilization. 
After so many years of Independence, the Indian political system has failed 
to create a unified national Indian political identity. The divisive bonds of religion, 
caste, region, language and ethnicity not only have survived but have grown 
stronger. Therefore it was the need of hour that these hindering forces should be 
kept aside for the progress of the country. 
There should be no scope for any compromise on the objective of 
secularism. The Principle of separation of the State from religious influence and 
power should be accepted. The State should stand above religion but it should not 
be anti-religion. For, it is the duty of the State to protect the religious practices and 
places and cultural identities of the majority and the minority communities. Laws 
to prevent the use of religion as a basis for winning political support should be 
enacted. 
Above all, there is a need for the progressive secularization of the Indian 
society. The inculcation and propagation of secularism must be taken seriously by 
the government. A conscious and vigorous efforts should be made to promote a 
rational scientific and modem notion of secularism, as well as the humane values 
of all religions. These must be incorporated in school curricula and public 
education programmes to develop secular temperament and religious tolerance 
among people. 
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